Living for the Caliphate:

Hizbut Tahrir Student Activism in Indonesia

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Contents

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List of Abbreviations

BKLDK	*Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus,* Coordinating Body of University Dakwah Organizations, founded in Bogor in 2006
FOSDA	*Forum Studi dan Dakwah,* Forum for Study and Dakwah, founded in 2004
FSLDK	*Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus,* Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations, founded in 1986
GMNI	*Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia,* Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement, founded 1954
HMI	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam,* Muslim Students' Association, founded in 1947
HMI Dipo	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam,* Dipo refers to the Diponegoro Street in Jakarta where the organization's headquarter is located. Dipo is often used to distinguish this organization from HMI MPO after HMI split in 1986. HMI Dipo accepted the Pancasila as its ideological basis
HMI MPO	*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*, Muslim Students' Association Assembly of the Savers of the Organization, founded in 1986 after this part of HMI rejected to adopt the Pancasila as its basis ideology and kept Islam as its ideological basis
HTI	*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*
ICMI	*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia,* Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals, established in 1990
IMM	*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah,* Muhammadiyah Student Action Unit, founded in 1964
JARIK	*Jaringan Islam Kampus,* Islamic Campus Network, founded in 2006
KAMMI	*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia,* Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit, founded in 1998
LDK	*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus,* University Dakwah Organization
MHTI	*Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia,* the women's branch of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

MUI	*Majelis Ulama Indonesia,* Indonesian Ulema Council, founded in 1975 it is Indonesia's most important Muslim clerical body
NU	*Nahdlatul Ulama,* the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia with over 40 million followers, founded in 1926
PKS	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera,* Prosperous Justice Party founded in 1998
PMII	*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia,* Indonesian Muslim Student Movement, founded in 1960

Chapter I:

Setting the Scene: Introducing Hizbut Tahrir

In May 2009, the book "Dynamics of Islamic Student Movements" *(Nef, 2009b) was launched at a public event held at the renowned Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. As the book's editor, I had over the previous months intensively collaborated with activists from nine different Islamic student organizations. I had selected those organizations that were most visible on the campus of this university. All activists were writing about their visions for a better society, the history of their organization, its structure and agenda. On this hot May afternoon, the publishing house "Resist Book" had invited representatives of the different organizations to discuss their contributions. With more than 150 students present, the room was so full that some students could not get in. It was the first time that activists from these Islamic organizations had gathered to discuss with one another. Despite all of the differences between the organizations, they shared at least one common vision: all wanted to bring Islamic values* (nilai-nilai keIslaman) *back into everyday life, and thus sought to promote the view of Islam as a "blessing to all"* (rahmatan lil 'alamin). *All seemed to agree that worship of God is not restricted to a prayer between class ending and playing football. Rather, it should influence all aspects of everyday life. Yet, what Islamic values are, and how they should influence practice, was the core issue of debate.*

Sitting on stage, Ridho, representative of the Islamic Campus Network, JARIK - a group that strongly promotes democracy, liberalism, and interfaith dialogue - started his speech by greeting the audience in Indonesian "selamat siang" *(good afternoon), rather than with the meanwhile more common Islamic greeting* "assalamu alaikum war rahmatullahi wa barakatuh" *(May the peace, mercy, and blessings of Allah be with you). Stressing the revolutionary spirit of Islam, he made the following statement:* "The truth is that all isms – liberalism, secularism, humanism, were well taught by Muhammad. For example, at the time Islam emerged in the seventh century, women were treated badly, regarded as non-human, to the extent that Umar ibn al-Khattab, before becoming a companion of the Prophet, buried his daughter alive. The Prophet came to eradicate such practices. We

should continue his struggle for a better and fairer world." *Whereas some activists sitting in the audience obviously shared his view and expressed this by applauding, a young woman raised her hand and, when given the word by the moderator, responded:* "What are capitalism, liberalism, pluralism and secularism? As Muslims, we know that these are not part of Islam. So what we have to do is to smash *(menghanjurkan)* these ideologies through one institution, the caliphate *(daulah khilafah)*." *She started her speech with the Islamic greeting and introduced herself as a Hizbut Tahrir activist. Sitting at the back of the room, she stood up and spoke in a firm and determined way. As is typical for Hizbut Tahrir activists, she was dressed in a one-piece dress reaching down to her ankles, and covered her hair and breast with a veil* (jilbab)*.*

After the discussion, a young woman approached me and said, while softly shaking her unveiled head in critique of the Hizbut Tahrir activist's ideology and her outward appearance: "I just can't understand how young women like this activist can come to make such a statement in public. How can you choose to dress in such a way, actually change your whole life as prescribed by the organization and parrot an ideology imported from the Middle East?" *She was not the only one to criticize the statement of this Hizbut Tahrir activist. On campus, the ideology of this organization was severely contested. Yet, at least some ideas promoted by Hizbut Tahrir activists also found approval far beyond its actual membership.*

Meeting a Hizbut Tahrir woman activist a few days later, I asked her how she found the book discussion. It turned out that she too was not very happy about the comment of her Hizbut Tahrir colleague and criticized her for using buzzwords and arguing harshly: "It is good that she spoke up in public, people need to see and hear us, but I think she should have chosen a softer and more refined way to counter this guy's argument. Rather than calling to destroy these other ideologies, she should have stressed the positive side of living in the caliphate, make people dream and long for it. But this is not so easy, you know. Standing up, making good statements, particularly in public, is difficult". *Although she continued to stress that Ridho's understanding of Islam was wrong, she admired his way of relating to the history of Islam, as well as his eloquent and calm way of talking.*

This is a study of the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir and the practices of its educated, middle class adherents on a university campus in Indonesia. It seeks to shed light on an Islamic movement that successfully attracts particularly well-educated people by pairing a rigid textual interpretation of Islam with a critique of neoliberalism and globalization. Yet, despite framing its ideology in an anti-liberal language, these Muslims aim to rationalize faith by reflexively applying knowledge of different provenances to everyday practices in order to optimize their efficiency and success in spreading its ideology. Submission to a strict ideology is reconfigured as an ideal form of piety with the aim of increasing the productivity of its members in a world where knowledge and rationality are held in high esteem.

This study breaks new ground by focusing on the interplay of globalization and religious revival. It argues that the Islamic piety movement, of which Hizbut Tahrir is part, is not a refuge from globalization, nor a way of resisting it (Bayat & Herrera, 2010; Castells, 1997; J. Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000; Esposito, 1992; Göle, 1996; Olivier Roy, 1996). Rather, inspired by the work of Daromir Rudnyckyj (2010), religion is analysed as an integral part of globalization and neoliberalism. In his study on the articulation of development, religion, and globalization, Rudnyckyj examines spiritual trainings aimed at reforming workers at Indonesia's largest steel company Krakatau Steel. Focusing on how religious practices are reconfigured to optimize the efficiency and productivity of employees in an increasingly global economy, Rudnyckyj argues convincingly that globalization and religion are not opposed. Rather, religion can be conducive to globalization.

The activists I worked with often used the terms globalization *(globalisasi)* and neoliberalism *(neoliberalism)* interchangeably. Often they did so to condemn the increasing privatization of goods and services. At times they spoke of both neoliberalism and globalization as a historical epoch, other times as an ideology opposed to both socialism and Islam, and still others to refer, often pejoratively, to Indonesia's increasing connectedness and dependence on the global economy. Generally, neoliberalism was considered the economic doctrine that leads to global capitalism. In contrast to at least some of the circulating definitions and ideas linked to neoliberalism, I use the term – building on Foucault's analysis (2008: 131) – as an analytical category to make reference to a certain form of rationality. I thus understand the term to address the technique as a way of introducing a certain economic rationality of

efficiency, hard work, self-discipline and productivity into spheres that were previously organized according to different logics, such as religion.

In Indonesia, as in other parts of the world, the intensified global circulation of information and capital, along with the increasing transnationalization and privatization of the state, has correlated with an intensification of Islamic ideologies that are highly critical of the current global system. With its central call to resist the democratic system and the capitalist world economy, instead offering what they frame as an Islamic alternative, the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir has been attracting support among well-educated male and female professionals and students since the organization's ideology reached Indonesia in 1982 (Fealy, 2007: 156; Muhtadi, 2009: 629; Osman, 2010: 610). In 2000, the organization became known to the public when it held its first International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta, attended by around five thousand activists (Osman, 2010: 608). In the past decades, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has increased its membership and general support considerably, and by 2007, more than 100'000 people attended the International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta (Muhtadi, 2009: 625).

Compared with the two large-scale Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which together represent more than 75 million of Indonesia's 200 million Muslims (Bush, 2009: 2), Hizbut Tahrir, as an organization, could be seen as rather marginal. Despite its numerical and political marginality in Indonesia, understanding the entanglement of a resurgence of religious sensibility with capitalist reason deserves attention. Far beyond Indonesia, Islamic groups with agendas that bear similarities to the one of Hizbut Tahrir are influential in attracting students and young professionals. As Rudnyckyj argues, this leads not only to a neoliberalization of Islam, but also to the Islamicization of neoliberalism (2010: 22). The fact that the organization is operating legally in Indonesia makes this country an interesting place to study Islam as an integral part of neoliberalism and economic globalization.

Further, despite its comparably small number of official members, the criticism formulated by Hizbut Tahrir activists in regard to the shortcomings of democracy and economic performance has been well received by leaders from various Islamic organizations. Fritz Schulze argues thus that it is not surprising that Din Syamsuddin, the leader of

Muhammadiyah, counting approximately 30 million members in Indonesia, gave a public speech at the large International Caliphate Conference organized by Hizbut Tahrir in 2007 (2008: 39). The movement is not only able to influence discussions beyond its actual membership (Osman, 2010: 617-9), but its strategy of pairing discourses of self discipline, piety and efficiency also inspires the modus operandi of other organizations (Said, 2007). On the campus of the Gadjah Mada University, Hizbut Tahrir could also be regarded as a marginal movement in terms of size. In the academic year 2008-9, only around two hundred of the around 55'000 students were official members of the organization.[1] Yet, in that year, the organization was the most active in terms of organizing various events such as discussions, conferences, workshops, and promoting their ideas in public. This was most likely not because it received more funds than other organizations, but rather because of the high personal commitment of its members.[2] Also, its activists held strategic positions in the student council and in the official University Dakwah Organization. It shaped discussions far beyond the boarders of its own organization.

This research must be situated vis-à-vis the burgeoning literature that argues that "political" Islamic movements involve an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition beyond or outside of the "properly" Islamic sphere it has occupied in the past. In contrast to these studies, it explores the trend of expanding the influence of Islam and calling for the formal implementation of the Sharia in relation to the growing tendency of the nation state to

[1] I do not know the exact number of members for the academic year 2008-9, neither for the previous or following years. The members were secretive about this information. My estimation is based on various hints from both Hizbut Tahrir and non Hizbut Tahrir members, as well as on observations while attending numerous events.

[2] A lot of events organized by members did not require a lot of funds, but rather high personal involvement of individual members. According to members of different Islamic organizations, Hizbut Tahrir was not more active in organizing events due to external funding, but rather because of the strong commitment of the members to the organization's vision. Hizbut Tahrir members claimed that they only receive very limited funds from the organization; yet, I have no reliable information about the budget of the Hizbut Tahrir of the Gadjah Mada University.

extend its power and control into vast domains of the life of its citizens that were previously outside its reach. The call to formally implement Islamic law is thus not analysed against the question of whether this strand of Islam will succeed or whether it even should, but rather as a critical and widely contested response to the modernization endeavours of the nation state.

This study complements the existing literature that deals with what is often referred to as "political" Islam by examining how Hizbut Tahrir's core concepts are debated and popularized in a particular local context: among student activists of the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta. In regard to understanding social movements and their claims, student activism is little studied. Even less studied are Islamic strands of student activism.[3] In the existing studies that focus on the role of the youth in participating in Islamic movements, the young people are often analysed as a strategic target group to ensure the movement's future success. They are also conceptualized as easy to indoctrinate, and not yet fully rational (Bayat & Herrera, 2010: 6). Further, youth participation in Islamic movements is analysed as a response to poverty and unemployment (Herrera, 2010). This study fills the lacunae in the existing research by focusing on young Muslims studying at one of the best universities in the country. They see themselves as privileged within the country and are often children of parents from the middle or even upper middle classes. Rather than analysing these young activists as passive victims of indoctrination, mentally unsettled, or lacking a better alternative to claim their rights and dignity, I focus on their agency in shaping the movement and popularizing its core concepts.

Inspired by Talal Asad's (1986) conceptualization of Islam as a *"discursive tradition"* as developed in his seminal article *"The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam"*, I focus on how student activists relate to the Islamic past in order to cope with challenges faced in the present, and to imagine a better future. Asad makes the argument that authoritative knowledge of what is considered "proper" Islamic conduct is negotiated through reason and argument by referring to different representations of Islamic tradition. He makes this

[3] In the Indonesian context, exceptions are the detailed study about the early history and development of the *tarbiyah* movement conducted by Rifki Rosyad (1995), as well as the studies by Edward Aspinall (1995, 1999, 2005), in which Muslim students also play an important role.

argument against a certain mainstream way of dealing with Islam. By asking the question of what an anthropology of Islam might look like, he criticises authors such as Ernest Gellner and Clifford Geertz for trying to organize the considerable diversity in the beliefs and practices of Muslims along the lines of their social structures, customs or sets of beliefs. According to Asad, Islam is not simply what different Muslims regard themselves as properly Islamic. Rather, in his attempt to conceive an anthropology of Islam, he suggests that one should begin, as Muslims themselves do, from the notion of Islam as a "*discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith"* (Asad, 1986: 14). Asad concludes that if both reason and debate are an integral part of Islam, the anthropologist's task should be not only to describe, but also to analyze the different ways of arguing - as well as the reasons for arguing - that constitute Muslims in different places, at different times.

Following Asad's argument, this study aims to examine the distinctiveness of Hizbut Tahrir activists' style of arguing, dressing, and behaving. In order to do so, I contrast their way of calling for the caliphate and embodying the movement's ideology to other Islamic groups on the campus that promote different understandings of Islam and proper piety. Asad (1986) stresses that knowledge about what is considered "Islamic" is formed continuously through the interaction of people, texts, and practices. He thus stresses the need to contextualize the discourses of adherents in relation to specific strands of Islam in order to promote their particular understanding of piety to others. What conditions enable and structure the students' understanding of "correct" Islamic behaviour needs to be carefully examined. I am thus less interested in how the founder of Hizbut Tahrir Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani argues for the establishment of the caliphate[4], than I am in to what extent this idea becomes relevant to the lives of students, and shapes their perceptions of right and wrong. In order to do so, I examine what role an-Nabhani's, and other local leaders', texts play in the everyday lives of the activists and examine how they are understood, debated, used to make truth claims,

[4] The three central books that discuss the necessity of a caliphate, and outline its structure are *"System of Governance in Islam (Nizhamul Hukmi fil Islam – Sistem Pemerintahan Islam)", "System of the Caliphate (Al Khilafah – Sistem Khilafah)"* and *"The Islamic State (Daulatul Islamiyah – Negara Islam)",* all written by Hizbut Tahrir's founding father Taqiyyudin an-Nabhani in the 1950s and 60s.

and related to everyday life. The content of the founding texts is thus not discussed in isolation. Rather it is examined how Hizbut Tahrir activists relate to these texts and aim to change their lives according to the organization's ideology – how they strive to live for the caliphate.

Young Muslims refer in different ways to the Islamic discursive tradition and relate it to secular knowledge in different ways. In this dissertation, I do not analyse Hizbut Tahrir activists as less modern than the JARIK activists, for example. Within Indonesian Islam, different representations and convictions of what it means to live a pious life coexist and are used to contest one another. This study thus makes a contribution to the ongoing theoretical debates in several disciplines on multiple modernities. Hizbut Tahrir activists often frame their ideology as an alternative path to development and thus to modernity. Their ambition to bypass the nation state in order to establish an Islamic alternative is not analysed in this study as anti- or pre- modern. Although the activists conceptualize their vision of modernity as opposed to western modernity, their way of arguing is influenced by capitalist values that also structure discourses on western modernity. Thus, analysing their vision of a better world as distinct from western modernity hinders to understand the entanglements between the two visions of modernity.

Anthropologists studying the pluralisation of modernities, or the vernacularisation of modernity (Knauft, 2002) often emphasize the creative and selective appropriations of aspects of western modernity in colonial and post-colonial contexts and the varied outcomes these produce. Current social science debates on modernity are primarily concerned with exploring differences in the paths and patterns of modernization *between* – rather than *within* - societies or civilisations. Eisenstadt (2000), for example, distinguishes between multiple modernities at the level of civilisations, each with its own specific cultural values and institutional arrangements. His emphasis on distinct yet parallel linear trajectories of modernity, however, neglects past and present exchanges and interactions between western and non-western societies, albeit under asymmetrical relations of power. Calling for a focus on configurations of modernity within one society by examining everyday practices, Shalini Randeria argues that the path and patterns of modernity in different regions of the world are inextricably interwoven historically. Even within one society, she

argues, various ideas, institutional structures and values - all modern but differently modern - can co-exist and be used in order to contest one another. She thus speaks of entangled modernities, not only *between* western societies and those outside the west, but also *within* a society (Randeria, 1999, 2002, 2004).

In the post New Order era, positive value is attributed to certain types of eclecticism and experiential religiosity (Howell, 2007: 220). Currently, we observe a variety of different configurations of modernity within Indonesia. The increasing flow of information, ideas, peoples and goods, has not led to a uniform national modernity – religious or secular. Neither have the persisting legacies of the authoritarian New Order regime. Rather, increasing globalization and political liberalization have led to a plethora of, at times, competing imaginaries of modernity. In regard to the relation between Islam and modernity, Aziz al-Azmeh (1993) has stressed that we must recognize that Islam is comprised of many realities, and that they are all modern, but in different ways. Assuming that one strand of Islam is more modern reflects an orientalist perspective of the researcher, rather than reality. Taking his claim seriously that modernity is not opposed to Islam, I am interested in the question of how modernities are entangled. In this study, modernity is not understood as a historical period, but rather – similar to neoliberalism – as a term that refers to a particular way of reasoning and organizing conduct. This perspective seems to reflect an understanding of modernity that many activists with whom I worked held. The notion of "modern" was associated with a specific type of rationality, education, work ethic and attention to what is going on in the world. Yet, in contrast to being labelled neoliberal, being referred to as "modern" *(modern)* was regarded as positive.

Hizbut Tahrir: From Jerusalem to Indonesia

The Islamic scholar Taqiyyudin an-Nabhani (1909–1977) founded Hizbut Tahrir *(Party of Liberation)*[5] in Jerusalem in 1953 (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 7). The organization is currently active

[5] Hizbut Tahrir calls itself a party *(hizb)*, and at times even a political party. The founder of the organization, an-Nabhani, saw it as the religious obligation *(fard)* of Muslims to establish an Islamic party in order to construct

in over forty-five countries in Western Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, South-East Asia as well as in the United States and Australia (Osman, 2010: 601). Its logistical headquarter is said to be located in London (Karagiannis, 2010: 1). The organization is banned in several parts of the globe for different reasons. The major factors for outlawing the organization are its aim in seeking to overthrow existing regimes, its assumed affiliation to terrorist groups and its anti-Semitic rhetoric (Mayer, 2004). However, in Indonesia, the country with the largest population of Muslims in the world, the organization is allowed to operate legally, and benefits from the increasingly liberal democratic climate since the late 1990s. Hizbut Tahrir stresses its own non-violence.

In the years after founding Hizbut Tahrir, an-Nabhani developed an ideology *(mabda')* that he deemed applicable to the everyday life of Muslims. This ideology is still considered by the organization's members to offer solutions to individual problems as well as guidelines for regulating and ordering societal and public affairs. According to an-Nabhani, Islam provided a complete blueprint for a distinctively Islamic government, whose form was divinely prescribed in the Qur'an, and in the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad *(Hadith).* As such, he considered it self-evident that the state *(dawla)* is an intrinsic part of religion *(din) (din wa dawla)* (an-Nabhani, 2002). Hizbut Tahrir activists claim that no distinction can be made between politics and Islam. In his writings, he framed Islam as an alternative to socialism and capitalism. He considered both of these ideologies as secular and incompatible with Islam. Further, he argued that they have failed in practice, and are responsible for the decline of the Muslim world (an-Nabhani, 2000).

An increasing body of scholarship has emerged in Europe, America, Australia and also Indonesia in recent years, which seeks to understand Hizbut Tahrir. Scholarship on this particular strand of Islam has had two major foci. On the one hand it examines whether, or under what circumstances, the organization could become a security threat for the country in which it is active, or for other countries around the world (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009; Baran, 2004a, 2004b, 2005; Cohen, 2003; International Crisis Group, 2003; Karagiannis, 2010;

an Islamic state. He states that Muhammad Himself called his group a party. For a detailed discussion of the term, see Taji-Farouki (1996: 84-5). As Hizbut Tahrir is, however, not involved in party politics, I will use the term organization.

Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006; Ward, 2009). Often this literature is closely linked to the policy question of how various governments in countries where the organization is active should deal with it. Related to this line of inquiry is the second most dominant strand of scholarship that examines the reasons for the success of Hizbut Tahrir (Ali, 2006; Fealy, 2007; Karagiannis, 2010; Muhtadi, 2009; Osman, 2010).

Extant studies on Hizbut Tahrir vary in the methodology used to investigate the organization, in the central questions they examine, as well as in terms of their geographical focus. Among the primary studies supporting the view that Hizbut Tahrir presents a security threat is the oft-cited report written by Ariel Cohen (2003), a researcher at the conservative Washington-based think-tank, The Heritage Foundation[6]. He suggests that Hizbut Tahrir is a danger to U.S. interests in Central Asia, and he also sees it as a potentially dangerous terrorist organization. He links Hizbut Tahrir to al-Qaeda and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and argues that Hizbut Tahrir, with its clandestine and radical agenda, threatens the United States' national security and its access to important military bases in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Hizbut Tahrir is considered an obstacle in the United States' endeavour to spread democracy, and promote market reforms that would ensure its access to natural resources (Cohen, 2003: 1). Concluding that the organization poses a severe threat to the world's stability, as it seeks to overthrow existing regimes, it is not surprising that he suggests that the United States should expand its reconnaissance work on the organization in different countries, including Indonesia (ibid.: 7).

Zeyno Baran also works for a conservative Washington-based think-tank, the Nixon Centre. Baran's (2004a, 2004b, 2005) studies on Hizbut Tahrir have also suggested that the organization is a security risk, and though she does not see it as a terrorist group itself, she believes it is a *"conveyor belt for terrorists"* (Baran, 2005: 68). She argues that this organization is successful in winning the hearts of Muslims by propagating anti-American and anti-Semitic sentiments. She believes that it is only a small step from being a member of Hizbut Tahrir to becoming active in a more radical movement, and capable of committing

[6] This foundation formulates conservative public policies and promotes free enterprise and a strong national defense. For a detailed portrait of "The Heritage Foundation" see its webpage http://www.heritage.org/ (4 July 2012).

terrorist acts. Further, Hizbut Tahrir aims to destroy *"America's most pioneering ideological principles: democracy and capitalism"* (Baran, 2004a: 130). Framing the movements' success as a local response to poor socio-economic conditions, she argues that America should help improve the economies of the countries in which Hizbut Tahrir is gaining support (ibid.: 134). Further, suggesting that Hizbut Tahrir activists poorly understand Americas foreign policy, and the advantages of democracy and capitalism, she stresses that American politicians should travel frequently to countries where the movement is active in order to explain their agenda to Muslims and convince them of its benefit to all Muslims (idid.: 131).
A recent study conducted by the London-based think-tank promoting human rights, tolerance and greater cohesion, the "Centre for Social Cohesion", tries to show that Hizbut Tahrir *"ideologically legitimizes acts of terrorism"* (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009: 5), and proposes measures to the UK government on how to reduce Hizbut Tahrir's public legitimacy. The authors of the study believe that the organization encourages civic intolerance (ibid: 5).
The question of whether Hizbut Tahrir presents a security threat and how local governments should respond to its existence is also central to the studies of Karagiannis and Mc Cauley (2006), Karagiannis (2010), Mayer (2004), and Ward (2009), as well as to the Report of the International Crisis Group (2003). This strand of scholarship looks at the question at hand more critically and emphasizes that Hizbut Tahrir ideologically opposes violence. For example, Mayer (2004) focuses on the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir, and concludes that most Hizbut Tahrir members will most likely continue to embrace non-violent methods. He bases his study on a careful analysis of both Hizbut Tahrir publications as well as on extant scholarly research.
Karagiannis and McCauley draw on extensive field research in Central Asia, and seek to explain why Hizbut Tahrir opposes violence, whereas the other important radical Islamic group in the region, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, embraces violence under the same circumstances. In their study, they examine the different scenarios in which Hizbut Tahrir could possibly turn to violence. In his monograph, Karagiannis analyses Hizbut Tahrir by employing social movement theory. He argues that since the collapse of the USSR, an ideological vacuum has emerged in Central Asia that has allowed Hizbut Tahrir to grow rapidly. He frames the success of Hizbut Tahrir mainly as a response to the people's

dissatisfaction with the economical situation, as well as a response to the spiritual vacuum that emerged after the collapse of socialism in the region. He proceeds by discussing if and how the organization might move to violence and concludes by putting forward policy recommendations for western, and regional policy makers. These recommendations state that the governments of Central Asian countries should grant the movement more space to express its views in public.

The report of the International Crisis Group, an international, non-profit, non-governmental organization founded with the aim of preventing conflicts around the world, also focuses on Hizbut Tahrir's activism in Central Asia, and stresses its opposition to violence as a form of political struggle. They strongly recommend the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan not to ban the organization, but to allow it freedom of expression (International Crisis Group, 2003). As with Karagiannis and McCauley's article, and Karagiannis' monograph, this report was based on intensive field and literature research.

As to the question of security and stability, Ward focuses his study on Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia and notes that the organization strictly opposes violence and terrorism. In his study, he examines the question of how likely it is that Hizbut Tahrir will succeed in gaining power, and establishing the caliphate. He concludes that this could be many years away (Ward, 2009: 162). These authors do not address a predominantly academic readership, but more so government officials, policy circles and decision makers. Exceptions might be the studies by Ward, Kargiannis and Mc Cauley that address a more academic public, but not exclusively so.

The monograph by Suha Taji-Farouki (1996), a lecturer in Islamic studies at the University of Exeter, could arguably be seen as the most detailed study about the early history of Hizbut Tahrir; its ideological demands, its recruitment strategies as well as its envisaged methods to gain power in different middle eastern countries in order to establish the caliphate. Farouki shows that the term "caliphate", which has become the hallmark of Hizbut Tahrir, is imagined by an-Nabhani as a divinely prescribed, complete and detailed system of governance. Although an-Nabhani aims for a rehabilitation of the Ottoman Empire in its Islamic dimensions, Farouki argues that he wrenched the institutions and practices of the historical caliphate out of their proper context and instead proposed a timeless model of

universal relevance as opposed to a rehabilitation of a model of governance that had existed in the past. This study is based on the detailed analysis of a large variety of publically accessible, as well as internal, Hizbut Tahrir documents. Her study is valuable for a historical contextualization of the demands made by the founder of Hizbut Tahrir, an-Nabhani, and outlines the basic ideas of the movement in a comprehensive manner.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Research

As I will discuss in the following section, Hizbut Tahrir's ideas reached Indonesia in the early 1980s, and Yogyakarta in the early 1990s. Inside the country, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia had already received attention from local scholars before the first studies in English were published. In 2004, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (2004) wrote a chapter about Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in their book entitled *"Radical Salafi Movements in Indonesia"*. In this book, the authors examine different groups that have been shaping Indonesian Islam in recent years. Besides containing a chapter about Hizbut Tahrir, the book covers other organizations they label as "radical", such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Laskar Jihad and Front Pembela Islam. Although the authors' decision to lump these groups together under the label of "radical salafism" may be criticised, the chapter about Hizbut Tahrir provides the reader with an overview about the core ideas of the movement, its history, its mobilization strategies and its visions for a better future. The authors primarily base their account on interviews conducted with Ismail Yusanto, the spokesman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Yusanto's ideas and his way of public self-representation are passed on to the readers often in direct quotes. The authors' aim seems to be to provide an objective introduction to the movement. They seem to address an audience interested in learning more about the organization, without linking it to terrorism. They do not provide political recommendations about how the Indonesian state should deal with the group. Only in the conclusion do the authors raise the question about whether the "radical" ideas – as they label them – will become accepted in Indonesia. They do not give their own opinion, but state that time will reveal the answer.

Another important early study about Hizbut Tahrir was conducted by the Indonesia scholar Imdadun M. Rahmat (2005). As with Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, his main aim seems to be to familiarize the readership with the history, the core concepts, and mobilization strategies of the movement. In his book, he attempts to systematically compare Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia with other movements he labels radical, namely the *tarbiyah* movement, inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and with the Salafi movement. His main focus seems to be to outline the similarities and differences between the three movements. He bases his research on interviews with Ismail Yusanto, Muhammad Musthofa (the son Abdullah bin Nuh, both central figures in promoting the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia) and Nuim Hidayat (a former Hizbut Tahrir activist). Further, he cites official party publications. As the title of his book suggests *"New Directions in Radial Islam"*, he points to the fact that Hizbut Tahrir, as well as the other groups that are influenced by ideologies originating from the Middle East, change the religious landscape in Indonesia. What he deems particularly new about Hizbut Tahrir is the organization's rigid discipline that it demands of its members, for example in constantly criticizing and publically challenging the opinions of others in various forms, including public discussions, publications, trainings, or public speeches. It is this focus on self-discipline paired with a sophisticated strategy to work effectively towards a specific goal, the establishment of the caliphate, that, according to Rahmat, distinguishes Hizbut Tahrir from other Islamic movements active in Indonesia (2005: 113ff.).

About Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia, the most insightful studies in English were conducted by Fealy (2007), Muhtadi (2009), Osman (2010), and Ward (2009). The Australian political scientist, Greg Fealy published the first study about the organization in 2007. Fealy's study is based not only on both secondary and Hizbut Tahrir's own literature, but also on interviews conducted with high-ranking members of the organization, such as Muhammad al-Khaththath (Former Chairman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and Secretary-General of the Muslim Community Forum (FUI)), Ismail Yusanto (spokesman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), and Ahmad al-Junaidi (member of Hizbut Tahrir's Central Executive Committee) (Fealy, 2007: 215). In Fealy's view, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia deserves scholarly attention despite the fact that it is still a relatively small movement. Particularly interesting about this

organization is, according to him, that it not only draws inspiration from the Middle East, but that it is directed by a foreign leadership with a transnational agenda that transcends national boundaries. Yet, Fealy does not study the particular appeal of this transnational vision in depth, or its political appeal to grassroots activists.

Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman's study (2010) of the mobilization strategies of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is currently the most comprehensive and detailed analysis of the general outlook of the organization, its structure, core ideas, and mobilization strategies. Osman's study is influenced by social movement theory, and in particular by the work of Wiktorowicz (2004).[7] The main question he poses in his article is how Hizbut Tahrir activists seek to revive the caliphate and mobilize masses. It is based foremost on interviews with high-ranking male members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, such as Muhammad al-Khaththath, Hafidz Abdurrahman (also a former Chairman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Agung Wisnuwardana (a Central Committee member of Hizbut Tahrir in charge of youth affairs), and Ismail Yusanto. Further, Osman has attended a number of events where high-ranking members delivered speeches. Besides the interviews with members of the Indonesian chapter of the organization, he also conducted interviews with high-ranking members of other local chapters of Hizbut Tahrir, such as with Dr. Sharifuddin Md Zain, the leader of Hizbut Tahrir Malaysia.

Osman's study provides interesting insights into how the aforementioned Hizbut Tahrir leaders conceptualize and plan to revive the caliphate, as well as in what they currently do to change the *"fikrah"* - the mindset of the masses, in order to justify a need for the re-establishment of the caliphate. Osman outlines how the organization's leaders seek to

[7] Aside from Wiktorowicz (2001, 2004), a growing number of scholars have linked insights from social movement theory to analyzing Islamic movements (Bayat, 2005; Hafez, 2003; Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006; Kurzman, 1996; Meijer, 2005; Munson, 2001; Wickham, 2002). These authors mainly deal with issues such as resource and mobilization strategies, framing processes and opportunity and constraint structures that favor or hinder the success of a specific movement. In contrast to my study, the mentioned authors tend to focus on the macro structure of movements and largely neglect the perspectives of individuals in their personal endeavors to popularize the movement's ideology in their specific context. Further, the activists' efforts to work on themselves to embody a understanding of Islam are largely omitted.

spread the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. He discusses official publications - such as the weekly pamphlet Al-Islam, and the monthly journal Al-Wai'e, designed for a more intellectual public. Oman also mentions that Hizbut Tahrir is eager to use the Internet to disseminate its ideas. He also discusses the importance of public talks, demonstrations and the strategy of infiltrating mosques. Especially interesting is the discussion of Hizbut Tahrir's concept of *nusrah*, the organization's strategy to build a network of assistance for successfully establishing the caliphate in the future in order to gain power. Whereas his focus on the male elite of the organization provides interesting and previously unpublished details about Hizbut Tahrir, the discussion of how the vision of these middle-aged men is "implemented" on the ground remains under researched.

In their research, Burhanuddin Muhtadi and Ken Ward focus on the question of how and in what aspects the organization influences the current political climate of the country. In his literature-based analysis, Muhtadi (2009) suggests that the organization has influenced democratic consolidation in Indonesia in a negative way. He explains the success of Hizbut Tahrir in recent years mainly as a consequence of public dissatisfaction with the government. Ward (2009), basing his insights mostly on Hizbut Tahrir publications, sees its success, and the mode of political governance for which it is calling, primarily as a profound critique of the status quo. He focuses on the question of how likely it is that Hizbut Tahrir will succeed in gaining power and establishing the caliphate, concluding that this could be many years away.

None of these studies focus on the everyday practices and subjectivities of ordinary young members of Hizbut Tahrir. The discussed authors tend to follow Hizbut Tahrir activists own narrative of framing its ideology in opposition to capitalism. Analysing its Islamic ideology and economic globalization as two separate domains hinders their ability to analyse how a specific economic logic constitutes everyday practices of Hizbut Tahrir activists and their ways of popularizing the movement's ideology among peers. Further, although Osman notes that women play an important role within the organization, the extant studies do not focus on how they participate and shape the organization, its image in public, its functioning and strategies of persuasion. Surprisingly, despite the large presence of women members, no interviews seem to have been conducted with them by any of the scholars working on

the subject. Although male scholars conducted all the discussed studies about Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, I assume that by respecting the wishes of women members in regard to where to meet and accepting the company of other members, it would have been possible to include their opinions and viewpoints. Hence the voices of Hizbut Tahrir women adherents remain unheard. Generally speaking, in the extant studies, women students seem to be perceived as a rather passive group that is targeted to participate in the struggle for the caliphate, rather than as a group actively shaping and driving the organization's activities. With my analysis of Hizbut Tahrir's student activities and women in particular, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the appeal of this organization within the twenty first century.

The Polyvocal Call to Piety

As hinted at in the prologue at the beginning of this chapter, it is a polyvocal call to piety that is audible on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University in the city of Yogyakarta in the first decade of the new millennium. For example, activists from different Islamic organizations active on the campus founded the "Islamic Campus Network" *(Jaringan Islam Kampus – JARIK)* in 2006 to counter what they said was a growing tendency towards "radical" *(Islam radikal*) or "fundamentalist" *(Islam fundamentalis)* Islam. Their aim was to offer an alternative to the teachings of these groups and promote a different, and in their view, a more "moderate"*(moderat)* and "progressive" *(progresif)* understanding of Islam. [8] In 2009, this network was active in fourteen other cities other than Yogyakarta. Besides promoting human rights, freedom of religion, and democracy, the students active in this network called for secularization *(sekularisasi)* (Ridho & Attar, 2009). They demanded that the state grant religious freedom, but that religion and politics are separate. In their view,

[8] This account is also based on different interviews and discussions conducted with Subkhi Ridho and Niccolo Attar in Yogyakarta in 2008, 2009 and 2011. In 2009, Niccolo was JARIK's coordinator for public campaigns and education in Yogyakarta, and was simultaneously a member of HMI Dipo of the Gadjah Mada University. In the same year, Ridho was head of JARIK Yogyakarta, while also being active in the Yogyakarta Alliance for a Peaceful Indonesia (AJI Damai), and in the Network of Young Intellectuals of Muhammadiyah (JIMM).

religion belongs to the private sphere *(ruang privat)* (LSAF, 2006: 95). However, this does not mean that it should not influence the public sphere. What the activists of JARIK opposed is that a particular understanding of Islam should become dominant. No movement should be able to impose its truth claims on others; therefore they object to the formal implementation of Islamic law. Yet, if the activists argue for secularism, human rights or democracy, they relate their arguments to the founding texts of the Qur'an and Hadith. Religion and politics are thus not considered as separate in the sense that no religious arguments should be used to legitimize or delegitimize public decisions that have an impact on the lives of all citizens.

In the twenty first century, Islam continues to shape the everyday lives of an increasing number of Muslims worldwide. In Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world with over 200 million[9] Muslims, Islam inspires daily practices, perceptions of the surrounding world, and moral values. Especially since the 1990s, Islam in Indonesia has become increasingly visible to the public; simultaneously as individualization and an increasing differentiation within Islam has taken place. Examples of the increase of public representations of Islam are the increasing popularity of veils *(jilbab),* the growing numbers of mosques and prayer houses, the increasing usage of Islamic greetings, the more common sight of Muslims excusing themselves for daily prayers, the appearance of new forms of Islamic student activism on university campuses or the increasing number of Islamic media such as books, films, music and magazines, as well as Islamic banks and clothing stores. Although Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and even Confucianism are recognized as official religions, Islam is dominant and omnipresent in most parts of the archipelago. Indonesia is a multi-confessional state, not a secular and not an Islamic state (Hidayah, 2008: 1). I prefer the term multi-confessional to non-confessional because the state is based on religious fundamentals and explicitly limits the choices of accepted

[9] According to the 2010 Indonesian Population Census, Indonesia counts 237 million inhabitants of whom 86 percent identify as Muslims. More detailed information about the current demographic developments can be found on the webpage of the national Department of Statistics *(Badan Pusat Statistik)* http://www.bps.go.id/ (3.11.2011). For a mapping of the world's Muslim Population see also Miller (Ed.) 2009, http://pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx (3 November 2011).

confessions. The "Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence" or "Belief in the one and only God" *(Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa)* is the first principle of the country's national ideology, the Pancasila.[10] Religion and politics are entangled in myriad ways, so that for Indonesian citizens there is hardly any space for identity formation "outside religion".

Indonesia has a relatively young population with a median age of 28, compared to that of most European countries, which is over forty.[11] The majority of Indonesia's youth live in urban areas (Hull, 2001).[12] Seeking to understand how young people in an urban setting relate to religion and navigate their way in the age of mobile phones, Twitter, and Facebook, between often disjunctive global and local religious and secular influences, seems important.[13] In Indonesian society, an important role is assigned to young people in general for demographic reasons, but especially to students, as they are the country's future elite. Yet, ethnographic studies focusing on how young educated Muslims navigate their way through the manifold influences of religion and neoliberalism in an increasingly connected world where a large number of options exist remain scarce. In recent years, particularly since September 11, 2001, young Muslims have been increasingly analyzed as potential agents of change and hopes for a better future. But they have also been identified as a "disruptive" or deviant group, receptive to "radicalism", and thus constituting a stability risk, though without carefully examining their everyday practices (Bayat & Herrera, 2010: 3). As Soares and Osella argue, it is the focus on what they call *everyday politics* or *micropolitics*

[10] The Indonesian anthropologist Sita Hidayah (2008) argues that the translation of the first principle as "Recognition of the Divine Omnipotence" is more accurate than the official translation.

[11] http://world.bymap.org/MedianAge.html (2 November 2011)

[12] For detailed demographic data on age stratification of the Indonesian society see the results of the 2010 population census, accessible on the webpage of the central bureau of statistics *Badan Pusat Statistik* http://dds.bps.go.id/eng/index.php (2 November 2011).

[13] In January 2011, Indonesia was the world's second-largest market for Facebook and the third largest for Twitter, although fewer than twenty percent of the 230 million Indonesians are connected to the Internet (The Economist, January 8th 2011, p. 58), for the online version see http://www.economist.com/node/17853348 (18 January 2011).

(2009: 1) that can help to shed light on linkages between politics, economics, family, and consumption. The question at stake is how to be a good Muslim in contemporary society. Giddens notes that there is no way not to choose; one has only the choice to adapt, reject or assimilate – and there is no neutral choice (1991: 80). At times seemingly small decisions are, as Giddens argues, not only about *"how to act but who to be"* (1991: 81). What to wear, what music to listen to, whom to meet or not to meet with late at night, how to move, what language to use, where to spend leisure time, and many more seemingly ordinary choices that one makes every day to inform a particular self-identity and influence how one is seen by others (Giddens, 1991: 83; Goffman, 1959: 26). In our increasingly globalized world, where goods, images and ideas travel rapidly across borders, young people face an enormous wealth of options to choose from.

Young urban Muslims in particular have manifold options as to how they may live their religion in everyday life and participate in representing Islam to the public. The assemblage of what may be regarded as "Islamic" has proliferated and traditional authorities have crumbled, and with that the cleavages between different strands of Indonesian Islam are becoming increasingly blurred. How is public Islam negotiated in a time that seems to be characterised by selective borrowing from religious and secular sources of various provenances? Different anthropologists working on processes of transnationalism such as Appadurai (1996), Hannerz (1996), and Eriksen (2003) have pointed to the important role of communication technologies in a globalized world. Especially Appadurai (1996) and Liechty (1995), but also Bucholtz (2002) and Thornton (1996), researching youth culture, have argued that young people are especially affine to new media and communication technologies. Further, these scholars outline how especially the young, educated middle class are the major target group of global media products, who also constitute the main user group. In the case of Indonesia, Slama's study (2010) examining the habit of Internet chatting among students in Yogyakarta, confirms the link between youth and high media affinity.

Walking around the campus of the Gadjah Mada University in 2011, it is remarkable to see how almost all students come to campus with their laptop or notebook, and, of course, their mobile phones. Yet, as I argue foremost in chapter three and seven, the access to a wide

range of information does not, in most cases, lead Hizbut Tahrir activists to revise their truth claims or question their ideology. Rather, information from different sources is used to frame their own ideas and convincingly promote them. Knowledge about different topics is thus an important part of being a Hizbut Tahrir activist and efficiently pursuing the organization's goal to change the mindset of the masses and seize power to establish the caliphate. Although all students have access to similar information, the diversity of representations and practices in the everyday lives of Muslim students of the Gadjah Mada University is striking.

Being Young in a Globalized World

The spectrum of choices in how to live as a young Muslim has proliferated due to a more liberal political climate, and due to the intensified flow of ideas, goods, money and information. Yet, distinguished scholars on Indonesian Islam point to the fact that ideas and goods from outside the archipelago have always influenced Indonesian Islam in manifold ways. The book *"Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Durée*" edited by Eric Tagliacozzo (2009), provides a profound analysis of the movement of political, religious, economic and educational ideas between Southeast Asia and the Middle East for over seven centuries. In thirteen chapters, the contributors focus on a broad spectrum of questions regarding the ties between Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The main conclusions are that the movement of ideas affected not only the Indonesian archipelago, but also the Middle East. The edited volume by Michael Feener and Terenjit Sevea (2009) explores the connections between South and Southeast Asia and aims to question the Middle East as a normative point of orientation for shaping Islam around the Indian ocean. The authors contributing to this volume stress the patterns of interaction not only of these two regions with the Middle East, but also that from the medieval to the contemporary periods South and Southeast Asia have maintained a complex relationship. As in the volume of Tagliacozzo, also the contributors to this volume stress the fact that long

before the 20th century Islam developed in different regions of the world in interaction with influences of various provenances.

The study of historian Antony Reid (1988) about commerce between 1450 – 1680 also outlines, with much analytical rigour, how not only goods, but also ideas and people were constantly on the move. He starts his book with a sentence that remains relevant – maybe more than ever before: *"The history of man is a seamless web"* (ibid.: xiii). In regard to analysing movements such as Hizbut Tahrir that frame their ideology as being imported from the Middle East, and as new within the Indonesian context, one should keep in mind that the fact that ideas are spread to different places is not a recent phenomenon. Yet, the question of what is specific to Hizbut Tahrir's narrative of stressing its transnationalism deserves attention. As the aforementioned authors have convincingly argued, the influence of globalization is not unidirectional. The ideas of Hizbut Tahrir were not simply transplanted to Indonesia. Analysing them – as some activists on the campus do – as a form of cultural imperialism in religious guise from the Middle East hinders one's ability to see how both practices and the message of the movement are reconfigured within the country.

Although the flow of ideas, people, and goods is far from new, these global connections between Muslims living in different parts of the world have reached new dimensions. In particular, the transfer of information via the Internet has opened up new possibilities to connect with like-minded people and exchange ideas and images quickly. The increasingly liberal political climate after the fall of Suharto's new Order regime in May 1998 has also allowed previously unimaginable political freedom. This being the case, Michael Feener, an expert on Islamic law in the age of globalization, argues that Indonesian Islam is not only an important subject of study for obvious demographic reasons, but also because it is particularly dynamic and vibrant and thus provides important insights into how modern Muslim societies develop around the world (2007: xviii). In his argumentation, Islam in Indonesia is particularly heterogeneous because a wide variety of texts are easily accessible and legally debated in the country. Given that Islam is so highly visible in Indonesia, different strands of Islam have emerged in a context within which Muslims are eager to compare, contest or promote various understandings of Islam.

The picture Ricklefs, one of the experts of Islam in Indonesia, draws about the dynamics of Islam in Java is *"one of much complexity, confused and confusing, for that is the reality on the ground"* (2008: 133). What seems to be true for Java is also true for the campus of the Gajdah Mada University. The dynamic and vibrant climate of Indonesian Islam, that both Ricklefs and Feener are referring to, is found in its most concentrated form on the campuses of the best Indonesian universities, such as at the Gadjah Mada University *(Universitas Gadjah Mada - UGM)* located in Yogyakarta, the Bandung Institute of Technology *(Institut Teknologi Bandung – ITB),* or the University of Indonesia *(Universitas Indonesia – UI)* in Jakarta. Students at these institutions are likely to come from the middle or upper middle classes. The spectrum of Islamic student groups promoting different understandings of what it means to live as a good Muslim, and which hold different visions of how to change society, is larger at these national universities than at Islamic universities (Gazali, 2008). Especially those organizations calling for the establishment of an Islamic state are stronger in non-Islamic universities.[14] The Indonesian Islamic activist and student of the Gadjah Mada University, Hatim Gazali (2008) explains this fact by arguing that those activists who study at an Islamic university have a more profound education in Islam that prevents them from falling prey to the truth claims made by "radical" organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir. His line of argumentation is widespread particularly among those Muslims who oppose the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir and stress their own profound education in Islam. Yet, although it is the case that many Hizbut Tahrir activists have not studied in Islamic boarding schools, nor have they mastered Arabic as much as activists who classify themselves as "progressive" and "moderate" have, I suggest that this educational background is not the only or main reason for explaining why students of Islamic universities are less eager to join an organization like Hizbut Tahrir. Rather, a main reason for this difference - that might seem counterintuitive -

[14] I do not refer to these universities as secular universities, but as multi-confessional universities. They are not secular as the formation of pious citizens ranks as one of the top priorities of the Gadjah Mada University. On its official webpage the first mentioned point in its "orientation" is to "generate graduates who are capable, religious, and pious". http://www.ugm.ac.id/en/?q=content/orientation (3 November 2011). So in this sense the university might be called multi-confessional, in the same way that the Indonesian state is a multi-confessional state.

might be the different types of rationality and reasoning cultivated at the different universities. The spirit of academic excellence, hard work, productivity, efficiency and scholarly rigour extensively cultivated at the Gadjah Mada University might be more in line with the core values of Hizbut Tahrir than the rationality that is cultivated at an Islamic university which might – at least in some cases – be less modelled on the principles of a capitalist market logic.

Yet, it would be too simple to reduce the existing complexity on the campus into two opposing groups, as I do in this chapter's prologue – one "moderate", "liberal" or "progressive" on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a "radical", "conservative" or "extremist" one. Reality is more complex. Enhancing such a dichotomised view is prohibitive to an examination of the complex dynamics and interplays. Although with the data I have I could support a widely acknowledged argument that a strand of Islam is gaining strength, which, in Ricklefs words, is considered to be, *"puritan, inflexible, anti-feminist, intolerant of other cultures, and faiths, rejecting of local culture, opposed to mysticism, hoping to impose its version of Islam from the top down"* (M. C. Ricklefs, 2008: 133), I could also make the opposite argument and say that Islamic groups critical of such developments are currently gaining support. These Islamic groups and communities promoting a contextual interpretation of Islam, strive for gender equality, struggle for multiculturalism, engage in interfaith dialogue, and hold the local culture and with it various forms of mysticism in high esteem. Not surprisingly, in this picture of reality, manifold combinations exist. Ricklefs argues that both sides are gaining support and argues that a new polarization of Javanese society is observable along lines of religious identity, similarly as it occurred in Indonesia between 1850 and 1965 (Ibid.: 134). In this picture, Hizbut Tahrir would be one among other organizations deemed "radical".

I could also support his argument on increasing polarization. However, Ricklefs' analysis is more complex – otherwise he would not state that the situation is "confused and confusing". Inspired by his study, I seek to address the complexity of Islamic trends and argue that what we currently observe are some clear cut situations of opposition, but far more often I have observed that different activists, often even active within the same organization, differentiate along various parameters, such as in attitudes towards women,

style of dress, or whether they would welcome the implementation of the Sharia. I argue that an increasing number of people are not adhering to the extreme ends of this continuum; rather, the majority of activists seem to combine elements of different strands of Islam. They select from a wide array of sources. They no longer gain their religious knowledge from one religious authority (if this was ever the case), but rather from different institutions, such as the nationalist university, the boarding school at which they studied while enrolled at university, the different organizations in which they were active, the books they read, or the friends they had. Roof (1999), writing about the rise of religiosity in America, coined the term "religious seekers". Yet, although this number of religious seekers is large, Hizbut Tahrir members describe themselves in their biographical narratives as such seekers only until they had found Hizbut Tahrir, or, to them, the ultimate truth. Hizbut Tahrir members who argue that only their understanding of Islam is correct thus strongly object religious eclecticism. Yet, they also benefit from the general interest in different understandings of Islam of other activists.

Despite the fact that we find many "religious seekers" on campus that combine and recombine various elements from different traditions of various provenances, it seems important to point out the fact that these seekers do not act in a vacuum. Rather, they relate to others in their attempts to live as young Muslims. On the campus, we find groups that organize seminars together, that spend leisure time together, talk about similar things, dress in a similar way, or, more generally, who hold similar views of what it means to be young and Muslim. At times, this corresponds with organizational boundaries, but often, it does not.

The different organizations play an important role in what Hannerz calls *"producing or reproducing distinctive clusters of meaning"* (Ibid.: 74). They are an important site of teaching and learning, meeting peers and applying knowledge. Within the, often rigid, structures of the different organizations we find on campus, students go through different stages of learning the core ideas, and then passing them on to their juniors as teachers. Through the frequent interaction with other more or less like-minded activists, they also learn to distinguish themselves from others.

One of the ambiguities central to the issue of new forms of piety in everyday practice is that the apparently homogenizing tendencies inherent to globalization as such seem to imply a continued or even intensified heterogeneity in cultural terms. Often it is the process of globalization itself that appears to lead to a hardening of contrasts, or even to engender new oppositions (Appadurai, 1996; Clifford, 1988; Featherstone, 1990; Friedman, 1994; Robertson, 1992, 1995). Working on identity and globalization, Meyer and Geschiere argue that the global and the local are two faces of the same movement. Paradoxically, the culturally homogenizing tendencies of globalization imply continued or even reinforced cultural heterogeneity (1999: 2). Although Hizbut Tahrir activists pair their ideology in many instances with a capitalist logic, they frame their ideas as opposed to the west and reinforce contrasts between Muslims and non-Muslims to mark their own distinct group identity.

In recent years, many anthropologists have investigated, in different ways, the new complexities engendered by the increased contact between societies. Hannerz notes: "*It must now be more difficult than ever, or at least more unreasonable, to see the world as a cultural mosaic, of separate pieces with hard, well-defined edges. Cultural interconnections increasingly reach across the world. More than ever, there is a global ecumene. The entities we routinely call cultures are becoming more like subcultures within this wider entity, with all that this suggests in terms of fuzzy boundaries and more or less arbitrary delimitations of analytical units"* (1992: 218). Globalization thus need not be simply a matter of far-reaching homogenization – the increasing interconnectedness of the world also results in some cultural gain. Again in Hannerz's words: *"a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world*" (1996: 66). Understanding more clearly the ongoing processes in an increasingly connected world seems crucial. If, as I argue, principles of a market economy are introduced into other spheres of life, this does not change religion in a uniform way. Further, Hizbut Tahrir activists attempt to Islamize the economy might add new nuances to how calculative reason is enacted in practice.

The analytical framework drawn from the studies of globalization proves useful in analysing questions concerning new forms of being young and Muslim – this not only in terms of creative mixing and the richness of expressions that emerge from it, but also when analysing power and pressure from the centre (i.e. Euro-American west, Middle East, Jakarta) towards

the periphery. I agree with Hannerz in saying that: "*The cultural processes of creolization are not merely a matter of a constant pressure from the centre toward the periphery, but a more creative interplay"* (1996: 68). Hannerz uses the concept of creolization drawn from the field of linguistics where creole languages are seen as combinations and creations of different languages. He deems the concept particularly useful to reflect on power relations between the centre and the periphery, stressing the fact that the periphery talks back, and that creolisation is a process of constant negotiation where new forms are formed (Hannerz, 1992: 264-265).

The everyday practices of Islamic student activists do not fit comfortably into the analytical dichotomy of local-global polarities. Global and local, the particular and the universal are combined in important ways and are complementary elements rather than contradictory. The new expressions of religiousness among middle- and upper-class cosmopolitans are part of a synthesis of global and local. This being the case, the need for a conceptual framework that recognizes the interconnectedness of the 'global' and 'local' becomes clear (Voll 2007: 293). One of the merits of the notion of globalization might be that it signals the problem of how to "grasp the flux". In order to develop concepts suited to "grasping the flux" there is a need, as Fabian has suggested, to "liquidate culture" that is, to exchange a static, homogenizing concept of culture in favour of more open, fluid notions which are able to contain the making and unmaking of localities and the shifting of boundaries which these processes entail (Fabian, 1991: 191). In regard to Hizbut Tahrir, rejecting neoliberalism and embracing a capitalist rationality need not to be analysed in terms of contradiction. Rather, the question is of how Islam and neoliberalism are entangled in manifold ways and manifest themselves in the practices of activists.

The Difficulty of Labelling Competing Islamic Viewpoints: Fundamentalism & Co.

The different Islamic organizations present on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University are constantly labelled by others and constantly label themselves. The aims of these labelling processes are manifold. Often, it is an attempt to reduce complexity and

differentiate some organizations from others. Yet, other times the labels the activists use to describe themselves are different from labels ascribed to them by others who oppose their views. Although I do not want to argue that labels are meaningless and fail to reveal important characteristics of an organization, and in some cases describe the character of an organization, I doubt that they are useful *analytical* categories to understand complexity.

In scholarly literature, and in everyday language in both Indonesia and western countries, organizations promoting the implementation of Islamic law and demanding the establishment of an Islamic state – such as Hizbut Tahrir - have been referred to as "radicals" *(radikal)*, "fundamentalists" *(fundamentalis)*, "conservatives" *(konservatif),* or "Islamists" *(Islamist).* In Indonesia, this strand of Islam is further often classified as "rightwing Islam" *(Islam kanan)* as opposed to "leftwing Islam", or as "exclusivist Islam" *(Islam eksklusif).*

Western authors in particular tend to label Hizbut Tahrir activists as "Islamists". The well known and oft-cited French scholar Olivier Roy defines Islamism as a *"brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing sharia, but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action"* (Oliver Roy, 2004: 58). According to this definition, different Islamic organizations and communities active on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University qualify as Islamist organizations. However, what is the analytical value of the various terms? Do such labels serve as analytical categories to understand the appeal of such organizations, the agency of its activists, the ways in which they imagine a different world, or how they challenge notions of tolerance? Speaking of organizations that seek to abolish democracy and challenge the concepts of gender equality and human rights, one enters a terrain shaped by prejudices and anxieties, not the least of which are reflected in the different labels used to categorize these organizations.

Both Hizbut Tahrir activists themselves and some other activists, classify them as *dakwah* activists *(aktivis dakwah).* The term *dakwah (arab. da'wa)* has historically encompassed a broad range of meanings; literally, it may be translated as "summon" or "call". In the Indonesian context, as well as in other parts of the world, *dakwah* is commonly understood as the duty to encourage or convince fellow Muslims to embrace a certain understanding of

Islam and let Islam inspire all aspects of their lives. Yet, what activities may define as *dakwah* is highly contested among different activist groups. Equally contested is thus who may be classified as a *dakwah* activist. Elizabeth Fuller Collins, for example, labels Hizbut Tahrir as one among four *"streams of dakwah"* (E. F. Collins, 2003: 154). For her, a core characteristic of a *dakwah* activist is that he or she wants an Islamic government. Yet, not all Islamic activists agree with this narrow definition of "*dakwah* activist" and argue that doing *dakwah* is an obligation of all Muslims, which cannot be reduced to promoting a specific understanding of Islam. Some even claim that the term has been hijacked by certain groups in order to make truth claims, defining their activity as "properly Islamic".

Only since around the beginning of the 20th century, *dakwah* started to be understood not necessarily as an attempt to convert non-Muslims to Islam, but rather as an endeavour to call Muslims to a specific understanding of Islam and to "renew" their faith (Janson, 2001; Nagata, 1984; Roald, 1994). Racius (2004) provides an overview of the wide range of meanings the term encompassed in the past starting from the early centuries of Islam to present. Other overviews dealing with the history, conceptualization and practice of *dakwah* are provided by al-Faruqi (1976) and Mendel (1995); for a comparison of *dakwah* and Christian missionary activity, the work of Poston (1992), or for the European context the work of Wiedl (2008) provide important insights. The most cited Qur'anic reference for this interpretation is verse 3:104: *"And that there might grow out of you a community (of people) who invite unto all that is good, and enjoin the doing of what is right and forbid the doing of what is wrong: as it is they, they who shall attain to a happy state"*.[15] In this usage focusing on the reformation and amelioration of the Islamic community, the usage overlaps to some extent with the notion of jihad; although in current use it does not emphasise the idea of militancy that is sometimes attributed to the term jihad (Hirschkind, 2001: 28)[16].

Many of the aforementioned labels do not contribute much to our understanding of ongoing developments within Indonesian Islam. Often, they are used to polarize, or contrast

[15] Translated by Asad (2003). Other verses often cited for emphasizing the duty to call others to Islam are 3:110 and 16:125.

[16] The relationship between *dakwah* and jihad is also discussed by Racius (2004).

two different strands of Islam that are not clearly opposed to each other. Further, these labels tend to lump different groups together without making the intellectual effort to recognize specificities, shades of grey and also internal contestations within groups. Labels such as "radical" or "fundamentalist" serve to draw a line between "good" and "bad" Muslims, as Mamdani shows in his article "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim" (Mamdani, 2002).

Different scholars have already pointed to the inadequacy of the term "fundamentalism" and "radicalism" as analytical categories to understand contemporary Islam (Esposito, 1992; Harris, 1994; Hirschkind, 1997, 2006; Hirschkind & Mahmood, 2002). Also the label "conservative" Islam, often opposed to "modern" or "progressive" Islam seems unable to grasp the complexity of claims, and are thus of little help to understand the activists' complex way of relating both to the past and to the future. What is it that they would like to conserve? What needs to be reformed? How do they relate to the fundamentals or roots of Islamic tradition in order to frame their claims, mobilize support, and establish authority?

Following the argument made by Talal Asad (1999; 2003), Chales Hirschkind (2006; 2008a), Saba Mahmood (2005) and Frédéric Volpi (2010) I suggest that the meaning of "politics" or "political action" needs to be rethought and re-contextualised. The notion of politics is not a given, as it is neither timeless nor incontestable, but is rather socially constructed (Volpi, 2010: 11). What should count as "political action" and thus as a parameter to distinguish Muslims from Islamists as suggested by Roy (2004: 58)? Asad argues, convincingly, that given the conditions of modernity and the structures of state authority in contemporary societies, activists who seek to change the world in whatever way, including Islamic activists, have little choice but to engage with the various, all-encompassing institutions of modern governance. No movement, so he argues, can remain indifferent to state power. The fact that Islamic activists are to varying degrees preoccupied with state power, and politics in the broader sense, is thus a consequence of *"the modern nation-state's enforced claim to constitute legitimate social identities and arenas"* (Asad, 1999: 191).

Mahmood also stresses that activists representing different strands of Islam, also those struggling for other goals than the formal implementation of the Sharia, have political aspirations. She argues that all aspects of every day life, such as family, education, worship, welfare, or commercial transactions have been brought under the regulatory apparatuses of

the modern nation state. Therefore, different movements' efforts to remake any of these activities will necessarily have political consequences and can thus be, in the broad sense, viewed as political actions (Mahmood, 2005: 193-4). By understanding "politics" in a broad sense, the label "political Islam" loses its analytical and explanatory power. Different Islamic student organizations and communities active at the Gadjah Mada University are all shaped in different ways by modes of modern governance, both by the nation state as well as by transnational modes of governance in the form, for example, of international organizations. As all Islamic activists seek in some way to change society, they are forced to engage with these all-encompassing institutions. The spiritual domain is thus, as also argued by Mahmood, politicized, regardless of whether this is intended by the activists or not (Mahmood, 2005: 193). Any kind of Islamic activism is thus ultimately political.

As pointed out by Hirschkind and Larkin, religion is enfolded with politics in various forms that need to be examined. Neither religion nor politics is an "anthropological universal", but is constantly negotiated, produced, and defined (Hirschkind & Larkin, 2008a: 2). However, the authors argue, there seems to be a trend to see religion as soon as it appears outside of what is seen as the private and personal sphere as a sign of something else, "*an idiom through which marginal groups express political demands; a salve in time of crisis; a vehicle of social mobilization and solidarity; an instrument by which cynical leaders manipulate their supporters*" (Hirschkind & Larkin, 2008a: 1). If religion is read as something else, most often as "political project lurking under the name of religion" (ibid.: 1) and is thus not taken seriously, no attention is paid to the specificity of its bodily practices, to its various discursive forms, to its theological legacy, to its forms of reasoning and discipline that legitimate its claims (ibid.: 1-2). They stress that in a globalized world, neither religion, nor politics can be seen as separate phenomena but rather as mutually constitutive (ibid.: 3). It is thus necessary, they argue, to understand these entanglements and explore the political use of religion and vice versa. Labels such as "Islamism", "radicalism", and "fundamentalism" seem to hinder this endeavour. In the following chapters I do not avoid labelling. Nor do I assume that no significant difference exists between different organizations – far from it. Yet, rather than using labels as an analytical category to classify

groups, I aim to pay attention to the particular context in which different labels are used and what those using them aim to communicate.

The Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta: Localizing Transnational Ideas

This study focuses on students enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University *(Universitas Gadjah Mada – UGM),* located in the Special Region of Yogyakarta in Central Java. This university was founded in 1949 and in 2011 counted approximately 55'000 enrolled students: this makes it Indonesia's oldest and largest university. In the country, this university is seen as one of the three top institutions of higher learning, along with the University of Indonesia located in Jakarta and the Bandung Institute of Technology in West Java.

On the official homepage of the university, it is defined as a Pancasila University. While it is therefore not an Islamic university, it grants Islam an important place in its structure and curriculum. Islamic symbols are by far the most visible on campus. Probably most eye-catching to a foreigner like me entering the campus is the large number of veiled women students. In 2011, almost seventy percent of the women were wearing a large variety of different veils, in colours ranging from bright pink to black. Besides the variety of Islamic dress, the large information boards across campus are dominated by posters advertising a variety of "Islamic events" organized by the various Islamic groups: for example book discussions, prayer meetings, film screenings, and book markets.

The large Gadjah Mada University Mosque, built in 1999, is also a monument of Islam. It is surrounded by a spacious garden. Also, all faculties have prayer halls *(musholla).* On the campus, Islam is not only visible in its different facets, but also audible. The call to prayer *(azan)* is hard to overhear, mixing with the other sounds on campus. Simultaneously, Islam influences the class schedule: on Friday at noon, for example, classes are suspended. Also within the structure of the university, Islam has a fixed place: The official Islamic University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin receives not only funding from the university, but is also offered an office space in the university mosque.

The city of Yogyakarta has around half a million inhabitants and is often described as the centre of "Javanese culture", where a syncretistic, mystical oriented version of Islam is still particularly strong. Mulder (1978, 1998), among others, outlines how Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Solo) in particular are known as the centres of *kejawen,* a kind of Javanese religion, which can be observed as a form of Islamic mysticism harking back to the Hindu-Buddhist period of Javanese history (Mulder, 1998: 16). In his books, he is particularly interested in what he calls the cultural revitalization of *kejawen* in post-independence Indonesia. The idea of a strong Javanese tradition influences discussions of what it means to "be a good Muslim" as well as how Islam should inform politics and social order to a considerable extent, both as a source of inspiration for an alternative modernity as well as a "relict from the past" that needs to be overcome. Different Islamic activists thus deal in different ways with what some consider as their heritage from Islam's, or their own, past.

Besides having the reputation of being the "heart of Javanese culture", the city with over one hundred institutions of tertiary education is also famous as a student city. A large number of young people from different parts of the Indonesian archipelago come there in pursuit of higher education.[17] Many students live far away from their parents and families, and stay either with relatives or in boarding houses *(kos).* There exist a large variety of different boarding houses in regard to infrastructure, but also in regard to rules and regulations the owner or guardian of the house implements. Commonly, female and male students live in separate boarding houses where more or less strict rules exist regarding curfew and whether it is allowed to have visitors of the opposite sex. Often, these visitors are not allowed to enter the room. There are also Islamic boarding houses or houses where people from a certain region cohabite, for example from West Sumatra.

The fact that many young people live sometimes far from their families has an impact on how they seek to define themselves in their new environment. It gives them freedom to act more independently; this may be as a Muslim who lives more or less piously than their parents, or in any other way that the parents would not have approved of. Also, being away

[17] For a detailed list of only the private institutions of tertiary education in Yogyakarta see http://www.kopertis4.or.id/Pages/Direktori%20Maret&202004/ptn_Pts/kopertis5.htm, (24 November 2010).

from home allows many students to spend more time on different campus activities, rather than on family and societal obligations, as they did back home. Many are thus actively looking for ways to engage in different forms of communities or organizations. Islamic organizations are one choice among many. Other options range from sports clubs, to writing circles and theatre groups. As a student city, Yogyakarta offers a large variety of places to "hang out", such as cafés, soccer halls, food stalls, cinemas and shopping malls.

Most students who pass the entrance test to study at the Gadjah Mada University do not have a strong background in Islamic education, unlike students enrolled at an Islamic university, such as at the State Islamic University Sunan Kalijaga also located in Yogyakarta. Whereas the students of Islamic universities tend to have a profound Islamic education and have often studied in Islamic schools for years, many of the students of the Gadjah Mada University come from families they define as not very religious, and have only studied in state schools where Islam was not studied as intensively as in Islamic schools. Relatively few students have studied in Islamic boarding schools *(pesantren).*

The Gadjah Mada University is what Matei Candea calls a "bounded field-site" (Candea, 2007). The site is thus explicitly partial, located in a single bounded location. When Marcus and Fischer in their book *"Anthropology as a Cultural Critique"* (Marcus & Fischer, 1986) called for a multi-local ethnography, they argued that the "traditional" single-sited method of intensive participant observation in one single bounded location is no longer suitable for grasping the realities of an increasingly interconnected world. They emphasized the need to follow people, ideas as well as objects, and thus called for a multi-sited ethnography (Candea, 2007: 168-9). Despite the fact that the Gadjah Mada University is a "bounded field-site", the student activists I have worked with were in different ways connected to the "globalised world"; besides travelling themselves, often within Indonesia, they were highly influenced by what was going on in the world through the media or through their university studies. Their understanding of how Islam "should" inform politics and social order was informed by various translocal ideas originating from the Middle East, from the west as well as from within Indonesia.

Due to the complexity and interconnectedness of this environment, I chose a field-site bound in one locality. The knowledge and insights I gained are thus partial. Like Candea, I

see value in focusing on one particular and locally limited site. The choice of the Gadjah Mada University is indeed arbitrary in the sense that it has no overarching "meaning" or "consistency"" (Candea, 2007: 179). It is, as Candea argues, precisely this fracture and incompleteness, the fact that it is not representing a wider holistic entity, such as Indonesian student activism in general, which makes a locally bounded field-site attractive. Despite the role that Islamic student activists of the Gadjah Mada University have played in Indonesian history, despite its size and reputation as one of the top Indonesian universities, and despite its fame as having a particularly vibrant and dynamic intellectual Islamic climate, the Gadjah Mada University is seen *"not as an object to be explained, but a contingent window into complexity"* (ibid.: 179).

I do not conceptualize my chosen field-site as what Weber defined as an "ideal type" in the sense that I consider the campus of the Gadjah Mada University as representative for Java, for Indonesia, or even for countries beyond. Rather, it is to some extent an arbitrary location that exists at a particular moment in a concrete place. This fact that it is locally bounded makes it suitable to reflect on how young Muslims pair economic rationality with Islam, as it allows me to focus on practices and argumentation in a specific context. Candea argues, convincingly, that it is the anthropologist's own choice and practice of bonding a field in the increasingly connected and complex world that makes the choice of the location arbitrary. This choice of a locally bounded field site gives the anthropologist the *"something to strive against, a locus whose incompleteness and contingency provide a counterpoint from which to challenge the imagined totality of the "cultural formations""* (ibid.: 180).

Notes on the Methodology of Data Generation

I draw my data material from three different periods totalling almost two years of fieldwork at the Gadjah Mada Universit between 2005 and 2011. The longest period at the university was during the academic year 2008 until 2009, when I generated most of my material. During my time in Yogyakarta, I tried to interact as much as possible with Islamic activists holding different visions about how Islam should inform societal order and belonging to

different Islamic student organizations and communities. I did not exclusively focus on the activities of Hizbut Tahrir activists, but on the overall dynamics of Islamic student activism on the campus. However, the choice of organizations upon which to focus is limited to those that most actively promoted their ideas in public, for example by organizing discussions, workshops, or demonstrations. I do thus not represent the whole spectrum present at the Gadjah Mada University. Especially the voices and viewpoints of students committed to the Salafi, Tablighi Jama'at or the Negara Islam Indonesia NII movements are not represented. According to the opinion of several interview partners, there are students enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University that are active in these organizations. Yet, these were not publically present on the campus. Between 2006 and 2011, these organizations were not active in organizing events for the larger student community or inviting people to discussions. It might be the case that their lack of visibility as an organization at the Gadjah Mada University campus made me – and a large number of students with whom I discussed the question of who was important in shaping the Islamic discourse on campus – overlook and underestimate their influence. Examining the ideas and organizational patterns of these students would be interesting and relevant for a better understanding of ongoing dynamics at the Gadjah Mada University – however, this is beyond the scope of this research.

I conducted over seventy open interviews with both men and women students, most of who were members of various organizations, mainly Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Muslim Students' Association (HMI Dipo- *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*)[18], Muslim Students' Association – The Assembly of the Savers of the Organization (HMI MPO – *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam – Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi*), Indonesian Muslim Student Movement (PMII – *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*), Muhammadiyah Student Organization (IMM – *Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah*), Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit (KAMMI – *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia*), the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Salahuddin and the Islamic Campus Network (JARIK – *Jaringan Islam Kampus)*. The organizations present on the campus cover a wide spectrum of Islamic legal opinions. Classifying these

[18] HMI is often referred to as HMI Dipo, after the Diponegoro Street in Jakarta, where its head quarter is located. This is done to distinguish it from HMI MPO after the two organizations split in 1986.

organizations in a few words is difficult due to their at times large internal heterogeneity. Sticking to the self representation as given in interviews, and in different public events I attended of these organizations, the organizations JARIK, PMII and HMI Dipo presented itself as "moderate", "inclusive", supporting Islam's internal plurality and objecting to the establishment of an Islamic state. For most of these activists, the Sharia was not considered as a fixed set of legal prescriptions that should be legally enforced. Rather, the Sharia was for them a moral system in which the rules of what to do depended on the context. They thus promoted a contextual understanding of Islam. Particularly in JARIK and HMI Dipo, it was common to find unveiled women activists in high-ranking positions.

HMI is the oldest Islamic organization in Indonesia. It was founded in 1947, but then split into two sections in 1986 due to internal disputes about whether to accept a governmental decision that required all organizations to make the Pancasila their ideological basis. HMI Dipo accepted the new law (Albar & Kurniawan, 2009; Puspito, 2009; Saleh, 1996). PMII was founded in 1960, and was, until 1972 structurally linked to the largest Islamic mass organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Yet, despite its structural independence, the majority of activists come from NU families and most have a profound Islamic education. PMII of the Gadjah Mada University positions itself as opposing "fundamentalism" and "radicalism" and instead proposes an "inclusive" and "progressive" understanding of Islam (Anis & Yahya, 2009). In various discussions, Hizbut Tahrir members pejoratively labelled JARIK, PMII and HMI Dipo "liberal".

IMM was founded in 1964 and is structurally linked to the large Islamic mass organization Muhammadiyah. In 2008-9, the branch of the Gadjah Mada University was, together with HMI MPO one of the most heterogeneous organizations present on campus. Whereas the male members tended to collaborate and discuss frequently with members of both HMI Dipo and PMII, and promoted a "moderate" and "progressive" understanding of Islam, at least some of the women activists seemed to be more interested in the ideology promoted by the *tarbiyah* movement, strongly represented by KAMMI. Whereas IMM was not keen on stressing its internal differences, HMI MPO seemed proudly to point to the fact that its members came from different Islamic backgrounds. Yet, the majority of members were, in

2008-9, promoting the necessity to introduce the Sharia and "Islamize" the economy according to Islamic values (Albar & Kurniawan, 2009).

KAMMI was founded in 1998. It is the main vehicle of the *tarbyiah* movement on campus and largely promotes the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the campus, it is Hizbut Tahrir's closest alley as the two organizations share a variety of concerns. Yet, as I outline in subsequent chapters, it is also opposed to Hizbut Tahrir primarily in its approach to Islamize society. *Tarbiyah* activists do for example not reject participating in party politics. Jamaah Shalahuddin is the official University Dakwah Organization that is dominated by *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists. I discuss this organization in detail in the next chapter.

Besides interviewing members of different Islamic student organizations active on the campus, I also interviewed a number of lecturers and professors about how discussions of Islam and the presence of Islamic groups on campus had changed over the last few years. Among other influential people, I had the chance to interview the rector of the Gadjah Mada University, Prof. Ir. Soerdjawadi.

Being non-Muslim influenced my position in the field. It happened rarely that students tried to persuade me to convert to Islam. In general, I was perceived as an outsider, and thus an "objective researcher", as I was not involved as a member in any of the organizations I examined. They valued this detachment positively and did not argue that only a Muslim could understand Islam. Quite the opposite, they considered not being personally involved favourable to conducting research. I was seen as someone who could teach the west "how Islam really is", as a kind of translator or mediator. Many were thus keen on emphasizing the unity of Islam and avoided stressing ideological differences between the different organizations. Rather, foremost during the first interviews, they were keen to represent a monolithic picture of Islam. Yet, this attitude changed over time. Becoming aware of the fact that they saw me as a more or less objective researcher with skills in social anthropology, I opted to play this role of "the more experienced researcher" and edit a book. The idea was to collect chapter contributions written by activists from different Islamic organizations and communities. The local publisher "Resist Book" was supportive, and offered me a publishing contract. They felt that the proposed title fit their book series on social movements. I chose

this publisher as it is not affiliated with any strand of Islam, has good distribution networks, and is reputed for its fast publishing.

When I approached the presidents of the different Islamic student organizations with the suggestion to submit a book proposal, they were interested in the idea of contributing a chapter to the volume. They felt that such a book, uniting different Islamic organizations and giving an overview of the different strands of Islamic activism, was not yet to be found on the market. More important still for them was the opportunity to inform others about their organizations' own visions and missions. I selected nine organizations after long discussions with friends and activists about which ones to include. The main criterion of choice was how active they were in promoting their visions on campus, organizing events, and thus influencing public discussions. In eight out of nine cases, I approached the presidents (seven men and one women) with the proposal in order to show respect for the organizational hierarchy; the decision of who would actually write the chapter was left to the organization. In all cases, the presidents themselves wrote the contributions, five of them assisted by a co-author.

It was six months from the moment of the first discussions with these activists before the book was available in bookstores (Nef, 2009b). During this half year, I worked intensively with the fourteen authors and co-authors. The activists signed a contract agreeing to write a short chapter outline, followed by a first draft and the final version. This process gave me the chance to meet them on a regular basis and discuss their text, also it gave me the opportunity to ask for clarifications, or to include or reduce certain sections. It was a balancing act between, on the one hand, allowing personal emphasis and style of representations of the authors, and, on the other hand, trying to highlight topics that might be of interest to potential readers. Most of the contributions contained information about the organization's history, their visions for Indonesia and the larger Muslim community, as well as the role of students as agents of change, gender relations, and the organization's everyday activities on and off campus. Besides the text, we included at least two photos and the logo of every organization along with captions. Working together with mostly male activists was at times challenging, but insightful. In one case, I discussed the issues while sitting behind a curtain *(hijab)* dividing the room into male and female parts. Over time, I

learned which activists did not wish to shake hands with women, which ones had or would like to have a girlfriend, and which lowered their gaze when talking to me, rather than looking me in the eyes.

After the book was published, I was known among a number of Islamic activists and some considered me a kind of expert on Islamic student activism on the campus. Although I did not see myself as an expert, I was invited together with a chapter contributor to the local radio-station to discuss the book and talk about Islamic student activism. Further, different organizations invited me as a speaker to their training workshops where they teach new members of the organization. This gave me insight into how knowledge transmission from senior to junior members took place, as well as how and what was taught during these training workshops.

Besides editing the book, I also produced a short film entitled *"Voices of Islam".* Together with a local documentary filmmaker, I interviewed activists of different organizations. In the end we had over six hours of film material; the end product is, however, only a ten-minute film. The camera as research tool seemed to suggest to the person interviewed that she or he is not only talking to me, but rather to a broader, anonymous audience. In addition to informal conversations and discussions, as well as recorded interviews, filming gave me yet another perspective and at times also a second chance to ask a similar question. The ones who participated in the film seemed to have enjoyed doing so and were eager to see themselves in the film once it was finished. Besides giving me another way to interact with different activists, it also allowed me to have a closer look at the interior of some of their offices and meeting rooms and to notice details that had escaped me before.

When watching the film with activists, they were typically amused and giggled when seeing themselves or their friends on screen. Yet, they also commented on statements, foremost on those two statements cited at the beginning of the chapter by the Hizbut Tahrir activist, and Ridho, the JARIK activist. Depending on with whom I watched the film, the activists slightly shook their heads in disagreement at different statements. The general idea to make a film was warmly received and none of the activists who I asked participate refused to give their opinion.

During my stay in Yogyakarta, I also joined a large number of conferences, small workshops and discussion rounds organized by the various groups on a broad spectrum of topics. This gave me the chance to observe their behaviour, listen to different forms of arguments, as well as to become sensitive to topics they regard as particularly necessary for discussion. I also collected books written by activists themselves on their organization, as well as books or articles written by others, and bachelor and master theses, mostly submitted in one of the departments of the Gadjah Mada University. I also collected posters, brochures and flyers related to these organizations' activities.

Particularly when collaborating with Hizbut Tahrir activists, I felt that my research topic demanded that I suspend my own aversion to some of the activists' opinions – not to reach a position of scholarly objectivity, but at least to be able to understand their standpoint and logic of arguing. It was my aim to treat Hizbut Tahrir activists as serious representatives of a social phenomenon worth understanding. I thus seek to discuss in this study topics that the activists I worked with regard important and relevant. Therefore, I focus on the different ways in which Hizbut Tahrir women activists enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University ask questions about the world in which they live. My aim is to draw an emphatic picture of these activists, highly committed to the struggle for their vision of a better world.

Chapter Outline

After having set the scene in the *first chapter* by providing an introduction to Hizbut Tahrir and the general setting of this study, the *second chapter* of this dissertation examines the historical conditions that have favoured Hizbut Tahrir's development on the campus of Indonesia's oldest and largest university. Besides examining how students of the Gadjah Mada University started studying the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, the larger socio-political context of Suharto's New Order government is outlined. In conducted research thus far about Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a central role has been assigned to the University Dakwah Organizations *(LDK – Lembaga Dakwah Kampus)* in promoting Hizbut Tahrir's ideas. To delineate the historical development against which the contemporary postulate for the re-

establishment of the caliphate has emerged, this second chapter focuses primarily on the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin.

Chapters three, four, *five*, *six* and *seven* zoom in on the every day life of Muslim student activists enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University. These chapters focus on how individual activists navigate their way in the contested religious terrain and interact with others holding different beliefs. Scholars focusing on individual action inspire my approach, such as Anthony Giddens (1991) and Lila Abu-Lughod (1991). Like Giddens, Abu-Lughod reminds us that *"Individuals are confronted with choices, struggle with others, make conflicting statements, argue about points of view on the same events, undergo ups and downs in various relationships and change in their circumstances and desires, face new pressures, and fail to predict what will happen to them or to those around them"* (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 154). My goal is not to write against a general idea of Islam that homogenizes the richness of individual experience, but rather to identify with which new practices students debate and struggle.

Chapter three explores the meaning and necessity of learning in the struggle to establish religious authority and debate Islam in public. Indonesian students are, in their daily lives, confronted with a plethora of ideas of different provenances, local and global, secular and religious. Religion successfully challenges secularization theory by compromising with science, adapting its language and methods. Young educated students do not formulate their call to piety against modernity and science, but rather appropriate secular knowledge for their struggle. The path to piety in the age of modern media technologies is probably more than ever before a path of learning and public debate. To outline the importance of knowledge, I zoom in on different institutionalized sites of learning where Hizbut Tahrir activists in particular hone their knowledge. I chose a two-pronged approach to underline my argument: besides focusing on different sites of learning and their specificities, I include the point of view of individual members and participants.

In *chapter four* I examine how student activists argue for the re-establishment of the caliphate and relate the texts of an-Nabhani to their everyday life. The founder's ideas are thus not discussed in isolation. Instead, the focus of this chapter is on how to examine how the activists reconfigure these texts in order to reach their goal. To establish authority, they

relate to their perception of an Islamic past to analyse the present world in which they live, and imagine a better future. I particularly focus on public events I attended regularly during my fieldwork as well as on a book chapter written by a Hizbut Tahrir woman activist in 2009, in which she argues for the establishment of the caliphate. Paying close attention to public events and documents allows me to examine discourses that the activists consider important in convincing others of the necessity of systemic change. In particular, I focus on how the call for the caliphate is entangled with a critique of what students refer to as neoliberalism or capitalism, the demand for better access to education and health care, as well as with a sceptical attitude towards the process of democratization. For clarification and to provide more detailed information, I complement the insights with explanations gained during various formal and informal discussions with different activists.

Chapter five and *six* address the question of how the call for the caliphate not only constitutes one's way of reasoning and understanding of Islam, but how it influences everyday practices and moral development, or, what Asad has referred to as *"apt performance"* (1986: 15). In *chapter five,* I examine consumption practices of secular goods such as popcorn, cigarettes, and the meaning of fasting during Ramadan. Hizbut Tahrir activists do not view piety as opposed to consumption, but rather it is, to a certain extent, expressed through consumption. Hizbut Tahrir activists do – at least ideally – carefully select products they consider in line with their ideology. Difference in consumption and public behaviour leads at times to tensions, and often to discussion about what it means to "be a good Muslim". Different Islamic organizations active on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University have different explicit, but more often implicit, rules of how their activists should behave, what they should do in their leisure time, and with whom they should interact. What some activists regard as proper behaviour, others may see as sinful. I argue in this chapter that seemingly trivial choices – such as what snack to buy or what pen to write with – initiate important debates about proper conduct, about how to live a pious life. Learning to internalize specific behavioural patterns is an important task in one's everyday life. Ideas related to moral consumption are rarely discussed in large seminars; rather, they are core topics in incidental and casual discussions. Nevertheless, everyday consumption practices are consequential to Indonesian's perception of public morality, of good and evil.

Chapter six focuses on how the call for "improving" sexual morality and the struggle for the caliphate are entangled. Since the late 1990s, activists from different strands of Islam have come to agree that the makeup of the moral subject is a pressing matter of public concern as it is regarded to be at the heart of social order. Ethics and sexuality have thus become urgent topics of public discussion. The language of sexuality and ethics were discovered as a tool to revitalize the public sphere. In this context a market for books, films and music has emerged that relates sexuality and Islam. Particularly for Hizbut Tahrir women activists, discussing sexual morality has become one powerful arena to formulate their call for an alternative societal order. In this chapter I focus on changing semantics of outward expressions of Islamic morality *(aklak)* and then move on to examine how taming one's sexual desires has become framed as a core marker of piety and submission to God – at least by some students. In these discussions, the figure of "free sex" has been framed as the epitome of secularism.

Chapter seven examines how the core ideas of Hizbut Tahrir are articulated in newly accessible media technology and how these articulations constitute everyday religious practices. Media technologies open up space for public discussion and result in a democratization of religious authority. Yet, for the Hizbut Tahrir activists with whom I have collaborated, the easy access to other interpretations of Islam and opinions about how Islam should influence every day life has not resulted in questioning the truth claims made by the organization's leaders. Rather, new technologies enable students to actively participate in public debate. Skills in media usage are now, more than ever, regarded as crucial in formulating one's ideology. In this process, media technologies not only transform Islamic student activism, but also the boundary between entertainment, *dakwah* and divine worship become increasingly fuzzy.

In the *concluding chapter* I summarize the main strands of arguments and place them within the larger context of current anthropological discussions about the relationship between economic globalization and religious experience. I explore some of the limitations of my study while outlining questions that remain open.

Chapter II:

The Historical Context of the Emergence of Hizbut Tahrir at the Gadjah Mada University

"During the 1970s, not many students talked about religion, although the majority were Muslims. Rather, students were interested in western pop culture, western music and in a consumerist lifestyle. Islam was seen as somehow old fashioned. Our idea was to merge Islam and pop culture and make Islam become relevant to the life of students, so we started organizing different events to change the image of Islam and make it look modern and trendy. Eventually, we founded Jamaah Shalahuddin as a modern and moderate organization that should accommodate Muslims of all strands of Islam. […] With the radical agenda to call for the caliphate and the establishment of the Sharia Jamaah Shalahuddin has now, they will not be successful in Indonesia".
(Chairil Anwar, one of the founders of Jamaah Shahuddin)[19]

The ideology of Hizbut Tahrir reached Indonesia in the early 1980s. Ten years later a small group of men students enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University started eagerly studying the ideas of Taqiyyudin an-Nabhani and began to promote the idea of establishing the caliphate among peers. From a structural point of view, Hizbut Tahrir of the Gadjah Mada University is a subdivision of Hizbut Tahrir's District Executive Committee *(DPD – Dewan Perwakilan Daerah)* of Yogyakarta. This District Committee is hierarchically subordinate to the Provincial Executive Committee *(DPW – Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah),* which is one division of the Central Executive Committee *(DPP – Dewan Pimpinan Pusat)* based in Jakarta. Via this structure, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is linked to the central leadership board of Hizbut Tahrir. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has a special branch for its women activists *(MHTI - Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia),* which has its own organizational structure mirroring that of Hizbut Tahrir

[19] Interview conducted in Yogyakarta in May 2009.

Indonesia. At the national level, as well as at the grassroots level of the Gadjah Mada University, MHTI organizes various events exclusively for women. At the Gadjah Mada University at least, there are slightly more women than men activists.

Despite the relatively small number of official members, the impact of Hizbut Tahrir was hard to overlook. Not only had these members succeeded in forcing other Islamic organizations to rethink their opinions about the relationship between religion and politics, and about how Islam should become a blessing to all *(rahmatan lil alamin)* at the beginning of the 21st century (Said, 2007); also, the student chapter of Hizbut Tahrir had managed to influence the agenda of the University Dakwah Organization, Jamaah Shalahuddin *(Lembaga Dakwah Kampus Jamaah Shalahuddin).* In 2008, this organization declared in its annual working agenda the establishment of the caliphate, and the formal implementation of the Sharia, as top priority (Nugroho, 2009: 113).

Jamaah Shalahuddin is the official organization for Muslim students enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University. Officially, as its president in 2008 claimed, all Muslim students are its members. However, only around three hundred of them are active. As the official Muslim organization, Jamaah Shalahuddin holds a strategic position to reach students and pass on their ideas. They have their office in a side wing of the campus mosque. This mosque, completed in 1999, can accommodate a crowd of over 10'000 people on its two floors and in its spacious yard. Aside from its primary function as place of worship, mostly for students and professors of the Gadjah Mada University but also open to the public, it also serves as a meeting place for discussions and learning. Due to its architecture, the atmosphere in the mosque is comfortable, even on hot days. Not only the mosque itself, but also the spacious garden in which it is situated, serves as meeting place for groups of students, especially in the early morning and before dawn. Being structurally linked to the university, Jamaah Shalahuddin receives limited financial support, and is officially allowed to carry the name of the University – an asset when it comes to establishing credibility and attracting funds from private companies for organizing activities. As in Hizbut Tahrir, also in Jamaah Shalahuddin the women members outnumber the men. However, men hold the important leading positions.

The fact that Jamaah Shalahuddin declared the establishment of the caliphate and the formal implementation of the Sharia as important goal for the year 2009 is no unique phenomenon. It was also declared as a top priority by University Dakwah Organizations of other top Indonesian universities, namely of the Bandung Institute of Technology, the Institute of Agriculture in Bogor, the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, the Sebelas Maret University in Surakarta, and the Andalas University in Padang, West Sumatra. In a co-publication of the Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations *(FSLDK – Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus)* the University Dakwah Organizations of these universities declared the establishment of the caliphate *(khilafah*) as main goal (Fathurrahman et al., 2007: xiii).

In this chapter, I aim to examine the historical context that has favoured the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir at the Gadjah Mada University. Changing forms of state authority have altered and influenced how activists frame their claims and how they seek to change society. In the studies so far published on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a major role is ascribed to the University Dakwah Organizations in promoting the organization's ideas (Fealy, 2007: 157; Muhtadi, 2009: 627; Osman, 2010: 610; Rahmat, 2005: 121). Fealy notes that Hizbut Tahrir members "*used* campus and broader Islamist networks" (Fealy, 2007: 157, personal emphasis) and Osman stated that this transnational organization "*utilized* the Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) for their purposes" (Osman, 2010: 610, personal emphasis). Yet, no study has yet examined the way the ideology was diffused and received on the ground.

The history of how student activists promoted the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir until the middle of the 21st century remains obscure. I aim to provide modest insights about how the first group of students began to study and promote the organization's ideas. By mainly focusing on a personal account of one of the first Hizbut Tahrir activists at the Gadjah Mada University, as well as on changes that have taken place within the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin, I seek to outline and contextualize some of the changes this organization has undergone thus far. Further, I reflect on why Jamaah Shalahuddin deemed the establishment of the caliphate a top priority in 2008. I do not aim to frame the developments that have taken place within this organization, as well as in different University Dakwah Organizations of other renowned state universities, as a logical

consequence of changing political circumstances: Other trajectories would have been possible. Yet, I aim to stress the entanglement between the socio-political changes and Hizbut Tahrir's success in promoting its ideas. In my attempt to contextualize the emergence and development of Hizbut Tahrir, I also aim to point to open questions and research gaps that I am, with my data, unable to address.

I start this chapter by historically contextualizing the arrival of the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia in the 1980s. I then zoom in on the developments that have taken place in the late 1970s and 80s at the Gadjah Mada University in order to better understand the larger context within which the ideas of Taqiyyudin an-Nabhani fell: I discuss the founding context of Jamaah Shalahuddin, the Indonesian state's aimed de-politicization of the universities, and the emergence of the *tarbiyah* movement. Finally, I discuss Jamaah Shalahuddin's working agenda of the year 2008 to establish the caliphate.

A Glance at the Emergence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

Rahmat (2005), Fealy (2007), and Osman (2010) provide the most detailed account on how the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir reached Indonesia. The ideas of Taqiyyudin an-Nabhani reached Indonesia in the early 1980s. In this process, two figures played a particularly important role, namely Mama Abdullah Bin Nuh and Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi. Adbullah Bin Nuh runs his Islamic boarding school *(pesantren)* in the city of Bogor. Already in the late 1970s he was a well-known Islamic scholar, and had a large following. Most of his students studied at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (*Institut Pertanian Bogor).* During one of his visits to Sydney to see his son, called Muhammad Mustofa, who was studying there, Bin Nuh met Abdurrahman Al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi was a Palestinian Lebanese who had migrated to Australia to escape persecution. Fealy describes Al-Baghdadi as a tall, imposing, and charismatic man (2007: 155). Born as a child of Hizbut Tahrir activists, he had from the age of fifteen actively promoted the core concepts of Hizbut Tahrir (Rahmat, 2005: 98). Bin Nuh who, in the late 1970s, was disillusioned with the then present Islamic movements in Indonesia warmly welcomed the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir. According to Osman, he was

impressed by the organization's methodology, which seemed in his view to offer concrete solutions he believed the Muslim world was facing. In 1982 Bin Nuh invited his Australian – Lebanese friend, Al-Baghdadi, to teach in his school in Bogor. Since then, Bogor remained the organization's intellectual centre, although it is currently headquartered in Jakarta. Al-Baghdadi married a local woman and stayed in Bogor.

Al-Baghdadi, Bin Nuh, as well as to a lesser extent his son Mustofa played a major role in promoting the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir among the students in Bogor. One of the first students that played a key role in promoting the ideas among his peers was Fathul Hidayah. According to Rahmat, he became a motor of the new movement *(motor penggerak)* (Rahmat, 2005: 98). In 1985, a core group of students also started to give speeches in various other cities, foremost on campuses of the top Indonesian universities. According to Rahmat, it was in this year when the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir first reached the Gadjah Mada University. Yet, at that time, the name of the organization was not usually mentioned. Young Hizbut Tahrir activists, especially those from Bogor, visited different campus mosques and were often invited by groups as discussants and asked to share their ideas. They were also frequently given the chance to give public speeches and hold trainings and workshops in different mosques or private houses, as the students were interested in learning more about their ideas and discussing with them (Rahmat, 2005: 121). It was at this time that Ismail Yusanto was a studying at the Gadjah Mada University.

During Suharto's New Order regime, Hizbut Tahrir activists in Indonesia maintained a low profile. As is still the case today, the activists used their informal networks to promote the organization's ideas. Neither Fealy nor Osman points to problems that arose when openly promoting the implementation of the Sharia and the establishment of the caliphate. Fealy mentions only that the activists avoided to mention Hizbut Tahrir (2007: 155). The chapter about Hizbut Tahrir in the book written by Jamhari and Jajang Jaroni (2004) provides interesting insights into how Hizbut Tahrir operated under the Suharto regime. As a student at the Department of Geotechnical Engineering of the Gadjah Mada University and a prominent member of Jamaah Shalahuddin, the current spokesman of Hizbut Tahrir Ismail Yusanto, foremost studied the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. In particular, he and his

friends studied the books of Hasan al-Banna[20] and Sayyid Qutb[21]; those two authors had become icons for activists, also in Indonesia (Jamhari & Jahroni, 2004: 171). Yet, as he told the interviewer, he did not find the answers he was looking for in these texts. Only after studying the books of an-Nabhani, did he find all-encompassing concepts. This narrative that Hizbut Tahrir provides solutions to all problems at hand has become a hallmark of the organization as I discuss in subsequent chapters.

From the interviews with Ismail Yusanto, as printed in the book of Jamhari and Jajang Jaroni (2004), we also gain information about how the repressive government affected the every day practices of Islamic activists during the 1980s. Yusanto told that studying these Islamic texts that criticized the government and promoted the formalization of the Sharia was challenging. Often studying in small groups at night, it could happen that the group needed to change its location three times during one night. Particularly after the massacre of Tanjung Priok that took place in 1984, where up to 28 people were killed[22], activists were particularly alert and careful. The students had to take their shoes inside, also when studying in a mosque or smaller prayer house *(mushallah).* They did not use loud speakers, recording devices, or photo cameras. After the study session had finished, the students went home one after the other. All of these measures were taken so as not to attract the attention of the repressive government apparatus. Some of Yusanto's friends were caught by state agents (Jamhari & Jahroni, 2004: 173). In this political climate, Yusanto told the authors, the activists that started to study the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir kept a low profile. Hizbut Tahrir avoided publications and many Hizbut Tahrir members would not know the name of the organization's leaders. Only after the fall of Suharto, did the socio-political

[20] For a detailed account on Hasan al-Banna, see Krämer (2010). For a comprehensive study on the early history of the Brotherhood, see Mitchell (1993).

[21] For a fine monograph on the biography, major thoughts and the intellectual legacy of Sayyid Qutb see Calvert (2010). Further, this book provides insights into the post-1954 development of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

[22] For a historical contextualisation of the events that took place in September 1984 see Ricklefs (1991: 307).

context change and Hizbut Tahrir would come out of the underground and make its ideas public (ibid.: 174).

Despite the repressive political climate, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia was officially established. In the mid 1980s, the executive board of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia was founded, chaired by Bin Nuh. According to Fealy, this happened presumably with the approval of the central leadership of Hizbut Tahrir (Fealy, 2007: 155). During this time where state control was still intense, Hizbut Tahrir managed, according to Fealy, not to raise the suspicion of state authorities. Fealy notes that Hizbut Tahrir was *"adept at using state-sponsored religious bodies for recruitment and organizational purposes"* (2007: 155). Yet, it remains under-researched how the activists framed the necessity to establish the caliphate and implement the Sharia. In the extant research I found no reference to what kind of problems the activists linked to the necessity of establishing the caliphate. Or, to use Talal Asad's (1986) concept of reading Islam as a "*discursive tradition*", how the activists related what they consider as the ideal past to the present to imagine an ideal Islamic polity in the future. It remains unclear how, for example, the students of Bin Nuh and Al-Baghdadi linked the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir (although not often using the organization's name) to their lives. No study seems to exist so far that seeks to outline how the students regarded the idea of establishing the caliphate as a solution for a better future (if, as I assume, improving the future of the *ummat* was a major concern). Further, the question of how embracing the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir influenced daily routine and practices appears unexplored. Although the activists needed to maintain a low profile, I assume that their ideological convictions influenced their everyday lives and their imaginaries of – in the language of Asad (1986) - *"apt performance"*. Did the Hizbut Tahrir activists, themselves often inspired by books of ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Hasan al-Banna or Sayyid Qutb, distinguish themselves from these activists?

A question that is not addressed in any of the studies about Hizbut Tahrir regards the beginning of women's participation. I found no reference to when women started to study the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. As I discuss later in this chapter, in Yogyakarta the first study circle for women was founded in 1994. However, I assume that women study circles were established before that year, particularly in Bogor. The question of how women

activists framed the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir and related it to their everyday lives remains particularly obscure. With my data I am unable to address the topic of women's participation during the 1980s. I am also unable to answer the question of how students in general discussed the necessity of establishing the caliphate. Yet, in the subsequent subchapter I aim to provide a brief picture of how the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir reached the campus of the Gadjah Mada University in the early 1990s.

Historicizing Hizbut Tahrir at the Gadjah Mada University

The following account of the establishment of Hizbut Tahrir in Yogyakarta is mainly based on personal communication with Dwi Condro and his wife in March 2009. At that time, he was a high-ranking member of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and a PhD student at the National University of Malaysia (UKM), writing his dissertation in the field of Islamic economics, on the *dinar.* Interested to learn about the establishment of Hizbut Tahrir at the Gadjah Mada University, I had asked Ismail Yusanto via email about whether he could recommend an interview partner to me to learn more about the history of Hizbut Tahrir at the Gadjah Mada University. He kindly responded with the suggestion that I contact Dwi Condro and sent me his contact data. He was in the first study circle *(halaqah)* that was founded in Yogyakarta in 1991, taught by Ismail Yusanto. Dwi Condro, a charismatic and friendly man, was ready to be interviewed immediately and suggested that we meet in the yard of the Gadjah Mada University. His wife and two children accompanied him to the interview.

Proudly, he told me that he was among the first students who became familiar with the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir. This was in the late 1990s. Having started his studies in 1986 at the Faculty of Agriculture, he had always been what he calls a seeker *(mahasiswa yang suka mencari).* He became a member of the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin, and of the extra campus Islamic organization HMI MPO. The problem was, according to Dwi Condro, that in HMI MPO he and his friends did not intensively discuss Islamic matters *(materi keislaman).* They mainly learned organizational skills. Yet, his and his friends' hunger to learn more about Islam and discuss questions about how Islam could

change the world were not sufficiently addressed. So one way to allay this hunger for knowledge was to listen to sermons held in different locations. He was interested in Salafism, but was also active in the study circles of the *tarbiyah* movement (I discuss the *tarbiyah* movement later in this chapter). In these meetings he became familiar with the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Together with friends, he eagerly read the books of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. The shortcomings of these ideas were, in the opinion of Dwi Condro, that they did not provide him with satisfactory answers about how to improve the social, economic, and political problems that Indonesia was facing at that time. He did not get practical solutions about how to improve the situation in his country – but he was sure that the answers could be found in Islam. No concepts *(konsep)* were provided in the study circles of the *tarbiyah* movement. He adds that it might be that he gained this impression because he did not study these ideologies in depth.

He finally, as he said, found Hizbut Tahrir *(bertemu Hizbut Tahrir).* He had heard about the ideas of an-Nabhani and its agenda to re-establish the caliphate in a speech of one of his seniors, Ismail Yusanto. Fascinated by these ideas, Dwi Condro, together with a few friends also interested in studying the ideas intensively, asked Ismail Yusanto, located in Bogor, to send them a teacher. Having obtained the promise that they will be taught, Dwi Condro and his friends gathered more people, who were also interested in studying intensively. At the beginning of 1991, the first study circle was established, comprised of about ten students. At least in the way Dwi Condro told the story, the initiative to study came from the students seeking knowledge and new ideas.

At that time, this group of friends had rented a house in Klebengan, close to the Gadjah Mada University. When Ismail Yusanto came to teach the group once a month, they met in this house. At that time, only men were studying. They studied the books of an-Nabhani that had already been translated to Bahasa Indonesia in the early 1990s. Yet, the students used the Indonesian and the English version simultaneously in order to better understand the key concepts and simultaneously improve their knowledge of Arabic. During these meetings, they would read the books line by line. Each argument and concept would be explained by Ismail Yusanto and discussed until everyone had fully understood the idea and was able to relate it to the present context and reformulate it. Also, in absence of their

teacher, the group of friends was eager to read and discuss the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir. The ideas served as an entry point to discussion about how to improve the current socio-political situation. The concepts formulated by an-Nabhani in the 1960s were thus translated to the local context.

Dwi Condro told me that he and his friends were alert and eager not to attract the attention of the state's security apparatus. Importantly – as their friends in other cities - they were reluctant to mention the name Hizbut Tahrir in public. They were also cautious not to openly criticize the Suharto government. Yet, they were still eager to promote their ideas to peers they considered open minded. They strongly felt the obligation to do *dakwah* and regarded promoting the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir as their religious duty. Finding the balance between being cautious and doing *dakwah* was often challenging. Many of their friends who were members in HMI MPO and in Jamaah Shalahuddin were interested in discussing the core ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, and wanted to imagine how life could be different if the caliphate were established. This utopia served as an entry point to criticize the status quo, primarily already weakening Suharto government.

Ismail Yusanto came to teach his students for nearly four years, until 1995. Then, according to the account of Dwi Condro, he felt the students understood the ideas of an-Nabhani well enough and would be able to pass them on to others. Yet, if they were uncertain in regard to specific questions or in certain fields he was there for them. Also, they went to visit him and his friends in Bogor on a regular basis to study there.

Each student of the first study circle founded his own study circle with between six to ten students so as to spread the organization's ideas. As was standard for Hizbut Tahrir study circles, these meetings took place once every week for two hours. This cell system *(sistem sel)* proved to be efficient. Often students who wanted to study in a study circle were advised to find their own interested friends. It was thus not only the duty of the teacher to enlarge the group, but also of the students interested in studying. At the time, this cell system was not new, but was also a teaching method used by the Muslim Brotherhood *(usrah)* (Damanik, 2002: 88). According to Dwi Condro, and other activists I had the chance to talk to during my fieldwork, the study circle system is still today one of the two major ways of spreading Hizbut Tahrir's ideology.

It was not only during the New Order that this teaching method proved effective to maintain a low organizational profile, but also today it has many advantages. In Dwi Condro's opinion, its benefit lays foremost in the establishment of long term relationships between participants in the group, with a lot of space dedicated to in-depth explanation and questioning. This format does not only train the teachers' skills in explaining the ideology, but also forces the students to discuss what they learn.

According to Dwi Condro, the students had no links to Hizbut Tahrir members in other countries in the 1990s. Even within Indonesia they were only in direct contact with very few senior members. To protect both themselves as well as the senior members, they did not know the internal hierarchy and the names of other members that they were not interacting with. According to Dwi Condro, he and his friends were not really interested in the larger structure of the organization. Their concern was to save Indonesia. The international communication was the business of those above them *(orang-orang atas).* He and his friends just wanted to do *dakwah,* learn and discuss.

Beginning in 1994, women students of the Gadjah Mada University wanted to study the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir intensively. When Ismail Yusanto came to Yogyakarta to teach his male students, he would also teach the first study circles for women. These meetings were held in a mosque in close proximity to the campus of the Gadjah Mada University. From sometime in 1995, the group was taught weekly by a woman called Meta, who had moved from Bogor to Yogykarta. According to the wife of Dwi Condro, the same books are taught to women and men students. Yet, she told me that there may be differences in the way women discuss the text passages and relate these to their problems. Unfortunately, I have no information on what kinds of challenges Hizbut Tahrir women activists faced in the mid 1990s, how they interacted with men students, what kind of critique they faced from their families, or how they aimed to spread the ideas to peers. A further topic that remains unclear to me and seems to remain unaddressed in extant studies is about how these activists nowadays raise their children, and whether these children have themselves come to embrace the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. This "second generation" of Hizbut Tahrir activists, many of them now teenagers, has so far not attracted the attention of researchers.

Both Dwi Condro and his wife are still active in promoting the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir in different ways, also to their son and daughter who were at the time of the interview in primary school. Both have their own study circles, sometimes even more than one at the time. They both not only work with students, but with anyone interested in studying. Dwi Condro, for example, told me proudly that he once had a study circle of gardeners and other handworkers. They were very interested and learned fast. When one of them once gave a Friday sermon in a mosque, Dwi Condro asked his friend if he knew the profession of the man speaking. He answered that, telling from his way of speaking and arguing, this must be a university lecturer. He could hardly believe his ears when he learned that he was an uneducated gardener.

Besides teaching study circles, both Dwi Condro and his wife give public speeches. Dwi Condro's field of expertise is Islamic economy. He thus frequently discusses the advantages of introducing the gold standard and analyses economic problems he believes Indonesia is facing. To promote his ideas among a larger group of students, he opened, together with Ismail Yusanto, the STEI Hamfara, an institute for tertiary education in the field of Islamic economy. The aim of this school is, as it is outlined on the webpage http://stei-hamfara.ac.id, to provide the students with an alternative system to capitalism and socialism. The school is free, so no tuition fees need to be paid. All students must live at the school. There they have to pay for their food. The school was built with money from donors from Jakarta, as well as with money from a Japanese professor Hasan Konakata. According to Dwi Condro, Prof. Konakata is not a Hizbut Tahrir member, but masters the ideas of an-Nabhani better than many Hizbut Tahrir members. Besides teaching at STEI Hamfara in Yogyakarta, Dwi Condro is also a lecturer at the State Islamic Institute Surakarta *(Institut Agama Islam Negri IAIN Surakarta).* He is frequently invited as discussant to various events Hizbut Tahrir activists organize, for example to the First Indonesian Student Congress held in Jakarta in 2009 that attracted over 5'000 students from all over the archipelago. I discuss this congress in more detail in chapter seven.

No detailed study seems to exist that focuses on how student activists changed their strategies and practices to spread the organization's ideas in public after the year 2000, when the organization became legally recognized. The resistance and support they have

encountered remains under-researched. According to interviews conducted with different professors of the Gajdah Mada University, the organization was hardly visible on campus until around 2005. The reason for this might be that the organization needed time to change its *dakwah* strategy from acting as an underground movement to actively promoting its ideas in public. Until then, its activists were reluctant to publically mention their membership in Hizbut Tahrir. Further, the organization did not publically promote its ideas under its own name. Only in the years after 2006, Hizbut Tahrir started to increasingly visible on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University in the form of posters on information boards, increasing frequency of events both large and small, the eagerness of members to speak up in different thematic public seminars, and events held on the campus. Since then, Hizbut Tahrir activists often mention their organizational affiliation publicly and apply its ideology to different problems at hand; for example poverty, what they see as underdevelopment in the health care and education systems, and the moral degeneration of the Islamic community.

Embedding the Emergence of Hizbut Tahrir in the Historical Context of Suharto's New Order

To better understand the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia, at the Gadjah Mada University, as well as the shifts that have taken place within Jamaah Shalahuddin that I discuss further on, it seems important to get a picture of the larger socio-political context. Particularly, it seems crucial to understand Suharto's attitude towards political expressions of Islam. After Suharto came to power in the mid 1960s, he attempted to restrain and suppress the potential power of that which he considered political Islam. As a consequence of the mass persecution and killings between 1965-66, communism in Indonesia as a political force collapsed (M.C. Ricklefs, 1991: 287-8). Communism - referred to as the extreme left - was often named the states enemy number one by Suharto, and was considered a major danger to the stability of his government. Suharto considered the extreme right - political Islam - as threat number two (Anwar, 2009). For so-called stability

reasons, the early New Order government thus severely restricted the public activities of Islamic organizations. In 1968, Suharto disappointed some Muslims when he refused to recognize the Jakarta Charter that would have obliged all Muslims to follow Islamic law (Hefner, 1993: 3). Furthermore, he refused to restore Masyumi[23], which was banned by Sukarno in 1960 (M.C. Ricklefs, 1991: 268). While Suharto regarded political expressions of Islam as potentially dangerous and destabilizing, he supported programs aimed at strengthening personal piety, as this was seen as a useful tool to counter a potential re-emergence of communism.

In the 1960s, during the heyday of modernization theory, religious communities were considered to be undesirable relics of the passing of "traditional" societies. Since the days of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, scholars in the west argued that "religion" would be replaced by "science" and have decreasing significance in human life. The core idea was, as elaborated by scholars like Emile Durkheim (1915), Peter Berger (1967) and Shiner (1967), that the more modern a society is, the less religious it is. Knowledge, it was thought, should make religion superfluous. In the middle of the twentieth century, "secularization theory" became a central part of the theories of modernization. The separation of religion from politics, and from broader processes of the secularization of society came to be seen as an inherent part of modernization.[24]

In Indonesia, discourses on modernity, religious and secular, domestic and international have interacted and become incorporated into Indonesians' perceptions of what constitutes proper "religion" for "modern" people (Howell, 2007: 219). During Suharto's New Order Indonesia (1968 – 1998), "proper" religiosity was thus defined by legal and administrative structures. As Howell argues, religion was modernized and adapted to the perceived needs of modern people. Religion thus had to be scriptural, which means focused on the observance of specific legal and moral codes and on prescribed worship, thus "rational"

[23] Masyumi (Majilis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was founded in 1945 and was the major Islamic political party in Indonesia (M.C. Ricklefs, 1991).

[24]For a good literature review on classical theories of secularization as well as for early and more recent critics of the secularization theory see Schultz (2006). Further, the study of Swatos and Christiano (1999) provides a detailed discussion of the secularization debate from the mid 1960s until the late 1990s.

congregational and exclusive (2007: 220). Such a construction was gradually articulated in law and state administrative practice in Indonesia under the influence of modernist Muslims, mainline Christian churches and secular elites inspired by mid-century social scientific modernization theories. Consequently, experiential religiosity and eclecticism was devalued. Not only were such emotive and "inward" forms of spirituality castigated by scripturalists as a violation of Islamic orthodoxy, but modernizing elites in general hoped to move the nation beyond such "irrational" and outmoded "superstitions" (Howell, 2007: 220). The New Order's economic development programs, the rapidly increasing levels of secular education, entry of middle-class Muslims into upper-echelon jobs in the modern sector of Indonesia's economy, and increasingly cosmopolitan life experiences in the middle and upper classes constituted the Islamic sensibilities.

During the first years of the New Order under Suharto, students played a major role in opposing the new government. As Edward Aspinall outlined, students started organizing protests against the new president, focusing on corruption and criticizing his handling of the 1971 elections, as well as the construction of the Taman Mini entertainment park (Aspinall, 2005: 118). While the aim back then was to "correct" the government rather than overthrow or replace it, disillusionment deepened in the following years. In 1974, student activists asked for the dismissal of personal assistants of Suharto, who were, in their eyes, too influential and corrupt. The government answered this demonstration with violence, and nine students were killed and 23 were injured. This event entered history as the "Malari Incident"[25] (Rosyad, 1995: 13). As a consequence of this event, the Minister of Education, Daoed Joesoef, banned student involvement in politics and in 1977-78 issued a package of policies referred to as NKK/BKK (Normalization of Campus Life / Bodies for the Coordination of Student Affairs). New institutions replaced the former student bodies whose members were no longer elected by fellow students, but rather appointed by campus administrators (Aspinall, 2005: 120; Kraince, 2000: 94-6). This package of policies made it increasingly difficult for students to openly criticize the government.

[25] "Malari" is an abbreviation that stands for Peristiwa Malapetaka Limabelas January (The Fifteenth January Event).

Existing extra university student organizations, thus those that were not under the bureaucracy of the university as Jamaah Shalahuddin, were forbidden to conduct activities on university campuses (Aspinall, 1995: 30). Student activists were thus forced to find alternative forms of activism; one form was engagement in Jamaah Shalahuddin, while others became active in NGO's and in community development. During this time, study groups *(klompok studi)* mushroomed at different universities, and also at Gadjah Mada University. Students gathered either in private homes or in mosques, such as in the Mardliyah Mosque close to the Sarjito hospital (the Gadjah Mada University Mosque was not built until 1999). Aspinall describes the emergence of study groups formed in different university towns after 1978 as a consequence of the Normalization of Campus Life. In Yogyakarta, he writes, around twenty different groups existed in 1987 that were loosely structured and varied in size, as well as in political outlook. In these study groups, which met near the campus, students regularly discussed social and political theory, and social problems and developments. Not all of these study groups were Islamic in their outlook, however; in some study circles the works of Paolo Freire and Franz Fanon, of the Frankfurt school, or classical Marxism was discussed (Aspinall, 2005: 120-1).

Mahfudz Sidiq (2003) outlines that as a consequence of the legally enforced depoliticizing of the campuses in the late 1970s and 1980s, groups similar to Jamaah Shalahuddin were founded at different universities. Up through mid 1980s, University Dakwah Organizations (LDK) were established at most universities. Yet, the program they offered and how they were organized varied from university to university. By the beginning of the 1990s, most of these LDK were formally linked to their university (2003: 72). As I discuss below, these University Dakwah Organizations already started to collaborate in the 1980s.

Whilst discouraging political Islam, the New Order government encouraged personal piety, as an anti-communist strategy. This can be seen in its efforts to sponsor neighbourhood prayer meetings, construct new mosques and prayer halls, and the coordination of the pilgrimage to Mecca for thousands of Indonesians each year (Brenner, 1996: 693). The state also supported a variety of Islamic institutions. In 1967, Masyumi activists founded the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation *(DDII – Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia)* as a response to the political repression of political Islam (Hefner, 2000: 109). Mohammed

Natsir, former charismatic leader of Masyumi, had, in regard to the political circumstances, decided to shift the focus of his energies away from political involvement to *dakwah* (van Bruinessen, 2002: 122). The main focus of the DDII was to call on Muslims to become "better Muslims", living their lives in accordance with the Sharia on a personal level, but not demanding the formal implementation of Islamic law. The state tried during this period to foster and domesticate Islam, while also attempting to relegate it to the private sphere. It banned veiling in public schools until 1990, as this form of Islamic dress was linked to forms of Islam considered potentially political and thus threatening to the government's stability (Brenner, 1996: 676).

As Rosyad points out in his study about Islamic student activism in Bandung, the situation of fierce political repression was quite frustrating for students during the late 1970s and 1980s (1995: 14). However, looking back at the political situation at that time, Abdul Gaffar Karim writes that these repressive policies were also *"a blessing in disguise"* (2006: 34). He argues that the limited space that all students, not only those involved in Islamic organizations, had for their activities made the mosques a particularly attractive place. Mosques were regarded as safe places from government repression and therefore the mosque, and with it religious activities in general, gained importance (Ghozaly, 2008: 31; A. G. Karim, 2006: 35). Diederich argues further that the political repressions had a surprising side effect, namely that alternative religious currents emerged during this time (Diederich, 2002: 103). Student activism did thus change its orientation and to some extent its organizational format during this period. Instead of focusing on directly criticizing the state and governmental structures, activists focused on becoming themselves "better Muslims" and in promoting morality by engaging in *dakwah,* in urging people to adopt "more Islamic" behaviour in their everyday life.

The general politically ordered de-politicization of campus activists in the late 1970s, as well as of Islam in Indonesia more generally, triggered a turn to Islamic thought. The ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood became a major force of inspiration during this time, both for students, as well as for Muslims with Masyumi background (van Bruinessen, 2002: 125). Although the ideas of the Brotherhood had already reached Indonesia in the late 1950s,

they only found a sizable following in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 28).

In the 1970s, Indonesia witnessed a rapid increase of urban wealth. Night clubs were opened, the consumption of alcohol increased and especially upper-middle class youth began to embrace a permissive hedonistic lifestyle inspired by western pop culture (Hefner, 2000: 123). What was proposed in the writings of the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to offer an Islamic alternative to openly political Islam as well as to western inspired consumer culture. Although the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is today commonly seen as the example of political Islam par excellence, the fascination of the students with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood was focused on the idea promoted by Hasan al-Banna of "Islamizing the self". The focus was thus on personal piety rather than on directly demanding systemic change. Aside from the work of al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, the writings of the Pakistani scholar Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi also became popular (van Bruinessen, 2002: 125).

In the 1980s, Islamic publishing began to flourish and works of Islamic scholars were translated into Indonesian. Students and other well-educated Indonesians eagerly read these various texts. Especially students formed numerous discussion groups or study circles where these new ideas very vividly and critically discussed. Besides books of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami, the works of Muslim scholars such as of Fazlur Rahman, Frithjof Schuon, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Sayyid Naguib al-Attas were also discussed. The works of the Iranian thinkers Ali Shari'ati and, a few years later, of Murtaza Mutahhari had a strong intellectual impact and appealed especially to students and young Muslim intellectuals. Many young Indonesians were fascinated by the Iranian revolution (van Bruinessen, 2002: 126). What seemed most fascinating in the works of Shari'ati and Mutahhri was the idea of a revolutionary Islam that has to defend the rights of the weak and oppressed *(mustad' afin)* (van Bruinessen, 2002: 131).

What seemed particularly interesting in the ideas of these writers was not their agenda to establish an Islamic state, but their focus on personal piety, the emphasis of community services, and the formation of close-knit study groups that allowed the creation of discrete "Islamized spaces" (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 28). The initiation to change society begins,

according to these activists, with the transformation of the individual and the gradual "Islamization" of society, as this would in the end lead to the legal implementation of the Sharia, and the formation of an Islamic state.

The Ideas of Hizbut Tahrir in the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin

After having set the larger context, I now return to the Gadjah Mada University and discuss the intellectual climate in this particular context. I focus here on the developments that have taken place within Jamaah Shalahudin and embed these within the political context of the last forty years, starting in the 1970s when the group was founded. After taking a closer look at the history of the organization and its recent agenda, some of the transformations do not seem as striking as they are described by one of the founding fathers in the citation at the beginning of this chapter. Rather, the organization's current legalistic strategy seems in line with its core goal of making Islam compatible with modernity. As Comaroff and Comaroff outline, resorting to law, and especially to religious law, to initiate social change is a phenomenon widely observable worldwide, especially since the twenty-first century (J. L. Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009: 47)**.** Holding the current legal system responsible for problems the country is facing and demanding more or less radical systemic and legal changes is thus, according to the authors, a common way to criticize the status quo, to work for what is envisioned as a better future and to extend the influence of one's own group.

The fact that Jamaah Shalahuddin demands the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of the Sharia cannot be interpreted as a shift from an apolitical attitude towards a form of political Islamic activism, as suggested by Chairil Anwar in his interpretation of the "new direction" the group is taking. Rather, their agenda to make Islam compatible with modernity, as stated by Anwar quoted at the beginning of this chapter, seems ultimately to have been a political endeavour. The fact that they currently promote a legalistic approach, the establishment of Islamic law, needs to be seen in the contemporary context. As in the past, also in today's Indonesia, it seems that all aspects of everyday life,

from education, to welfare, healthcare, management of natural recourses, commercial transactions, and interfaith relationships, are in one way or another under the regulatory apparatuses of the modern Indonesian nation state. Similarly, Islamic student organizations have been shaped in different ways by modes of modern governance. This being the case, and for a long time now they have been searching for ways to engage with these different institutions, and have sought to alter the modes of governance. Yet, political engagement took various shapes under different circumstances.

As noted in this chapter's introduction, in 2008 the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin declared the establishment of the caliphate a top priority for the coming term (Nugroho, 2009: 113). Together with students inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbut Tahrir activists constitute the dominant force within this organization. Both Dwi Condro and Ismail Yusanto are alumni of this organization. In this subchapter, I seek to take the developments that have taken place within Jamaah Shalahuddin since it was founded in 1976 as a starting point for my discussion of the ideas upon which Hizbut Tahrir flourished. I base my account on the dearth of published literature on Jamaah Shalahuddin, on interviews, and on the book chapter written by the officiating president of the organization in 2008, Edi Nugroho. Further, I embed the developments that have taken place at the Gadjah Mada University within the larger context.

Ahmad Fanani, Muslich ZA, A. Luqman, M. Toyibi, Samhari Baswedan and Chairil Anwar founded Jamaah Salahuddin in 1976.[26] In the beginning, this was an unstructured group of students rather than a formal organization (A. G. Karim, 2006: 36). In 1979 it became a formal organization under the coordination of the vice rector for student affairs. Research conducted on Jamaah Shalahuddin remains scarce. Abdul Gaffar Karim (2006), a social and political scientist and lecturer at the Gadjah Mada University, has written the most comprehensive study to date about the general development of the organization, from its founding in 1976 until the first years of the twenty first century. In particular, he examines how the changes within Suharto's New Order politic have constituted the development and

[26] In different accounts, the names of founding fathers vary. Karim does not include Chairil Anwar in his list of founding fathers (2006: 36), however, he notes that there seems to be no fixed list (A. G. Karim, 2006: 55). Nugroho includes also Djafnan Tsan Affandi, Erlius and Hadi Prihatin in his list of founding fathers (2009: 109).

agenda of Jamaah Shalahuddin, and embeds the changes within the organization in the larger context of the Islamic revival that has taken place in Indonesia since the 1970s. He bases his study foremost on interviews conducted with former members of the organization, as well as on the analysis of press releases of the group. Although his study sheds light on the general outlook of the organization, particularly during the 1980s, he does not mention the influence of Hizbut Tahrir's ideology on the organization. Neither the organization's name, nor the works of an-Nabhani are named. Only in a later published personal account about changes that have occurred on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University does he mention the presence of Hizbut Tahrir's ideology in Jamaah Shalahuddin (A. G. Karim, 2009: xxii).

M.M. Billah (1989) has written a comprehensive study about the ideology of Jamaah Shalahuddin in the 1980s, thus before the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir reached the Gadjah Mada University. His study is nevertheless noteworthy in what it reveals about the ideological ground upon which an-Nabhani's ideas fell when they reached Yogyakarta at the beginning of the 1990s. In his study, he compares Jamaah Shalahuddin with two other Yogyakarta groups, one active at the Mardliyah mosque and the other at the Syuhada mosque. He reveals that he did not find among any of the three groups examined a tendency or any sign that they wish to change the governmental system (Billah, 1989: 383). Rather than calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, as the Jamaah Salahuddin did in 2008, they promoted the vision of each man as caliph on earth *(khalifah di bumi)* (Billah, 1989: 381). This idea is different from the idea of establishing an Islamic state or the caliphate *(khilafah),* which is ruled by a single caliph *(khalifah):* The focus is on improving one's personal relationship to God. According to Billah's observations, the reference books mostly discussed by Jamaah Shalahuddin activists during the 1980s were the writings of Ali Shari'ati, Sayyid Qutub, Abul A'la Maududi, Iqbal and Al-Ghazali (1989: 340).

The language used by Jamaah Shalahuddin activists in the 1980s, as discussed by Billah (1989), is different from the language its activists use over two decades later, though similarities do exist. The major difference seems to be that no systemic or legal changes were demanded during the 1980s. However, the organization was political in the sense that it was discussing questions related to the ideal relationship between Islam and state power.

Yet, its activists had to find a different way to engage with structures of state authority and the all-encompassing institutions of the Indonesian state. The activists' choice to focus on "improving" Islamic morality is political in many ways, as it also challenges modes of governance and carries with it political consequences. The core idea that Islam should inspire all aspects of life, and not only parts of it, is prominently promoted. Activists argue that Islam cannot, as postulated by the state, be reduced to obeying the five pillars of Islam (Billah, 1989: 379). The claim that Islam should be lived in a complete manner *(Islam kaffah)* is, however, not equated with a call for "Islamizing" the entire state apparatus. Nevertheless, the activists did think about what answers Islam could provide to respond to problems of modernity *(zaman modern)*, such corruption, prostitution or high interest rates. Creating an Islamic family was seen of utmost importance and the basis for building a strong Islamic personality (Billah, 1989: 365). The power of God is considered absolute, so Allah determines all processes.

In his study, Yon Machmudi talks about the rise of the *tarbiyah* movement in Indonesia, and how Hizbut Tahrir was in competition with groups inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood at different University Dakwah Organizations (Machmudi, 2008: 119). Machmudi's study reveals that one of the core books of Hizbut Tahrir, the *Kitab Mafahim,* was read and discussed during the eighth conference of the Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations FSLDK held in Makassar, South Sulawesi in 1993. The founder of Hizbut Tahrir an-Nabhani wrote this book. In it he outlined the basic concepts of the organization. According to Machmudi, this book became one of the main reference texts in many University Dakwah Organizations (Machmudi, 2008: 119). However, he does not mention whether the book was subsequently discussed within Jamaah Shalahuddin. He states that during the 1990s, three main groups were struggling to control the organization, namely *tarbiyah* activists inspired by the writings of prominent scholars of the Muslim Brotherhood, foremost were Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, salafi groups[27], and Hizbut Tahrir activists.

[27] A detailed study about the rise of salafism at Indonesian universities is provided by Hasan (2006, 2007). He also supports the observation made by Machmudi that Jamaah Salahuddin was mainly dominated by Hizbut Tahrir, *tarbiyah* and salafi activists during the 1990s (Hasan, 2006: 83).

According to information Machmudi gained during an interview with Ismail Yusanto, Jamaah Shalahuddin was despite the influence of Hizbut Tahrir not controlled by its members. Until the late 1990s, the *tarbiyah* activists were the stronger faction within the group and restricted the opportunity for external Hizbut Tahrir members to give lectures at student gatherings. Apparently this changed after 1998 (Machmudi, 2008: 120).

In the following section, I aim to discuss the idea behind founding Jamaah Shalahuddin, according to one of the organization's founding fathers Chairil Anwar. In 2009 when I interviewed him, he was the dean of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the Gadjah Mada University. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Chairil Anwar regrets the development within Jamaah Shalahuddin and uses the fact that the organization currently has the establishment of the caliphate on its agenda as an entry point to contrast the idea of the organization's founders over thirty years ago. Yet, the core aim of the founding fathers, namely to make Islam compatible with modernity and provide an alternative framework to what he labelled "western consumer and pop culture" is still at the heart of the organization's working agenda.

According to Anwar, it was back in the mid 1970s that the founders' primary aim to make Islam become trendy and compatible with the lives of students was articulated. They aimed to show that openly displaying one's Islamic identity and discussing Islamic matters was cool, not old-fashioned and backward. Islam was framed so as to enable an alternative, morally superior way of life. He and some of his friends felt that the Islamic community needed to be brought back to Islam. Concerned by the minor role Islam seemed to play in the life of students, the previously mentioned "founding fathers" met to discuss how Islam could be rendered attractive to students. They decided that they needed to merge aspects of what they called pop culture *(budaya pop)* and Islam to respond to the students' spirit.

In 1976, they agreed to celebrate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad *(Maulid Nabi Muhammed)* in a trendy way, and named this event *Maulid Pop*. This event was later regarded as the founding moment of Jamaah Salahudin, although the name was not yet used. Besides this, they organized other events, for example to remember *Isra' Mi'raj* (the Prophet's Nightly Journey and Ascension to Heaven). Rather than delivering religious sermons, they organized poetry readings, art exhibitions, performances, and invited bands

playing Islamic music *(nasyid).* The aim of the group was to present Islam in a modern way, as being up to date, trendy and compatible with the academic dynamic climate of the campus.

In order to address the largest possible group of students, they aimed to end the conflict between the two dominant student organizations at the time, namely the secular-nationalist Indonesian Nationalist Student Movement GMNI founded in 1954, and the Islamic Student Association HMI. Besides HMI, two other Islamic student organizations were active at the Gadjah Mada University during the 1970s, namely the Indonesian Muslim Student Movement PMII and the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM. The idea of the founders was that Muslims of all strands of Islam should feel welcomed in this new community. Therefore, they rejected identification with one particular strand of Islam and tried to overcome the chasm between the two large mass-based organizations existing in the 1970s, Muhammadiyah and Nadlathul Ulama. Instead of focusing on the competing ideologies and interpretations of Islam as represented by the two, the founders' aim was to stress the unity of the Islamic community, and to stress its compatibility with modernity as a source of inspiration to deal with the challenges the students' faced in their lives. The idea was, as Karim stresses, "to promote a *neutral* and *independent* method of *dakwah*" (2006: 37, emphasis added).

According to Anwar, the name chosen for the organization in the 1970s reflects the spirit of open-mindedness and the intent to address the largest possible public. The organization was named, a few months after it had started to organize its first events, after the well-known Muslim hero Shalahuddin al Ayyubi. At the time, the name was chosen not to remember the merits of Shalahuddin as a fighter against western crusaders, but to remember his talent as someone who could communicate with people from different sides, regardless of origin and ideology (A. G. Karim, 2006: 37). However, in the current context, members of the organization stated in interviews that they admire Shalahuddin al Ayyubi as a fighter against western imperialism. Depending on the political and social context, the interpretation of the merits of this Islamic hero is flexibly adapted. Rather than stressing his ability as a mediator between different fronts, his qualities as defender of Islam and saviour of the Islamic civilization are stressed.

In 1985, a new legislation required all socio-political and religious organizations in Indonesia to acknowledge the official state ideology, *Pancasila*, as their sole ideological basis *(asas tunggal),* on the threat of losing their legal right to exist. This meant that the state ideology had to stand above all other creeds, including those of Islam and other religions (Riza, 2008: 374). A consequence of this law was that no religious organization or political party could legally deny or challenge the authority of the state. Violent protests and divisions among Muslim leaders were the result of this governmental decision. Islamic student organizations responded in different ways to the new governmental legislation. Jamaah Shalahuddin was not affected directly by this new regulation, as it was legally not an autonomous organization, but linked to the Gadjah Mada University, which is ideologically based on the Pancasila. Nevertheless, the governmental decision to install the Pancasila as sole ideological basis had an effect on the organization. Since Jamaah Shalahuddin was founded, many of its members were simultaneously active in the Muslim Student Association HMI, as for example Dwi Condro. Disagreement over whether to replace Islam as ideological basis of the organization with the Pancasila ideology eventually resulted in a split of HMI into two organizations in 1986 (Albar & Kurniawan, 2009: 4; Riza, 2008: 378). HMI activists at Gadjah Mada University were among those who had argued against accepting the Pancasila as the organization's ideological basis and therefore joined the organization that kept Islam as its foundation named HMI MPO. Rusli Karim (1997) focuses in his book *"HMI MPO in the Crisis of Political Modernization in Indonesia"* on the transition the organization experienced since it was first founded in 1947, but foremost between the years 1986 and 1997. His argument is that with the foundation of ICMI in 1990 the Islamic community has experienced important changes as the state's attitude towards Islamic organizations started to change. He critiques the accommodative behaviour towards state politics of various Islamic groups. By taking HMI MPO as a focus, the book provides rich insights into the relationship between the Islamic groups and the state before the fall of Suharto.

As HMI MPO was not legal anymore, Jamaah Shalahuddin became the main organizational vehicle at Gadjah Mada University for the members of this organization who had opposed the new governmental law. The Indonesian Muslim Student Movement PMII and the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM had both, as their mother organizations NU and

Muhammadiyah, accepted to adopt the Pancasila as ideological basis (Rosyad, 1995: 13). According to Karim, Jamaah Shalahuddin had already become increasingly politicized in the 1990s, when the repression of the Suharto government started to loosen (2006: 40).[28] During this time, the definition of what was seen as political activism became increasingly flexible and Jamaah Shalahuddin activists started to formulate political demands. It is in this political climate of increasing dissatisfaction with the Suharto government that the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir fell on fertile ground. It was precisely at this time when the relationship between Islam and politics was being intensively debated, and students felt increasingly frustrated.

In the mid 1990s, the student party of Jamaah Shalahuddin, the Roundabout Party *(Partai Bunderan)* won three elections for the Student Council. As in other Indonesian universities, student parties linked to different movements existing at the university would compete for positions within the Student Council. The strategy to get involved in student politics was, however, debated within the group and was seen as a decrease in neutrality by some of its members (A. G. Karim, 2006: 40). According to Chairil's observations, Jamaah Shalahuddin remained an inclusive and moderate organization until around 2000. The Roundabout Party, its name referring to the big roundabout in front of the university's main entrance, is still active today and is still the most successful student party on the campus.

Involvement in political activities, such as in the university's student council, was seen as the logical consequence of adherence to *dakwah* that was promoted within Jamaah Shalahuddin. As outlined in the writings of Hasan al-Banna, which were according to Dwi Condro eagerly read by members of Jamaah Shalahuddin, performing *dakwah* was seen as an obligation for all Muslims. Their own personality has to be changed first, then "Islamic values" *(nilai-nilai Islam)* should be taught to friends and family, and finally societal institutions should be "Islamized". For example, what is viewed as reflecting a strong sense of morality is the strict avoidance of dating and smoking. Furthermore, it has become a consensus since the late 1980s that women activists should veil. Karim notes that they were

[28] For a detailed discussion about how Suharto's attitude towards Islamic groups changed during the 1990s see for example Hefner (2000) or Aspinall (2005).

not forced to do so, but that it was the moral standard that had developed within the organization (A. G. Karim, 2006: 45). After "Islamizing" the self, gradually, the whole Muslim community should thus be "educated" and "Islamized". Engaging in student politics, as this becomes possible again during the 1990s, is thus seen as one way of fulfilling the perceived duty do engage in *dakwah.*

Hasan al-Banna regards Islam and the state as inseparable. However, like al-Banna, the *tarbiyah* members did not regard the formation of a formal Islamic state in Indonesia as a goal for the near future. Rather, in line with al Banna's approach, the Islamization of the state was seen as a gradual process. Society needed to be Islamized first, so that Muslims would understand the principles of Islam and strive to establish a formal Islamic state as a natural consequence of their understanding of Islam. Muslims must be convinced first that Islam provides a complete, perfect and universal set of beliefs, which they must embrace (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 29). In the 1990s, the demand to establish an Islamic state is not yet formulated openly and put on the agenda of the organization. The focus is rather on calling for democracy with the idea that if all Muslims are educated and embrace Islam, this would than lead to an Islamic state (Kraince, 2000, 2003). Yet, no research seems to exist examining the attitudes of Hizbut Tahrir activists in the efforts to bring down Suharto. I strongly that they did not call democracy. As I discuss in chapter four, Hizbut Tahrir activists deem democracy as being opposed to Islam. In their view, the sovereignty should be in the hands of Allah, not in the hands of the people. How they framed their call for the caliphate in the late 1990s remains obscure.

Already in the late 1980s, Jamaah Salahuddin activists conducted a survey to evaluate their fellow Muslim students' understanding of Islam. They felt that weekly Islamic Studies Lectures that are compulsory for each Muslim student during the first year of university were ineffective and not sufficient to provide a basic understanding of Islam. According to the survey, many Muslims did not know how to properly perform the daily prayers, and a large number were not able to read the Qur'an written in Arabic script. In response to these results, Jamaah Salahuddin activists developed a tutoring system where one or two senior Muslim students would teach a small group of about ten junior Muslims. People with a similar level of Islamic knowledge were grouped together, with men and women students

taught in separate groups. This program originally named Islamic Studies Mentoring *(Pendamping Agama Islam)* was first implemented in 1987 and was coordinated by Jamaah Salahuddin activists in cooperation with the Islamic sections of the student councils of each faculty (A. G. Karim, 2006: 47-8). As Karim notes, it is interesting that the university fully supported the idea and deemed Jamaah Salahuddin responsible for the program. Karim's explanation is that the university liked the idea that Islamic student activists focused on *non-political* activities, such as *dakwah* (A. G. Karim, 2006: 48). They seem to regard teaching what they call basic values of Islam as neutral knowledge transmission.

In 2004, the officiating rector of the Gadjah Mada University, Prof. Dr. Sofian Effendi, agreed to rename the program, Assistance in Islamic Religion *(Asistensi Agama Islam – AAI)* and make it compulsory for all Muslim students during their first year of study. [29] However, according to Karim, many students believed it was compulsory also before 2004, because it was announced in the first lesson of the Islamic Studies Lectures, which are mandatory for all students. Since the program's implementation, it has become the organization's most important program, and has allowed its members to reach thousands of students in subsequent years. Whereas Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and Hindu students also had to take classes in their respective religion, there was no tutoring system that they were obliged to follow. Sofian Effendi explained to me that at that time he was not aware that this tutoring system would become one of the most important vehicles of recruitment for *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists, of "radical" Islam, as he calls it. He was not aware, he told me, of the "political" consequences and implications this program would have. In 2009 he argued that it would be too late to stop the program, as objection from the students would be too large. Yet, in 2011, the program was declared optional within different faculties. The problem, he told me, is that activists with profound knowledge of Islam that promote what he calls "moderate" Islam are not interested in becoming tutors. This is, Prof Effendi assumes, because they prefer to engage in other activities than teaching junior students the so-called basics of Islam. He is well aware of the fact that the tutors promote a specific understanding of what it means to be and live as a pious Muslim. Students reported

[29] The interview with Prof. Dr. Sofian Effendi was conducted in February 2009 in Yogyakarta.

to him, for example, that they were encouraged by their tutors to start wearing headscarves and long skirts instead of jeans. Others complained about tutors who seem to regard democracy as opposed to Islam.

Notably, the president of Jamaah Shalahuddin in 2008 still described the organization in an interview still as "neutral" and "independent", as was done by the founding fathers over forty years prior. His interpretation of neutral and independent is not in the sense of ideologically neutral, but in the sense of not officially linked to any specific organization. Yet he stresses that the individuals active in the organization, especially those holding strategic positions, are linked to other organizations, and this inevitably shapes the outlook of Jamaah Shalahuddin. However, as the official University Dakwah Organization of the Gadjah Mada University, the organization is at least officially obliged to remain neutral and independent.[30]

Hizbut Tahrir's Development within the *Tarbiyah* Movement

As the previously reviewed studies about the development and ideological outlook of Jamaah Shalahuddin as well as the personal account of Dwi Condro reveal, the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir needs to be embedded into the larger context of the *tarbiyah* movement, that developed foremost at the leading national Indonesian universities. The main aim of this movement is to teach Muslims to understand Islam as a total way of life. *Tarbiyah* may literally be translated as education. Yet it refers to the entire process of personal education, as well as to the education or guidance of others that is to lead to the personal transformation as a "total" or "complete" *(kaffah)* Muslim. According to Chairil Anwar, the students of the Gadjah Mada University only started to use these terms *tarbiyah* after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Although most Islamic activists, including Hizbut Tahrir activists, focus in different ways on educating others, the word *tarbiyah* has become strongly associated with activists inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, foremost by

[30] For a diagram displaying the organizational structure of see http://js.ugm.ac.id/tentang-kami/struktur.html, (21 December 2010).

the writings of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb. In the current context of Islamic student activism, Hizbut Tahrir activists do not define themselves – and are not defined by others - as *tarbiyah* activists.

The study by Rifki Rosyad (1995) provides an insightful account of the early phase of the *tarbiyah* movement in Bandung. In his study entitled *"A Quest for True Islam"*, he explores what might be seen as the beginning of the *tarbiyah* movement in the city of Bandung in West Java. In the late 1970s, the charismatic Muslim intellectual Imaduddin Abdurahhim started to give trainings to students at the Salman Mosque. These trainings called *Dakwah Mujahid* Trainings *(LMD – Latihan Mujahid Dakwah),* were sites where students were supposed to acquire a basic understanding of Islam. These trainings were strongly supported by Natsir and the Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (DDII), and lasted about one week. During this time, the selected students were cut off from the outside world. Not only students from Bandung joined these trainings, but also students from Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and other cities (Rosyad, 1995: 33). In 1979 the trainings were renamed Islamic Intensive Study *(SII – Studi Islam Intensif),* as the government understood the word *mujahid* contained in the former name of the trainings as a stability threat (ibid: 34). Students from the Gajah Mada University also joined the trainings delivered at the Salman Mosque during this time. Returning students were supposed to teach what they had learnt to fellow students, especially via the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin (ibid: 34).

The participants of the trainings were carefully selected with respect to their level of motivation to continue the trainings. The most important criterion for being selected was the overall "intellectual potential" of a student. Their grade point average at university had be above a certain level to make sure they only chose the best students. The aim was to create an elite group, capable of combining academic excellence with Islamic knowledge *(kekuatan iman)* and Islamic morality *(akhlak)* (Djamas, 1989: 269). In 1981 the Salman Mosque Youth Association *(Kelaurga Remaja Islam Salman – Karisma)* was founded (Rosyad, 1995: 34). The government did not consider their religious activities as political activism. Besides Islamic training, the group also offered other types of training to university

and high school students, such as computer courses, English language courses and other skills regarded as useful for succeeding in the job market (Kailani, 2010: 75-76).

The most important program of this group was its "mentoring program" (Rosyad, 1995: 34-35), where a small group of fifteen to twenty students called *mutarabbi* would study with a mentor referred to as *murabbi*. This concept of teaching Islam in an *usrah* (nuclear family) was prominently formulated and propagated by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. The teaching material commonly used in the study circles *(halqah)* consisted commonly of Muslim Brotherhood materials, foremost the writings of Hasan al-Banna, as well as those of Pakistani scholar Abdul Ala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami. Al Banna's ideas on politics, the state, personal behaviour and organizational methods became the main inspiration, however, for the *tarbiyah* movement, and his writings were its primary reference (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 28).

The Salman group was innovative in making Islam look cool and trendy, as was Jamaah Shalahuddin, who also sought to merge Islam and pop culture. Pop bands were invited to play at different events, *Karisma* organized seminars on different topics, published a small journal distributed among students and developed economic programs for the poor neighbourhoods close to the campus. In its diverse activities, especially in the mentoring programs, the duty of every Muslim to conduct *dakwah* was emphasized. Students returning to their home universities were eager to continue this kind of Islamic education or *tarbiyah* at their home universities.

It seems important to note that the movement that started in the mid 1970s on various university campuses, and took shape during the 1980s, was not a coherent movement with a discernable centre, but was rather comprised of different groups that were loosely structured and varied in size, as well as in political outlook (van Bruinessen, 2002: 132). In the interview, Chairil Anwar stated that the activists from the Salman mosque and Jamaah Shalahuddin activists were on good terms. Yet he stressed that Jamaah Shalahuddin was operating differently and was focusing more on action, on organizing events, rather than on organizing trainings. Furthermore, he stated that Jamaah Shalahuddin was far more open and tried to address a broad community of Muslim students, rather than targeting

individuals with a certain personality. He saw the founding of Jamaah Shalahuddin however as a response to the political governmental repression under Suharto.

In the early 1980s some activists of Jamaah Shalahuddin founded a communication network that would facilitate the exchange of ideas between different University Dakwah Organizations, the Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations *(FSLDK – Forum Silaturrahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus).* One prominent founding member of this Friendship Forum was Ismail Yusanto. The Friendship Formum linked Jamaah Shalahuddin with the University Dakwah Organizations of the Bandung Institute of Technology, where the Salman movement emerged, University of Indonesia, the Bogor Agriculture Institute, where some of its students had begun in the 1980s to study the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, and the Airlangga University located in Surabaya (A. G. Karim, 2006: 50).

This forum is currently still active and links University Dakwah Organizations of different universities. In its current organigram, Jamaah Shalahuddin still has a division called "team FSLDK" *(Tim FSLDK)* that is directly subordinated to the president of Jamaah Shalahuddin and responsible for communicating with the University Dakwah Organizations of different universities.[31] In 2004, the Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations openly outlined the establishment of the caliphate on its agenda (Fathurrahman et al., 2007). My conclusion at the time after reading the agenda was that Hizbut Tahrir members, or sympathisers, mainly controlled the organization.

However, according to Arwyn (Akhmad Arwyn Imamur Rozi), president of Jamaah Shalahuddin in 2011, the FSLDK does not hold an important role anymore in coordinating different University Dakwah Organizations.[32] In January 2012, no call to establish the caliphate can be found on the official webpage of the FSLDK. The poor condition the webpage, along with the few accessible articles, underscore Arwyn's statement that the

[31] For an overview of the whole structure of Jamaah Shalahuddin see http://js.ugm.ac.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=55&Itemid=88, (6 October 2010).

[32] Interview conducted in August 2011 in the office of Jamaah Shalahuddin.

FSLDK has lost influence.[33] At least to a certain extent, the FSLDK has been replaced by a new organization that aims to coordinate the different University Dakwah Organizations named Coordination Body of University Dakwah Organizations (*BKLDK – Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus)*.[34] As I argue in chapter seven, Hizbut Tahrir controls the BKLDK; its call for the caliphate is omnipresent.

In 1998, Jamaah Shalahuddin members - and some among them Hizbut Tahrir activists - were actively involved in founding the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit KAMMI *(Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia).* Since then, KAMMI is the main, but not the only, student vehicle of the *tarbyiah* movement. KAMMI was founded at the tenth Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations (FSLDK) in Malang in March 1998, about two months before the fall of Suharto, as a national organization of Muslim students. It was co-founded by Jamaah Shalahuddin members. During the conference in Malang, university *dakwah* activists from about 64 universities were present, with a total number of around two hundred students, including delegates of Jamaah Shalahuddin (A. G. Karim, 2006: 53). The main aim was to find a new way to coordinate the University Dakwah Organizations of different universities to bring down Suharto. On May 21, 1998, he resigned. The aim at that point was not to found a distinct Islamic group that would compete for membership with the already existing extra campus organizations, namely HMI MPO, HMI Dipo, IMM and PMII, but rather to found an action committee that would respond to the current political situation (Damanik, 2002: 182-3). In October 1998, KAMMI declared itself an organization and formulated its own ideology that bears many similarities with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood as propagated by its founder, Hasan al-Banna (Damanik, 2002: 193). It remains unknown when exactly Hizbut Tahrir activists left KAMMI. Also under-researched is what kind of power struggles took place between the activists of the different organization before KAMMI declared itself a formal organization. Structurally, KAMMI of the Gadjah Mada University is under the centralized authority of KAMMI's headquarters in Jakarta, and adheres to its ideology.

[33] The official webpage of the FSLDK is www.fsldk.org (6 December 2012).

[34] The official webpage of the BKLDK is www.Dakwahkampus.com (6 December 2012).

It became KAMMI's hallmark that Indonesia is experiencing a multidimensional crisis *(krisis multidimensional).* The students identified the political system that they claimed was dominated by corruption, collusion and nepotism as the cause for the crisis *(KKN – Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme).* They were convinced that if Islamic norms and values could be restored, they could then inform decisions and provide direction for society as a whole, and the crisis could be overcome. Islam, the moral strength of the nation, should hence be restored. They called for a moral reformation *(reformasi moral)* (Damanik, 2002: 186) or a total reformation *(reformasi total)* (Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 167).

Students of the Gadjah Mada University had also joined the congress in Malang where KAMMI was declared. Haryo Setyoko, a student of the Gadjah Mada University became the first general secretary *(sekretaris umum)* of KAMMI, thus holding the second highest position within the newly founded group, after the President of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah (Damanik, 2002: 184). Setyoko at that time was a student at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences and officiated as president of the student council of the Gadjah Mada University *(BEM UGM)* from 1997-8. Before becoming the president of the student council, Haryo Setyoko was an active member of Jamaah Shalahuddin (Sidiq, 2003: 196-7). He is described as rather calm and taciturn, but also as a brilliant speaker with refined rhetorical skills. Due to his experience in leading organizations and his educational background, he is further remembered as talented in organizational as well as ideological strategizing.

The local branch of KAMMI at the Gadjah Mada University was founded on 9 April 1998 shortly after its declaration in Malang. This event was attended by around 800 students (Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 167). The following day, a group of UGM students travelled to Jakarta to join the large meeting *(rapat akbar)* held at the Al-Azhar mosque, attended by 20'000 people (Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 168). For a detailed analysis of the role of KAMMI in the protests and demonstrations leading to the fall of Suharto after 32 years in power, see Kraince (2000, 2003) and Sidiq (2003).

On different campuses of nationalist universities such as the Gadjah Mada University, but also on different Islamic universities, the *tarbiyah* movement with KAMMI as its main student vehicle, keeps – as Hizbut Tahrir - gaining support. It is in many respects the closest ally of Hizbut Tahrir and largely supportive of many aspects of its agenda. It shares many of

Hizbut Tahrir's meta narratives; for example about western imperialism seeking to weaken Islam. Also, activists of both movements are highly concerned about what they see as the moral decline of society due primarily to an increasing acceptance of western liberal values. The political project of KAMMI differs, however, in two aspects from the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. Firstly, its aim is the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state, rather than a pan Islamic caliphate, and secondly in terms of methodology, it considers participation in the democratic process as a legitimate means of reaching the goal of establishing an Islamic state, although this does not mean that it supports democracy per se (Rathomy, 2007). However, as discussed in chapter four, HTI allowed its followers to vote in the 2009 elections in order to prevent the greater harm of even more secular parties winning and determining state politics. Most activists I worked with opted to support the Crescent Moon and Star Party *(PBB – Partai Bulan Bintang)* and the officiating president at the time, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party for a second term.

In the aftermath of the fall of Suharto, the political landscape of the country changed considerably. During the following months, many new political parties were founded. One of these newly founded parties was the Justice Party PK that was in 2004 renamed Prosperous Justice Party PKS. Since the beginning, *tarbiyah* activists of different universities formed its main membership and significantly shaped its leadership structure (Machmudi, 2008: 107 ff.). In PKS, many former KAMMI as well as Jamaah Shalahuddin activists hold important positions (A. G. Karim, 2006: 54; 2009: xxiii).

In 2009, KAMMI was the largest Islamic extra campus student organization active on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University. Yet, it was not as active as Hizbut Tahrir in organizing public discussions and seminars. At that time, it counted over 300 active members enrolled in Gadjah Mada University's different faculties (Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 175). As is the case in Hizbut Tahrir, the number of women activists slightly surpasses the number of men members. While the establishment of an Islamic state and the implementation of the Sharia was not promoted by KAMMI as their main agenda, the conviction that Islam should inspire all aspects of life and that it should therefore also inspire the legal system is at the basis of their *dakwah* activities. As formulated by two of the organization's former presidents, Hasanudin and Nurrahman: *"Islam is the starting point*

of the struggle, the method, the path, as well as the goal" (Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 170). In regard to the implementation of the Sharia, the two former presidents of KAMMI of the Gadjah Mada University state: *"KAMMI strongly holds on to the Sharia, because it is the source of all goodness. (…). KAMMI is certain that Indonesia will become a happy country if Islamic values colour the life of society. All this will be reached if the Islamic* ummat *will lead this country. Because then the piety (keshalihan) of society will be better guarded (…)"*(Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 171).

KAMMI is hesitant to openly demand the formalization of Islamic law. Calling for the legal formalization of the Sharia and establishing an Islamic state is not an official hallmark of the organization. Rather, its main aim is to educate students to form an Islamic intellectual class that can lead the country according to universal Islamic values (Hasanudin & Nurrahman, 2009: 178). Many activists acknowledge that while this is their ultimate goal, the community has to be "Islamized" from below first. The president of KAMMI of the Gadjah Mada University in 2009-2010, Adhe Nuansa Wibisono stated *"About the implementation of Sharia law, well, I give my personal opinion: we have to create a conducive atmosphere first, people need not just to accept Islam, but they also need to practice Islamic values. Otherwise, if we try to directly formalize Islamic law structurally, it might turn out that the foundation is not yet solid."*

By studying the ideological vision of KAMMI, two key works seem especially important: creating a *masyarakat madani,* and creating future leaders *pemimpin bangsa.* Politics and religion are thus not regarded as separate spheres, but as entangled. Islamic ethics *(aklak)* should inspire all activities of Muslims, including political activities. A good national leader thus bases his conduct on Islamic law (Damanik, 2002: 241; Sidiq, 2003: 209). It refers to a responsible, engaged and caring society that is based on Islamic values. Although KAMMI does not, like Hizbut Tahrir, put the formalization of Islamic law on top of its agenda, the long-term aspirations of the two organizations that dominate Jamaah Shalahuddin are similar in regard to constituting practice and moral development. As I outline subsequently, this allows them to collaborate in many instances, particularly the women branches of the two movements, which often meet and maintain close personal relationships. Dwi Condro

also stated that he is on good terms with many KAMMI and PKS activists. According to him, the two organizations pursue a similar goal, although by different means.

Striving for the Caliphate: Jamaah Shalahuddin's Working Agenda for 2009

Every year, the activists of Jamaah Shalahuddin formulate a yearly strategic working plan *(Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Kerja – GBHK)* that constitutes next year's agenda. For the year 2009, the call for the establishment of the caliphate was deemed top priority. The following examination is based on analysing the argumentation as formulated by the officiating president of Jamaah Shalahuddin in 2008, Edi Nugroho (shortly called Edi), in the chapter he contributed to the book *"Dynamics of Islamic Student Movements"* (Nugroho, 2009). His chapter contains long lists with enumerations. In my analysis of his way of arguing, I partially adhere to his style of enumerating causes and reasons – rather than reformulating all of his arguments in a running text. During the editing process, as well as during interviews conducted with Edi, I further obtained additional clarification and insight into his way of reasoning. In addition to discussions with him, I also had the chance to talk to other members of Jamaah Shalahuddin; these discussions provide additional insights.

Edi was born in 1987 in Grobogan, Central Java. He went to the public school there before starting his studies at the Law Faculty of the Gadjah Mada University with focus on Islamic law. His life motto is "be useful to other people" *(Nafi'un li Ghairihi)*. Already before starting university, he was active in the Islamic organization of his school. After starting to study at the Gadjah Mada University, he became a KAMMI activist, but than decided that his efforts to do *dakwah* and promote Islam to others would be more effective in Jamaah Shalahuddin. Before officiating as president of Jamaah Shalahuddin, Edi was also active in the Islamic Organization of the Law Faculty, Muslim Family of the Law Faculty *(Keluarga Muslim Fakultas Hukum – KMFH)*. His life trajectory is typical for many Jamaah Shalahuddin activists in the sense that they do not have a primary or secondary education in an Islamic boarding school, and they are active in multiple organizations; struggling for a similar cause, but using different institutional vehicles to spread their ideas.

The yearly strategic working plan is elaborated in a discussion meeting *(musyawarah* or *syura).* The members follow what they consider an *objective and scientific methodology* – namely Social Analysis *(Analisis social – Ansos)* - to analyze the social reality they are facing and develop their strategic plans (Nugroho, 2009: 113). The approach is to examine the social situation and contemporary problems in what is called an objective manner in order to understand the problem, its roots and how it might possibly be solved. A problem is defined as a condition that is not in line with the Qur'an and the Sunnah and that brings general harm *(mafsadat)* to society (ibid.: 113). The ultimate aim behind solving problems is to reach a more just and better society.

This method is supposed to provide deep insights into economic, political, social and cultural problems society is facing. It implies the following steps: First, problems need to be identified; second, the roots of these problems need to be named; third, the roots of the problems need to be analyzed and solutions need to be found; last, a strategic method of how this solution can be realized is elaborated. To reach good results in the last step, another method derived from the field of management technique is employed to optimize strategic planning, the SWOT – Analysis, examining the organization's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. After combining the two methods, the focus interests for the year 2008, or 1429 H[35] are formulated.

Describing the discussion meeting to elaborate the yearly working plan for 2008, Edi states that the process starts with collecting opinions from different members about what they regard as urgent problems in different fields such as education, health, economy, law, politics and international relations. As Edi writes, it is then easy to identify the root of each problem, and elaborate how they are connected to each other. In 2008, they identified fifteen points (Nugroho, 2009: 113-4):

1. In the field of politics, the Islamic community is dominated / colonized *(terjajah)* by its enemies *(musuh).* Meanwhile, the Islamic community is internally divided by intrigues.

[35] Hizbut Tahrir and *tarbiyah* activists often use the Islamic calendar or Hijri calendar to date events, particularly to refer to the year. Yet, often the Islamic calendar is used in addition to the Gregorian calendar.

2. The Islamic caliphate *(Khilafah Islamiyah)* has not yet been erected.
3. The violence and arbitrariness of un-Islamic law *(hukum kufur).*
4. Part of the Islamic community studies an academic discipline and adopts a way of thinking without considering the Sharia.
5. The economic system based on excessive interest rates *(riba)*, although the Sharia economy is developing, and the enemies of Islam possess almost all economic assets to destroy the Islamic community.
6. Dissentions within the Islamic community.
7. The expansion of atheism and polytheism along with understandings that are opposed to Islam.
8. The majority of the Islamic community does not understand and practice Islamic teachings.
9. The spread of phenomena such giving Allah a partner *(kesyirikan)* [sic], making innovations without precedence *(bid'ah),* and sexual immorality *(maksiat).*
10. The engineering of the enemies of Islam to destroy the pillars of Islam, those who are known by the Islamic community as well as those who are unknown.
11. Poverty.
12. Christianization.
13. The Islamic countries lack influence in global politics.
14. Apathetic attitude.
15. Destruction of the environment.

In the next step, after listing these fifteen problems, Edi notes what the group defined in discussions as these problems' roots that bring destruction to the Islamic community. In this meeting, three core roots are identified, namely (Nugroho, 2009: 114):

1. The Islamic community does not yet fully understand Islam.
2. Islam is not yet implemented as way of life *(minhajul hayah).*
3. The conspiracy of the enemies of Islam *(Konspirasi musuh-musuh Islam)* to destroy Islam.

The subsequent step in the "social analysis" process was then to identify what needs to be done to solve these problems sustainably. Solving these problems will be at the heart of

their working plan for the coming year. Before outlining a working strategy, they make an analysis of requirements *(analisa kebutuhan)* and name two points, firstly they seek to strive for the implementation of the Sharia as well as for the establishment of an Islamic state *(daulah Islamiyah);* secondly, they will focus in on promoting an understanding of Islam as the first generation of Muslims had understood Islam *(pemahaman salafushshalih)* (Nugroho, 2009: 115). After this "analysis of basic requirements", they identify how they will work in the new year to reach what they define as they greatest goal, the formation of an Islamic state referred to in different parts of the text as *caliphate, daulah Islamiyah*, and *Negara Islam.*

The basic assumption is, as Edi outlines in his chapter as well as in our discussions, that all other problems are *sub-problems* of the fact that *Indonesia* is not an Islamic state and has not implemented Islamic law. Also problems such as the destruction of the environment, poverty, the internal division of the Islamic community, economic problems, as well as the generally perceived moral decline would, he is convinced, be solved if Islamic law would be followed consistently.

However, in the entire text it is not outlined what kind of Islamic state Jamaah Shalahuddin aspires to. Although Edi refers to the Islamic past to legitimate his call for an Islamic form of governance, he does not discuss a specific model in detail. The ideas the caliphate, daulah Islamiyah and Negara Islam are all used, seemingly interchangeably. It remains unclear whether the concept of the nation state is rejected as un-Islamic and as instrument of the enemies to divide the Islamic community, as suggested by Hizbut Tahrir, or whether he holds the idea of a caliphate that shall be erected within the national borders. We do not learn how a ruler of this state would be chosen or how exactly the health or education system would be managed. Although a specific form of government seems to be imagined that is divinely prescribed, complete and universal, we find no reference to how this mode of governance should be implemented.

The reason for not specifying the form of state imagined might be diverse. In an interview conducted with Edi he explained to me that at least for the moment the detailed outlook of a future Islamic state is not top priority: *"At least for the moment it is crucial that we all agree that we need an Islamic state ruled by the Sharia, once we come closer to our goal, we*

can discuss this matter. It just divides our members – however, as we are not there yet, we should all work together rather than let such questions divide us." Specifying the form of the imagined state is not part of the yearly working plan for the year 2009 either.

Conclusion

In the extant research on Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, different scholars stress that the organization has been particularly successful in targeting students from the best national universities (Fealy, 2007; Muhtadi, 2009; Osman, 2010; Ward, 2009). A strategic role has been ascribed to student bodies as a vehicle to popularize the organization's ideas and enlarge its networks. Yet, none of studies conducted thus far about the organization sheds light on the historical context in which the ideas of an-Nabhani were studied and promoted. It remains under-researched how both young women and men discussed the core concepts of Hizbut Tahrir and related them to present day in order to envision a better future. Rather, in the extant studies, students are analysed as rather passive recipients of an authoritative ideology. The question of how it has been reconfigured in order to explain the world in which they live remains unaddressed.

In this chapter, I sought to understand the agency of students in studying and popularizing the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir under the given socio-political circumstances. By focusing on the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin of the Gadjah Mada University, the socio-political climate in which the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir started to be studied was examined. When the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir reached the students of this university, it fell on fertile ground. Particularly, the *tarbiyah* movement, inspired by the work of Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, had prepared the ground for discussions of solutions about how to change the world for the better. Alumni of the Gadjah Mada University, who had studied the organization's core concepts in Bogor, proposed the main concepts of Hizbut Tahrir to their juniors as solutions to contemporary problems. Different meta-narratives could be fruitfully adopted and appropriated to argue for the establishment of the caliphate. Further, President Suharto's attempts to modernize religion to make it compatible with modernity

and conducive to the country's economic development have fostered a specific kind of religious rationality; one that is compatible with Hizbut Tahrir's scriptural interpretation of Islam and the organization's strong focus on the observance of specific legal and moral codes.

For the academic year 2008-9, Jamaah Shalahuddin had the establishment of the caliphate on its annual working agenda. What one of the organization's founding members interpreted as an increasing "radicalization" of not only Jamaah Shalahuddin, but of the general Islamic climate on campus in general, needs to be read from a historical perspective. The activists' way of reconfiguring Islam using an economic rationality to analyze contemporary problems and make it compatible with modernity seems - at least to a certain extent - to still be in line with the aim of the founding fathers. Its call to formally establish Islamic law needs to be seen in the context of a nation state that increasingly resorts to law to regulate almost all spheres of life. Although other trajectories would have been possible, this agenda reflect the *zeitgeist*.

With regard to the history of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, a lot of questions remain unanswered and understudied. In particular, Hizbut Tahrir's transition from an underground organization to a legitimate one has so far gone unexamined. This transition period might shed light on how Hizbut Tahrir activists reconfigured the organization's core demands to optimize the productivity and efficiency of its members in the now public *dawkah* endeavours to call for the caliphate. A further topic that requires examination concerns women's participation in present time, and also historically. Although the women's branch of Hizbut Tahrir is highly active – and seemingly more successful than the men's branch in attracting new members, no detailed study exists so far that examines women's influence in promoting and popularizing the ideas of the organization's founder an-Nabhani and pairing them with a strategic rationality of self-discipline, hard work and economic success.

Chapter III:

Learning to Call for the Caliphate

"Well, this is my personal opinion, but I saw all the problems that Indonesia is currently facing in the social, economic and in the political sphere. According to my opinion, Indonesia really needs to improve and I'm convinced that this improvement has to be inspired by Islam. The question is then, if we want to improve the situation with Islamic concepts, how should this happen? What are the concepts? Earlier, when I was studying in the circles of the tarbiyah *movement, I did not get the answers. The* tarbiyah *movement is good in regard to moral guidance* (penbinaan akhlak)*, but if we become the next Indonesian leaders what should we do? If we are sure that Islam provides solutions, then how should Islam inspire economic, political and social concepts? I did get answers neither in my studies nor in the circles of the* tarbiyah *movement. Maybe this is my fault. Maybe I did not study these thoughts deep enough. But at least, at the beginning we did not get these answers. Only after finding Hizbut Tahrir I found what I was looking for. This is what made me stay and study in Hizbut Tahrir. I feel that the Islamic concepts are complete and comprehensive. We must all unite and struggle for the re-establishment of the caliphate."*
(Interview with Tia, Hizbut Tahrir student activist, March 2009, Yogyakarta).

For many Muslims, learning is an integral part of worship, and thus of being a good Muslim. Seeking knowledge and passing it on to others is for many an important part of pursuing the path to piety. Further, knowledge is a precondition to establishing the authority needed to spread their own understanding of Islam and educate others. Yet, what is considered Islamic knowledge? Is it limited to reading the Qur'an and studying religious commentaries? And to what end should Islamic knowledge be used? Does learning have the aim to teach *correct* behaviour and submission to a certain set of values as formulated in a specific canon or authority? Or should Islamic knowledge, and the process of learning, create critical and

sensitive believers well prepared for arguments and ready for grappling with problems of modernity?

My understanding of the term "Islamic knowledge" is inspired by Talal Asad's (1986) concept of Islam as a *"discursive tradition"*. Asad's text pushed me to reflect on how authoritative knowledge is constituted in the dynamic space between students, texts and practices that determine what should be, or what is, "Islamic". Following Asad's reflections, "Islamic knowledge" is thus a whole body of knowledge that relates to the founding texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith, to the Islamic tradition, to make claims about proper belief and practice. As elsewhere in the world, also at the Gajah Mada University, what classifies as Islamic knowledge is highly contested. No universal definition of "Islamic" exists. Yet, different Islamic movements, among them Hizbut Tahrir activists, make strong truth claims that their understanding of Islam, thus their form of practicing and teaching Islam, is universal and eternal (see for example Ahmad, 2010).

A further source of inspiration for this chapter was the edited volume by Martin van Bruinessen and Stefano Allievi (2011) in which various contributors discuss the topic of how Islamic knowledge is acquired, disseminated and reproduced by Muslims living in western Europe. In particular, van Bruinessen's (2011) introduction to this volume raises interesting questions on the extent to which Muslims are merely consumers of the religious content offered to them, or in how far they actively reconfigure it. In his detailed study of how second and third-generation immigrant Muslims acquire and reconfigure knowledge, he is particularly interested in the "ordinary" Muslim and his or her everyday practices.

Indonesian students are confronted in their daily lives with a plethora of ideas of different provenances, local and global, religious and secular. As has been argued by Appadurai (1996) and Hannerz (1992, 1996), processes of globalization have intensified the flow of ideas, people, and images across national boarders, leading to greater complexity and the destabilization of hierarchies. In regard to the destabilization of Islamic authorities in Indonesia, scholars such as Azyumardi Azra, Kees Van Dijk and Nico Kaptein (2010) have noted in their edited volume that the struggle for Islamic authenticity and authority has taken on new dimensions. The chapter in that volume by Andrée Feillard (2010) examines the intensified struggle for Islamic authority in Java. He argues that since Suharto resigned,

various authorities have proliferated due to the increasingly liberal political climate. Furthermore, since the late 1990s, the advent of the Internet has considerably altered struggles over Islamic authority. The increasingly fast and cheap access to a vide variety of different sources has allowed the educated middle and upper classes in particular to consult various sources in search of answers to different questions – also in regard to questions related to Islam (Hosen, 2008).

Discussing the fragmentation of Islamic authorities in modern times due to better education and access to knowledge, it seems important to remember Jonathan Berkey' s study (2007) about the dichotomy between tradition and modernity. He points convincingly to the fact that since the emergence of Islam there have been tensions between religious and political authorities, and that the nature of religious authority has always been polyvocal and fluid. However, looking at the campus of the Gadjah Mada University after the millennium, it seems that an increasing number of people begin engaging in discussion more than ever: not only those having enjoyed a profound Islamic education, but also students who only may have a rather basic Islamic education combine this knowledge with what they learn at university. What counts as "correct" Islamic practice seems to have become more a matter of public debate than ever before.

In the lives of students, Islam is interwoven into the complex fabric of their social lives. In the current socio-political climate, students of the Gadjah Mada University can choose from a plethora of Islamic movements and authorities eager to promote their understanding of Islamic knowledge. As the story of Dwi Condro and the quotation of Tia cited at the beginning of this chapter show, Hizbut Tahrir activists frame their "encounter" *(pertemuan)* with Hizbut Tahrir as an active act, as the final destination after a long, and at times, frustrating journey of religious knowledge seeking. Often in personal narratives of Hizbut Tahrir activists, the decision to become member is framed as a religious duty, but at the same time as an act of one's own will, rather than as a consequence of family tradition, peer pressure, or social custom. The large majority of the Hizbut Tahrir student activists I talked to stressed that it was their personal, rationally taken decision to become a member of Hizbut Tahrir. Yet, although convinced of having found the "right" answers, most of the people I met did not stop studying the ideas and core concepts of other Islamic movements,

nor of secular thinkers. However, they no longer did so with the aim of revising their own beliefs, but rather with the aim of convincingly promoting the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir. In this logic, Hizbut Tahrir activists conceptualize the organization in a liberal logic as a group of consenting individuals who chose – based on their deep faith – to collaborate towards the same goal and promote Islamic knowledge. In this sense, they constitute themselves as pious followers that actively reconfigure knowledge. Reconfiguring not in the sense of changing the core ideas as formulated by the movement's founding father, Taqiyyudin an-Nabhani, but in the sense of applying this ideology to contemporary problems at hand and thus making it compatible with modernity.

Believing is not framed as passive and *knowing* as an active act. Most of the choices the students take regarding where to study and whether to deepen their religious knowledge is inspired by their educational and familial background, by friends they meet and by various other factors. However, regardless of where one seeks knowledge and how one has become convinced to study, learning to live a certain form of piety is an *active* act that demands time, motivation and self-reflection. In their struggle for a particular understanding of Islamic orthodoxy, the students expend a lot of time and energy. Living in accordance to what many come to see as God's will is thus not an act of passivity, but rather a conscious choice. Agency is in this context not interpreted as freedom to do what one wants, but as freedom to do what is perceived as correct behavior, as the freedom to do what is right.[36]

In the life of religious student activists, both secular learning and religion hold important places. Thus I argue in this chapter that religious belief and knowledge are not opposed, but linked in manifold ways. *Believing* is not framed as the counterpart of *knowing;* rather, knowledge is a constitutive element of believing, of being a religious person. Western knowledge is not seen to challenge the authority of religion and the legitimacy of Islamic knowledge, but endorse its authority and legitimacy, raising questions that are in want of Islamic answers. The deep personal relationship that many activists feel with God has not been substituted by knowledge and learning, rather learning is an integral part of worship

[36] For a more detailed discussion of the concept of agency, feminism and subjectivity in Islamic movements see especially Frisk (2009: 9-15) and Mahmood (2005: 27-31)

and constitutes modern Muslims. How can both secular and religious knowledge become a source to gratitude for a relationship to God, and help people cope with the challenges of modernity? The path to piety is - maybe more than ever before - a path of learning.

The question of how secular learning should be combined with traditional Islamic science and ways of learning is not new; it has been asked by Muslim modernists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mahmmad Qasim Zaman, Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Religion at Princeton University discusses the thoughts of Muhammad Rshid Rida (d. 1935), Yusuf al-Qaradawi (b. 1926), and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898). These scholars argued that secular science is not undermining Islam. Rather, Zaman outlines that already over a century ago scholars were eager to emphasize that secular learning is a condition for the flourishing of Islamic tradition in conditions of modernity. Further, Zaman's study highlights that although secular and religious learning is often *framed and analyzed* in dichotomous terms, Islam has never countenanced a sharp division between religious and secular learning. Rather, he calls for us to pay attention to how and why religion and secular knowledge are constructed as binary opposites, and dismantle the complexity underplaying such discursive constructions.

Different imaginaries about how knowledge and Islam should be linked are the focus of Mona Abaza's study (2002) on the debate about the "Islamization of knowledge" in Malaysia and Egypt. By focusing especially on the two arguments of the Egyptian intellectual Mohammed 'Immara and the Malaysian S.N. al-Attas, she shows how similar ideas articulated in a language akin to one another entail different political demands and are highly influenced by the different social and political climates in the two countries – last but not least due to the different roles ascribed to students.

In his study, Eickelman (2000: 121) states that religious belief in modern times is no longer a *"conversation-stopper"*. Seeing modernity characterised by an enhancement of human freedoms and an enlargement of available choices, religion can only retain its influence in a place like the campus of the Gadjah Mada University by adapting to the norms of scientific knowledge, rational reasoning, and relativism. Arguing against the faith-knowledge dichotomy, Eickelman points out that religion has successfully challenged secularization theory by making compromises with science, adapting its language and methods. Young

educated student activists do not formulate their call to piety against modernity and science, but rather appropriate secular knowledge for their struggle. The boundary between secular knowledge and religious knowledge thus becomes increasingly fluid and fuzzy: Secular knowledge is *"Islamized".* One may be an internationally respected scholar in one's specific academic field, and an influential Islamic scholar and authority at the same time – as is the case with many professors at the Gadjah Mada University.

Questions related to how Islam should inspire behavior and everyday choices are explicitly discussed among students. Seeing this as a consequence of higher education and training in critical thinking and analysis, Eickelman argues that an *"objectification of Islamic tradition"* has taken place (2000: 130). It is due to this objectified understanding of religion that Muslims' relationship to authority has been altered. Education makes the students conscious of their beliefs and underlying assumptions. It is thus common to hear students speaking of religion as a "system" or as an "ideology", allowing comparisons to other "systems". In this context, Islam is compared to the "system of capitalism" or the "system of communism", for example. To draw such comparisons – although they are at times not based on a nuanced understanding of communism or capitalism – education and knowledge is needed. Information access, knowledge and secular education shape religious practice and belief in important ways. Knowledge, both secular and Islamic, constitutes Hizbut Tahrir activists' self-understanding.

In this chapter, I am particularly interested in how Hizbut Tahrir student activists actively acquire Islamic knowledge. In their endeavour to strive to optimize human life, they subject it to a specialized array of modes of knowledge. The activists do not only acquire Islamic knowledge, but also contribute to the fact that Islam is a "living tradition" by constantly relating the founding texts of Islam to new problems and challenges at hand. By reconfiguring the ideas of an-Nabhani in new ways in search of Islamic answers, they contribute to shaping Islamic knowledge in the 21st century. Although the topic of learning cannot be entirely separated from teaching and reframing ideology, I will examine the latter processes in more detail in the next chapter. The focus of this chapter is thus on the process of learning as a necessary precondition for a successful struggle towards the establishment of the caliphate. Without knowledge, Hizbut Tahrir activists' strategy of convincing

particularly well-educated people, who are likely to hold important positions, would not bear fruit. Establishing authority and persuading others one's own understanding of Islam demands knowledge of different provenances.

I begin the chapter with a historical contextualization of the students' self-understanding as agents of change. They primarily legitimate this self-understanding by referring to their good university education. The narrative of the educated youth as pioneers *(pelopor)* of societal development is as old as the Indonesian nation. To outline the importance of knowledge in the every day life of activists, I then zoom in on the different institutionalized sites of learning where Hizbut Tahrir activists hone their knowledge to change themselves and the world around them: I focus on different sites of learning with different structures of authority, methods of knowledge transmission and variable curricula. First I discuss the process of learning within the study circles of Hizbut Tahrir, next I discuss the compulsory Islamic education each student enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University has to follow, I then continue to examine the role of two university mosques as sites of learning. Subsequently I examine the choice of many Hizbut Tahrir activists to become members of an Islamic "extra" university organization. Then I discuss the individual initiative of a Hizbut Tahrir woman activist to create a place of learning. I end the chapter by discussing two Islamic boarding houses where *tarbiyah* activists study, a site which collaborates with Hizbut Tahrir activists of the Gadjah Mada University in many aspects and shares, to a large extent, their vision of how Islam should inspire everyday practice and moral development. I use a two-pronged approach to organize my empirical data material: I entangle the individual narratives of different women activists with an analysis of different sites of learning, focusing on their structures and functioning specificities. Structural elements are thus combined with biographical elements.

The Narrative of Students as Agents of an Alternative Modernity

"You are the future leaders of the country."

"Indonesia's future and wellbeing is in your hands."

"If you imagine Indonesia as a train on its journey to prosperity, you, sitting in this room, will be its locomotives."
"You're privileged to study at this Gadjah Mada University. Many other young people have not been as lucky as you to get this chance, so make the very best out of it and study hard."
(Field notes taken at the Gadjah Mada University during 2008-9)

While attending classes and seminars at the Gadjah Mada University, I heard these and similar sentences over and over again. Not only did professors use these phrases to motivate or admonish their students, they were also reproduced in various speeches students gave at different occasions. The idea that students in general, and especially those of the best national universities such as the Gadjah Mada University, are, and should be, "agents of change" has become regarded, so it seems, as general truth.

The narrative of students as agents of change is not new in Indonesia. It has been present since the struggle for independence and has persisted throughout history. Keith Foulcher's study (2000) *"Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath)"* about the history and importance of this oath in the making of Indonesian nationhood sheds light on how the youth has been publically addressed as the future makers of Indonesia. The *Sumpah Pemuda* was initially formulated at a congress of nationalist youth organizations in Jakarta in 1928 as a threefold declaration of *"unity of nation, homeland and language"* (ibid.: 377). As Foulcher outlines, the pledge was steadily transformed to match the prevalent ideological emphasis on development, discipline, and stability, especially during the early years of the New Order. During this time, the pledge became a political instrument to remind the youth of its role in bringing national development. On 28 October 1998, President Habibie admonished the Indonesian youth to *"improve their "quality" in the interests of the efficient growth of the national economy"* (ibid.: 399). Since the New Order, the 28th of October, regarded as the anniversary of the oath, is a national day in Indonesia where large-scale events are held. These are designed, as Foulcher writes, *"to remind Indonesian youth of their historical destiny"* (ibid.: 377). In the annual commemorations, the narrative of youth as nation builders responsible for the wellbeing of the country lives on and influences the self-perception of young Indonesians.

The youth, but more precisely students, are widely believed to play an important role as critical watchdogs, and as capable of mobilizing the masses to bring about change. In discussions and speeches on the campus, the role that students played in shaping the past has been particularly stressed, making it seem as if students were the most important group to cause social change. The role of students, for example in bringing down Suharto in May 1998, is much more emphasized than is the role of other groups, for example the army or different NGOs. In his detailed account of the late Suharto regime and the early years of the post New Order, Aspinall ascribes an important role to student activists in opposing Suharto and changing Indonesia's regime. In his book *"Opposing Suharto"* (2005), and also in an earlier article (1999) that more explicitly focuses on the student activists, both Islamic and non-confessional, he outlines the important role students have played. However, he shows that students were just one among different power brokers. Contrary to the self-understanding of many student activists as driving force in the regime change, Aspinall draws a less heroic and more nuanced picture of their influence in causing change. Richard Kraince (2003), who explores the role of Islamic student organizations in bringing Suharto down, stresses the power of Muslim students as agents of change. However, Kraince also describes Islamic student activists as one force among others – albeit an important one. In Hefner's seminal book *"Civil Islam"* (2000), Muslim students and Islamic student organizations are also identified as major actors actively seeking to construct an Indonesian civil society without establishing a state based on Islamic law. Aspinall, Kraince and Hefner focus mainly on the efforts of different Islamic groups in challenging the political system. All three studies provide profound insights into the complex entanglements between politics and religion.

The metaphor of the train with students as its locomotives powerfully reflects not only the self-understanding of students, but also reveals the *zeitgeist*. This image resembles Giddens metaphor of the juggernaut[37] that he uses in his book *"Consequences of Modernity"* to visualize modernity (Giddens, 1990: 139-41). Giddens compares living in modernity to being

[37] Giddens takes this term from the Hindi *Jagannath,* a title of Krishna, meaning "lord of the world". Each year, a huge car – the juggernaut – took an idol of Krishna through the streets (1990: 139).

aboard a giant car that is hard to control (1990: 53). In his view, modernity has juggernaut-like qualities. He imagines the juggernaut as *"a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent but which also threatens to rush out of our control and which could rend itself asunder. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it, and while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are times when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee"* (1990: 139). Giddens emphasises that no specific groups will ever be able to steer this runaway engine. He points to the different, even contradictory influences that are often in tension (1990: 131). Those enhancing the narrative that students are locomotives of change are certainly aware of the various limitations modern institutions put on students. Nevertheless, students are believed to be able, at least to a certain extent, to steer the train – or the juggernaut – from the *"shady"* to the *"sunny"* side of modernity, to again use Giddens' image (1990: 7).

Most students have come to embrace the idea that they can and should change something, as they are the privileged and highly educated. This perceived duty rests heavily on the shoulders of many. The question expressed by the Hizbut Tahrir activist Tia, as cited at the beginning of this chapter, about how to improve the economic and social problems Indonesia is facing, is preoccupying many of her fellow students. Being constantly reminded that they are on the winning side of the current system within the Indonesian, but not within the global context, many students feel that something needs to be done and solutions needs to be found in order to change society for the better. They choose to become "activists" *(aktivis).*

Being an activist is generally regarded as cool or trendy *(gaul)* among Indonesian students. Many see being "study-oriented" – this English term is often used to classify students who are not active in an organization – as egoistic and apathetic behaviour. To a large extent there seems to exist among students of the Gadjah Mada University a shared definition of an activist. This definition is reflected in the thesis of Saherman (2002), as well as in the thesis of Musfiqon (2003), both alumni of the Gadjah Mada University. Both have written about different types of student activism. According to them, an activist is someone who is *active in an organization,* for example in the students' council, in a religious or nationalist organization (the antipode to religious for them is nationalist, not secular), in a NGO, or in

the student press. Seeking to change the world alone is not enough to be classified as an activist (Musfiqon, 2003: 21; Saherman, 2002: 29). The definition of what may count as an organization is not fix and includes various structures.

The core concerns of many activists are to reduce the gross economic inequality and the persistent and extreme poverty in Indonesia, to increase the access of the poorest to decent health care and education. Also high on the list of concerns are environmental problems, reducing the countries high unemployment rate and securing peaceful living. For inspiration they turn to different sources – most often to religion. As almost ninety percent of the students are Muslims, Islam becomes the primary source of guidance on how to alter modernity.[38] I want to stress that becoming a member of Hizbut Tahrir is just one among many options to join the struggle for a better world – but at least for a number of students it is an attractive one.

Studying the Ideology of Hizbut Tahrir

Becoming a formal member of Hizbut Tahrir is a long process that demands intensive learning. According to Hizbut Tahrir members of the Gadjah Mada University, it usually takes around two years from the moment one first starts studying the books of the organization's founding father an-Nabhani. To guarantee effective pursuit of practice and way of argumentation as pronounced in the founder's writings, this is done in weekly held small study circles *(halaqah)* under the supervision of a more experienced tutor. Although studying in the *halaqah* is usually a form of peer learning, the teacher is more knowledgeable. He or she might be equal or almost equal in terms of age, yet not in their degree of religious authority. During these meetings, usually lasting around two hours, the basic texts are discussed page-by-page, explained and related to contemporary problems. At the Gajdah Mada University, women teach women and men teach men.

[38] For an overview about different student organizations directly liked to the Gadjah Mada University see http://www.ugm.ac.id/content.php?page=3 (27 April 2012).

The reasons why students start to study the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir are manifold and personal. Also, what made them continue their studies within this Islamic organization, rather than in another organization, is a complex question. Yet, the answers the students give are often similar, as in the case of Tia cited at the beginning of the chapter. Her statement that Hizbut Tahrir provides the most comprehensive answers to all kinds of problems is echoed by most of its activists. At least in Indonesia, this narrative has become a hallmark of the organization.

Tia was born in Malang in 1984 into a family she considers 'not very religious'. In 2000, while still in high school, she started studying the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir, and became an ordinary member of the organization in 2002. In 2004 she was accepted at the economics faculty of the Gadjah Mada University. Before beginning in a Hizbut Tahrir study circle, she studied in circles of the *tarbiyah* movement. When she knew that she had passed the test to study at the Gadjah Mada University, she tried to use a network of Hizbut Tahrir friends in Malang to find members studying in Yogyakarta. A senior Hizbut Tahrir activist had given her two contact numbers, and indeed, Tia told me, these two students were very welcoming and helpful in finding accommodation and showing her the city: *"It is so nice to have friends all over Indonesia, actually, all over the world, who will welcome you with open arms and help you. You have so much in common, it feels as if I had known them for a long time. It is our common conviction that unites us – that the caliphate should be established – and of course this inspires all our life: We like similar books, laugh about similar things and of course there are many topics we want to discuss. Being a Hizbut Tahrir activist is like having a second family that really supports you – and this is a very good feeling."* In her account, being a member of Hizbut Tahrir is framed as opening a window to the world. This membership allows her to feel part of a large transnational network with a common goal. For Tia, this idea is promising, although so far she has only benefited from the organization's network within Indonesia, as have the large majority of student activists. While talking to Tia, I was once again surprised by the rhetorical capacities of this gracefully built, young woman: She spoke in a loud clear voice without stumbling in speech.

Tia's activist career seems to bear similarities with the trajectories of other student members. Most of them come from what they define as "not very religious" families, and

most of them have been educated in state schools, rather than Islamic schools; some have, however, been to Islamic boarding schools *(pesantren).* Most tend to become active in other Islamic groups before joining Hizbut Tahrir because they seek, as they often say, to "learn more about Islam". Often they are "invited by friends *(diajak teman)*" to join Hizbut Tahrir's weekly *halaqah* by peers or senior students at their high school or university who have already been attending these circles for some time.

According to Tia, an-Nabhani's book *Nizam al-Islam* (The System of Islam) (2002) is commonly discussed first in the weekly study circles. In the first chapter of this book, the need to radically change one's own way of thinking *(fikr)* is emphasized by referring to the Qur'an 13: 11: *"Allah does not change the circumstances of any people until they have changed what is within themselves"* (an-Nabhani, 2002: 5). The solution to change one's thoughts is through Islamic belief *(akidah)* that serves as an intellectual basis upon which all aspects of belief and daily life need to be built (ibid: 6). After the emphasis to work on one's self, the way to convince others of the organizations ideology is outlined, as is the constitution of the caliphate. According to Tia, studying this book in a study circle takes approximately one year. Two other basic texts that are commonly studied before one is "invited" to become a member are *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Concepts of Hizbut Tahrir) and *al-Takattul al-Hizbi* (Structuring the Party)[39]. In these books, the basic concepts of the organization are outlined as well as how the organization is supposed to grow and expand, like a living organism. As Hizbut Tahrir is operating legally in Indonesia, Indonesian translations, as well as the original version written in Arabic, can be purchased in different book stores for around two to three USD per book.

When Tia invited me to join a session of the study circle she was teaching, the atmosphere was serious and the students and Tia seemed focused and concentrated. Yet, particularly before and after the session, there was time for relaxed talking. During the sessions, the six students, Tia, and I were sitting in a circle. We had met on the first floor of the Campus Mosque of the Gadjah Mada University in the early morning at 6.30. The topic of this morning was the need to reform the whole society, rather than single individuals as outlined

[39] The English versions of these three books can easily be downloaded from various webpages.

towards the end of the book *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir.* After reading a few lines, Tia discussed them with the participants to ensure that everyone had understood the passage correctly. One major topic of debate was about how one could not focus on single individuals in daily *dakwah*. Although it seemed make sense to the students to reject gradualism and rather strive for a systemic revolution, they were unsure about how to enact this call in practice. In the end, they seemed to agree that although total systemic reform is needed to sustainably change all individuals, each activist should continue to do *dakwah* to spread the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir to a broad audience and change the mindset of the masses. In this discussion, Tia used the occasion to once more explain to her students the core difference between Hizbut Tahrir and the ideology of the *tarbiyah* movement. This was, according to her, that the *tarbiyah* activists believe that reforming the individuals will lead to societal reform whereas Hizbut Tahrir activists demand a systemic revolution. Yet, despite the fact that Hizbut Tahrir rejects gradualism, the practice on the ground of targeting individuals to convince them of the own ideas bears many similarities.

Tia is not only teaching students, but is also still studying in a *halaqah* taught by one of her seniors. As a student she broadens her knowledge of the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir and Islam in general. As a tutor she has the chance to revise what she has learned and hone her skills in didactics. According to Tia, supervisors should be patient, calm, speak softly and deal with any deviant attitude she or he faces. Besides ideological knowledge, supervising a circle demands discipline in terms of punctuality and proper preparation of the material, but also the rhetorical skills and sensitivity to assist individuals at various stages of learning, cultivate their strength and work on individual weaknesses. Furthermore, supervisors are asked to keep track of member attendance and punctuality. The study circles can be held in different locations, for example in mosques, private homes, on campus or wherever is convenient for participants.

After studying the three books and - importantly - showing visible change in conduct in regard to the way of argumentation, behaviour, and outward appearance, the novice may be invited to become a party member. During their time as a novice, thus before becoming an official member, students often already help in organizing and promoting events and seek to actively engage in fulfilling their perceived duty to perform *dakwah.* The students

are only "invited" to become members after they have shaped their wills, desires, and emotional feelings in accord with the authoritative standards of virtue of the organization. Only after having developed this state of mind, according to Tia, an oath of allegiance is taken where the new member swears to be loyal to Islam and the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir and to obey its leadership. I do not know the exact wording of the oath as students of the Gadjah Mada University take it. From conversations with Hizbut Tahrir members about its contents it might be similar to the oath that Taji-Farouki found all members have to take, namely: *"I swear by God Almighty to be loyal to Islam and to defend it, to embrace Hizb al-Tahrir's opinions and constitution, to have confidence in its leadership, and to implement its resolutions even if they are contrary to my own opinion, as long as I remain a member. In all this I place my trust in God"* (cited in Taji-Farouki, 1996: 134).

On this particular path to piety, submission to the organization's ideology is regarded pivotal, however, the will to submit oneself to this ideology must come from the heart. As Nana, a Hizbut Tahrir member formulated it: *"You cannot force students to become Hizbut Tahrir members or to struggle for establishing the caliphate. You have to really want it, you have to be convinced that it is the only solution, the true understanding of Islam. All we can do is relentlessly try to convince students, to show them how beautiful the world could be, to make them miss the caliphate. […] It is not that I think that the pluralism within Islam we have here is a good thing, I'm convinced that this is wrong, these students do not yet understand Islam correctly, but again, they have to reach this insight themselves, we can only help them, open their eyes."*

In 2011, Nana was a student in biology just having completed her third year of study. She was born in village in East Java in 1988 into a religious Nahdlatul Ulama family. Unlike many of her friends, she learned Arabic at a young age, and despite studying in the local state school, she was frequently in the mosque to study with other children in her village. She started veiling at the age of twelve. Her parents made sure she prayed regularly, read the Qur'an and fasted during Ramadan. Religion was important to her parents she told me, although now she thinks that their understanding of Islam was very basic. *"Although they firmly believe in God, pray and fast, I feel that they do not reflect critically on religion, it is just part of there life, but, how shall I say, they do not use religion to analyse what is*

happening around them." For Nana, religious learning needs to have a purpose, namely to try to improve society, not just to follow the five pillars of Islam. When visiting her parents, she tries to teach them that Islam is a whole way of life, but, she told me, it is difficult, because they do not really understand and simply point out that they are good Muslims. *"Well, to be honest, sometimes I resign, I just enjoy spending time with them, eating my mum's delicious food, seeing my neighbours. I do not want to tell them what to do, they are my parents, I respect them. But still, in very gentle ways, I keep trying to at least make them understand me. […] I think doing dakwah here on campus is easier because at least people here understand what I'm talking about, not that they agree, but we can discuss."*

Besides the active involvement in study circles both as students and as supervisors, Hizbut Tahrir student activists are also asked to read books to broaden their knowledge in different fields. Books not in line with the party's ideology might also be read, as this knowledge may be valuable to broaden one's understanding in different areas, or serve as reference for formulating critique and calling for the establishment of the caliphate. Additional knowledge of various provenances is thus demanded to actively reproduce the knowledge learned in the study circle.

Students are also asked to attend public seminars held on the campus on different topics with the aim to widen their knowledge on one hand, and to seize the opportunity to speak up in public and present their own views and analysis on the other. Thus Hizbut Tahrir activists frequently speak up in public events, book discussions or workshop, present themselves with their name and as members of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia and try to ask critical questions while at the same time offering their interpretations and solutions. Members are also encouraged to present their views in written form whenever possible. They are for example encouraged to join different kinds of student initiated magazines or news letter groups or to start producing their own leaflets, try to submit newspaper articles or to write on blogs or other online forums. Again, this is seen as a mean to spread the organization's ideology, but equally important as a way to acquire additional skills – in this case journalistic skills. Furthermore by joining writing groups, members will have the possibility to interact intensively with fellow students. Depending on their skills and

interests, students are also encouraged to play theatre, practice filmmaking or become a member of an Islamic music group *(nasyid).*

Mandatory Religious Education at University

Along with their study of Hizbut Tahrir's ideology, the activists are required to take classes in Islam during their first year at university, as all Muslim students of the Gadjah Mada University must, regardless of the discipline they are studying.[40] The first year students of a given faculty are grouped together and then, after a placement test, divided into three groups depending on their ability to read the Qur'an, their knowledge of Islamic history and jurisprudence. Lecturers from different departments teach these classes. At the Faculty of Cultural Sciences, a team of four professors taught these classes during the academic year 2008-9: Rahmat Sholeh, Eman Suharman, Uswatun Hasanah and Musyaffa. As in other subjects, students must pass exams that influence their academic performance score. Based on various conversations with students, who had studied with the different lecturers, the curriculum in these classes is "neutral", meaning that the lecturers do not promote one specific understanding of Islam. Yet, Hizbut Tahrir activists told me that they often object to what is taught in these classes. In their view, no "neutral" Islamic knowledge exists.

Incorporating religion as an academic subject might be seen as an endeavour on the part of the university to manage both the religious knowledge and morality of its students. In the university's orientation statement, it states that the Gadjah Mada University aims to *"generate graduates who are capable, religious and pious"*[41]. In his study about the

[40] Naïve as I was when I was an exchange student at the Gadjah Mada University in 2005, I understood the requirement to study "religion" *(agama)* two hours a week as the obligation to study whatever religion one is interested in to broaden one's knowledge – as student in the Faculty of Cultural Science – in other religions. My fellow students were surprised by my reading of the academic curriculum and told me that – of course – one had to take classes in one's own religion.

[41] For a detailed "orientation statement" see the webpage of the Gadjah Mada Unviersity http://www.ugm.ac.id/en/?q=content/orientation (9 February 2012).

attempts of the Egyptian state to manage public morality by incorporating Islam as a subject in the school curriculum, Gregory Starrett (1998) notes that this policy has contributed to the fragmentation of the religious discourse and has fostered public debate. As religion became "functionalized" and "objectified", as Starrett claims throughout his work, it also became more debatable and contested. In Indonesia, religion became an integral part of every school's curriculum under Suharto's New Order Regime. In reference to Starrett, this could have been one factor - among many - that contributed to Islam becoming a matter of public debate and contestation, as was the case on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University.

In addition to their regular classes, it is compulsory for all Muslim students to follow a tutoring system called Assistance in Islamic Religion *(Asistensi Agama Islam – AAI),* which was initiated by Jamaah Shalahuddin members in 1987. Contrary to their classes at the university, this form of teaching by fellow students was not regarded as "neutral". After taking a placement test, women and men students are divided into small unisex groups and are taught by senior students once a week for about two hours. Prof. Sofian Effendi's opinion that *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists have come to dominate this tutoring program was expressed by numerous students, both by those in these two movements, as well as by others who deplored the trend. The fact that mainly activists with a certain Islamic understanding were interested in becoming tutors was not because others would not be accepted, but rather because they took a different approach to promoting their understanding of Islam.

To become an AAI tutor, one has to apply and pass a placement test. The job is time consuming and not paid, so the motivation is ideological: pursuing what is regarded as religious obligation to create pious Muslims. Farid, a member PMII for example explained to me why he was not interested in becoming a tutor: *"I studied in an Islamic boarding school when I was young – for me, it would be quite easy to pass the test to become tutor. Actually, most of my PMII friends would pass the test. With very few exceptions they are all from NU families: most have a very good religious education. Maybe it is because of this that we are bored by the idea of teaching others how to pray, or how to dress properly. I like it much better to discuss contemporary problems with friends, to hang out with them, or to write*

newspaper articles. Anyway, they require the men tutors to wear Muslim clothes – as if Muslims wearing Jeans are not good Muslims. This is nothing for me. This whole tutoring system is infiltrated by tarbiyah and Hizbut Tahrir activists that make its curriculum." This quote expresses the opinion of other activists who agree that the AAI has become "infiltrated" *(diinfiltrasi)* by these groups. They argued that you can see it from the way both men and women tutors dress, but also from how they teach and what they teach.

On reading the curriculum of the AAI for the year 2008-9, I found many indicators that supported the statement of Farid and many other activists, that the Central Coordination Management of AAI was dominated by *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists who promoted a specific form of Islamic orthodoxy; of what to do and what to avoid, of what should be regarded as pious Muslim behaviour. Aside from reading the Qur'an, the curriculum included Islamic history and Islamic jurisprudence, and also Islamic morality *(aklak)* and Islamic personality *(pribadi Muslim unggul).* In the guidebook entitled *"Guide Book AAI (Buku Pedoman AAI)* edited by the Central Coordination Management of AAI of the Gadjah Mada University *(PKP AAI UGM – Pusat Koordinasi Pengelola Asistensi Agama Islam UGM)* (Utama et al., 2008) outlines the functions this religious tutoring system should fulfil. Further, it contains a detailed curriculum. The book was especially published as a guideline for tutors. According to the team, the main function of AAI is to relate Islamic teachings to the everyday life of students. The mission of the tutors should be to: *"Develop the intellectual capacity of the students so that they become faithful* (beriman) *and pious* (bertakwa)*, […], and that they base all their actions on what has been shown by the Prophet (SAW), and that they have the capacity to care about the social condition of society"* (Utama et al., 2008: 7). Further, they declared that their "Grand Theme", as they called it, was: *"To guide the students to become the generation educated in the Qur'an and with an Islamic morality* (berakhlak islami) *so that they become good examples for the Islamic community* (tauladan umat)*"* (Utama et al., 2008: 8).

Various characteristics are thought to be indicative of an Islamic personality, including among them not smoking (Tim AAI, 2008: 37). The guidebook further emphasises that Islamic clothes should be worn (Tim AAI, 2008: 7). To refer to men and women students, the Arabic terms *"ikhwan"* (brothers) and *"akhwat"* (sisters) are used. This specific style of dress

and not smoking as outward expressions of piety is, as I discuss in the following chapter, characteristic of *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists and reflectes a specific understanding of how Islam should be lived. The frequent use of Arabic terms in everyday language is also specific to *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists. Activists of PMII, like Farid for example, often consciously rejected the replacement of Indonesian terms with Arabic words. He and his friends would consciously choose, for example, to greet peers in Indonesian, rather than in Arabic. As he explained to me, this is an unnecessary form of "Arabisation *(Arabisasi)*" that has, according to him, nothing to do with being a good Muslim, nor with the general spirit of Islam and the goal of making Islam a blessing to all *(rahamatan lil alamin).*

Despite his critiques of the AAI, Farid maintained that he also enjoyed the study sessions. He always tried to question the authority of the tutor, which he also thought was fun: *"In general, quite interesting discussions emerged between the participants, and I learned a lot about how others argue, what they regard as important. In these discussions, I benefited a lot from my profound Islamic education and my substantial knowledge of Arabic".*

To conclude: AAI is one institution in which *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists promote their specific understanding of Islam, and gained knowledge in order to enhance their ability to debate issues in public. Important to keep in mind, however, is that it is not only the tutors who promoted their ideas, but also participants. In general, skills of argumentation are honed and people are stimulated in order to get them to reflect on religious issues in everyday life. Especially by becoming a tutor, one has the chance to gain teaching and management experience and to train one's self to speak up in front of a group. The ability to publically debate seems to be an important marker of one's ability to convince others to accept their ideology. Although the tutors evaluate and mark the learning progress and active participation of the students (Tim AAI, 2008: 11), the authority of these tutors in regard to Islamic orthodoxy should not be overestimated. For many students, such as Farid and his friends, they are not regarded as truth tellers.

Joining Mosque Lessons (Pengajian)

The Mardliyah Mosque and FOSDA

Three times a week, every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday in the early morning at half past six, one can observe the parking lot outside the Mardliyah Mosque getting crowded with motorbikes. The women park their motorbikes on the right hand side before entering the mosque, the men on the left hand side. A hand written sign notifies those arriving of which area to go. Seen from the perspective of those arriving, the women enter the mosque from the right so that, from the perspective of the religious teacher *(ustadz)*, the men would sit on the right, the women on the left side of the mosque.[42] About sixty percent of the audience are women, separated from the men by a *hijab*, a curtain splitting the room in two equal parts. The majority of the audience who come to listen to the lesson *(pengajian)* are students; mostly *tarbiyah,* Hizbut Tahrir and Salafi activists.

The Mardliyyah Mosque is located in Yogyakarta between faculty campuses of the Gadjah Mada University, south of the Sardjito hospital. The topic of the lessons as well as the names of the teachers are announced on programs distributed on the campus, on posters hanging on different information boards and on flyers. The Tuesday lesson is for women only. A woman or man preacher addressed topics around duties and rights in marriage, beauty, love and health, and also contemporary issues regarded as being of special interest to women. The Thursday lesson address contemporary issues, the topic varying every meeting. The Saturday lessons are devoted to topics concerning the study of law books pertaining to ritual obligations and faith *(kitab aqidah dan fikih)* (Munawar, 2009: 191-192).

The chosen teachers are deemed experts in their respective fields of study. Some of the teachers belong to the Union of Indonesian Islamic preachers (Ikatan Da`i Indonesia IKADI[43]) such as Ustadz Sholihun, Ustadz Tulus Mustofa, Ustadz Khudori, Ustadz Didik Purwodarsono

[42] Inspired by the essay by Robert Hertz (1960) on the pre-eminence of the right hand in many societies, this seating reflects the dominant social organization in Indonesia where right may be read as symbolic of what is clean and sacred. However, as I seek to outline throughout my dissertation, I would not conclude from the seating arrangement that women were not respected members of the Muslim community.

[43] This organization was founded in 2002, and headquartered in Jakarta. The aim of this organization is to provide a network to preachers to spread the values of Islam as a blessing for all.

or Ustadz Syatori, the leader of the women students' Islamic boarding house Pondok Pesantren Darus Shalihat (Munawar, 2009: 194). The lessons are usually attended by around one hundred people, mostly activists, and to a large extent, students of the Gadjah Mada University. If the teacher is well known, and the topic attractive, the number of participants can reach 200 people.

The Forum for Study and Dakwah FOSDA organizes these morning lessons. Active in this group in 2009 were foremost *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir members. They participated in the transmission of their understanding of Islam to others. Equally important however, as Rini told me, was to gain organizational skills and general knowledge about Islam, and to enlarge one's personal network. Aside from organizing lessons three times per week, FOSDA also teaches skills that activists are thought to need, such as reading the Qur'an fluently *(tahsin)* and Arabic language courses. The Forum for Study and Dakwah is thus one among other arenas where students of the Gadjah Mada can get involved to change society in a more Islamic way – and develop the skills they need to do it.

Rini chose to join FOSDA almost one year ago. In 2009, she was responsible for the marketing, as she calls it. This meant to distribute flyers, hand up posters and inform Islamic student organizations about the activities they organized in the mosque. She decided to become a member because FOSDA seemed to be a good environment to pursue the struggle of *dakwah.* Therefore, when invited by a university friend to join, she agreed.

Islam has shaped Rini's life since she was a child. Born in Central Java, she was the third of four children. Like her older siblings, Rini also went to the local Muhammadiyah primary school, and after that the national high school, before starting her studies in the Department of Accounting of the Gadjah Mada University. Since she was a child, she told me, she liked to study Islamic history, Islamic jurisprudence and Arabic. As a student, she joined the Islamic group of her faculty *(SKI - Seksi Kerohanian Islam).* Rini told me that she has learnt a lot so far, not only about Islam, but also about management. She was familiar with the core ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, but she had no time to actively study in a *halaqah.* Yet, she frequently discussed with friends and had already attended various events organized by Hizbut Tahrir activists. The group's ideology was slightly too political for her, she told me. For the time, she preferred to study different ideas and focus on becoming a good Muslim.

Yet, she liked to discuss with her Hizbut Tahrir friends and stated: *"We are not that different after all. We share so many values and opinions about how to live as a good Muslim. […] In our daily discussions, the topic of establishing the caliphate is not dominant, how shall I say, we have smaller aims, to live our lives according to the Sharia and try to convince our fellow students to follow our example."* In a year or two she told me, she planned to leave FOSDA and find another group or organization where her skills would be needed and where she could engage in the struggle to change the world, deepen her religious knowledge and gain new skills. She was not yet sure if she would study the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir more in-depth. The important thing, according to her, was to develop one's self, evaluate one's position and reflect on how and where one can serve the *ummat* to make Islam relevant to all. Being a pious, educated young woman and submitting to religious norms are not opposed binaries, but are, rather, linked in manifold ways.

FOSDA was formally founded in 2004, the *dakwah* activity in this mosque dates back to the late 70s, however. M.M. Billah (1989) describes the Mardliyah group in his study about the 1980s as "modern" *(medern)* due to its internal division of labour and sharing of responsibility (1989: 331). Before FOSDA was founded, the managers of the mosque *(takmir)* organized the activities. These were mostly students who also lived in a small building attached to the mosque. FOSDA was formally created in order to divide up the responsibilities of leading the mosque (for example calling and leading prayers), and engaging and planning *dakwah*. According to Ardian Munawar, the president of FOSDA in 2009, the vision of FOSDA was to turn the Mardliyyah Mosque into an *Islamic leaning centre* (2009: 184).

Like the mosque, the office of FOSDA is also divided by a *hijab* into a women's and a men's section. The activists enter through separate doors and communicate without seeing each other, in accordance with the rules of the organization's president in 2009 on how men and women should interact. Despite the curtain, a man and a woman are not allowed to be alone in the room (Munawar, 2009: 193). Women are not permitted to officiate as president; nevertheless they play a key role in the organization, according to Munawar. In 2009, they outnumbered the men members: of the around thirty activists, around twenty were women. They were responsible for composing the program for the weekly lessons and

corresponding with the speakers, they also disseminated information about ongoing activities and engaged in teaching women and children. Also, the women activists were responsible for the money collected in the mosque on the women's side of the curtain. This amount commonly surpassed the sum donated by men members.

As stated in an interview with FOSDA member Rini, women enjoyed a large degree of independence from their men colleagues and realized their own ideas about how to spread their understanding of Islam to other Muslims: *"If we [the women] have ideas for new activities, the men members support us. Well, men and women members have different responsibilities, and women do at least in some areas of life need to submit themselves to men's authority, as for example to the authority of a president. But still women should take their own decisions and go their way. They are not inferior - they are different."* According to her, men and women have different responsibilities in life, especially once they have children. However, having a family and raising children should not stop women from pursuing their aim of promoting the message of Islam. A woman should assist their husbands, just as a husband is obliged to assist and support his wife. *"For pursuing this struggle, to become a good mother, it is important that women are educated."*

The formerly cited Hizbut Tahrir activists, Tia and Nana, also regularly joined the lessons in the Mardliyah mosque. Depending on the speaker, the addressed topic and their personal schedule, they attended between one and two lessons each week. Tia explained to me that, for her, this was a good occasion to broaden her knowledge, get inspiration and become familiar with different topics. She also stressed how nice it was to meet friends. She enjoyed the atmosphere in the mosque. It was a good start in the day she says: *"Sitting there, listening to the sermon makes me feel close to Allah. It gives me strength and energy for the rest of the day."*

The University Mosque

At the Gadjah Mada University Mosque, public sermons or study classes *(pengajian)* took in 2008-9 place five times a week. The University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin organized these lessons. As outlined in the previous chapter, Hizbut Tahrir activists held

important positions in this organization. On Tuesday from 16.00 – 17.30, a sermon would be delivered covering contemporary problems or thematic issues. Every Wednesday evening during the same hours, a sermon especially for women was given. On Friday evening the sermon was about Islamic core concepts of belief, and each Sunday two sermons were held, one in the morning from 6.30-8.00 about Qur'an exegesis and in the evening at four o'clock on the exegesis of Hadith (Nugroho, 2009: 130-1). The current program can be downloaded from the webpage of Jamaah Shalahuddin http://js.ugm.ac.id. It was also distributed in flyer format and printed on posters hanging on information boards of different faculty campuses.

Jamaah Shalahuddin members also delivered sermons themselves, for example in a mosque in Mlati, a village located nearby. Each Wednesday evening members taught the children of this village and each Saturday night they gave a sermon to the village youth (Nugroho, 2009: 131). Edi Nugroho, the officiating president of Jamaah Shalahuddin in 2008-9, explained to me that the benefit of delivering these sermons was two-fold: *"Of course we try to educate the people of this village, to do dakwah, but, preaching there is also an opportunity for our members to learn how to deliver sermons. It is not that easy, you know. Delivering sermons is an art* (seni). *You have to be sensitive to the everyday problems of people, feel what moves them and then try to relate these topics - political, social, economic - to Islamic theology* (akidah)*. As you might imagine, this needs knowledge and understanding, but also self-confidence* (percaya diri)*, but also rhetorical skills, a calm and self assured public appearance and also argumentation skills. You need to practice, only by delivering sermons you become better and calmer. This village is a good training ground – well we might say that the audience is good, supportive."* Members were also asked to teach whenever possible in the local mosque where they lived, or in any other mosque where they would be welcomed to teach. Edi told me that he advised new activists, both men and women, to seize any opportunity to do *dakwah* and spread their message.

Jamaah Shalahuddin also offers basic courses in Arabic as well as courses to read the Qur'an *(tahsin).* The library, which counts between one and two thousand books, is not only accessible to its members, but also to other Muslim students. Reading is regarded as a problem, however. Edi told me that he tried encouraging members to read, but many tried to avoid it, saying that they favoured discussions or face-to-face teaching.

Besides the sermons at the campus mosque, Jamaah Shalahuddin also organizes seminars on different topics. A program that had been steadily developed since the organization was founded, and that is still one of their biggest and most important events, is the program during Ramadan *(Ramadhan di Kampus).* During the fasting month, different events take place on a daily basis. Well-known Indonesian Islamic scholars, whose understanding of Islam is in line with the agenda of Jamaah Shalahuddin, are invited to speak. Islamic music *(nasyid)* bands perform. Book discussions take place, as well as other events. Also *Idul Adha,* the feast of sacrifice is thought to be an ideal time to interact with society. The meat of the sacrificed animals is distributed to different villages in the surrounding area of the city of Yogyakarta.

In all these events, Islamic activists, among them Hizbut Tahrir activists, have the possibility to hone their organizational skills, gain experience in fundraising and enlarge their personal network. In order to educate their fellow students, they needed knowledge and awareness, as Dina outlined. She was an active member of Jamaah Shalahuddin, and a member of the organizing committee of Ramadan 2011. She told me: *"I need to be patient, sensitive to the interlocutors' or audiences' needs and serve as a good example; otherwise the message I want to promote will not be credible. Just imagine I would teach students to restrain from dating and then they would see me with a boy. And I need good arguments to explain what I say, because people here are critical, ask questions, argue."* In general, women were responsible for targeting women; men for men.

Dina studied Japanese language. This was only her second choice, but the marks from her entrance exam to the Gadjah Mada University were not high enough for her first choice, international relations. She grew up in Yogyakarta and still lived there with her parents. A few months prior to our meeting, she began intensively studying the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir in a study circle, and came to regard it as her religious duty to struggle for the caliphate. She aimed to deepen her knowledge and become a full member of the organization, because she was convinced, she said, that this was how Islam should be lived. A friend of Jamaah Shalahuddin "invited" her to join the weekly study group. Like all Jamaah Shalahuddin members, she wore a long veil that concealed the shape of her body. Dina became a member of Jamaah Shalahuddin after her second semester in 2010. Before that

she was active in the "Muslim Family of the Social Sciences *(Keluarga Muslim Ilmu Budaya – KMIB)"*[44]. After one year she began looking for a new challenge and wanted to meet new people, also from other faculties. Because she had friends who were active in Jamaah Shalahuddin, she decided to join. Up until that point she liked it very much, she told me, especially the preparation for Ramadan 2011, which she described as intense, but interesting.

Joining HMI MPO: Studying in "Extra" University Organization

Important sites for gaining knowledge were the different so-called Islamic "extra" university organizations. "Extra" organizations operate nationally and have branches in almost every large university across the country. They are called "extra" campus organizations as opposed to "intra" campus organizations that operate within the university, such as the internal university student council and the faculty senates (Latif, 2008: 301). At the Gadjah Mada University, five Islamic extra campus organizations were in 2008-9 competing for members and offered a variety of perspectives from which to understand Islam and view the world: namely, these were HMI Dipo, HMI MPO, PMII, IMM and KAMMI.

Since the late 1980s, activists of HMI MPO were particularly interested in the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. Yet, its core concepts also faced criticism within the organization. HMI MPO of the Gadjah Mada University positioned itself in 2009 as one of the most heterogeneous organizations active on the campus. It did not have the establishment of the caliphate on its agenda (Albar & Kurniawan, 2009). Randi Kurniawan, the head of research of HMI MPO in 2008-9, told me that HMI MPO had members that sympathised with, or were members of Hizbut Tahrir, and that others sympathised with Shi'ism, others had a NU background, and still others came form Muhammadiyah families. According to him, this was not a problem, but rather an asset of the organization that lead to many interesting discussions. Yet, other members saw the influence of Hizbut Tahrir within the organization more critically, using

[44] For a short portrait of the KMIB see http://fib.ugm.ac.id/index.php?action=generic_content.main&id_gc=232 (8 February 2012).

the term "infiltration" when discussing the presence of Hizbut Tahrir members within HMI MPO.

Despite the substantial number of Hizbut Tahrir students active in HMI MPO, so far no study seems to exist that examines how the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir has affected this organization's ideology. In his study entitled *"Radicalization of Student Movements"*, Ubedilah Badrun (2006) takes HMI MPO as an example in order to underline his thesis that after the fall of Suharto, Islamic student movements developed in two directions, one has become more moderate, and the other more "radical". To outline his statement, he analyses how HMI MPO has become increasingly "radical", especially after 1998. By "radical" he understands groups that seek to cause radical or fundamental change, thus groups which seek to change the whole system (Badrun, 2006: 11). However, he does not discuss the influence of Hizbut Tahrir's ideology on the agenda or everyday activities of the organization.

In particular it was HMI MPO's agenda to reject neoliberalism that fell very much in line with the agenda of Hizbut Tahrir. HMI MPO also regarded the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, as well as various multinational companies, as enemies that needed to be defeated as they deprived Indonesia of its independence (Albar & Kurniawan, 2009: 25). The HMI MPO's focus on restoring Islamic morality was also in line with Hizbut Tahrir's agenda. Nana, the Hizbut Tahrir activist cited above was also active in HMI MPO for two reasons. She told me, first to enlarge her personal horizon, learn, and get new experiences, and second to spread her idea of the caliphate to her friends there: "*For me, this is a good occasion to meet new people, to discuss and learn about Islam, to have fun, but – of course – I also try to convince my friends there of the necessity to re-establish the caliphate and implement the Sharia. I enjoy the atmosphere there, the discussions are lively, because there are also people who still have doubts about whether the caliphate could be established and are critical, but not allergic to the idea."*

Hizbut Tahrir also has its own "extra" university organization called Student Movement of Liberation *(Gema Pembebasan – Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan)*. This organization was founded in 2004 and has a similar hierarchical structure as the other "extra" organizations. The main aim of Gema Pembebasan is to *"make the ideology of Islam become the*

mainstream ideology of all Islamic student movements".[45] However, in 2008-9 and also in 2011, this organization played a marginal role on the campus of the Gadjah Mada Universtiy and was largely invisible in terms of organized activities and press releases.

Each year, between two and three hundred new students would decide to join one of these extra organizations. In the academic year 2008 - 9, KAMMI was the most attractive organization to join, followed by PMII.[46] Contrary to the findings of Latif, who states that dual memberships were common (Latif, 2008: 299), I found that in 2008-9 it was not common to join more than one extra campus organization. It was also, according to discussions with many activists, rather rare that one changed to another organization during one's studies. However, there were some students who only joined for a short period and then became inactive. Most of the students who joined one of these organizations went through more or less intense periods of personal involvement within the organization, but many remained emotionally attached to "their" organization – some went on as alumni to play a role in the organization, for example as trainers, financial donors or as professional or political mentors helping junior members to start and advance their careers.

From a structural point of view, the five organizations bear many similarities. The structure that Puspito (2009: 93) outlines for IMM is also found in the other extra organizations. All of them are structured hierarchically with a central office *(pusat)* located in Jakarta. On the next level one found the provincial level *(daerah),* this provincial office was responsible for the coordination of different branches *(cabang).* At the forth and lowest level in the organizational diagram one finds the different commissariats *(komisariat)* that unite members of one faculty or one university, depending on the number of students. Each organizational level had its own internal structure that was also hierarchical.

The organizations' general agenda and the ideological outlook are to a certain extent predicted by the central office. However, despite this structural dependence, the local

[45] For the detailed structure and vision and mission statement of the organization see its webpage http://www.gemapembebasan.or.idi (18 January 2012).

[46] In 2008-9, 86 new students joined KAMMI and around 80 new members joined PMII. This information is based on communication with the than officiating presidents of the two organizations, Muhammad Hasanudin of KAMMI and Muhammad Yunus Anis of PMII.

branches enjoy quite a lot of autonomy. This being the case, the local committees of different universities in different cities bear at times substantial differences.[47] The subchapters of the organizations claimed that they were financially largely independent of the central office. They mainly did their own fundraising in regard to specific events and trainings. Money came foremost from their alumni who also studied at the Gadjah Mada University and wished to support the young generation. Another option is to submit a funding proposal to the Department of Education, Youth and Sport of the Special Region of Yogyakarta *(Dinas Pendidikan, Pemuda, dan Olahraga Provinsi DIY – DIKPORA).*[48] This department funds specific events, such as trainings or larger conferences. In different interviews with the presidents of various organizations explained to me that the local chapters were largely self-sustaining, and that they did not receive major financial support from the central organization or from other sources such as political parties. Unfortunately, I do not have detailed information about the budgets of these extra organizations and their sources of funding.

In terms of space, some activities were held in the secretariat *(sekre* or *sekretariat)* of the organization. The secretariat of an organization is usually in rented houses where men activists live together; it serves as a meeting place and often also as an archive. The students

[47] A HMI MPO member of the Gadjah Mada University for example reported that the HMI MPO members in Makassar, Sulawesi were more "radical". He told me that quite a lot of the active women members would don a face veil and that a curtain *(hijab)* separated men and women members during meetings.

Also IMM members of the Gadjah Mada University told me of substantial ideological differences between different local branches. In IMM, as the officiating president of the term 2008-9 Irawan Puspito outlined, the internal variation was large. Some members, so he told me, sympathised with the *tarbiyah* movement and were inspired by their imaginations of morality while others were closer to the liberal wing of Muhammadiyah called JIMM *(Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah – The Intellectual Youth Network of Muhammadiyah)* and thus in topics such as religious pluralism, multiculturalism, democracy and social hermeneutics. The edited volume *"Manifesto of the Young Generation of Muhammadiyah"* (Ghazali, Yodir, Fanani, & Boy, 2007) represents and excellent overview about the major topics of interest. Prominent JIMM members wrote all chapter contributions.

[48] The agenda of the DIKPORA is outlined on its webpage http://www.pendidikan-diy.go.id/ (8 February 2012). On this site, a selection of projects and groups they fund is presented.

living there have the responsibility of keeping it safe, but also to make it a comfortable meeting place. At the time of my research, HMI MPO of the Gadjah Mada University had rented six houses that served as student homes and secretariats. One part of the rent was paid by the organization, another part by the members living there. At times, an alumnus who wanted to support the young generations paid the rent. Integrating the office into one's home has the advantage that someone is almost always around. Often, different members come to hang out there, meet friends or discuss topics in their leisure time. These secretariats became a casual meeting point. Many offices get quite crowded, especially towards the early evening.

Training activities that were generally organized were discussions, cadre-training seminars, and study assistance lessons. In most organizations, smaller discussions for members were organized weekly or every second week. Often topics of public actuality were discussed. Not only newsworthy topics were debated, but also issues such as environmental pollution or the perceived moral decline of Indonesian society. In these small discussions especially junior members were actively encouraged to speak up in front of an audience. One important aim was thus not only to reach a hopefully nuanced understanding of certain problems, but also to gain confidence to speak up and hone one's skills in debate. These smaller discussions were not aimed for a larger public but for members. Usually, they took place in the offices of the respective organizations.

In April 2009, I was invited by HMI MPO activists to talk about the Swiss model of federalism. The activists asked a lot of questions. After my short presentation, the discussion organizer asked the participants to reflect on the advantages and disadvantages of this system in the Indonesian context and to discuss, whether or to what extent this system is compatible with Islam. The opinions of the around 25 present members diverged on what they thought about federalism and its compatibility with Islam. During Suharto's New Order regime, federalism was a taboo (Ferrazzi, 2000: 65). However, since his fall, ongoing reform processes in Indonesia granted greater autonomy to the provinces. Students thus linked my presentation to a discussion on the effects of this policy. Relating these developments to Islamic teaching, some concluded that federalism is, like democracy, a western import and is, therefore, incompatible with Islam. In the opinion of Hizbut Tahrir

activists, federalism is against Islam and conflicts with their idea of a powerful caliph that would rule under Sharia law. Yet, other activists saw benefits in such a system and argued that it would open new possibilities for an effective political struggle for an Islamic society. Although a handful of speakers dominated the discussion, the moderator steadily encouraged the calmer ones to participate in the discussion, and to articulate their opinion.

The organizations have an internal education system *(system kaderisasi)* in which a wide range of subjects and skills are taught. The working program is usually agreed on every new yearly term, on the branch level (*cabang*) as well as on the level of its subdivisions (*komisariat).* Besides the general agenda, there is space for rather spontaneous gatherings; usually announced by SMS. Cadre training seminars in all five organizations have three levels and carry names like Cadre Training I (*Latihan Lader I* or also called Basic Training), Cadre Training II, followed by Cadre Training III (also called Senior Course). The first cadre training is usually organized on the faculty level, and takes place twice each year. Other member trainings organized by the branch are held at least once a year. These Cadre Seminars usually last between two and five days and are held in houses, mosques or boarding schools often located at the outskirts of the city. In the ideal case, the group of participants stays at this location for the duration of the training seminar. The schedule is tight and the sessions often continue until late at night. Especially for women students, returning home late is often problematic – not only because it is regarded as inappropriate, at least by some people - for women to return late, but also because many boarding houses close their doors at nine o'clock or even earlier. Staying in one location with other members had the further aim of intensifying social relations and creating friendships among students. Last, but not least, it is more fun, or so the students told me.

The curriculum coveres different topics and is organized in different blocks. One training block usually concerns the organization, such as its history, its structure, its training system, its most important thinkers and its general perspective. Another block focuses more on general topics, such as on other student organizations, on the university as a site of knowledge transmission, and also on issues such as democracy in Indonesia, the current economic system and social analysis. In a third block the participants are taught planning, lobbying and management techniques.

The teachers are mainly senior members of the organization – women and men - or alumni. External teachers, considered experts in certain fields, are also often invited to moderate a ninety-minute session. The lessons commonly start by giving a one-hour introduction to the topic, using different visual supports, most often Power Point Presentations. The last half hour is then reserved for discussion. However, in reality what was called discussion in the curriculum was often rather more of a question – answer session, during which the referee spoke most of the time.

Towards the end of my fieldwork and after having edited the book *"Dynamics of Islamic Student activism"* (Nef, 2009b) in 2009, and again in 2011, I was invited by PMII, HMI MPO and by IMM to talk about Islamic student activism on the campus. On the 30th of April 2009, I received a formal request from the head of the local branch of PMII *(Pengurus PMII Cabang Sleman)* Akhmad Agus Fajari. In this letter, I was formally asked to be a speaker at the Advanced Training *(Pelatihan Kader Lanjut)* of PMII on Sunday morning May 10th in Kaliurang, a village located about 40 minutes by motorbike from the campus. They wanted me to talk about the different Islamic student organizations currently active in Yogyakarta and their various ideologies. I was reluctant to accept the invitation and argued that they all new much more about this topic than I. However, my friend who had given me the invitation finally convinced me to give the talk, and insisted that they would welcome the discussion and my personal opinion. On that Sunday in May, my presentation was rescheduled to the evening, as other speakers had caused the schedule to change. It turned out that the forty or so students present were primarily interested in my opinion about why both *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists had been so successful in recent years in spreading their message and gaining support among students. Some students echoed the frequently heard theory that they were successful because they provided easy, clear cut solutions to all problems and that when young people look for stability these organizations provide clear guidance. Others were skeptical and argued that the phenomenon might be more complex than that. In general, I was surprised by how little some of the present students seemed to know about the personal backgrounds and motivations of fellow students to join a vehicle organization of the *tarbiyah* movement or Hizbut Tahrir.

In addition to organizing training seminars, the organizations provide study assistance before both the mid and end of semester exams. The idea is that senior students should help the junior activists with the preparation. Outstanding academic performance is regarded as very important for one's future and for the reputation of the organization. Learning and academic performance are framed as part of being a good Muslim. Discipline, not only in regard to praying and fasting, but also in regard to education is reconfigured as central to Islamic morality.

A more informal way of self-formation and learning are the frequently organized friendly visits *(silaturahmi)* that different organizations arrange regularly. The aim is to visit and discuss with alumni and representatives from different organizations. In 2009, for example, I joined such an event where the women of PMII had invited the women's branch of HMI MPO to their office to learn more about their work and their general agenda. Usually the participants would sit in a circle, drink sweet tea and eat snacks provided by the host group. In exchange, the visitors would bring a small gift.

Differences existed not only between the local branches active in different places, but also within the branches themselves. In 2008-9, the two most heterogenic organizations at the Gadjah Mada University were, according to my observation, HMI MPO and IMM. These internal differences became visible through the outward appearance of the organizations' women members. In general, the different organizations all aim to educate their members and hone their ability to link religious and secular knowledge to make well-informed analyses of the world in which they live. The main aim is thus not only to gain knowledge in classical fields of religious knowledge, but also to apply this knowledge to what was learned at University – to Islamize secular knowledge and to put secular knowledge to a religious end. As Anis, a HMI MPO member formulated it: *"Today, we have to be able to debate Islam, not because we doubt in God, no, but because we believe firmly in Allah and want to spread his words. Therefore, we need to study hard, not only the Qur'an, but foremost secular knowledge. If you come to hold an important position, you are more respected and more likely to be listened to, this is how it is in this country".*

The "Muslim House": An Individual Student's Initiative to Create a Place of Learning

Another place of learning in 2009 was the "Muslim House" *(Rumah Muslim),* strategically located near the campuses of the Gadjah Mada University and the Yogyakarta State University UNY. This small business could be seen as one example of how Hizbut Tahrir members got creative in finding their own ways to spread their word about the need for the caliphate and reproduce Islamic knowledge. Riskha, together with friends, opened the Rumah Muslim in 2008 with the idea of providing a place for Muslim activists to meet, discuss, and share ideas. This group of friends shared the hope that the centre would help to build synergies between different Islamic movements, enable dialogue between activists, and, to some extent, create common agendas and lead to unified action. For her, the house was one way of fulfilling her religious duty of *dakwah,* struggling for the establishment of the caliphate, and at the same time, a chance to practice what she had learned during her studies.

Riskha had become familiar with the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir during high school and became a member two years later in 2002. In 2004 she began studying management at the economic faculty of the Gadjah Mada University. This was also the reason why she liked her job as manager of the Rumah Muslim so much – it gave her the possibility to merge Islamic knowledge with the management knowledge she studied at university, and thus strive efficiently for a better world.

The "Muslim House" was set up as a meeting place for student activists affiliated with various Muslim organizations. A large banner hanging over the entrance door invited, among others, members of Indonesia's two largest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama NU and Muhammadiyah, to come in. On this banner, Hizbut Tahrir was the last to be mentioned after no less than seven other organizations and movements. Looking from the outside, it was not clear that Hizbut Tahrir activists managed this centre. Upon entering the Rumah Muslim, the influence was quite obvious, however.

Inside, visitors found a combination of a bookshop, boutique, small library, and meeting room. The boutique sold the typical long, one-piece dresses worn by Hizbut Tahrir women activists, and in the bookshops Hizbut Tahrir-branded items such as jackets, stickers, or CDs

could be purchased. Browsing the shelves, one found a collection of books explaining the concepts and ideas of Hizbut Tahir, but also benchmark literature of other Muslim organizations, as well as non-religious books about subjects including post-Marxism, socialism and revolution. Attached to the Muslim house was a food stall *(warung)* selling *halal* food and serving as well as meeting place for students.

The Rumah Muslim's core activity was organizing seminars and discussions, mostly addressing contemporary problems that Indonesia is facing, such as the consequences of increasing globalization, western cultural hegemony, or the negative impacts of the current economic system. One example of such a discussion was the book written by the Indonesian Health minister Siti Fadilah Supari, in English titled *"It's Time for the World to Change"* (Supari, 2008). In this book, she harshly criticises the unfair treatment of the WHO and accuses America of being in involved in a bird flue conspiracy. She argues against sharing blood samples infected with the avian influenza virus H5N1 with the World Health Organization and claims that the viruses are misused to develop chemical weapons, and not to make vaccines. Further, she argues that Indonesia was used as a testing ground. Although a certain scepticism may be justified according to the anthropological study of Celia Lowe (2010) about the multiple narratives around avian influenza in Indonesia, Siti Fadilah's attitude and statements towards the WHO were regarded by many as inappropriate. After the elections in 2009, she was not reappointed as Health Minister.

At the opening of the Rumah Muslim an Islamic novel by Abdul Latip Talib was discussed titled *"Salahudin Ayubi"* (Talib, 2009). In this book, the author tells one version of the life history of the Muslim hero with high moral standards, said to have saved Palestine from the crusade. Salahudin was described in the discussion as an example of a Muslim fighting for justice. At the same time he was praised as someone who treated all humans well, including non-Muslims. Besides issues of social justice and the role of Islam in this context, the role and responsibility of the youth, and especially students, as agents of change was also a frequent topic. Another book addressing this issue that was discussed was titled *"Step Aside: It's Time for the Young Movement to Lead!"* (2008) by Eko Prasetyo. Such events were attended between 30 to 70 students, mostly activists themselves. The participants sat on

the floor, men on the right, women on the left side. A moderator usually led the discussions; the question and answer sessions were very lively.

In the advertisements for these events, such as posters and flyers distributed on the campus, the orange logo of the Rumah Muslim was used, and not the logo of Hizbut Tahrir. The management of the Muslim House organized some of these seminars itself. Others were held by outside activists who could rent a room and audio-visual equipment. The fee was low, with the room-hire costing less than one US Dollar per hour. According to Riskha, the criteria for renting a room were that the event had to be non-profit oriented, and of benefit to the Islamic community. If these two criteria were met, non-Muslims could also hold events, according to her. However, according to my knowledge, no group ever organized an event that was not at least favourable to Hizbut Tahrir's agenda.

The slogan of the Muslim House was "erudite, bold, active *(berilmu, berani, beraksi)*". Riskha explained the motto: *"Boldness is a characteristic of young people, yet before one can be bold one has to learn, because in Islam, knowledge precedes action. Being bold and erudite is however not enough - one must also become active."* According to Riskha, the idea of providing space for dialogue could not be separated from the management's desire to spread the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, and to explain its vision to a larger public. For this reason, they were selective in inviting Islamic movements for dialogue. They looked for discussions with people who were – at the very least – not allergic to the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, so that common ground could enable a platform for joint action. Discussions with groups they regarded as "too liberal" were considered to be a waste of time. Rishka saw such dialogues as yielding no benefit to anybody. She referred especially to the Islamic Campus Network JARIK, but she also considered a large majority of PMII activists to be "too liberal".

There were a number of reasons for not officially linking the centre to Hizbut Tahrir. The most important reason was that it allowed the activists to reach a broader public without mentioning Hizbut Tahrir first. This allowed them to bring up ideas up and discuss their application to contemporary problems. Other student activists were generally able, however, to realise the agenda of Hizbu Tahrir from the language and approaches used by its activists. Nevertheless, many were still interested in listening, discussing and gaining familiarity with the organization's line of argument.

In 2011, the Rumah Muslim was closed. As Riskah told me, the rent in this central location had become too expensive. The bookshop still existed, but it had also moved to a different location. She was confident that she would find a new way to strive for the establishment of the caliphate and combine her management skills with the organization's ideology. In 2011, she was working in a research cluster of the Gadjah Mada University and planned to finish her master's degree soon. *"I have many ideas, we will see, for the moment I don't have time for a larger project as the Rumah Muslim, still, I struggle for the caliphate as good as I can, it is not that there is time for dakwah and time for studying, no, it is all one path, the path of Islam."*

Islamic Boarding Houses: Educating Hizbut Tahrir Activists' Allies

Rounding out this chapter, I focus on two sites of learning and education where *tarbyiah* activists are educated. Although they do not support Hizbut Tahrir's agenda to call for the caliphate, different activists studying in these boarding schools collaborated with Hizbut Tahrir activists in the struggle to "improve" the students' morality and "Islamize" everyday life practice. Understanding how they study and work on themselves to become pious Muslims thus seems important. Primarily in their attempt to strive for academic excellence in combination with religious piety and personal discipline bears strong similarities with Hizbut Tahrir, but also with the Gülen Movement founded by the Turkish author and Muslim scholar Fethullah Güllen. So far, adherents of the Gülen movement have established hundreds of schools all around the world (Yavuz & Esposito, 2003). Yet, despite the fact that all three movements focus on combining Islamic discipline and secular knowledge, the main difference lays in the fact that in the discussed cases of the *tarbiyah* activists in Yogyakarta, both the men and women students study at the national Gadjah Mada University, and only reside and study in their class free time in the boarding houses.

Notably, there seemed to exist no equivalent boarding houses for Hizbut Tahrir activists enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University. Usually, they lived in ordinary boarding houses, although often together with friends in the organization. Yet, as discussed in the previous

chapter, Dwi Condro and Ismail Yusanto have recently opened an institute of tertiary education where students are obliged to reside. Yet, in the STEI Hamfara, the aim is to teach "Islamic knowledge", rather than an entirely secular curriculum, as in the schools of the Gülen movement (van Bruinessen, 2011).

The Pesantren Mahasiswi Daarush Shalihat

"Women are the painters of the "face" of tomorrow's civilization, because the future civilization's "face" will depend on the "face" of today's women. Currently the "faces" of women are smeared with stupidity, so one can imagine what the tomorrow's "face" of humanity will look like. It would be different if they would embellish themselves with noble knowledge (kemuliaan ilmu) *and enchanted Islamic morality* (pesona akhlak)*. This world would change and become a garden of beauty, goodness and justness. Therefore, educating today's women means holding tomorrows glory in one's hands."*
(Text in the brochure of the boarding school for women university students in Yogyakarta - *Pesantren Mahasiswi Daarush Shalihat*, 2009*)*

In 2009, the *Pesantren Mahasiswi Daarush Shalihat* was particularly engaged in educating women students. This institution possessed the characteristics of a classical Islamic boarding school aimed at educating its students in different subjects. Simultaneous with their studies at the boarding school, however, all students were enrolled at university, and mostly at the Gadjah Mada University. In total, 35 women lived with five senior coordinators, who were often still students themselves, together with the founder, spiritual leader, and the teacher *ustadz* Syatori Abdur Rauf, his wife and children (Handitya, 2008: 9). It is located a few kilometres away from the Gadjah Mada University in Pogung Baru, Sleman. Its declared aim was to produce Muslim women with an above average academic performance in their respective fields of study, and at the same time produce women with a "good Islamic personality" *(kepribadian Islam)*. As written in the brochure cited at the beginning of this chapter, educating women was regarded as important for the future wellbeing of humanity.

The embryo of the boarding house was opened in 1996. At that time, only ten students lived together with the *ustadz* in what was than named *Asrama Muslimah* (Residence for Women Students). It was only in May 1999 that the name was changed to *Pesantren Mahasiswi Daarush Shalihat*. Changing the name from *asrama* (residence) to *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) emphasises its main function as an institution of learning and education. In 2009, a new building was under construction to accommodate a total number of around one hundred students; an increasing number of students are interested in staying and studying at this boarding school.

The women living in this boarding house defined themselves as *tarbiyah* activists, however, as I was told, they supported many of the topics Hizbut Tahrir women activists promoted on the campus and frequently collaborated with Hizbut Tahrir activists in organizing different events; namely those aimed at the "restoration" of sexual morality of fellow students. The following discussion of this institution is based on a long interview with Lintang Nuari Haditya. She lived and studied in this boarding school, and until 2009 was one of the student coordinators. Further, she wrote her bachelor thesis about this boarding school (Handitya, 2008).

Women university students interested in studying at this boarding school had to apply and pass a selection process. All Muslim university students with an *above average academic performance* were welcome to apply for the study program, which took two years to complete. The aim was thus to select the best students. Then they had to pass a test where their Islamic knowledge was examined, and pass an interview where their personality was analyzed, as well as their motives for following the two-year study program. Students with the best performance in Islamic knowledge, or those who were most fluent in reading the Qur'an were not selected for these reasons, but rather those who showed the *largest potential* of becoming pious future leaders and encouraging others to follow their example were chosen. The study program was not free: Students had to pay around 100 USD per semester, including accommodation in a two or three bedroom space. Compared to average student expenditure in Yogyakarta, this sum may be considered moderate.

The program that the students were obliged to follow was intense and tough. Twice a day, the students had to attend Islamic classes, one class took place in the morning from 05.00 to

06.15 o'clock, and the second class was at night from 8.00 to 9.15. In these classes, the students were taught knowledge of the Qur'an and Hadith, Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh),* Islamic morality *(akhlak)* and reading and memorizing the Qur'an. They were also instructed in Arabic language and grammar. Modern media facilities such as a beamer to show Power Point Presentations were used. Most students had their own laptop and many owned a motorbike with which they travelled to the campus, where they also attended regular classes and were expected to achieve high marks. All were obliged to return to the boarding school before the call for the *magrib,* prayer performed just after sunset. They were only allowed to leave again after the morning class at 6.15.

Besides these two classes and their university studies, the young women repeated what they had learnt and practiced memorizing verses of the Qur'an. Each night around 3 o'clock, the students got up to perform the night prayer, *tahajud.* Lintang explained to me that it was not that they *must* perform this prayer, but that they learned to understand the benefit of it so that they wanted to perform it: *"If I don't pray tahajud, I feel like missing out on something beautiful. I know that it is not a mandatory (wajib) prayer, but we all have come to like it very much. So getting up at night is not too hard, because we feel that we get something out of it. It has become a habit and now I'm very used to it".* Besides these classes, they attended extra curricular classes such as how to invite speakers, how to teach, how to take care of corpses and how to communicate with society. There were also public sermons every Thursday and Saturday evening that the students should attend. *Ustadz* Syatori usually delivered these sermons. Cooping with waking up during the night, studying until late and getting up early was seen as part of the process of forming a pious self.

In particular, the writings of reformist scholars such as Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Quthb and Yusuf Qardawi were studied during classes (Handitya, 2008: 168). This selection shows the intellectual legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, although the books by these and other authors were used, what mainly inspired the curriculum was the social reality students encountered in their daily life, as these were also considered the fields they would need to teach to others to reach the goal of "improving society" (ibid: 169). Questions of reproductive health, such as how to handle menstruation in an Islamic way, were eagerly discussed and explained, as were other practical matters, like how to live as an Islamic

family, how to raise children in an Islamic way and how women should maintain an Islamic morality. Students were taught, for example, in Islamic jurisprudence *(fiqh)* in regard to Islamic dress, but also in regard to Islamic working law. Students also learnt to cook at the boarding school, as becoming a pious *(shalihat)* housewife was also regarded as essential. In the teacher's approach to Islamic law, women were obliged to cover not only their hair, but also to conceal the shape of their body and cover their feet. This specific understanding of the Islam was regarded as un-debatable and correct. Given that this was regarded as the absolute truth, students needed to learn to promote this particular understanding and defend it against other interpretations they faced. The knowledge they acquired should be put to a concrete end: to convince others to follow their example.

The aim of the school was not only to create students with profound Islamic knowledge and high moral values, but train, prepare and motivate them to pass their knowledge on to others, to engage in *dakwah*. All women students were thus asked to become active in different student organizations in order to spread their knowledge. Lintang, the senior coordinator argued that keeping all the knowledge just for oneself and not passing it on to others would be selfish and not in accordance with the example given by the Prophet. Passing the knowledge on was considered an integral part of *dakwah,* of calling others to greater piety, and was seen as being of utmost importance to reach the goal of creating an Islamic civil society *(masyarakat madani)*. Most of the students were involved in the University Dakwah Organization Jamaah Shalahuddin, in KAMMI, in other university student bodies of the different faculties or in the Forum for Study and Dakwah FOSDA located at the Mardliyah mosque. Others were also active in organizations not directly related to the university; they opted, for example, to teach children in a nearby mosque.

During Ramadan, the students were involved in organizing and teaching an intense course in Islam over two to seven days. The aim was to teach "the beauty of Islam" to a broader audience of students. Women were taught, for example, that the veil should not just cover the hair, but that it should also conceal the shape of the body and thus also cover the chest. Further, they were instructed in the psychology of praying. Students should understand the deeper meaning of the obligation to pray five times a day and not see it merely as a duty one must fulfil. Students were also taught about how to interact with the opposite sex: it

was explained, for example, that Islamic law forbids dating, and it was discussed why this was the case. The students of the boarding school were involved in all these activities, besides studying at university and being active in an Islamic student organization or community.

It was steadily emphasized in classes, Lintang told me during our conversation, that in the family, as well as in society, the role of women was as important as the role of men. The goal was to prepare the students to become the first teachers of their children as well as of the broader Islamic women's community. Such was her disposition *(fitrah)* as a Muslim woman, Lintang explained to me. She should thus live an exemplary life and embrace Islam entirely. When Muslim women were publically active, which they should be, she stressed, it is important that they follow Islamic law and do not mix with non related men *(ikhtilat),* veil properly and should guard their honour and reputation *(izzah).* If they respected these limits, they could become active in any domain they regard as fruitful for spreading the message of Islam and creating an Islamic society.

After studying in the boarding school for two years, the women students often rented a house together, but stayed in close contact with the boarding school. Events for alumnae were organized frequently. Lintang also planned to continue to do *dakwah,* so that Muslims would not orient themselves with western ideology, wear increasingly tight dresses and go clubbing rather than to the mosque. She found it deplorable that young students were closer with pop music than with the Qur'an, and seemed to forget that they were Muslims. In regard to western ideology, she emphasized that she also admired many achievements of western civilization, for example the technological progress, punctuality, and high academic achievement. However, she emphasized that all these values she admired were also to be found in the Qur'an. Many Muslims just had not yet internalized them, Lintang argued.

Lintang describes the Pesantren Darush Shalihat in her thesis as a *modern, new trend* in Indonesia. New is, according to her analysis, the combination of two education systems that

were traditionally separated, namely secular[49] university education and education in an Islamic boarding school *(pesantren)* (Handitya, 2008: 1). Whether the Pesantren Darush Shalihat qualifies as *pesantren* may be subject to debate. The term *pesantren* is not protected in Indonesia so that any institution may call itself a *pesantren*. However, the genealogy of the term, and the different institutions calling themselves *pesantren,* has at least traditionally been liked to NU.

Hefner stresses in the introduction to his edited volume about the politics and trends of Islamic education in Southeast Asia the persisting importance of Islamic education. Despite the fact that learning has for centuries been an integral part of Islam, Islamic schools have only recently become the focus of international attention, especially since 9/11 and the Bali attacks in 2002 and 2005 (2009a: 1). In his chapter in the same book, he analyses new trends in the Islamic education system in Indonesia and outlines an increasing tendency among the over 11'000 Indonesian boarding schools *(pesantren)* as well as in the 36'000 modern Islamic day schools *(madrasas)* to integrate general or secular education in their Islamic curriculum (Hefner, 2009b: 57-8).

Noor, Sikand and van Bruinessen (2008) outline in their edited book *"The Madrasa in Asia"* the important role the *madrasa* still plays in educating Muslims in different Asian countries such as in India, Pakistan, China, Malaysia and Indonesia. As this volume outlines, a large variety of different types of Islamic schools exists. Not only do they differ substantially in their teaching methods, in the age group they target or in their sizes, but also in their curricula. As the authors point out in their introduction, the importance assigned to *madrasas* has not diminished in recent years; rather, the different kinds of institutions for Islamic learning have proliferated. Also in modern times, the *madrasa* continues to be an important site for training Muslims all over Asia. However, neither of the two books contains a contribution that discusses the combination of boarding school with secular university education – the trend that Lintang describes as new.

[49] I use the term secular here because Lintang uses it in her thesis. As outlined before, the Gadjah Mada University dedicates an important place to religion in its curriculum.

The Indonesian scholar Arif Subhan (2010) outlines the history of Islamic education and the idea of combining religious and secular education. He emphasises that already in 1926, when the Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor was established in East Java, the basic idea was to combine the virtues of the *pesantren* system with modern knowledge: English and Arabic were, for example, taught to create students well equipped to hold important positions. For its mixed curriculum this Islamic boarding school is called *modern*. Further, Gontor is named *independent* because it is not affiliated with either NU or Muhammadiyah (2010: 129).

The Pesantern Darush Shalihat differs from the Pondok Modern Darussalam Gontor and similar Islamic boarding schools in the respect that students do not study secular subjects within the boarding school, but rather at one of the best Indonesian universities. It is claimed, as Lintang argues, that it would be almost impossible for an Islamic boarding school to reach a similar academic standard and international recognition as the Gadjah Mada University. What is furthermore modern, according to Lintang, about Daarush Shalihat is its location. The boarding school is in the city, unlike the over 10'000 boarding schools in a rural area. The students are thus not secluded form the world, as Lintang told me, and therefore do not live in a more or less protected enclave, but rather in the heart of the bustling city with all its potential moral hazards.

Not only its central location, but also its ideology as a centre for excellence, affords it the ability to invite experts in different fields of study to give lectures, according to Lintang. Commonly, as already noted by Geertz in his study about Islamic *pesantren* in the 1950s, students were very much focused and dependent on the *kyai*, the head and religious authority of the school (C. Geertz, 1960). In boarding school Daarush Shalihat, Lintang argued, this was not the case as the students were taught by a large variety of men and women teachers.

The main argument of her thesis is that through this structure of mixing secular university education and Islamic learning, this boarding school is especially adept at answering the challenges and demands of modernity to successfully produce future Muslim women leaders (Handitya, 2008: 169). However, despite being taught by a variety of teachers, the teachings do not contradict each other in regard to their interpretation of the Qur'an,

according to Lintang; they differ in their focus, they claim authority in a specific field, rather than claiming any religious authority.

In addition to the teaching, the *subjection to tough discipline* also prepares the students for modernity – so Lintang told me when I asked her how she managed to cope with the tight schedule: *"Getting up in the middle of the night for prayer, regular fasting, and following a structured daily routine brings our mind close to God. Also, it prepares us for the future. Later, as wives and hopefully working mothers, we will benefit from the discipline and conscious time management we learn here."* Piety, agency and discipline were entangled for Lintang and defined her self-perception as a modern woman with a top education.

In her account, Lintang portrayed herself as a modern young women who authored her own life, even as what Fernando calls in her analysis about pious women in France as a *"quasi-feminist subject"* (2010: 22). During our long interview she repeatedly valorised personal freedom, for example when she emphasised that one needed to follow religious obligations such as praying, fasting, and veiling because one is convinced that this is right, because one consciously chooses to do it: *"Here we learn that veiling is a religious duty. From how I understand the Qur'an veiling is compulsory for Muslim women - well, I mean proper veiling, so that the body shape is concealed. But I would oppose a law that would force women to veil. One needs to want to veil, this choice must come from one's heart (dari hati), one needs to be ready (siap)."* Yet, simultaneous to stressing the importance of free will, she also emphasises that submission to God's will is an obligatory practice, a religious duty not to be compromised. Fasting, veiling, and praying are thus simultaneously acts of free choice and a religious obligation. For Lintang, as well as for many other women I have worked with, personal autonomy and submission to religious norms are not opposed but part of their constitution as modern religious subjects.

Hizbut Tahrir activists do not share this opinion about ethics as a personal matter, as expressed by Lintang – at least theoretically. Although Hizbut Tahrir activists with whom I worked also argued that one cannot force people to piety, they would, once the caliphate was established, not let Muslims decide about how they wish to dress. Rather, as Tia who I cited previously explained to me, the Sharia should be used as guideline for organizing such matters. As she outlined, this would imply that all women would have to dress according to

Hizbut Tahrir's understanding of Islamic law. Yet, for the moment, Hizbut Tahrir and other activists have no other choice other than to conceptualize decisions related to piety as an expression of one's "proper" understanding of Islam, thus ultimately as a personal matter.

Creating Future Leaders – PPSDMS Nurul Fikri

A similar institution that also emphasises academic excellence, religious piety, morality and personal discipline is the Islamic boarding school program called "The Strategic Development of Human Resources Program Nurul Fikri" *(PPSDMS – Program Pembinaan Sumber Daya Manusia Strategis)*. It was designed for unmarried male Muslim students with excellent academic performance, enrolled in one of the top national universities. In the case of Yogyakarta, they have to be enrolled at the Gadjah Mada University. Further, they have to be active members in a student organization.

This program was founded by the Bina Nurul Fikri foundation in Jakarta in 2002. The program director in 2010 was Dr. Musholli, who is, like other members of the program's central board, a high-ranking member of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In 2010, the PPSDMS Nurul Fikri had local branches in five Indonesian cities, in Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Bogor. During the two-year term 2008 – 2010, a total number of 160 students were selected. After passing a competitive entrance exam, the students received a monthly scholarship of 1'200'000 Rp (130 USD) over two years. The houses were well equipped; three students shared a room, with 24-hour Internet access, a library, English and sport classes. In return, the students were obliged to follow the curriculum and the rules of the boarding house. They had to understand and accept the mission, vision, and idealism, as well as the basic values of the institution.

The vision of this institution was to *"Create future leaders who understand Islam, have integrity, and hold high credibility, have a mature personality, are moderate, and care about the nation and the country"*[50]. In the statement about the program's mission, it is outlined

[50] For an overview about the vision and mission of the program, see http://ppsdms.org/tentang-kami/visi-misi, (27 December 2010).

that one goal is to create future leaders that are clean *(bersih)* of private ambitions, from worldly interests, and free of bodily desire *(hawa nafsu).* A better Indonesia should be created, and the model of goodness should come from Allah, the creator. The notion "free from private ambitions" does not mean, however, that one should not strive for excellence and try to advance one's own career or pursue the struggle of *dakwah,* Reza explained to me: *"Of course we should all try to make the best of our potential, be ambitious in our studies, set high goals. We should analyse our strengths and weaknesses and choose the best way. The best way is forcibly the one that makes you rich, but one should always keep the wellbeing of Indonesia and the ummat in mind and try to make your way that you are a valuable member of society."*

After the two-year training, all students should be able to understand that Islam is an entire way of life *(system kehidupan)* that should inspire all aspects of human life. They should be able to guide people. Further, they ought to be able to submit an article to local newspapers or to the intra university press. Besides being able to fluently read the Qur'an and understand contemporary Islamic debates, the students also need to master English and basic skills in taekwondo. The detailed daily, weekly, and monthly curriculum is outlined in the foundation's guidebook *(buku pedoman).*

Other than in the case of the previously discussed Pesantren Mahasiwi Daarush Shalihat, no religious authority *(kiayi* or *ustadz)* consistently lived with the students, teaching and supervising them. Each one of the houses in different Indonesian cities was managed by an alumnus from the previous generation of students, who was usually also still a student. The house in Yogyakarta, located around four kilometres north of the campus, was from 2008 – 2010 managed by Reza. Yet Islamic teachers came to the boarding house frequently to teach different subjects. The regional leader *(pembina regional)* of the house in Yogyakarta was Dr. Wazis Wildan, who also regularly taught at the Pesantren Mahasiswi Darush Shalihat. Ideologically, both institutions bear many similarities. The men in the boarding schools also had to follow tight disciplinary rules. They are not allowed to smoke or have girlfriends and must regularly attend the daily activities.

The program is founded by institutions as well as by private founders. The largest founders in March 2010 were the Bank Mayapada and the Medco Foundation who both contributed

around 10'000 USD each in the month of March 2010 alone. The foundation's total income in March 2010 was around 33'000 USD.[51] The program is linked to the Prosperous Justice Party; many of the founders are high-ranking party members.

The whole program, and the ideology transmitted to the students, is inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood: In classes about Islamic thinkers, the seminal work of Sayid Qutb *"Milestones" (Petunjuk Jalan)* is studied to understand the principles of political Islam. To understand how Islam should influence the global political system, the students read the work of the founder of Jamaat-I Islami Abdul A'la al-Maududi's *"The Book of Government or Rules for the King" (Khilafah dan Kerajaan)* (Buku Pedoman Sistem dan Manjemen Pembinaan 2008: 131). Qutb, like Hasan al-Banna, the most influential thinker of the Muslim Brotherhood, and A'la al Maududi, understands Islam as an all-encompassing system that should inspire not only the lives of individuals but also the whole mode of governance, including law.

One of the students living in this boarding house between 2008-2010 was Wibisono, the officiating president of KAMMI of the Gadjah Mada University in 2009. He called himself lucky to have passed the test to live and study in the boarding house for two years. Until that point, he told me, he as learnt a lot in different Islamic subjects. What he enjoyed most, he said, were the frequent discussions with his friends also living there. As with Lintang, Wibisono also saw a lot of benefit in submitting himself to this tight regime of discipline, but as he explained to me, it was not always easy and there were indeed moments when he would have preferred to hang out with friends until late and drink coffee and relax. He also emphasised the fact that it was his personal choice – and the right choice - he said: *"Here I learn so much for life, it is intense, but it is worth it, it is an investment for the future. […] Not only in terms of having an Islamic personality, but also in terms of personal connections to friends, in skills I learnt."* He stressed that this education makes him ready for the challenges he will face as one of the future leaders of the country. As far as I can tell from his level of

[51] For detailed lists of monthly donations to the foundation, see http://ppsdms.org/kategori/laporan-donasi, (27 December 2010).

self-esteem and rhetoric, the institution seems to have succeeded in creating at least one future leader.

Conclusion

Acquiring and reconfiguring Islamic knowledge is crucial to the daily lives of Hizbut Tahrir activists. For successfully engaging in *dakwah,* constant learning is considered a precondition. Hizbut Tahrir activists thus – more or less reflexively - apply knowledge to practices of human conduct in order to achieve optimal standards of efficiency in calling for the caliphate. The core argument I have made in this chapter is that in an increasingly complex world where information and science are held in high esteem, religious knowledge and learning are of utmost importance to establishing authority. In a place like the Gadjah Mada University, where different religious opinions coexist, and where all students have, via the Internet, access to a large variety of different texts and images, any form of behaviour or practice needs to be underlined by rational argumentation. Becoming knowledgeable about various knowledge sources has become one central element to the successful establishment of religious authority. Different forms of knowledge have become compatible.

In their daily lives, Hizbut Tahrir activists dedicate a lot of time to expanding their knowledge in different fields, both Islamic and secular. Studying the ideology of an-Nabhani allows them to raise questions about their surrounding world and relate their understanding of Islam to current issues. The activists thus acquire organizational, management, didactic, and rhetorical skills through various activities they pursue. Further, for Hizbut Tahrir activists, striving for academic excellence in their respective field of study is of utmost importance as this legitimates their truth claims in a specific field. In their logic, a student with a degree in medicine has more authority to criticise the World Health Organization's policy in dealing with avian influenza in Indonesia, for example, than does someone without substantial knowledge in this field.

It is not the case that Hizbut Tahrir students accept non-Islamic authors or other Islamic scholars as authorities in their own right, on the level of their own religious authorities.

Often in debates with peers, they refer to other scholars in order to add legitimacy and force to their argument. Thus, different forms of secular knowledge significantly contribute to the way they frame their own ideology, and to a certain extent this ability of relating their understanding of Islam to secular knowledge is a powerful way of attracting well-educated Muslims in Indonesia. Secular knowledge is *"Islamized"* in the sense that students refer to the Islamic past and relate it to what they have learned at University in order to analyze the world in which they live. Often, this is a productive way to raise questions and provide their own Islamic answers.

In this chapter, I have discussed different sites, with various structures of authority, where student Hizbut Tahrir activists learn to successfully call for the caliphate. In their personal narratives on how they came to embrace the organization's ideology, Hizbut Tahrir students frame their decision as a conscious act, as an expression of their deep faith, but also of their free will. Although by becoming a member of Hizbut Tahrir the students agree to submit themselves to the organization's ideology, they are required to engage actively in the spread and reproduction its knowledge. Students do not follow blindly, but critically seek the kind of knowledge that helps them to make sense of the world around them. This process of seeking knowledge is not opposed to submitting one's self to an authoritative set of moral values: Personal autonomy and submission to religious norms and authority are not seen as opposing binaries, but rather as mutually constitutive. If a group of students calls for the establishment of the caliphate, they do so by way of reason.

Chapter IV:

Arguing for the Caliphate

During Ramadan 2011, I was invited via SMS to a film screening and discussion session organized by the women branch of Hizbut Tahrir, held in the yard of the Gadjah Mada University Campus Mosque. As written on posters hanging on different information boards on the campus, the idea was to discuss the necessity for establishing the caliphate, while waiting to break the fast. As usual when I joined events organized by Hizbut Tahrir women activists, the group of around thirty students welcomed me warmly. They considered politeness and open-mindedness, also towards foreigners, as core Islamic virtues. We were sitting in the shade on plastic mats (tikar). *Various students had brought their laptops along and loudspeakers to amplify the sound of the film. In small groups we sat around the computers to watch the six-minute film* "Heart-to-Heart Talk of a Child of the Nation (Curhatan Anak Negri)[52]". *This film was one of the teasers shown at the* "Rajab Conference 1432H of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia"*. This conference was held in 29 different Indonesian cities between 2 - 19 June 2011, attended by over 40'000 people. Its title was* "A Prosperous Life under the Shelter of the Caliphate".[53]

The film starts with a scene of a happy Indonesian boy riding home from school on his bicycle. In the next scene, he is still riding his bike but has grown up and is proudly wearing a graduation cap as sign that he just obtained an academic degree. The music is festive. In the next moment the scene and music change completely: it turns out the he has just been dreaming. In reality he is poor, his school is broken and there is no money to repair it. A male narrator reads the boy's dairy in which he talks of his dreams of a good education, and becoming successful. This dream is thought to be the dream of many, yet, as is written in his

[52] This film can be downloaded form YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q1FYG7aP-nA (18 March 2012).

[53] See for example http://www.save-islam.com/2011/06/konfrensi-rajab-1432-h-riau-syariah.html (12 July 2012).

diary, the reality of thousands of Indonesians looks bitter. Instead of going to school, they are forced to live in poverty. In the boy's view, this lack of proper education leads the poor youth to immoral behavior, such as committing crimes, dealing and using drugs, as well as having premarital sex. Engaging in sexual relationships is viewed as leading to illnesses and abortions. All of these "immoralities" are framed as consequences of poverty and are illustrated by pictures.

The boy in the film deplores the life conditions so many Indonesian citizens have to cope with, and emphasizes that this is due to the rotten system. He argues that Indonesia is a rich country, rich in natural resources and asks the question of why so many people are poor in such a rich country. If all people could benefit from this wealth, and not only some privileged civil servants and politicians, all would be able to live a decent life of prosperity. The situation is shown to be hopeless, as those who benefit from the current system have no interest in changing it. Yet, not only do they have no interest, they are also viewed as having no power to effect change, as they are themselves trapped in a corrupt system. In such a situation, only a systemic revolution is believed to bring salvation: People should have confidence in Allah and follow his words and the example set by the Prophet. In the boy's view, all rules and solutions are clearly outlined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It is imperative that the Sharia is implemented. The caliphate needs to be established. The word "caliphate" is uttered as the very last word in the film, as the ultimate solution to bring prosperity and wellbeing to all.

After the screening, the organizers asked the students to discuss the film in small groups. In my group, all Hizbut Tahrir activists agreed that the caliphate constituted the only solution to improving the living condition of all citizens. In line with the ideology as outlined by an-Nabhani, Islam was framed as alternative to neoliberalism or capitalism. They agreed that in order to bring about change, a total systemic revolution was necessary; that the mind of the masses (fikrah) *needed to be changed. The discussion then turned to how each activist must contribute to reaching the organization's vision of establishing the caliphate by convincingly spreading the organization's ideas to others.*

In Indonesia, as well as in many other parts of the world, state efforts to bring development and the promised prosperity for all largely failed; the improvement of life quality that many people had hoped for remained unfulfilled (Aragon, 2000; E. Collins, 2007; Murray Li, 2007). Particularly after the Asian financial crisis of 1998, and the fall of the Suharto regime in the same year, many Indonesians had lost faith in the state-led schemes for nationalist modernization (Rudnyckyj, 2010). During this time many citizens' confidence in their government to manifest the promised wealth and prosperity was deeply shaken, and the call of Hizbut Tahrir activists then, to place hope in individuals rather than the state, was heard. Rather than relying on the state to effect change and modernization, Hizbut Tahrir activists aimed to offer a different path to development in which the Indonesian nation state was – at least in theory - no longer deemed responsible for improving the wellbeing of its people.

Following a neoliberal logic, they put the responsibility for improvement and change in the hands of individuals. Students, and the country's professional elite, were framed as agents of change. Rather than leaning back and waiting for the financial benefits from technical development, Muslims must become active. They should work hard on themselves to strive for academic excellence and prosperity, and at the same time they should effectively convince others of the necessity to establish the caliphate, to change the system totally. They argue that the state was deeply corrupt and paralysed in acting independently due its involvement in World Bank and IMF projects, and by its dependence on large multinational companies. As the state increasingly outsourced services, it lost its power to act efficiently. What they demanded thus was a systemic revolution *(revolusi)* (an-Nabhani, 2002). A sticker saying *"Fight against the System – Unite People under Khilafah"* decorated the motorbike helmets and notebooks of several of the activists with whom I worked.

Daromir Rudnyckyj (2010) has argued convincingly that calling for spiritual reform – although with different political aims – is a phenomenon observable far beyond Indonesia. Different religious groups mobilize religious values to address the challenges of modern life in a globalized world. As he outlines in his study, religion and politics, economy and popular culture are intertwined in manifold ways. Also Thomas Csordas (2009) argues in the introduction to his edited volume *"Transnational Transcendence: Essays in Religion and*

Globalization" to carefully analyse the entanglement of globalization and religion. He particularly stresses the necessity to pay attention to the transformation of religion in the contemporary world by examining how religion is not only framed as a refuge from globalization, but rather how globalization and its underlying rationality affect practitioners' style of arguing and striving to mobilize masses. As Rudnyckyj and Csordas, Brian Silverstein (2008) lays out - particularly in his work on contemporary Turkish Sufi practices of discipline - that Islam should not be understood as a sphere analytically separable from politics or economy. Rather, he emphasises the necessity to analyse how reasoning and spiritual reform is articulated to mobilize religious values and address challenges of state-supported development.

Student Hizbut Tahrir activists frame their solution to establishing the caliphate as an alternative to "neoliberalism" or "capitalism". They do so following the books of an-Nabhani who conceptualized what he calls the "Islamic economy", particularly in his book *"The Economic System in Islam"* (2000) [54], as an alternative to a capitalistic system. In this book, his core critique of capitalism is that it fails to distribute scarce resources to individuals so as to satisfy at least all of their basic needs. He mainly criticizes the capitalistic system's pricing mechanisms of supply and demand and argues that this market oriented system is blind to problems such as poverty, morality and justice (an-Nabhani, 2000: 25-6). The main problem within the capitalist system lays, in his argumentation, in the regulation of property rights and ownership. Foremost, he argues that natural resources should not be privately owned. Rather, these resources should be conceptualized as common property. Following this logic, the revenue from the exploitation of these resources should be used to ensure the wellbeing of the community, not of single individuals (2000: 72).

An-Nabhani does not criticize the aspiration to achieve individual wealth. On the contrary, he stresses in the introduction to his three hundred-page book the necessity that all Muslims *"establish for themselves a productive way of thinking. Thereafter, they will be able to proceed, based on that, to acquire material wealth, make scientific discoveries, and*

[54] An English online version of the full book of an-Nabhani can be downloaded, see www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/PDF/EN/en_books_pdf/economic_system.pdf, (14 October 2010).

industrial inventions" (2000: 12). To *"catch up"* with capitalist nations, Muslims should not adopt *"western laws and concepts"*, neither should they, according to an-Nabhani, try to reconcile them with Islam. Rather, the aim should be to *"expose the foundation upon which the capitalist solutions are established, illustrate their falsehood and destroy them intellectually"* (2000: 13). Most important in this endeavour is, he argues, that Muslims stick to the rules of Islam.

In regard to democracy, an-Nabhani argues that it is fundamentally antithetical to Islam because it places the sovereignty to make laws in the hands of the people. For this reason, Hizbut Tahrir activists reject democracy. An-Nabhani's argument is that in Islam, all rules are already clearly outlined. A Muslim man that is elected by Muslims of both genders must be responsible for implementing Islamic law. An authorized aid, the provincial governors and the district governors should assist the ruler. Islamic law is the sovereign, not the people. The right of the *ummat,* of both Muslim men and women, is to appoint the caliph, but he alone has the right to adopt legal rules. Yet, the Muslim community is obliged to control his actions and interfere if his decisions are deemed oppositional to Islamic law. The hallmark of the organization is that Islam provides solutions to all problems at hand. Either, the rules can be extracted directly from the Qur'an and the Sunnah where explicitly stated, or, obtained through a process of deduction called *ijtihad*. The core argument is that if Islam would be lived in an all-encompassing way *(Islam kaffah),* society would be just and all people would live in prosperity and peace (an-Nabhani, 2002).

Modernization has changed the terrain upon which Hizbut Tahrir's call for the caliphate takes place. When Hizbut Tahrir was founded in 1953, the organization was forced to act secretly, as the Jordanian authorities banned its activities. From the beginning, Hizbut Tahrir members were arrested. The organization was forced to operate in an increasingly repressive atmosphere (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 8ff.). In contemporary Indonesia, Hizbut Tahrir is allowed to act legally, and is adept in using its personal networks, as well as mass media technologies, to popularize its ideas. The ability to communicate faster has condensed time/space relations, allowing like-minded individuals to share their thoughts, ideas and writings with multiple audiences in numerous ways never before conceived. Coordinating

different events and "actions" *(aksi)* over long distances has become faster and cheaper than ever before.

Hizbut Tahrir student activists relate to the ideas of an-Nabhani in different ways in order to make truth claims, convince others and pursue the "struggle" *(perjuangan)* of establishing the caliphate. Following an-Nabhani, student activists also frame Islam as an ideology that is opposed to capitalism, neoliberalism and democracy. Inspired by Asad (1986), I examine in this chapter different activists' styles of arguing for the caliphate and reviving the ideas of an-Nabhani, as he demanded them to do (an-Nabhani, 2000: 13). The ideas of an-Nabhani are thus not discussed in isolation. Rather, it is examined how both women and men activists relate to the organization's ideology as a means of criticizing the status quo and imagining a better future. As Asad argues *"these discourses relate conceptually to* a past *(when the practice was instituted, and from which the knowledge of its point and proper performance has been transmitted) and* a future *(how the point of that practice can best be secured in the short or long term, or why it should be modified or abandoned), through* a present *(how it is linked to other practices, institutions, and social conditions)"* (1986: 14).

As I outline, the process of relating to the past plays a crucial role in the lives of students. The Islamic past is the basis on which they formulate their demands, and according to which they model their *dakwah* strategy and envision a better future. Yet a detailed reference to Islam's past as a way of supporting truth claims, was absent in personal and public discussions that I had with students. Often, it remained unclear whether they aimed to *re-establish (mendirikan kembali)* a caliphate that had existed in the past, or whether they wanted to *establish (mendirikan)* a new caliphate, or a mixture of both. Often, the terms "re-establish" and "establish" were used seemingly interchangeably. Also, seldom did they relate their vision of the caliphate to the Ottoman Caliphate that was abolished on March 3, 1924. If they referred to it, they did so in order to emphasise the short time span of only 90 years since its abolishment, and to stress that it was a system that had, in their eyes, successfully existed in history. Yet, I never heard activists critically discuss the weaknesses of the Ottoman Caliphate, or how this system of governance differed from the ideas formulated by an-Nabhani. Further, I heard no discussion in which the demands of the Khilafah Movement of the early twentieth century were discussed, or related to the

ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. At least in my observation, the students' references to the Islamic past as a way of legitimizing their truth claims were generally rather vague. Their claim to imitate the example of the Prophet and to "follow Islam" played an important role in conceptualizing what Asad called *"apt performance"* (Asad, 1986: 15), yet this claim of imitating the past seemed to hinder critical discussion of the Islamic past in relation to the organization's idea. Intensively discussed, however, was how the Islamic past should be related to the present with the aim of securing a better future.

To attain the perfect system, according to the activists, a three level approach is needed. As the Hizbut Tahrir activists Riskah Budiarti (2009) outlines in her book chapter, to reach the goal of establishing the caliphate, Hizbut Tahrir activists need to follow a three-step *dakwah* method *(thariqah),* as exemplified by the Prophet. The first step is to build *(tatsqif)* a cadre of *dakwah* activists with a strong Islamic personality *(sykhshiyah Islamiyah).* The second step is to interact with the Islamic community *(tafa'ul ma'al ummah)* with the aim of spreading their understanding of Islam to others, and to promote the idea of the caliphate. The third step, which Hizbut Tahrir has not reached yet, is to come to power and establish the caliphate (Budiarti, 2009: 153-4). According to Riskha, hundreds of different ways *(uslub)* of fulfilling the perceived religious obligation to do *dakwah* exist. These range from organizing small-scale events such as weekly discussions to organizing large-scale conferences. Furthermore *dakwah* may be conducted by, for example, opening small businesses, becoming active in campus politics, or writing blog posts.

The caliphate is proposed as a solution to all problems that Indonesia is seen to be facing, such as poverty, insufficient access to health and educational resources, corruption and crime. Inspired by Asad's approach of reading Islam as a discursive tradition, I think of students, both women and men, not as passive recipients of a foreign ideology, but rather as actively reconfigure the organization's ideology. Addressing the question of how Muslim women shape the Islamic revival, Pieternella von Doorn-Harder (2006) aims to challenge the stereotype that women are passive followers of religious trends and discusses how they engage actively in spreading their vision of what it mean to live a pious life. She makes her argument by focusing on the women's branches of the two largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. She shows how these activists have

significantly contributed via these organizations to bring about societal change in different spheres of life, such as education, sexual health, family planning and women's rights. In her study, she focuses on Muslims who defend their rights and stand up against *"the rise of Islamist groups of young, aggressive, well-organized men whose mindset was not necessarily friendly to women"* (van Doorn-Harder, 2006: 261). As she outlines, a prototype of such a *"radical"*, in her words, or extremist group is Hizbut Tahrir. Its members are regarded as lacking solid Islamic knowledge and many of its followers are believed to be blindly following a narrow interpretation of the Qur'an (ibid: 54). Describing these organizations as a group of "*aggressive men"* hinders van Doorn-Harder's examination of the role of women's agency within these groups. Although Hizbut Tahrir activists promote a different interpretation of Islam than that of the women she has worked with, Hizbut Tahrir women activists are not passive wives or second wives, victims of patriarchal husbands, or otherwise blinded by empty promises, but engage actively in promoting their understanding of Islam. Like the women active in other organizations, they contribute to shaping the public debate on piety and the "proper" place of Islam in everyday life.

This chapter focuses on women and men Hizbut Tahrir student activists' style of arguing. The analysis contributes thus to the larger discussion and examination of the interrelation between religion, globalization, economy and politics. The activists' argumentation and choice to submit themselves to a rigid set of rules is not read as a lack of critical thinking, but rather as a conscious decision to choose an alternative path of societal and personal development that demands active learning and self-transformation. In my analysis I triangulate information gained during various interviews with a book chapter written by a Hizbut Tahrir woman student of the Gadjah Mada University, and personal observations and recordings of public events organized by Hizbut Tahrir activists with goal of examining the logic of their arguments.

The Vision of an *"Autonomous, Strong, Influential, Progressive and Honourable Society under the Caliphate"*

The narrative of the caliphate as the solution to all problems that Indonesia is currently facing, features prominently in Hizbut Tahrir activists' argumentations. In the following, I analyze how the Hizbut Tahrir activist and student of the Gadjah Mada University, Riskha Budiarti, who initiated the opening of the "Muslim House" discussed in the previous chapter, argues for the establishment of the caliphate in a book chapter she has written entitled *"The Academic Community of the Gadjah Mada University Establishes an Autonomous, Strong, Influential, Progressive and Honourable Society under the Caliphate"* (Budiarti, 2009). An-Nabhani's book, *"The Economic System of Islam"* (2000) largely inspired her writings on her vision of a "better" system. Besides focusing on the core narratives in her book chapter, I draw on discussions and interviews I had with Riskha.

Riskha is addressing what she considers to be one of the major deficits of the capitalist system, namely that it does not guarantee a socially just distribution of goods. Also in an-Nabhani's work, this question of just distribution of goods is at the heart of her reflections According to Riskha, and many fellow activists, a large majority of Indonesian citizens live in poverty; not because Indonesia is regarded as a poor country, but because the country's wealth is inefficiently and unfairly distributed. Particularly criticized is the fact that both foreign and Indonesian companies were granted permission by the Indonesian state to commercially extract natural recourses such as oil, gold and gas. Following an-Nabhani (2000: 72), Riskha argues that goods that are originally hidden inside the earth are public property (2009: 142). It is thus against Islamic law, she believes, that companies such as PT. Freeport or Exxon Mobile "rob" these hidden treasures that belong to the Indonesian citizens. As she argues, the economic revenue from public property, foremost from natural resources should be used to guarantee free access to health care and education (Budiarti, 2009: 148-9). Her critique is thus not exclusively a critique of foreign companies, but more of the Indonesian state that granted licences to private companies. Rishka also criticizes the state for not ensuring that the profit of state companies is redistributed among its citizens, but rather used for personal enrichment of the powerful elite within the country. An ideal ruler living Islam in an all-encompassing way would at least provide for the basic needs of its

people and would acknowledge that these resources should be used to finance public expenditure such as access to health services, education, as well as strive to meet the basic needs of the people - both Muslims and non-Muslims. Public income as well as public expenditure should all be in accordance with Islamic law. Such a system would create prosperity for all and make the caliphate a just and honourable place to live (Budiarti, 2009: 145).

Riskha argues that according to Islam, the state is responsible for meeting at least six basic needs: three individual basic needs, namely food, clothing and shelter *(pangan, sandang, dan papan)*; and three public needs, namely education, health and safety *(pendidikan, kesehatan, keamanan)*. The *Baitul Maal* (House of Money or treasury) is one among other institutions that regulates social imbalances. This financial institution is under the control of the caliph and, among other duties, is in charge of administering the distribution of *zakat* (given alms) revenues for the financing of public services. Everyone should have access to these goods, the rich as well as the poor, Muslims, as well as non-Muslims. No discrimination of any kind should exist (Budiarti, 2009: 140-1). If a person loses the ability to work, Riskha told me in one of our many conversations, the state should give this person a pension from its treasury funds. The state should also assist blind or other "diff-abled"[55] people with funds to cover at least the aforementioned basic needs. Preserving the lives of the poor is not only framed as the duty of the caliph, but is as the duty of all individuals. Private charity and government measures are both necessary to reduce poverty. Money for hospitals should, for example, come from both state and private donors. Libraries should be established that are open to all, and they should be financed by charitable endowments and state assistance.

The Islamic economic system departs from a holistic approach, or so she writes. Therefore, Riskha argues, property rights need to be examined most carefully. Yet, despite criticizing what she sees as the misuse of public property, she stresses that Islam does guarantee

[55] Students of the Gadjah Mada University, including Hizbut Tahrir activists, seem to prefer to speak of "differentially abled" or "diff-abled" people rather than of disabled people as they assume that they have abilities, but different ones. Hizbut Tahrir activists link this - also in American and European emerging - discourse on abilities of different people to the idea that Allah has created all humans according to his will.

personal property rights. To underline her argument that Islam guarantees private property, she refers to the Qur'an Al-Hadid (7): *"Believe in God and His Apostle, and spend on others out of that of which He has made your trustees"* (Translated meaning of the Qur'an by M. Asad, 2003: 951) (Budiarti, 2009: 142). Again basing her argument on the reference work of an-Nabhani (2000: 65-8), yet without referencing him directly, she outlines that it is in human's nature to strive for and accumulate private property. Becoming rich through honest work is thus perceived to be an expression of worship and piety. Movable, as well as immovable goods such as land, may be possessed, and the caliph would have the duty to guarantee private ownership.

In the caliphate, no absolute economic equality should be established or demanded by the communists, she argues. She explained that Allah has blessed members with different abilities and talents. Islam does grant a certain individual economic freedom, however, it should not be the case that we find people who can buy an entire island – an allusion to Bill Gates, as she told me - while others do not even own a small piece of land. She refers to the Qur'anic verse Al-Hasyr (7): *"So that it may not be (a benefit) going round and round among such of you as many (already) be rich."* (Translated meaning of the Qur'an by M. Asad, 2003: 968) (Budiarti, 2009: 143). In this verse, she argues, the responsibility of the state is outlined to guarantee a just distribution of wealth (Budiarti, 2009: 142-4).

In her book chapter, she does not outline what level of wealth, or displays of wealth, would still be tolerable. Rather than discussing state sanctions, she makes an ethical argument stressing that Islam teaches genuine love for all people, so if all truly love God and worship him, people cannot bear seeing others living in misery. The rich would also benefit from a more just and equal society, not only in the hereafter where they will be held accountable for their deeds, but also in the here and now. In her account, she does not criticise Saudi Arabia or the Golf states for their gross economic inequalities.

As a means of solving currency related economic problems and curtailing the high inflation rates that have frequently impacted the Indonesian economy over the last decades, Riskha argues in her chapter for a return to the gold and silver standard. This is also a core argument in the work of an-Nabhani (2000: 256-78). As it would not be convenient to pay with gold and silver coins, Riskha suggests that the people could still use paper money as

well as "electronic money" for their payment transactions. All money that is in circulation would need to be fully backed up by gold and silver reserves, however, stored in the house of treasury, so that not more money can circulate than the government actually possesses. Money should serve as means to facilitate trade, not as tool to generate income. This will lead to a more stable economy, as no financial crises will occur. An Islamic economy will therefore be strong and not easily hit by depressions (Budiarti, 2009: 146-7).

The major critique of the weaknesses of capitalism is not far off from other anti-capitalist movements. Riskha's main point is that the current system is unable to guarantee a fair distribution of wealth and power, but rather favours those who already possess greater resources. It is thus considered unjust as it favours those who already possess property, rather than leading to a more or less balanced allocation of resources. The practice of lending money at interest is criticized as being *haram*, unlawful in Islam, and harmful to society. Furthermore, the exploitation of natural resources is emphasized as causing oppression, and is considered to be a form of imperialism.

Her critique of the current economic system was paired with the belief that solutions for a more just economic world could be found in the Qur'an and Sunnah. Muslim activists from various organizations share the belief that Islam provides answers to solve various problems, including economic problems. In this domain, activists from different organizations are able to discuss questions in relation to actual problems Indonesia is facing. The question then becomes not only what the Islamic economic system should look like once the caliphate is established, but also what could be done in the meantime. One of the topics being seriously discussed is the advantage of a currency based on the gold standard. As with the topic of "improving" morality, also in regard to the current economic system, Hizbut Tahrir student activists are constantly seeking to apply the organization's ideology convincingly to actual problems at hand.

The State's Obligation to Guarantee Education

Riskha outlines that in the Islamic system, education is seen as a basic societal need. Therefore, it is obligatory for the state to guarantee each individual, women and men, free access to schools up to the level of university (Budiarti, 2009: 148). As the state also has to guarantee access to health institutions and is responsible for overall safety, it has to generate sufficient financial income. It should not be as it is in Indonesia today, where achieving higher education is mainly a privilege of the middle and upper class. State investments in the domains of education and health are said to be especially important, as they will influence the intellectual capacity of the future generation, which Hizbut Tahrir activists consider crucial for the future wellbeing of the *ummat*. It is therefore thought to be of utmost importance that these expenditures are not financed with foreign money – as she claims university education is - as this will reduce the state's independence and lead to economic and cultural domination. What happens today, in her view, is that third world countries in particular, including Indonesia, are dominated by foreign capital and lose their independence (Budiarti, 2009: 148-9).

She argues that in a good society, many different people should have the capacity to be leaders. Leadership qualities are considered part of an Islamic personality *(syakshiyah Islamiyah)*. One has to be able to combine intellect and behaviour based on Islamic faith *(aqidah)* (Budiarti, 2009: 149). To create such a generation *(khoiru ummah)*, a high quality education curriculum is needed. It is advocated that this curriculum should be based on Islam and should be free from the influences of the capitalist market system. Arabic is recommended to be the main language used. The Qur'an and the Sunnah should be studied as living guidelines, not only in regard to individual behaviour, but also for public behaviour, so that the community can live together in prosperity. Furthermore, science and technology should be in the curriculum. Schools and universities should focus entirely on improving their quality, rather than spending time looking for funding. All funding should come from the state treasury. Also non-profit oriented private schools would be allowed. This system should be able to educate people to become internationally recognized scholars, and the future generations in the caliphate (Budiarti, 2009: 150-1).

The idea of creating an "Islamic generation", as Riskha calls it, bears significant similarities with the three-step model as formulated by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, to build an Islamic society (Mitchell, 1993). In Hasan al-Banna's scheme, the first stage of the Islamic struggle *(perjuangan Islam)* is to turn individuals into "good" Muslims with and Islamic personality *(syakshiyah Islamiyah).* The next step involves the creation of the Islamic family *(keluarga sakinah)* that is considered the foundation for the next step, the Islamic society that will live according to the Sharia. As discussed in the previous chapter, education of both men and women is deemed highly important in the making of pious Hizbut Tahrir activists capable of convincing others of the necessity to establish the caliphate.

Calling for Access to Health Care and Education

An example of a larger event, taking place in Yogyakarta, was the conference held on Saturday, the 13th of December 2008, entitled *"Save Indonesia from the Capitalization*[56] *of Education and Health care with the Caliphate (Selamatkan Indonesia dari Kapitalisasi Pendidikan dan Kesehatan dengan Khilafah)*".[57] Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's District Executive Committee *(DPD - Dewan Pimpinan Daerah)* of the Special Region of Yogyakarta officially organized this conference. Around 800 women attended this conference. Most of the participants were students from different Yogyakarta universities, mostly form the Gadjah Mada University and from the University of Islamic Economy *(STEI – Sekolah Tinggi Ekonomi Islam)* Hamfara.

[56] The word commercialization might be more apt to capture the meaning of the term. Yet, the term capitalization seems to better reflect the activists' idea that different spheres of life are ruled and influenced by an economic rationality.

[57] For more information on this conference visit the official webpage of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/12/18/selamatkan-indonesia-dari-kapitalisasi-pendidikan-dan-kesehatan-dengan-khilafah/, (11 January 2011).

Students were mostly responsible for promoting the event among women university students, handling registration, inviting media and fundraising. A group of students also performed a production on stage about how they miss and long for the caliphate. The production mainly consisted of different characters discussing their problems, such as mothers who share their worries about their children's future and hardship with paying for education. The dialogues were not critical discussions. Instead, living under a caliph was framed as heaven on earth. In a pathetic voice, towards the end and close to tears, the absence of the caliphate was deplored. Raising their hands, those on stage prayed to God to help them and support them in their efforts to struggle, as they call it, for the establishment of the caliphate. Besides this theatre, student activists gave an artistic performance, a kind of dance, accompanied by music where they waved the black and white flags of Hizbut Tahrir.

The main points made by the prominent women members of Hizbut Tahrir was that the current secular system will not be able to provide good health services and education to the whole community. Especially women were seen as the disadvantaged group within the current capitalistic system and thus as a group that would benefit most of a systemic change. Mei Allif was the head of the organizing committee for the conference in Yogyakarta. When I arrived at the Multi Purpose Building of the Sunan Kalijaga Universitity in Yogyakarta, black and white Hizbut Tahrir flags were prominently decorating the entrance of the building. The reception committee, responsible for the registration of all participants, was friendly and welcomed my interest in the conference. I was accompanied to a place in the second row of the large hall. The conference lasted from the morning until three o'clock in the afternoon. Several prominent women members of Hizbut Tahrir presented their papers.

Siti Muslikhati, a member of the local committee of MHTI of the region of Yogyakarta, read a paper that seems to reflect the general line of argument quite well. Besides officiating as a high-ranking member of Hizbut Tahir Yogyakarta, she was in 2009 a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta in the International Relation Department. Siti Muslikhati obtained her Master's degree from the Gadjah Mada University. Her paper is titled *"Reduction of Public Services by the State in Indonesia"* (Muslikhati, 2009). The main

argument is that the neoliberal call for reducing the role and influence of the state to a minimum is a new form of economic imperialism, or a form of neo-colonialism (ibid: 7). She argues that multinational corporations are concrete agents of capitalism. Not only do they exploit the natural resources of Indonesia, without respecting human rights and by destroying nature, but they also convey a specific rationality to the country's citizens. They aim to make people believe that the neoliberal economy would yield to development and prosperity. Yet, so she states, the opposite is the case. They usurp goods people need to live, like water, petrol or gas to sell them for profit; the majority of the population is excluded from these revenues. Further, basic services such as education, health care and safety are "capitalized", infiltrated by capitalism, so her argument.

She stresses two main problems in regard to this development: First, that in the case of schools in particular, the curriculum is influenced by the capitalist mentality that enforces the already widespread opinion that capitalism would lead to prosperity. Second, this "capitalization" of these domains leads, she claims, to the exclusion of large parts of society who do not have enough money to pay for these services. Especially, she argues, poor women and children easily become victims of the blind capitalist system and have no access, or poor access, to education and health care. As the mothers are not well educated, their children are likely to suffer from poverty. The rich will become richer and the poor, poorer. What is sold under the slogan of *"good governance"* and the empowerment of the *"civil society"* are in fact euphemisms to demand less state involvement and a free market; namely neoliberalism (ibid: 6). Therefore, she argues, it is time to change the ideological orientation *(berubah kiblat).*

In her view, Islam provides mechanisms to create a just, harmonic, prosperous and safe society for all human beings that respect our natural environment. What needs to be done, Siti Muslikhati argued, is to replace the capitalistic ideology with the ideology of Islam and implement it on the individual, state and global levels (ibid: 10). As outlined by an-Nabhani (2000), and shared by Siti Muslikhati, is that the capitalistic system is not able to guarantee a good life, justice and social welfare. She frames the concept of an "Islamic economy", which she promotes instead following an-Nabhani in opposition to capitalism, rather than as an Islamic variation of capitalism. Her idea is thus not to Islamize capitalism, but to effectuate a

complete change. Notably, she refers to European countries as at least partially functioning welfare states that succeed in granting a decent life to even the poorest in society. Yet, the caliphate is imagined as better than any existing welfare state. In her paper, however, the health care system of Britain is used to exemplify - albeit rather uncritically - how free access to health care could function, as well as to roughly estimate the costs of such as system. These costs are then situated in relation to Indonesia's estimated wealth in terms of natural resources.

During and after all speeches, the audience expressed sympathy and agreement by shouting *"Allahu Akbar"* (God is the Greatest), rather than by applause. A moderator on the scene also raised her right fist from time to time, and called out *"takbir".* The audience responded by shouting *"Allahu Akbar"*. Conference participants were asked to stand up and wave the flag of Hizbut Tahrir and chant *"la ilaha illallah Muhammadur rasulullah"* (There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah). Towards the end of the conference, a prayer was held where the speaker emphasized how much they missed the caliphate, many people in the conference hall started crying and sobbing. During the whole conference, it was repeatedly emphasized that everyone should fulfil her duty to strive as best as she can to reach the ultimate goal, the establishment of the caliphate.

After the conference, the participants had the chance to buy a variety of Hizbut Tahrir branded items such as mugs, T-shirts, jackets, stickers, books and even food. All participants obtained a certificate that they had attended the conference. No men were present during the entire conference, except at one moment, when tables and chairs needed to be carried away for a small theatre performance. After the conference had finished, cameramen from a local TV station appeared, asking some people from the audience for personal statements.

Different sponsors, mostly local ones supporting the call to establish the caliphate supported the conference. "Da'im Donuts & Coffee", positioning itself as the Islamic pendant of the American Dunkin' Donuts, supported the conference with donuts. This kind of bakery sells different kinds of donuts, other pastries, pizzas and burgers; all made from products declared *halal* by the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI). The founder, a former

student of the Gadjah Mada University, seeks to develop a Sharia-based business model.[58] "Syafa'at Advertising" also supported the conference. This is an advertisement agency that also bases its business ideology on the Sharia. The founders seek to design modern advertisements based on Islamic law. They also conceptualize Islamic advertisement campaigns for clients looking for alternatives to the current selling strategies often based on gaining attraction by what they consider un-Islamic means.[59]

This "capitalization" of the conference itself, in the sense that it was sponsored by various private companies, seemed unproblematic to the organizers. Also the fact that an imitation of American donuts, rather than a local snacks were in the food box distributed to the participants did not trigger bewilderment of criticism. The main argument was that the companies supporting the conference were all respecting the rules of Islam, but even more important seemed to be that they were considered powerless in influencing the conference's agenda and content. Also in regard to health care and education, the problem was not considered to be its entanglement with the economy per se. Also private sponsorship was regarded as positive, for example in the case of STEI Hamfara, founded by Dwi Condro and Ismail Yusanto. If the caliphate were established, private centres for education would still be allowed. It was thus not the organizers' point – somewhat contrarily to what the conference's title proposes – to argue against all private funding into sectors regarded as being under the responsibility of the state. In the end, the critique of the "capitalization" of healthcare and education was partial. Rather, it seemed that also in what they framed as "alternative to capitalism", a capitalist rationality played – at least in practice until the caliphate was established - a dominant role in criticizing current practices as well as in organizing their "struggle" for a better society.

[58] For more information, see http://daim-donuts.com, (19 October 2010).

[59] For further information see www.syafaatadvertising.net, (19 October 2010).

Arguing against Democracy

Besides capitalism, Hizbut Tahrir activists also severely criticized democracy and framed it as being opposed to Islam. Following the argument made by an-Nabhani, democracy was often seen as a consequence of capitalism or as a guise of capitalism. An-Nabhani wrote that theoretically people think that they govern, but that actually they are governed by the capitalistic economic system that influences their way of thinking (2000: 14). Yet the problem with democracy is not only that it is based on a capitalistic rationality, but that the sovereignty of law is not in the hands of Allah (an-Nabhani, 2008 [1953]: 75). Particularly for those two reasons, Hizbut Tahrir activists frame democracy as being opposed to Islam. In their view, the proper form of governance according to Islamic law is the caliphate.

The Indonesian scholar Arief Ihsan Rathomy (2007) outlines in his comparative study between Hizbut Tahrir and the *tarbiyah* movement that the main difference between the two movements lays in their different attitudes towards democracy. Whereas Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia rejects participating as a party in the democratic elections, the *tarbiyah* movement is, via its political Prosperous Justice Party PKS, actively competing for votes. Whereas the *tarbiyah* movement aims to Islamize society through democracy (Rathomy, 2007), Hizbut Tahrir demands a systemic change and opposes – at least for the time being – the pursuit of its utopian ideal of establishing the caliphate within the democratic system.

Different Islamic organizations in Indonesia oppose Hizbut Tahrir's understanding that democracy is opposed to Islam and argue that Islam and democracy *are* compatible. Particularly Robert Hefner outlines in his seminal book *"Civil Islam"* (2000) how different Islamic organizations have played a major role in the democratization process Indonesia is experiencing. Also Richard Kraince (2003) has argued in his study about Islamic student activism between 1998 – 2001 that Islamic students were among the driving forces that called for democracy and that brought down the authoritarian Suharto regime. The Indonesian scholar Saiful Muhani (2007) has written one of the most comprehensive books that aims to show that Islam and democracy are compatible. He bases his book not only on outlining the merits of democracy, but also on theological arguments that underline the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Besides a wide range of publications that also challenge the view that Islam and democracy are opposed, prominent young

Mumhammadiyah activists also argue strongly against antidemocratic claims (Ghazali et al., 2007: foremost chapter 3, 229-328).

As I conducted my main fieldwork during the election year 2009, when Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected as president in July 2009 for a second five-year period, many discussions centring on the benefits and shortcomings of democracy took place prior to this important national event. Hizbut Tahrir student members argued that this system imported from the west, as they framed it, had in the last ten years not managed to reduce poverty, improve education and health standards or general prosperity. On different occasions, Hizbut Tahrir activists openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the current capitalist democratic system they believed dominated Indonesia. Making the argument that democracy is incompatible with Islamic law, because the ultimate and absolute sovereignty is reserved solely to Allah, who has already outlined a perfect political system, they oppose Islamic activists and organizations that publically challenge the view that Islam and democratization are not antagonistic.

Although already prior to the 1999 elections, different Muslim groups objected to democracy as a western import and as un-Islamic, in the years after this regime change, an anti-democracy student movement has gained strength at different Indonesian Universities. Driving forces in this anti-democracy movement, but not its only supporters, are Hizbut Tahrir activists. In the following I take a particular discussion I attended at the Gadjah Mada University as an example to outline how Hizbut Tahrir student activists argued against democracy, but also to outline how women formed a temporary front organization to spread the Hizbut Tahrir's concepts – how they did *dakwah*.

A core group of six women, most of them Hizbut Tahrir members and sympathizers, organized this conference held at the Faculty of Engineering on the Saturday morning of November 15, 2008. The title of the conference was *"It's Time that the Students Speak: Elections as Democratic Agenda in Indonesia"*. According to Mita, one of the organizers and a Hizbut Tahrir activist in her seventh semester, she and her friends wanted to use the occasion of the upcoming elections in 2009 to point to the shortcomings of democracy and outline that a different form of governance, the caliphate, would be a better solution for all. She and five of her friends thus had the idea to organize a discussion. She explained to me

her motivation as follows: *"We are convinced that the caliphate should be established, look at the democratic system, it can not solve the problems here. So we often come together and discuss how we convince others and open their eyes. So we had this idea and wrote the outline together. It is part of dakwah. We are all motivated and work together."*

Jointly, they wrote an eight-page conference outline, which they handed out prior to the discussion to four different groups, together with a formal invitation. The women had invited those organizations they regarded as holding strategic positions within university: the representatives of the student council, the different student press organs active on the campus, the representatives or student coordinators of different departments, and the different Islamic organizations active on the campus. The discussion was further announced on posters pinned up on information boards in different faculties. The event was announced as an open public discussion *(diskusi terbuka)*.

The goal of the organizers, as written in the outline, was *"to sharpen the ability of the participants to discuss critically about democracy"*. They did not mention their affiliation to Hizbut Tahrir either in the conference outline, or in posters. Instead, they stated that KIMM Gama, an acronym for Intellectual Community of Muslim Students of Gadjah Mada, had organized the conference. The fact that they did not mention their affiliation had at least two reasons, as Mita explained to me: *first*, it allowed the group to address a larger public. According to Mita, a discussion title was chosen that would sound neutral and not reveal the organizers' highly critical attitude towards democracy. They hoped that with this strategy they could convince students to reconsider democracy. As not to put off students, the organizers also avoided mentioning the caliphate as a solution. Only during the discussion, would this solution be presented.

Second, by not using the name of Hizbut Tahrir the students were more independent in writing the eight-page conference outline sent to potential participants in advance, and also in conceptualizing the event. When using the organization's name, senior party members commonly checked the content and form. As Mita explained: *"We are more independent and do not need to ask for permission, well, not that the seniors would object, they enjoy it if we spread the idea of the caliphate, but still, it is just easier. But for my friends and me this was only a secondary reason. We just thought that it is strategically better to use the group*

name KIMM Gama, that like this we could attract more students. Also the fact that we have invited speakers like Eko Prasetyo attracts students – maybe also for attracting speakers not labelling the event is better. You know, there are many students here who do not support the agenda of Hizbut Tahrir, but they are worried about the democratic system. We want to address especially those and offer them a good solution, the caliphate."

When I asked Mita about how they had financed the event, she emphasised that organizing such an event was not a matter of money, but rather of motivation, commitment and time. *"Making photocopies and posters is cheap – and we did not make high gloss ones but simply back and white ones. Also sending short messages is not expensive. Inviting fellow students by email or via Facebook is free. It takes time to organize and distribute invitations, hang up posters, but it we do not need much. And, my friends and I do not have much money, but we think that still it is worth spending some money for the struggle. It is a good investment, and Allah will reward this. But, a senior friend also helped us a little – we asked her for help. We just told her about our idea and she liked it. She is working already. So she gave us a little money. But, also without her money, we would have been fine, and, I find this good to know, so we are not really dependent on funding in our dakwah, money is not really limiting us".*

Although the title of the conference may have sounded neutral to some, the tone in the conference outline was clearly anti-democratic. Notably, none of the arguments against democracy mentioned in the outline was theological; all points of criticism were secular. The first point of critique was that since democratic elections have taken place in 1999, the situation in Indonesia has not improved; the government has not become better. Further, common problems such as corruption, collusion and nepotism (in Indonesia often referred to as *KKN - Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotism*) have, according to the authors, not diminished.

Further, it was argued that the extensive state bureaucracy has not decreased and development programs in the fields of education and health have not been successfully accomplished. Rather than improving the situation, elections have caused a number of conflicts between competing groups. The necessary security measures to consolidate these conflicts, so they claim, have cost a lot of money that could have been spent more effectively. Besides spending money on riot prevention, the authors criticized that exorbitant sums of money have been spent during election campaigns; money, that could

have been spent to improve the hardship of the poor, or to improve education or health services. Besides being ineffective in solving problems, the country is wasting money, so the argument goes, the democratic system is also slow in decision-making processes and thus hinders the effective accomplishment of development projects. In conclusion, the authors state in their conference outline, looking back at the developments during the last ten years, that they do not believe that this system will lead to a just and prosperous society; it will not be able to address and solve Indonesia's core problems. It is thus time that that the students, the young intellectuals and leaders of tomorrow stand up and speak out.

The fact that none of the arguments was theological seems to me like a strategic choice. These secular arguments and critiques of democracy find support among a much wider audience than the argument that Islam is opposed to democracy per se. This secular critique of democracy is also voiced by various other Islamic and non-Islamic organizations, which are disappointed with the countries current economic situation and stagnation in development. Yet of the organizations that are publically present by voicing their opinions on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University, Hizbut Tahrir was the only organization in 2009 that openly demanded that democracy be replaced by a different system deemed more Islamic. Other activists rather reflected on the topic of how to improve democracy, foremost in regard to reducing corruption. Islamic activists in particular thought about how to Islamicize democracy in the sense of changing the morality of both voters and politicians to follow Islamic rules and make their choices in accord with Islam.

Around sixty students attended this discussion from different student organizations, from the student press and representatives of the student councils. Men were advised to sit in the front rows, women in the back rows. As it is often the case when an event is promoted as an open discussion at the Gadjah Mada University, this event was dominated by long monologues from the two invited speakers, one of them was the senior Hizbut Tahrir activist, Yoyok Tindyo Prasetyo, and the other speaker was Eko Prasetyo, a well-known critical social writer and the director of the publishing house, Resist Book, located in Yogyakarta. Eko Prasetyo holds a special role in bridging Islamic ideology from various strands of Islam with a leftist critique of capitalism and consumerism. He has written books carrying titles such *"Sorry: Islam is not for Sale!"* (2007), or *"Left Islam: The Way to Social*

Revolution" (2004). In these books he criticizes the trend to use Islam as a sales argument. Rather than merrily consuming Islam, he argues that Islam should be used to critically rethink social problems and address existing malaises. More generally, he tries in both his books and speeches to transfer a Marxist analysis to the Islamic context. With his critical and humoristic, at times sarcastic, comments he succeeds in reaching a large spectrum of activists, including Hizbut Tahrir activists who regularly invite him to discussions.

While Eko Prasetyo did acknowledge in the discussion that the democratic system has thus far not been able to solve many of the problems Indonesia is facing, he did not see this failure as inherent in the democratic system, but rather stated that system needed time to mature and improve. His main message was that everyone, including Muslims, should feel free to abstain from voting. Yoyok, on the other hand, following an-Nabhani's argument, said in his speech that democracy is a western import that it is incompatible with Islam, as the sovereignty lies in the hand of the people *(meletakkan kedaulatan di tangan rakyat)* and not in the hand of Allah. In democracy, laws could be passed that are in opposition to the Sharia, and that it is ultimately a tool of the west to deceive and weaken the Islamic community and promote capitalism. This happens mainly through the large sums involved in election campaigns. He ended his speech by explaining the advantages of the caliphate as a system of political and religious governance and urged the audience to keep struggling for its establishment. Only after these two speeches had finished was the floor opened up for the audience to ask questions and give their opinions on the matters discussed.

Given that all of the speakers from the audience were asked to briefly introduce themselves by mentioning their name and organizational affiliation, it turned out that quite a lot of women and men who participated in the discussion were Hizbut Tahrir activists. Not surprisingly, they agreed with Yoyok's argument and underlined how badly the democratic system had failed. The main argument made by various discussants was – echoing Yoyok's argument - that the sovereignty should lie in the hands of Allah, and that no one knows the path to a just and prosperous society better than the creator of all the universe. Allah has, according to the argument, outlined this path in the Qur'an and Sunnah. If the Indonesian nation, or even better everyone, would follow the Sharia, the world would become a better place. Notably, in this "discussion" round, no one dared to challenge the idea so

authoritatively promoted that democracy is un-Islamic. Although I knew that some of the participants did not agree with the ideas presented, they remained silent.

The majority of Muslims studying at the Gadjah Mada University did not to share this anti-democratic view and would not fully agree with the argument presented by Yoyok and voiced by the participants. Yudi, an anthropology student I knew from taking classes together there, told me after the discussion why he had decided not to speak up: *"Well, it is just not worth it, they do not take your arguments seriously, they are so convinced that democracy does not work. And of course, it is far from perfect, there are so many things to criticize, and this is easy, it is hard to make them believe that their system would not work. For me, it is hard to challenge someone like Mas Yoyok. Actually, I knew that it would be like this, but still, I was interested to learn more about their arguments. But it is not my aim to openly challenge them – not in this forum, but hopefully at an other occasion, face to face, well not Yoyok, but someone repeating his arguments."*

Finally, what did trigger discussion was not the utopian vision of the caliphate or how or whether it would succeed in solving contemporary problems. What was discussed was how Muslims should conduct themselves in the present "infidel" system, in the absence of the caliphate. The topic controversially debated was whether it is morally acceptable, especially for Muslims, not to vote, or whether voting is a duty, given that the system is currently democratic. Eko Prasetyo was wearing a T-shirt with the slogan printed on it *"Not to vote is a right (Tidak memilih adalah hak)"*. This was also the position he promoted during his speech. There were three speakers who emotionally reacted to his speech and stated that it was the duty of all Muslims, regardless of whether or not they support the democratic system, to vote for those party representatives who were the lesser evil, who were at least Muslim and promoting an agenda that is closest to the ideal. Others stated that one should make a statement and put a blank ballot sheet into the ballot box. Others argued that one should not vote at all.

One has to note that this discussion took place before the Indonesian Council of Ulama MUI had issued a fatwa that not voting *(golput – golongan putih)* is *haram*.[60] In reaction to this

[60] This fatwa was decided in Padang Panjang in West Sumatra during a congress from 24-26 of January 2009.

fatwa, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia released an official response on 28 January 2009 stating that not voting is only *haram* if there exists a candidate that wants to implement Sharia law in an all-encompassing way *(secara kaffah)*. According to this report, it is considered *haram* to vote for anyone who supports secularism.[61] Before the noon prayer call, the man moderator thanked the speakers and the audience for coming and closed the discussion round with a prayer. The women organizers stayed in the background during the whole event.

Voting the Best of the Bad Ones versus Not Voting

This official response that outlines Hizbut Tahrir's view on whether it is the duty of Muslims to vote or not, and under what conditions it is forbidden by Islamic law to vote, was eagerly discussed in a Saturday morning discussion round, as they are regularly organized by the women's branch of Hizbut Tahrir. In 2009, these weekly public discussion rounds *(kajian umum mingguan)* were commonly attended by around thirty women activists and held in the yard of the Gadjah Mada University Mosque. The organizers would bring plastic mats for the audience to sit on, a small table, commonly decorated with a few flowers and two sets of the white and black flags *(liwa and rayah)* of Hizbut Tahrir, placed at the right and left side of the table. Further, the organizers would organize loudspeakers and a microphone for the speaker.[62]

Before the discussion started, a photocopy of the official response of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia was distributed. Many students already seemed familiar with the document and were confused about whether or not they should vote in the legislative elections held on 9

[61] Tanggapan Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia terhadap fatwa MUI tentang Golput. Kantor Jurubicara. Nomor: 152/PU/E/01/09. Jakarta, 28 January 2009.

[62] Students at organized public events often used microphones – although for smaller scale events, this technology would not have been necessary. However, it seems to give the event a specific nimbus, making it seem important. Further, the activists argued that it gets students accustomed to using microphones. In the case of the Sunday morning discussions held outside, the microphone also had the effect of making the speeches audible to people just spending time in the yard.

April 2009. They were uncertain as to whether there were concrete candidates or parties they could vote in, without risking sinning and supporting or reinforcing the secular system believed to be un-Islamic. In the official response, no party names were mentioned that were considered *halal* to vote for. Also, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia did not urge its members to vote or not to vote. The question of most participants at this smaller discussion of women, as well as at the discussion organized by KIMM Gama, was thus whether it was better to vote the best of the bad ones or not to vote at all *(memilih yang terbaik dari yang buruk atau tidak memilih).*

The main speaker of this discussion round, a senior women student of the Gadjah Mada University of the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences started her speech by stating that in regard to the Indonesian constitution, it is allowed not to vote. Then, she continued to outline what she understood to be the official opinion of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in regard to this matter. First, she praised Hizbut Tahrir's critical attitude towards the fatwa issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council, and what she called their courage *(keberanian)* to challenge it. She stated that it was exactly this kind of critical thinking - not taking things for granted and challenging opinions - that Hizbut Tahrir members needed to practice. She then stated that this fatwa issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council needed to be seen within the current political context in which a number of members sitting in this council have strong political interests to mobilize voters, especially devote Muslims, to use their right to vote. According to her opinion, Islamic parties in particular, and foremost the Prosperous Justice Party, benefited from this fatwa. She did not give any recommendations as to whether or not to vote, or which parties or concrete candidates to vote for. She emphasizes that all Hizbut Tahrir members should inform themselves about specific candidates they are considering, and on the agendas of the different parties. In conclusion, she states that the decision to support or not to support a certain candidate should be well thought out, and determined whether it is the true intention of this candidate to "enjoin good and prevent evil" *(amar makruf nahi mungkar)* as stated in the official response.

In other such weekly public discussions held in the garden of the Gadjah Mada University, the women discussed different topics in the fields of economy, social relations, politics and law. On the first Saturday of every month, they would discuss topics in the field of economy,

described as follows: *"The financial crisis that reverberates, the poverty breaking out violently, the inflation that is caused by the capitalistic system that this country adopted. It is time that the Islamic Economy is enacted…!"*. On every second Saturday, questions in the field of social interaction were on the agenda, the description says: *"The understanding of Muslims about how men and women should interact in Islam is experiencing a terrible shock, because their understanding is far from the Islamic essence and they are far from Islamic ideas and Islamic law"*. On every third Saturday, political topics were on the agenda: *"Social matters are currently ruled by secular capitalism, that has proven to bring destruction to mankind. Only Islam will bring mercy to all".* On the last Saturday of each month, contemporary issues in Islamic law *(fiqih kontemporer)* were debated, described as: *"Islam answers all sorts of legal problems, for example concerning abortion, interest and others."*[63]
In these discussions, a Hizbut Tahrir member would give a rather long speech using a microphone before opening the floor for questions and answers or comments from the audience. According to my observations, members and sympathisers attended these discussions: the participants tend to be uncritical towards the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. If criticism was raised, this was done in a soft and subtle form. I never heard women activists openly criticise what the speaker had said, rather, they would pack their doubts in questions. Scepticism, for example, about whether the caliphate will ever be re-established was formulated in questions about how to reach this goal given the socio-political circumstances. Other questions emerged on the imagined time frame of when the caliphate would be established and what to do in the meantime. Other questions asked about how a caliph would manage to rule such a vast territory with complex problems – as Indonesia already seems to be too large to rule. Usually the speaker would not explicitly address the subliminal scepticism that, at least, I thought was present, but rather would use such questions to emphasise the responsibility of every single person to strive for the caliphate.
The target of these discussions was not primarily to convince members opposed to the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, but to strengthen the conviction of students already favourable to the

[63] See http://muslimahhizbuttahrir.wordpress.com/2009/01/29/kajian-umum-mingguan-muslimah-hizbut-tahrir-indonesia-keluarga-besar-ugm/ (27 Mai 2010). The translations are my own.

organization's ideology and motivate them to struggle for the common dream. Often, the necessity for *dakwah* was emphasised and seniors were trying to teach and motivate juniors to approach others, get active, involve fellows in discussions and find ways to creatively pursue what they regard as the path to piety. The programme of the exact discussion topic was posted on campus blackboards, distributed via Facebook and handed out in the form of flyers during mosque lessons.

The Narrative of Currently Living in a State of *Jahiliya*

The idea that the Islamic community is currently living in a state of *jahiliya,* as Riskha noted in her chapter, and as was mentioned to me in various discussions, seems to a be dominant narrative of Hizbut Tahrir activists; used to enforce their argument for the caliphate. Various members of Hizbut Tahrir, but also members of KAMMI and Jamaah Shalahuddin, used the concept of *jahiliya* to describe the poor conditions under which many people in Indonesia live. This concept was especially promoted by Islamic ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb and Yousuf al-Qaradawi, and has, since the 1980s and 1990s, inspired the *tarbiyah* movement in Indonesia (Bubalo & Fealy, 2005: 29). In his book, *"Milestones"*, Sayyid Qutb strongly promotes the idea that the Islamic community is currently in a state of ignorance and is not following Islam correctly. Towards the end of the first chapter of his influential book Qutb wrote: *"We must also free ourselves from the clutches of* jahili *society*, jahili *concepts,* jahili *traditions and* jahili *leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it*. Jahili *society, because of its* jahili *characteristics, is not worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we may later change the society"* (Qutb, 2005: 7).

In Qutb's view, and also in the opinion of many *tarbiyha* and Hizbut Tahrir members, the majority of Muslims are currently living in a state of ignorance and need to be educated. The assumption seems to be that they are unaware that they are not living Islam in the right way and need thus to be educated in order to change society. The problem is outlined as two-fold: on the one hand, so called "enemies of Islam" seek to weaken, dominate or even

destroy the Islamic community, and on the other hand, the majority of Muslims are still living in a state of *jahilia.* According to this logic, they are like people living before the arrival of Islam, who do not recognize that only implementation of divine law, the Sharia, can save the whole community. At least the Muslim community should become aware of the dangers of the west. They are, as a former president of Jamaah Shalahuddin wrote, "fighting a war of ideas *(ghazwul fikr)"* (Nugroho, 2009: 120).

Van Bruinessen (2009) notes that the concept of *ghazwul fikr* came to Indonesia in the 1990s, and has flourished since then. It has become a phrase used to refer to different forms of western domination, in the areas of film, music, lifestyle; and is often used when thinking about religion. The assumption is that westerners in particular are leading a war against Islam with an intent aim to destroy it; not with weapons, but with ideas. Western concepts of secularism, liberalism and religious pluralism are seen as particularly dangerous and harmful to the wellbeing of the Islamic community (van Bruinessen, 2009: 1). Edi provides details about what he sees as indicators of a western conspiracy against Islam, though his account remains unspecific about how the so-called enemies are trying to destroy Islam. He mentions that these enemies dominate the political and economical spheres (Nugroho, 2009: 113), but does not detail how democracy or global capitalism is causing poverty or destroying the environment (ibid: 114). It also remains unclear as to which westerners - men or women, the elite or ordinary - seek to weaken Islam. He also never provides an explanation as to why they should try to weaken Islam. Christianization is listed as one danger, but it is not clear whether this is seen as a goal pursued by the west as an end in itself, or is rather a side effect of the weakening of Islam. In these debates, the danger coming from the west is largely framed as a secular menace. The threat of Christianization is often not directly linked to the west.

Despite a strong anti-western tone in both Riskha's writing, as well as in various public discussions I attended, understanding their call for the caliphate as an expression of resistance against the west, and against the officiating politicians, who have, in their eyes, failed to establish a form of Islamic governance, seems to simplify the complexity of the activists' call for a more just society. Further, echoing the rhetoric of the west against Islam seems to prevent one from asking questions as to how Hizbut Tahrir activists position

themselves within the existing hegemonic order. Considering themselves as agents of change and as standing on the winning side of the system, at least within the Indonesian context, because they are students of a top Indonesian university, they are aware that the existing "secular" and "liberal" system enables their *dakwah* endeavours.

Criticizing the Call for the Caliphate

The logic of arguing for the caliphate triggers criticism form different sides, focusing on different points. However, many activists from different strands of Islam also share some of the points of critique as expressed by Hizbut Tahrir activists in regard to capitalism and democracy. The way the critique on the agenda to establish the caliphate is uttered varies largely in its analytical sophistication and internal logic. One point of criticism was that Hizbut Tahrir was not really doing anything to reduce poverty or improve the situation of the underprivileged. Karim, a proud member of the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM, for example, used Hizbut Tahrir as a reference point to outline the use of *dakwah* for a better world, arguing that Hizbut Tahrir activists were not really interested in the poor: "*What does it help to talk about the caliphate? First, I don't believe that it will ever be established, and I don't hope so, but more on that later. What concrete ideas do they have for now besides approaching those who they consider to hold important positions? Well, I know that some activists also try to convince the poor of their ideas, but this is not their main target group. They say that they do not need all people for establishing the caliphate, but mainly the powerful. But then, if they are really concerned with the poverty in our country, and I believe that they really are, this is not my point, why don't they try to do charity work, build schools, hospitals, like Muhammadiyah? I know they were also there to help the victims when Merapi erupted*[64]*, but who wasn't there? I'm talking about more systematically building a structure that may help at least a few of those suffering, but they seem to do nothing but promising that things will become better.*"

[64] In late October 2010, the active volcano Merapi erupted and killed over 150 people and left around 100'000s in need of shelter.

Activists of different organizations shared the critique of Karim, who stated that Hizbut Tahrir activists were merely dreaming about a better future, yet without actually helping others. Further, they shared Karim's hope that the caliphate would never be established. Activists of HMI Dipo and PMII in particular, criticized the idea promoted by Hizbut Tahrir activists that a perfect form of Islamic governance was clearly outlined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Karim told me*: "I'm not against the Sharia – I'm a Muslim, but I think that it is not at all evident how Islamic principles should influence our national legislation. There is so much discussion on almost every topic, just, for example, on how to treat religious minorities, marriage law, or the how a Muslim ought to dress. No, I really cannot imagine that a caliph sharing the moral values of Hizbut Tahrir members would tell me how to live."*

At stake in such discussions were often personal ideas of the proper place of religion and in how far religion was a private choice or a public affair. Karim's friend Arwin, a HMI Dipo activist made his concerns explicit: *"No thank you – living under an authoritarian caliph that would tell me what to do and leave – for example, try to stop me from going out with my girlfriend. I know where the limits are and I respect them, but I really don't need someone watching me all the time. Just imagine self-proclaimed groups that raid the streets to implement what they regard as the Sharia. It is my business if I want to ride on my motorbike with my girlfriend and have dinner. And further, what could I do to oppose this system – I guess nothing. They would legitimate all by referring to their reading of the Qur'an and Sunnah – what would happen to the free press? No really, it would be a catastrophe, and (laughing) where should I go to escape this system? But for the moment I'm not worried, they will have no chance, Indonesians are not stupid."* Like Karim, also Arwin feared that his personal freedom would be reduced, that norms would be implemented that he did not consider Islamic.

A further point that is often criticized was Hizbut Tahrir's ambivalence towards adopting a gradual approach of "Islamizing" society as promoted most prominently by *tarbiyah* activists. Nur, a KAMMI activist in her fifth semester told me that she shared many concerns of Hizbut Tahrir activists, but that she, despite discussions with friends active in Hizbut Tahrir, did not really understand their rejection of gradualism*: "They say that they want a revolution, not a gradual Islamization. They try to win politicians over, but they do not*

participate in the democratic system – as a party I mean. To be honest, I have problems imagining this non-violent worldwide systemic revolution they are talking about. And how should all borders be erased? I just think it is not realistic at all, probably it is better to have more modest goals as we do, namely to gradually try to Islamize society, struggle for Islamic values and then, if people are ready, establish an Islamic state and implement the Sharia within the national boarders."

Also criticized by many activists of other organizations was Hizbut Tahrir's black and white rhetoric, and its way of promoting the same solution to all imaginable problems. They were accused of simply echoing the party's ideology without being able to think critically themselves. Nisa, a PMII activist told me: *"How can it be that whatever problem you mention or whatever question you ask them they give you the same answer – parroting what they have been told, as if they had swallowed a tape or a button to press play? Where is their self-critical attitude, the recognition of nuances, and shades of grey?"* She continued to say that this was particularly where she saw the difference between Islamic "fundamentalists" – as she called Hizbut Tahrir activists and "moderate" Muslims as she called the PMII activists: *"We are more critical towards ourselves, think twice, and I guess our aim is not to produce members that all echo the same ideas but who are able to think critically."*

Conclusion

In this chapter I examined how Hizbut Tahrir student activists argue for the establishment of the caliphate in order to fulfil, what they consider to be, their religious duty, to do *dakwah.* To popularize the organization's core ideas and to change the mindset of the masses, Hizbut Tahrir activists do not only need rhetorical skills and extensive knowledge, but also good arguments in order to convince others of their vision for a better society. In what they call their struggle *(perjuangan)* for the caliphate, they base their arguments on the organization's ideology as outlined in the books of the organization's founding father an-Nabhani, as well as on the Qur'an and Sunnah. Yet, an-Nabhani's ideas are not simply

echoed, but reconfigured and related to present problems Indonesia is thought to face. As Asad argued in regard to his conceptualization of Islam as a *"discursive tradition"*, the activists do not simply aim to imitate the past, rather, they creatively relate their knowledge of the past to the present (Asad, 1986: 15). An-Nabhani's ideas were thus not discussed in isolation in this chapter. Rather, I sought to examine how students use his ideas to criticize the status quo and imagine a better future. Drawing on written and oral ethnographic evidence, it becomes clear that for the majority of Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir student activists, the caliphate is more a powerful symbol used to evoke an imagined past and an idyllic Islamic polity, than a reference to a specific period in history.

In 2008-9, the most important arguments for establishing the caliphate were related to framing it as an alternative to neoliberalism or capitalism, and democracy. Most prominent were not the theological arguments that democracy and neoliberalism were, in their understanding, opposed to Islam. Rather, and more convincingly to a broader audience, were secular arguments. It was argued that both the democratic system as well as the current neoliberal government had not succeeded in reducing poverty in Indonesia. In the eyes of the activists, the main reason why so many people have insufficient access to healthcare and education, some even to food and shelter, was not because Indonesia was considered a poor country. Rather, they argued that it was one of the richest countries in terms of natural resources. Yet, in the activists' line of argumentation, the revenues from the exploitation of these resources were unjustly and inefficiently distributed. In their view, property rights, particularly in regard to natural resources, needed to be reformed according to their understanding of Islamic law: natural resources should be commonly owned by the Muslim community. Democracy was considered not only un-Islamic, but also inefficient and expensive. Further, it was deemed highly vulnerable to corruption, as those in power were likely to enrich themselves, rather than caring for the wellbeing and prosperity of the larger population. Yet, despite this critical attitude towards democracy, the activists pursued in 2009 a pragmatic path. Many students opted for choosing the best candidate among "the bad" rather than not to vote at all.

Despite Hizbut Tahrir activists' attitude of framing the caliphate as being opposed to capitalism and neoliberalism, this chapter aimed to argue that the basic assumptions and

value judgements of these activists are in many ways close to those of neoliberalism. The call for the caliphate is thus, inspired by the work of Rudnyckyj (2010), Csordas (2009) and Silverstein (2008), not analyzed as refuge from globalization and the neoliberal world order. Rather, as I have argued, the style of reasoning and of mobilizing religious values to address the challenges of modern life in a globalized world is affected by a capitalist reason in different ways. Not only are the individuals – rather than the Indonesian state - deemed responsible for bringing, in their eyes, prosperity and justice. Also the activist's logic of arguing along lines of increasing efficiency, maximising output or the optimal allocation of funds are all further evidence that their own logic of argumentation and their imaginaries for organizing human conduct are deeply inspired by a market logic.

Chapter V:

Islamic Morality Consumed

During Ramadan 2011 - Islamic year 1432 - I attended a discussion session of Hizbut Tahrir women activists in the spacious yard of the Gadjah Mada University Mosque. During a quiz game, my group and I won a packet of imported American popcorn, wrapped in gift paper with traditional batik prints. The activists in my group were happy to have won the game organized by two senior Hizbut Tahrir activists responsible for the meeting. However, after opening the prize and realizing that they won a big packet of popcorn that declared in large bold letters that it had been made from American corn, the question emerged as to who had chosen the prize.

One of the organizers shyly apologized and said that she was in a hurry and had not paid close attention while shopping, but that she would certainly pay more attention next time, and choose a locally produced item. It was not, she stated, her aim to support America. Taking up the issue, one of her friends took the chance to state that one should indeed pay close attention to what products one buys and choose local products rather than support large transnational companies, as this means indirectly supporting Jews. After dawn, the popcorn was eaten nevertheless. During the discussion, the activist sitting next to me was taking notes with a Mickey Mouse pen, but no one seemed to notice.

A few days later when I met again with one of the women for an interview, I told her about my bewilderment that no one seemed to have noticed the Mickey Mouse pen. In response she told me: "You know, we are all still learning, it is a long process, it is never ending. In the end, Islam should be lived in its totality *(Islam kaffah),* so that you come to automate behaviour. It's good that you have noticed the pen. Personally, if I see that one of my friends is not living Islam in totality, I try in a very gentle manner to raise her awareness, to involve her in a discussion on the topic, but without blaming her. For me, this is part of *dakwah,* of being a good Muslim."

Hizbut Tahrir activists frame what they call "living Islam in its totality" as a precondition to successfully doing *dakwah* and convincing others to establish the caliphate. Learning to become a Hizbut Tahrir activist, and to acquire the authority to speak for the organization's agenda, entails not only mastering the ideology, but also learning to behave in a certain manner. For example, to "automatically" buy the "right" snack or use the "right" pen. Such consumption choices are important in the everyday life of activists. Often, topics related to what Asad calls *"apt performance"* (1986: 15) are not primarily addressed in large events; rather, they are core topics in many *incidental* and *casual* discussions. Living Islam in its totality needs to be learned, not only from books and in institutionalized trainings, but also through the socialization of peers, through discussions, admonishment, and observation. This process of learning does not happen overnight. Rather, it is a continual *process,* as the activist cited at the beginning of this chapter stated. The main difficulty, Ummi - the activist who had admonished her friend for the popcorn incident – explained to me, is not only correctly understanding the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir, and thus of Islam, but relating this knowledge to everyday life: *"One has to learn to translate the core ideas as formulated in the Qur'an and in various books by the organization's founding father an-Nabhani in order that they inform everyday behaviour - so that one does not choose the "wrong" popcorn or pen."*

Abstaining from American popcorn is a form of moral critique that ultimately shapes the public face of Islam. It, among other techniques, is employed in order to "be a good Muslim", and to live a pious life. Everyday choices such as consumption practices are consequential to Indonesians' perception of public morality, of good and evil. As Saba Mahmood and others have argued, seemingly apolitical expressions of piety, such as consumption patterns, influence perceptions not only of the public face of Islam, but also the political agenda (Mahmood, 2005: 162-6). Activists from different strands of Islam participate in shaping sensibilities and current debates around Islamic orthodoxy. Theological questions of "correct" Islamic exegeses are reflected, inter alia, in everyday decisions about consumption. Different responses to questions about how to live properly as a Muslim compete. In this contested field men *and* women engage actively in exercising Islamic authority regarding questions of Islamic ethical conduct.

Consumption patterns are one of many ways to ethical self-formation. Rather than standing in opposition to consumption, piety - and thus a certain form of morality - is expressed *through* consumption. Consumption and abstinence are core markers of different, and at times, competing forms of Islamic piety. In the preface to Pasi Falk's book "*The Consuming Body*" (1994), the sociologist Brian Turner pointed to the relationship between consumption and embodiment by arguing: *"[T]he notion of embodiment suggests that all of the fundamental processes of conception, perception, evaluation and judgement are connected to the fact that human beings are embodied social agents. It is not the case simply that human beings have a body but they are involved in the development of their bodies over their own life-cycles; in this respect, they are bodies"* (Turner, 1994: xi). In the increasingly globalized world, our range of choices has proliferated. To return to the popcorn, one finds a large variety these days not only of popcorn, but also of other sorts of snacks in ordinary supermarkets, such as in *Mirota Campus,* where the activist went shopping. As ever more choices are available, consumption becomes increasingly central to the demonstration of specific understandings of piety; it also becomes central to the honing of one's sensibilities as to which products are considered more or less Islamic, despite the fact that they are all labelled *halal.*[65] One is what one buys.

In recent anthropological literature about consumption and piety, the focus has been primarily on the question of how the consumption of *religious goods* constitutes religious subjects. Particular attention has been paid to the veil as a path to piety and ethical self-formation. The semantics of veiling in the context of the Gadjah Mada University are discussed in the next chapter. A major concern of almost exclusively women scholars focusing on Muslim women has been to examine how piety is enacted and embodied (Abu-Lughod, 1986; Brenner, 1996; El Guindi, 1999; Göle, 1996; C. Jones, 2007, 2010; Mahmood, 2005). Focusing on Indonesian middle class women, the American anthropologist Carla Jones (2010) examines how piety is enacted through consumption. For women, the most

[65]Almost all of the products sold in Indonesian supermarkets are certified as *halal* (lawful according to Islamic law). This label is important for many Muslims as it guarantees that Islamic food and slaughtering regulations are fulfilled. The only institution that has the right to supply this label is the Indonesian Ulema Council MUI (Fealy, 2008: 17).

visible commodity to mark piety is choosing a particular dress. The focus of her study is not to debate whether the veil helps or hinders women. The question she asks is, rather, what kind of femininity does the consumption of Islamic commodities produce? Jones focuses mainly on women who do not seem to have aspirations to contribute to social change. Religious consumption and enacting piety is largely framed as an apolitical act. She notes that despite the strong increase in Islamic consumer goods, ranging from clothes, to mobile phone ringtones, to TV show productions, to *halal* food, that Indonesians consider politics and religion as increasingly separate areas (C. Jones, 2010: 625). Whereas she argues that consumption and religion are interdependent systems, she does not discuss the political implications of religious consumption.

Saba Mahmood (2005) and Lara Deeb (2006, 2009a, 2009b) examine women Muslim activists in Egypt and Lebanon respectively. The authors focus on women who seek not to protest against male hegemony in the production of Islamic knowledge. Neither do these women, in the words of van Doorn-Harder, seek to make Islam *"congenial to women"* (van Doorn-Harder, 2006: 264), in the sense of secular feminist imaginaries of gender roles. Mahmood discusses how the formation of pious and ethical selves is in itself a political project that holds consequences for the political landscape. Diverging from Jones, Mahmood argues that consumption choices, such as veiling, are also political in the sense that it is an action that transforms religious sensibilities and political imaginaries. By focusing on the grassroots women's piety movement in Cairo, Mahmood provides insight into how these women activists shape the Islamic landscape. In Deeb's study about pious Shi'i women in Lebanon, the notion of what women's agency means is redefined. It is not merely equated with women's emancipation from patriarchal structures of authority. Rather, she consciously moves away from analysing piety practices as detached from the political sphere. Instead she stresses the importance of studying piety practices, of which consumption choices constitute an important part, as entangled with politics.

Focusing on the Indonesian context, Rachel Rinaldo (2008b) asks how Islamic practices inspired by a certain understanding of Islam produce "modern" selves. Focusing on women members of the Prosperous Justice Party PKS, she argues that Islamic piety is not an ontological category, but is rather negotiated, as several competing understandings exist of

what it means to properly enact piety. Consumption is important in these discussions. In these negotiation processes of defining which moral values should inspire conduct, women activists play a crucial role. By taking the debate around the pornography bill, which was initiated by women leaders of the Prosperous Justice Party, as an example, she outlines how religious sensibilities and national morality are connected. These women do not challenge the privileges held by men, such as that men conduct the intellectual and strategic work of the party and hold the top positions (Rinaldo, 2008b: 28). Further, they do not strive for gender equality in the sense of demanding that men and women perform the same tasks in family life, due to the fact that they regard gender differences as divinely ordained (ibid: 32). Their agency lays in propagating their specific understanding of Islam in public via different activities, such as holding public seminars, campaigning, educating others, public speeches, or writing newspaper articles.

In recent years, another strand of scholarship has examined the proliferation of Islamic commodities and services. In the Indonesian context, Fealy argues that with the increasing commercialization of Islam since the 1990s, Islam has become increasingly visible and dominant in the public sphere (2008: 37). Within this strand of scholarship, one focus has been on the sector of the emergent Islamic economy, such as on the development of Islamic banking and microfinance. Juoro (2008) addresses, for example, the question of how piety and the development of Islamic banking after the economic crisis of 1997-98 are connected and how the banking sector has developed. Sakai (2008) examines the development of Islamic microfinance institutes and links this development to an apparently new form of Islamic piety that looks for Islamic alternatives to the capitalist system. Choices of where to invest money are thus inspired not only by economic motivations, but also by a certain mindset.

"Islamic goods" play an important role in how Islamic activists from different stands of Islam publically express their faith. As I discuss in the next chapter, for women the style of veil and dress one wears are important outward markers of piety. Also, commodities such as stickers or branded key ring pendants are often used to convey a slogan or to reveal one's membership in a certain organization. Further, reading certain types of books, fiction and non-fiction, as well as listening to certain types of music reveal much about ones

understanding of Islam. Being a member of Hizbut Tahrir thus influences one's consumption choices in the realm of products that might be labelled Islamic, but also in choosing or restraining from certain products not directly linked to Islam, such as popcorn.

Despite the plethora of studies that examine how different imaginaries of Islamic morality influence consumption patterns, the question of how *secular products,* such as popcorn, gives rise to intense debates has so far largely been neglected. I argue in this chapter that in everyday life, often seemingly trivial choices – such as which snack to buy and what pen to write with – initiate important debates about proper conduct, about what it means to live a moral, pious life. How is the consumption or abstinence of certain products linked to calling for the caliphate and criticizing the status quo?

I argue that examining consumption choices and the moral critique implied not only plays a crucial part in every day life, but also sheds light on the complex entanglements between consumption and competing understandings of Islam. This being the case, I focus on how different understandings of Islamic morality *(aklak)* are expressed through consumption or abstinence. What should be consumed and what should be renounced mirrors established moral values held by different groups of student activists, at least to a certain extent. As Pasi Falk argues, in the age of modern advertising, products are transformed in representations (1994: 157). My aim in this chapter is thus to explore what kind of moral critique is linked to the consumption of ordinary products.

Using a secular product to think about Islamic morality and consumption takes me away from regarding modes of consumption merely as a marker of religious identity. Different strands of Islamic activists with whom I have worked during my two years of fieldwork, but also Protestant or Catholic activists with whom I have discussed, all reject the consumption of American products – at least theoretically. The fact that one restrains from consuming American products does not, thus, reveal much about one's membership in a specific Islamic organization. To gain insights about the different forms of Islamic morality competing on the campus, I examine the implied critique and also, how the different activists seek to persuade others of their understanding of Islam.

I start this chapter by elaborating on the question of how calling for the caliphate and (at least theoretically) condemning the consumption of American popcorn are entangled. Why should a "good" Hizbut Tahrir activist choose a different snack? How do Hizbut Tahrir activists frame the debate to renounce American products? After using the example of popcorn to think with, I turn to another commodity that triggers discussion as to the "proper" place of Islam in everyday life – cigarettes. For Hizbut Tahrir activists smoking is not only a health hazard but jeopardizes the wellbeing of the entire Islamic community. At stake in this debate is whether the body is regarded as individual property or as part of the larger Muslim community. Finally, I focus on the discussions around fasting during Ramadan and to what end fasting should be put. Again, "just" fasting is not enough in the eyes of Hizbut Tahrir student activists: Their call to live Islam in its totality, which also entails their call for the caliphate, implies cultivating a specific state of mind. I am particularly interested in exploring different activists' commonplace styles of reasoning, range and density of emotions and sensibilities that all express an ethical dimension of what it means to be Muslim.

A Moral Critique: Rejecting the Western Claim of Superiority

Why is "Imported American Corn" in both English and Indonesian written on this popcorn package mentioned at the beginning of this chapter? As Falk argues in his essay on *"Selling Good(s)"* it is not plain consumer information, otherwise the chosen colours would be less bright and the letters not bold. Rather, it is a *selling argument* that aims at distinguishing this particular package of popcorn from others. This information aims to single out this product (Falk, 1994: 159). The implicit massage seems to be that popcorn made from imported corn is tastier than what is produced locally; that the quality is superior, that it should be preferred to other similar products. "Imported American corn" seems to appeal to a specific desire linked to America.

The idea that foreign products are held in higher esteem than local ones is a phenomenon I have observed in various facets during my fieldwork. In supermarkets, for example, the fact

that products are local is often not mentioned, however, when the apples or carrots are imported from abroad, this is clearly declared. Imports from Australia, America, and in rare cases, Europe, are believed to be superior. "Made in Indonesia" or "Local" is only rarely a selling argument. Prices of imported goods tend to be higher than local goods – implying that to be able to afford to consume imported products is for many a status statement. Eating in Mc Donald's in Yogyakarta, for example, is clearly more expensive than eating at a normal restaurant. Not surprisingly, the McDonald's restaurant in the downtown Malioboro Shopping Mall is built in a way that people passing by can see inside through the large glass windows facing the main road. Taking a quick look at the Big Mac Index is revealing: An Indonesian earning an average salary has to work more than two hours to afford a Big Mac, compared to the twenty minutes that an American earning an average salary needs to work.[66]

Activists from different stands of Islam have all criticized this attitude of valuing foreign products more than local ones and have argued that this attitude reflects a lack of self-esteem. I found during many discussions with activists holding very different understandings about how Islam should inspire everyday life, that this rhetoric outlines a shared political culture across the commonly existing ideological divides between different activists. Ari, a psychology student in the fifth semester and member of the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM, told me in an interview that this is a "postcolonial deformation" (using the English word). *"So many people here still think that what comes from the west is better. Just look at all of the whitening products sold and advertised everywhere. People really believe that white skin is more beautiful, cleaner. Well, not only skin, scientific theories, and so many other products. Well, sometimes, local products are indeed of poor quality, but by far not everything. It is so deeply in the heads of many that what is from abroad is better. This is not only bad for the self esteem of Indonesia, it is also not good for our economy."*

Whereas Ari situated the reason for prioritizing western products in Indonesia's colonial past, other students blame what they call neoliberalism for this trend. Putri, a law student

[66] This webpage provides an overview about how long people have to work, earning average salaries, to buy a Big Mac http://www.labnol.org/internet/big-mac-price-index/9721/ (29 November 2011). The calculations are based on the Big Mac Index issued by The Economist.

and member of KAMMI argued, for example, that it is nowadays almost impossible to buy local water. *"If I want to buy something very basic like water, I have almost no choice, DANONE and Nestle are dominating the whole market of bottled water. Not only water. This is a problem of our government. They sell too many extraction rights to foreign companies. These companies sell us products with their foreign brand on it. This is not good for the country, for our development. In my opinion, this domination by foreign products, at least in some sectors, is a kind of neo-imperialism."*

At stake in the debates around rejecting imported goods are thus debates centred on national self-esteem, and about superiority and inferiority in a globalised world. Choosing a snack "made form imported American corn" is thus a sign that one is unaware of this problematic, that one is unfamiliar with this kind of moral critique; otherwise, if this consciousness was already internalised, making the right choice would be done "automatically", as the activist in the example states. This attitude is thus not specific to Hizbut Tahrir activists. What is specific to their way of arguing is how they link this critique to their call for establishing the caliphate. As outlined in the previous chapter, Hizbut Tahrir activists link the narrative of foreign companies' exploitation of Indonesia's – the citizens, as they argue – natural resources to the narrative of establishing a better world. If the caliphate was established, this exploitation would stop, the resources would be used to finance education, access to health care and thus serve to reduce poverty, or so they argue, and call for a systemic revolution.

Ummi, criticizing her friend for not having paid attention while shopping, argued that buying such a product is at odds with the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir, with their incessant struggle to convince others that what comes from the west is not better than what is outlined in the Qur'an. She explained to me: *"How can we argue against democracy, western concepts of capitalism and instead call for an Islamic alternative – but then be seen by others buying American popcorn? This is not a neutral gesture; it is a statement, one that is opposed to our ideology. If one wants to live Islam in its totality as we [Hizbut Tahrir activists] do, one should pay attention to such choices and reflect on the message one sends."* The problem with the American popcorn then was not that Hizbut Tahrir activists argued that trading foreign goods was against Islam. An-Nabhani has outlined that Islam welcomed both domestic and

foreign trade, as long as the products traded were *halal,* according to the Sharia (an-Nabhani, 2000). Rather, according to Ummi and her friends, buying American products where they could easily substitute local ones was a sign of prioritizing the west over Islam.

Conflating the Narrative of "Neo-Imperialism" with Anti Zionist Rhetoric

The narrative of "neo-imperialism" or "postcolonial deformation" is at times conflated with both anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. Often, as James Siegel points out in his chapter contribution entitled *"'Kiblat' and the Mediatic Jew"* (2001), Indonesians mix up Zionists and Jews. When Ummi admonished her Hizbut Tahrir friend, she linked the consumption of imported American popcorn to supporting Jews – not Israel - and thus to killing Muslims. This rhetoric provides a tool for her and her friends to draw a picture of a transnational Muslim community, the *ummat*, who shall unite against the perceived Jewish danger that aims to corrupt or even destroy Islam. It thus allows for the construction of a vision of the transnational Muslim community that is politically engaged, and this is particularly important in the self-understanding of Hizbut Tahrir as a transnational Muslim organization. Hizbut Tahrir activists were not the only ones to link anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist rhetoric to discourses of western imperialism. Yet, more often than other organizations I worked with, they framed "the Islamic ideology" as being opposed to "the west". In this logic, they often linked neoliberalism and democracy, the west, and America in particular with killing innocent Muslims by supporting Israel. This support and solidarity with Palestinian Muslims and related condemnation of Israel, thought to thrive on the support of different western countries, was often conflated in everyday speeches with the condemnation of Jews generally.

Van Bruinessen (1993) outlines that anti-Semitic rhetoric is common and not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, although only a very small Jewish community lives in Indonesia. Particularly during the regime of Suharto, the amount of anti-Semitic material increased, and books with anti-Semitic content were easily available. It was during the 1980s that Indonesians started discussing the existence of a Jewish conspiracy to harm Islam (ibid.: 9).

Since then, the Jews became scapegoats, as van Bruinessen outlines. Developments perceived as negative, and which were regarded as endangering Islam within the country, were ascribed to Jews, to the state or Israel, or to people supportive of Jews. Examples are the development of what is called "liberal Islam" *(Islam liberal)*[67], the debate around Human Rights or more generally social change. Jews were deemed responsible for several developments associated with the shady sides of modernity (ibid.: 11). Jews are at times deemed responsible for Indonesia's economic crisis *(krisis),* and suspected to produce political unrest and destabilization of the Islamic community (Siegel, 2001: 271). These anti Jewish sentiments are paired with an increasing solidarity for Palestine and a feeling of anger or powerlessness to change the world. Particularly Israel, but also America, to a smaller extent Europe, and large multinational companies were accused of supporting the suffering of many Palestinians.

This anti-Semitic rhetoric is thus not unique to Hizbut Tahrir activists. It is nuanced and expresses a variety of feelings and discomforts. In its most extreme form, it is assumed that various individuals, large companies and states cooperate to fulfil a hidden agenda of destroying Islam. A "softer" nuance is that Jews, as well as those states regarded as supportive of Jews, particularly America, do not aim to directly destroy Islam, but aim to exploit Muslim countries' natural resources, without caring about the people. The president of Jamaah Shalahuddin in 2008-9 wrote that the organization has to struggle against the conspiracy of the enemies of Islam *(Konspirasi musuh-musuh Islam)* that aim to destroy Islam (Nugroho, 2009: 114). His idea, which was shared by some activists, was that western countries consciously aimed to weaken the Islamic community.

Not all Islamic activists share these theories and actively promote them. But the attitude of criticising Israel and western countries that are believed to support Israel, and blaming Jews in general, is widespread among activists representing different strands of Islam. An alumnus of PMII, for example, gave an elaborated Power Point Presentation at a training

[67] For a brief discussion about core ideas of the main represent of "liberal Islam" the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) see Feener (2007: 210-213).

seminar for active PMII activists.[68] PMII members generally promote a peaceful attitude towards the small Jewish community living in Indonesia – as part of their concern for protecting the rights of minorities of any ethnicity or religion. The given presentation showed how Swiss banks were linked to the World Bank and to the American state, and thus indirectly supported the "war against Islam". Bewildering was in my eyes how the speaker paired his analysis of global financial flows with a strong anti-Semitic rhetoric, blaming not only the west and Israel, but also the Jewish community in general. Although understanding his solidarity for the Palestinians and his critique of unequal terms of trade, I was surprised by his rhetoric because the general agenda of this training session, such as teaching the participants about the benefits of democracy, of interfaith dialogue and of respecting Indonesia's unity in diversity *(Bhinneka Tunggal Ika)* seemed in disaccord with the idea of blaming Jews in general. Also some of the activists I talked to after the presentation were unhappy with his accusation of Jews. Yet, many shared his critical view of the Israeli attitude towards Muslims and supported his call to boycott product produced by companies that he had suspected of at least indirectly supporting "the war against Islam".

The way student activists linked the discourse on "neo-imperialism", and opposing Israel, differed between the various organizations. Yet, generally it was argued that one should choose local goods and diminish the consumption of products from large multinational brands. Let me provide an example of how it was argued, and how activists tried to convince fellow students to boycott products deemed to cause suffering to fellow Muslims. In 2009, a Hizbut Tahrir activist gave me a flyer calling for the boycott of a long list of brands, including: DKNY, Huggies, Johnson & Johnson, Nokia, Nestle, CNN, McDonald's, Fanta, Coca Cola, Revlon, L'Oreal, IBM, DANONE, 20th Century Fox, Maggi or Kit Kat, to name just a few. These brands were declared to be *"products that help the international Zionist movement".* Written on the poster was *"Save Palestine. We participate in the slaughtering. If we buy American products we are giving lethal weapons to kill our brothers and sisters in Palestine. We do not boycott all products. We only try to reduce our dependence on American products*

[68] This was a four-day training for PMII activists held in Kaliurang north of Yogyakarta in Mai 2009, where I was invited as a speaker about different Islamic organizations active on the Campus of the Gadjah Mada University.

that support the military operations of Israel and America." A large poster version of this flyer was also hanging on various information boards all over the campus and on the information board of the campus mosque. It was not only Hizbut Tahrir activists who were distributing these flyers, but also activists of other Muslim organizations, such as KAMMI and Jamaah Shalahuddin. Aside from calling for a boycott, they also raised funds or collected valuable items such as gold or hand phones to give to the Hamas. Printed on the flyer were photos of crying and severely wounded Palestinian children.

The core argument to boycott the aforementioned products, that they could be easily be substituted by local ones, was well received among various groups of student. However, the activists of different organizations criticized the language used and the general layout of the poster. Haris, an activist of PMII in his 7th semester, told me when I asked him what he thought of the flyer: *"Well, I think that it is good to boycott these large brands and rather choose local ones. I do not really to what extent they are really in the hands of Jews, but certainly these companies are important taxpayers in America and thus indirectly support this war. On the other hand, they also provide jobs to many Indonesians. I try to buy local products, and they are often cheaper. Back to the flyer: What I do not like is the rather aggressive language, the bold letters. We [referring to his friends from PMII] are gentler (halus) in addressing this issue, more scientific. We try to analyse the conflict and the different actors in a more detailed way. I think that the method of doing* dakwah *is the major difference between them and us. However, in the end, I agree with the idea of the boycott."*

The role of the Indonesian state remains ambiguous. In some narratives the state is at least indirectly responsible, through its collaboration with the World Bank and by granting extraction rights to large companies deemed responsible for the unfair terms of trade, according to activists, for the malaise of the Palestinians. Yet, the state also plays a central role in the dissemination of anti-Semitic material: No law has so far been passed that would restrict the distribution. Both anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist rhetoric is not only present on the campus in everyday speeches and flyers, but also in nationally distributed magazines and books. A visit to the Islamic book market in Yogyakarta is revealing in this regard. We find a large variety of books that take up the topic of the existence of a Jewish conspiracy in

various forms. Further, books with anti-Semitic content such as Hitler's *Mein Kampf* have not only been translated into Indonesian, but sell well in various book shops.

Back to the imported American popcorn: this consumption choice is equated with an uncritical attitude towards what is happening in the country. It expresses a kind of bluntness and lethargy not only towards the larger Muslim community, especially the Palestinians, but also towards problems that Indonesia is currently facing. As honing these sensibilities is one of the major goals of various Islamic and non-Islamic activists, including of Hizbut Tahrir activists, buying American popcorn and similar products is an outward sign that one has not yet succeeded in embodying Islamic morality. Caring for others is regarded as pivotal to being a good Muslim.

Cigarettes and Piety

Unlike imported American popcorn, which the activists from different strands of Islam tend to reject, commodities do exist, at least theoretically, that reveal different conceptualizations of what it means to live a pious life. Cigarettes are one example of such a commodity. As I argue in this subchapter, smoking is, for some activists, not an individual choice, but is linked to specific conceptualizations of health, and thus to the wellbeing of the Islamic community. At stake in the debate around smoking are ultimately different imaginaries of to whom one's body belongs, and thus ultimately about personal and collective responsibility and freedom. Restraining from smoking thus entails a moral critique. However, in the case of smoking, this critique differs among gender lines.

Smoking, especially smoking clove cigarettes *(kretek)* is widespread among male students on the campus. However, women who smoke are still a rather rare sight. Particularly rare in Yogyakarta are veiled women smoking in public. Especially for women, smoking is not only considered a health hazard, but also a moral hazard and read as an outward sign of immorality, especially of a "loose" sexual morality. Smoking women, so different women activists have told me, tend to go out, have sex with different partners, and tend not to be very religious. Eva, an Indonesian friend of mine who smoked regularly told me that

smoking is not only often equated with lacking morality but also with resistance to societal norms, not only "new" norms imposed by "want-to-be" Islamic authorities, but also resistance to Javanese tradition. For her, smoking is a way of showing independence, self-esteem, and a critical and modern mind.

However, smoking is not only a moral hazard for women, but also for some Muslims. During my fieldwork in Yogyakarta, the issue of smoking Muslims was eagerly discussed, and reached its peak at the beginning of 2009. On January 25, the seven hundred members of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) issued a *fatwa* against smoking.[69] As any other legal opinion by the MUI, it is not enforceable by national law and may be contested. The main reason for issuing the fatwa was that smoking is regarded as a serious health hazard due to its intoxicating effects, and as a type of slow suicide. It is thus regarded as being at odds with the Qur'an and the Sunnah. For the past couple centuries, Islamic scholars have been almost unanimous in declaring smoking *makruh* (to be avoided, but not *haram*). Especially Nahdlatul Ulama authorities have often accepted money from cigarette manufactures and tobacco traders, making them more lenient towards smoking.[70]

Not surprisingly, this fatwa was severely criticised by many Islamic activists, but also by well known Islamic intellectuals. Farid, an activist of the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM for example told me: *"I do not agree with this fatwa, and anyway, I will continue smoking. Of course I agree with them [the MUI] that smoking is bad for one's health, but I think that smoking is my private decision. I do not harm others. I do not think that this is a matter that should be regulated. Well, foremost I'm concerned that this fatwa will be imposed by the state on all citizens. I do not say that religion is a purely personal matter, but smoking should be a personal choice. Further, I have not found clear evidence in the Qur'an or in the Sunnah. I think that smoking could be defined as* makruh *[bad, to be avoided] and not as haram. Therefore I do not really respect the authority of the MUI, for me, the opinion*

[69] Different newspapers reported on this decision. See for example the article in the national newspaper Kompas: http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2008/08/12/13085542/mui.siapkan.fatwa.haram.untuk.rokok (14 December 2011).

[70] I thank Martin van Bruinessen for this information.

of the leader of Muhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin is more important, and he does not support this fatwa. […] They [the MUI and those following the fatwa] see themselves as better Muslims – just because the do not smoke. Anyway, I think that some of them smoke anyway." Similar reasons for rejecting this fatwa were put forward by other activists, mostly of student activists of PMII culturally linked to the Nahdlatul Ulama, who also refused to consider smoking *haram*.

What was mostly criticized was not the fact that these religious authorities discouraged smoking. Rather, at stake in these debates was whether or not smoking is related to piety, or whether it was a private matter versus a public concern. Entangled with this question is that of whether one's body is regarded as private or public: is ruining one's health by smoking regarded as harming just the self or the entire Muslim community. Also at stake in these debates is the question of whether religion is regarded as belonging to the private sphere, and outside the jurisdiction of public discourse, or whether it is a public matter and subject to regulation. This debate exemplifies how different imaginaries about the place of religion coexist in the same space at the same time, and mutually challenge the limits of intra-Islamic tolerance. At stake are different imaginaries of freedom.

Hizbut Tahrir women activists with whom I discussed the *fatwa* against smoking, seemed reluctant to define smoking as *haram*, rather, they categorised it as *makruh*. They seemed to be uncertain about whether it was really legitimate to declare smoking as *haram,* as done by the MUI. Yet, they argued strongly against smoking. In the eyes of Tia, with whom I discussed the topic, smoking or not smoking is clearly related to piety – a good Muslim must not smoke. Her core argument was that it is harmful, a kind of self-destruction and thus offensive to Allah. In her argument, the decision to smoke had far reaching consequences, as she believed it to have a negative impact on the general state of societal wellbeing. In Hizbut Tahrir, so she outlined, women, but also men, are strongly discouraged from smoking. This is against the organization's ideology and understanding of living Islam in an all-encompassing way. Besides stressing the negative effect on health that she argued was scientifically proven, she stressed the financial aspect of smoking, and argued that it is an expensive habit and a waste of money.

It is thus not surprising that whether a Muslim man smokes or not becomes a core criterion of distinction as to what kind of Muslim one is. Smoking is thus, to use Mahmood's term with regard to the veil, a "*critical marker* of piety" (2005: 158). Abdullah and Abdillah define those men Muslims who do not smoke as *dakwah activists* (2008: 4)*.* Those who do smoke are hence *not dakwah* activists. The two brothers Abdullah and Abdillah - both alumni from the Gadjah Mada University, and non-smokers who define themselves as *dakwah* activists - also mention other criteria besides smoking that distinguish *dakwah* activists from other Islamic activists. In general the easiest way to recognize a *dakwah* activist is by their high morality *(akhlak)* (2008: 6). Not smoking is thus framed as a core marker of moral integrity. Not only do *dakwah* activists refrain from smoking, but they also pray diligently in the mosques, and most of them study *(ngaji)* in weekly held study circles. Further, a male *dakwah* activist has, according to the authors, the following characteristics: a beard, but no moustache; sometimes wears an Arab style *peci,* an Islamic rimless cap; is dressed in long pants that do not go beyond the ankle *(celana cingkrang);* often carries a small edition of the Qur'an; usually lowers his gaze when speaking with the opposite sex; often uses Arabic words when speaking (Abdullah & Abdillah, 2008: 4-5). These activists, according to the authors, *practice* what they consider as Islamic law in all aspects of their life. Thus, so they postulate, those who smoke fail to live Islam in its totality and only hold a partial understanding of Islam.

To most Gadjah Mada University students, Abdullah and Abdillah's description of a typical *dakwah* activist in terms of outward appearance and behaviour seems quite accurate. Many define *dakwah* activists in a similar way. However, increasingly, Islamic activists focus more on promoting a different understanding of Islamic ethics and morality. They have become eager to point out that specific groups have hijacked the term *dakwah,* and define it according to their orthodox understanding of Islam. This debate turns around negotiating authenticity and thus Islamic morality *(akhlak).* What should a "real" *dakwah* activist do? Is smoking indeed telling in terms of whether one engages in *dakwah* in the sense of calling others to Islam and making "Islam become a blessing to all" *(rahmatan lil alamin)*? Who claims authority to define what "proper" *dakwah* is? Different understandings of what Islam has to say about how politics and society should work, give rise to competing

understandings of what *dakwah* means and how Islamic activism should be practiced. What *dakwah* means, who should be obliged to perform it, and how it should be done is thus a matter of debate and constant negotiation.

Using *dakwah* as an analytical term to define a specific group of activists as previously defined by Abdullah and Abdillah, but also as done by scholars such as Collins (2003), who lists groups she regards as *dakwah* organizations, simplifies the complex negotiations taking place. I suggest that it might be more revealing not to use the term as an analytical category, but rather as a concept in need of deeper analysis. Understood as "calling people to greater piety" as outlined in the Qur'an and Sunnah, all activists may be considered *dakwah* activists, even those who smoke.

Farid, a PMII activists who loves to smoke *kretek* told me: *"Maybe I do harm my health a little bit, but I think that smoking is also a social thing, smoking is important for Indonesian men, it is part of our culture. I think that it does not harm my personal relationship to God in any way. I think smoking is also something that brings us together. I sit with my friends, we drink coffee, we smoke and we discuss. In my opinion Indonesia faces bigger problems than the fact that many men smoke – so, I think my task as an Islamic activist is not to tell my friends to resign from smoking, but rather to get active in community development programs, write critical articles or discuss about how, for example, poverty may be reduced. This is far more important than annoying others by telling them how to live."* Farid and his friends were annoyed by the self-declared *dakwah* activists, as he called them, who believe that they are better Muslims and try to tell others what to do. Farid found them arrogant *(sombong). "What they understand by dakwah does not have much to do with making Islam become a blessing to all, but rather with invading (campur tangan) the privacy of others."*

Syamsul, on the other hand, is one of those activists who gave up smoking. He fits the definition of a typical *dakwah activist* as given by Abdullah and Abdillah (2008) quite well. In 2009, he was active in Forum for Study and Dakwah FOSDA and studies at the Department of Chemistry. In a discussion shortly after the MUI issued the fatwa against smoking he told me: *"I gave up smoking when I became active in FOSDA, and this was in the third semester. I came to understand that Muslims should care about their health. The Qur'an does not say anything particular about smoking, also in the Sunnah, there is no clear evidence. But, in the*

Qur'an it is clearly stated that you should not ruin your health, contribute to your destruction or kill yourself. Also it is stated that you should avoid what is bad and tell others to avoid what is bad.[71] *It is scientifically proven that smoking causes cancer and other diseases, thus kills. It should therefore be evident to all Muslims that one should not smoke. We [the FOSDA activists] try to convince fellow Muslims in the lectures (pengajian) to give up smoking. […] Indonesians are still backwards (kurang maju) in their thinking about smoking. The rate of people smoking is much higher here than in the west. Why are so many Muslims still smoking? Killing themselves? Like in many western countries, advertisement should be prohibited, but the local and international lobbies are too strong. They do not care about our health, only about the money. They do not care if Muslims die. […] I think it was good and correct of the MUI to issue the fatwa."* Syamsul also told me that he does try to convince his friends and fellow students who smoke to give it up. He does not insist, he said, but puts forth his arguments. In his narrative, Syamsul linked smoking to the narratives on cultural and economic imperialism. The large tobacco companies, so he argued, try to use Muslims to make money, to blind them by selling a feeling of freedom, of individuality, of being trendy. But they just want to make money and do not care - they care even less for Muslims. Therefore, so the argument goes, all Muslims should be woken up to the struggle against this form of slow killing – and one thing would be to stop smoking.

Smoking, as these debates have revealed, is thus fare more than a health hazard, but reflects core debates about to what extent the body is regarded as individual property or part of a larger community. At stake are different understandings of societal wellbeing and of personal and collective freedom. Is a core task of being pious to maintain public morality – for example by doing *dakwah* and trying to convince others to stop smoking? And if so, what aspects of behaviour or consumption should be regarded as belonging to the realm of public morality? Smoking? Is respecting one's personal will to smoke not also a virtue that is promoted in the Qur'an? If so, what is more important – respecting one's privacy or seeking

[71] Syamsul does not refer to specific verses during the discussion. When I asked him by short message what verses he was referring to, he told me that he finds the verses 2:195 and 4:29 particularly relevant to justify how one should care about one's health.

to protect the health of the Islamic community? The answers given vary according to different perceptions of the proper place of religion in life.

Ramadan Hedonism: Competing Imaginaries of Discipline

After popcorn and cigarettes as markers of piety, I turn to consumption during Ramadan. When examining consumption as a path to piety and as a technique to acquire a specific state of mind, zooming in on Yogyakarta during Ramadan is revealing. This is the time when, in the eyes of many, "Islamic hedonism" reaches its peak. Consumerism not only peaks, but Ramadan is also the month during which time negotiations of Islamic piety and proper moral behaviour spikes, as Samuli Schielke (2009b) argued in his article entitled *"Being Good in Ramadan"*. In his study, he focuses on young men Muslims in a north Egyptian village, and outlines how during this month in particular these men negotiate piety and become trapped between promises of consumerism, desire for romantic love, relaxation and submission to God. Also in Indonesia, Ramadan is a time when the relation between consumerism, piety and morality is intensively debated in public, such as in newspapers, magazines, and in the numerous discussions taking place at different locations almost every evening, as well as among friends and in families.

In 2011, as in previous years, I spent Ramadan in Yogyakarta. Along many streets, and around the campus of the Gadjah Mada University, many small stalls were set up. In the afternoon, students and local people began selling a large variety of drinks and light snacks for the breaking of the fast in the evening. Many students and people living in the area of the campus would stop by to buy food or drinks to take home. However, even more came together to spend time with friends and enjoy the different events taking place after a long day of fasting. Towards dawn, the market would become increasingly crowded with people, most of them on motorbikes. Various live bands would take their turn to play on a stage set up to entertain the crowd.

The atmosphere was relaxed and festive. The casual visitor might actually be surprised to see what happens on this city's street in the name of restraining desire – which is what most

people believe Ramadan is about. The music pounded, young people flirted and most people were dressed up. Most students hanging out there did not see a problem in being religious and having fun – they still fasted. That was part of the game. The discipline of restraining from food -and cigarettes - and hedonism are not seen as incompatible, at least not by those enjoying the evening. Indeed the subjugation of the body through body maintenance routines, such as fasting, was presented within consumer culture.

Different shopping malls in Yogyakarta also registered the highest numbers of visitors and sales during this month. On *Idul Fitri,* the big celebration at the end of Ramadan, everyone should wear a new dress. This seems to be an unwritten rule in Indonesia that most who can afford it seem to follow. The stores, especially those selling Islamic clothing, were therefore crowded during this time. Restaurants and food supermarkets also increased their business volume. The consumption of sugar, for example, increased significantly.[72] Critical voices could be heard saying that the shopping malls seemed to become the new mosques - that "the mosque moves to the mall" *(masjid pindah ke mal).*

The topic of dissent among different groups of activists is generally not whether to fast or not during Ramadan. At this point, I should emphasize that there are Muslim students who do not fast. Aside from those who fast for medical reasons, and menstruating women, there are also a number of Muslims, both men and women, who refuse to fast, or who only fast for a few days. However, they do not usually argue that this is "correct Islamic behaviour", but rather justify their behaviour by saying that they are too lazy *(malas)* or simply do not care.

The point of dissent is rather how a "good Muslim" should behave during this month; generally regarded as the most holy. Should one spend a few nights praying and sleeping on the marble floor of the campus mosque and attend various lectures *(pengajian),* or is hanging out in a popular café *(warung kopi)* from dusk until dawn while discussing how to save the world a better path to piety? Different ideas coexist as to in what state of mind one

[72]According to a survey conducted by the national newspaper Republika the consumption of sugar increases by 300 percent during Ramadan: http://ramadhan.republika.co.id/berita/ramadhan/kabar-ramadhan/11/08/01/lp8nh1-menag-imbau-sikap-konsumtif-saat-ramadhan-dikonversi-menjadi-amal (20 December 2011).

should be during Ramadan and how this should achieved. Islamic orthodoxy is thus, once again, negotiated – but not in regard to fasting, but rather about "how to fast".

During Ramadan 2011, I received a short message from a friend asking whether I wanted to join to break the fast in a popular student café near the campus. Although not all in our group of six were fasting, we sat like the others in front of our meals waiting for the prayer call *(azan).* One of her friends told us that she loves this café, especially during Ramadan, because this was the time when was most crowded. *"We often hang out here the whole night, often until dawn, then we go home and sleep. […] I pray five times a day, especially during Ramadan, and of course I fast."* Lina was not the only girl who was mainly awake at night during Ramadan. Young male students in particular like to hang out until dawn during this month – girls less so, as staying out until late is generally regarded as immoral behaviour for women. However, Lina was convinced that the women who prayed and slept in the mosque were not better Muslims. To outline that she was a good Muslim, she told me about her engagement in one of the many NGOs that advocate for poor women. For her, so she told me, it was action that counted, not whether one was veiled or whether one attended many lectures in the mosque.

On the campus of the Gadjah Mada University, Hizbut Tahrir and *tarbiyah* activists were the most outspoken critics of what they sometimes called "Ramadan hedonism". Not only did they have specific ideas what state of mind Muslims should be in during Ramadan, but they also offered a large variety of events, ranging from small discussions, to public film screenings, to book discussions, to "open house" question and answer sessions, where interested students or critics may come to interrogate them on different topics. During Ramadan 2011, Ummi, the Hizbut Tahrir activist who had admonished her friend of buying American popcorn explained to me the meaning of fasting: *"Fasting is not only about not eating, it is about getting closer to God (mendekatkan diri kepada Allah), one should become patient (sabar). Ramadan should be the time to think about one's relationship with good, about what it means to be Muslim and let Islam inspire all of your life. One should use this month to learn, to pray, to think about where one stands in life."* Learning to be *sabar* is an attitude, a particular perspective, Ummi explained to me, and this is linked to becoming a moral Muslim *(Muslim beraklaq).*

For reaching a disposition of forbearance *(sabar)* fasting is not enough. Sherine Hamdy (2009) argues in her article that becoming *sabar,* is not a passive activity but requires active work. Why is reaching this state of mind important, one might ask? Ummi explained to me that it is important because it influences your entire behaviour. It influences who you are. She said: *"People who are* sabar *are good people. They are calm, they to listen to the problems of others, they are gentle (halus), and they care about others. In short, they have moral integrity. If all people would be* sabar*, the world would be a better place, a place without greed, corruption and violence."* Ummi and the women with whom I discussed the meaning of fasting are convinced that reaching this state of mind is a necessary condition to living a pious life, and in the case of Hizbut Tahrir activists to successfully striving for the establishment of the caliphate. To reach this state of mind, different techniques exist. One favoured foremost by *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists is to spend the night at the mosque.

During Ramadan 2005, I was "invited" by KAMMI activists to spend one night with them in the Campus Mosque. On the second floor, the space for women, around seventy predominantly *tarbiyah* and Hizbut Tahrir activists were there with their sarongs. Some were sitting in small group discussions, others were reading the Qur'an on their own, and still others were laying on the marble floor, often using their bags as pillows and covering themselves with a *sarong*. In the middle of the night, all the women got up for ablution *(wudu)* and then to pray *tahajud*. Before dawn, a simple meal was distributed containing rice, a bit of chicken and egg and vegetables.

The women I was with were not serious the whole time, but also found time for personal discussions and some laughing. Mostly they laughed about incidents that could be summarised as minor violations to their image of perfect self-discipline: for example when someone talked about eating while still fasting. One girl, after having talked of different types of food she would like to eat before dawn admonished herself in a joking manner by saying: *"Well I should enjoy fasting but I still think about food all the time"*. This made the others laugh. I encountered similar forms of joking about what they perceived as small imperfections while attending other events organized by Hizbut Tahrir activists. Yet, depending on how strongly both KAMMI and Hizbut Tahrir activists judged the mishap, they

used the occasion to admonish their friends – although in a soft way, but with varying emphasis. These small imperfections – a core topic in the study of Schielke (2009a, 2009b) – were addressed mostly in a humorous way, however, this does not imply that they were not to be taken seriously. Most women present did regard themselves as not yet *(belum)* perfectly pious, but on the path to piety. Imagining piety as a path, however, they regarded themselves as further advanced than others who lagged behind, those who do not even veil properly, for example. To veil properly, in their understanding, is to cover not only the hair, but also the shape of the body.

Keeping in mind the importance of cultivating such a specific mental disposition, it is not surprising that so many activities organized by Jamaah Shalahuddin during Ramadan 2011 had to do with teaching Muslims that fasting is not enough. The declared goal as stated in the Ramadan 2001 brochure was to *"teach about the necessity to build the own character to create the unity and the development of the nation"*. One activity was called *"I'm proud to be a Muslim"*, one speech was entitled: *"The wisdom of Ramadan to create an excellent Muslim character"*. Yet, this endeavour to bring one's self closer to God does not take place outside the logic of consumption – the best group which won a prize at the event discussed at the beginning of the chapter was not criticized, what was criticized was only the chosen snack. Jamaah Shalahuddin activists, quite a number of them Hizbut Tahrir activists, link piety and consumption during Ramadan, and pursue a path to piety through consumption. Their slogan for Ramadan 2011 is: *"Indonesia with an Islamic morality, creating unity and the country's resurgence (Indonesia berakhlak Islami, wudjudkan kesatuan dan kebangkitan negeri)".*[73]

In an interview, the officiating president of Jamaah Salahuddin in 2011, Akhmad Arwyn Imamur Rozi (called Arwyn), explained to me why they had chosen this mission for this year and why they consider it relevant: "*Especially during the fasting month (bulan puasa), we try to get closer to a large number of students with the aim to make them aware of what being a good Muslim implies. This year, we have once again organized a large variety of different*

[73] This information is based on the booklet that Jamaah Shalahuddin distributes in advance of Ramadan to potential sponsors to raise funds. For more information on its agenda during Ramadan 2011 see www.ramadhandikampus.com.

events that are hopefully appealing to a large number of students. Each day, a lecture before breaking the fast (Kajian Buka Bersama – Kabuma) is organized where different topics are addressed. Each day, we distribute at least one thousand meals to those present. [Laughs] Of course, free meals attract students – we know that. But we also organize other events, such as film screenings or discussions. In the last ten days of Ramadan, students have the possibility to stay in the mosque (I'tikaf) to get closer to God by praying, reading the Qur'an and discussing with friends. It helps you to reflect on why we fast. Your sense of what it means to be a moral person (orang berakhlak) is sharpened. As you can imagine, spending the last ten days of Ramadan in the mosque, sleeping there, praying, fasting, discussing, this brings you into a different state of mind than running around shops to buy new clothes and large quantities of food. It makes you pure." For Arwyn and the fifty other Jamaah Shalahuddin activists who are actively engaged in organizing all the events, from fundraising to distributing flyers, to checking the sound system in the mosque before the lessons, the goal during Ramadan is to learn more about Islam during the lessons, to deepen their religious knowledge in regard to different topics, and to then reach a specific state of mind.

Various private sponsors, including Islamic banks, local newspapers and TV channels, financially support the Ramadan program, which Jamaah Shalahuddin activists organize in collaboration with Islamic Student Units from different faculties. The general agenda of "Creating moral Muslims" is one that sells well. Unlike the president of Jamaah Shalahuddin in 2008-9, Arwyn does not mention anything about the creation of an Islamic state or the establishment of the Sharia. Nothing can be read in the brochure about a conspiracy against Islam, of enemies, or of people who do not understand Islam. He told me that this does not sell well, but that the creation of an Islamic character is not opposed to the creation of an Islamic state – rather this set of mind is a precondition to an Islamic state.

The language used in the brochure is one of modern advertisement. Different Ramadan packages, such as platinum, gold, silver and bronze are offered to sponsors, bringing different advantages as to where one's logo will appear. To get "Diamond conditions", one has to invest Rp 200'000'000 (around 22'000 USD). To get "Bronze conditions", Rp 5'000'000 (around 5'000 USD) are enough. The total cost for the whole event is estimated to reach Rp 355'153'500 (around 40'000 USD). Of this total budget, the university

contributes around 10'000 USD. The path to piety that Jamaah Shalahuddin activists pursue is thus highly dependent on the global and local economic situation, of the capacity and willingness of companies to invest in advertisement. Their agenda setting, the language they use and the way they present their ideas is thus highly influenced by the logic of consumption. A "neoliberal reason" (Rudnyckyj, 2010) inspired the way Ramadan 2011 was organized. Economic calculations of supply and demand influenced the organization and management of the large event. Islam was successfully combined with management knowledge. Going back to Pasi Falk (1994), what the Jamaah Shalahuddin activists are trying to sell their customers is an image – one of a good and friendly Islam that helps to create the next generation of pious Muslims, and pious consumers.

Conclusion

Consumption as a bodily practice is a crucial site of moral cultivation and training. In this chapter, I have focused on Hizbut Tahrir and other activists' consumption of goods that are not part of what Fealy calls the "Islamic economy" (2008: 17). In everyday life, different consumption patterns often provide fertile ground for discussion and admonishment – as shown in the example at the beginning of this chapter. Consumption patterns are thus one important site of learning and honing ones sensibilities in regard to how different Islamic doctrines should or could be applied to one's own life. As I have argued, consumption, and perceptions of morality and piety are entangled in manifold ways. What kind of popcorn one consumes, where one goes during Ramadan, or whether one smokes reveals personal understandings of Islamic piety. Consumption and piety do not stand in opposition: a certain understanding of Islamic morality *(akhlak)* is expressed through consumption patterns. On the path to piety one has no choice but to choose, to consume. No refuge from consumption exists.

Different consumption choices and competing practices shape the public appearance of Islam. Regardless of whether one sees certain practices as belonging to the private or public sphere, the discussions that emerge around what "proper conduct" and "correct Islamic

morality" shape public sensibilities and constitute different political agendas. Hizbut Tahrir activists who aim to pay close attention to living Islam in an all-encompassing way and submitting themselves to the organization's ideology, are often confronted in everyday life with uncertainties about what choices are "Islamic". In legitimating choices, the Hizbut Tahrir's ideology was reconfigured according to calculative rationality insofar as it was argued for a long healthy life, against wasting money and against supporting states or companies deemed supportive of Israel. Neoliberal values such as self-discipline or personal responsibility were framed as core Islamic values and mobilized for promoting a particular understanding of Islam.

One of the main foci of this chapter has been to grasp the relationship between normative doctrines and the everyday struggles the activists face. Often, no clear answers exist as to what to choose, as various aspects need to be taken into consideration and weighted against each other. For example, the question as to whether it is "more Islamic" for Hizbut Tahrir activists to ride a bicycle than a motorbike is not easy to answer and different activists often have their personal reasons for opting for one or the other. Protecting the environment, saving money for "more Islamic" purposes and exercising the body is weighted against safety considerations, practicality and being faster and thus having time for learning and *dakwah.* Still, at the Gadjah Mada University, the percentage of Hizbut Tahrir and *tarbiyah* women activists who came to campus by bike was above average in 2008-9.

In Indonesia and beyond, the extent to which consumption and piety are entangled is a matter of debate. At stake in these discussions are competing imaginaries of personal freedom, as well as of how far the body is regarded as private property – and thus whether, for example, harming one's body by smoking constitutes an individual choice or a pubic violation. Is the personal health regarded to be at stake or the wellbeing of the *ummat*? Discussions about obesity or drug use bear similarities to the narratives connected to smoking. The different views regarding the realms of piety and consumption reveal contrastive understandings of the relationship between piety and bodily behaviour.

Chapter VI:

Reforming Sexual Morality

At around eight o'clock on a morning in September 2009 about sixty young Muslim women from different Islamic organizations started arriving at Gadjah Mada University Mosque in Yogyakarta. Most of them drove motorbikes, which they parked in the spacious parking lot in front of the mosque. Some women arrived alone, but most came in pairs. They made their way to the yard of the mosque to participate in the conference entitled "Prepare Yourself to Become a National Leader: A Critical Study on the Permissive Sexual Behaviour of the Young Generation".[74] *Most women dressed in ankle-length skirts, long blouses or long-sleeved, or one-piece dresses with headscarves extending over the torso. The colours were muted and subtle, such as shades of blue, green, cream, purple or rose. Most donned flesh-coloured socks to avoid exposing their feet, and many wore wristbands, known as* manset*, to ensure their arms were well covered by the sleeves of their garments. The majority of the participants did not wear makeup. The students were gathering to express concern about what they regard as a decline in Islamic morality among Muslim youth.*

The conference was organized by women activists from five different Islamic organizations active on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University, namely Hizbut Tahrir, Jamaah Shalahuddin, KAMMI, HMI MPO, and IMM. Women representing each organization delivered speeches, all stressing the necessity to counter the perceived trend of moral decline, especially the trend of young people having premarital sex.

In Indonesia, sexuality has come to play a constitutive role in defining Islamic ethics: current discussions around sexual morality shed light on how the moral Islamic subject is imagined. Although the narrative of moral "degeneration", particularly of the young generation,

[74] This conference took place on Sunday September 5, 2009. For a detailed account of the event and a photo of the participants see the official webpage of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/09/28/orasi-peradaban-islam-di-ugm/, (16 November 2010).

already existed during colonial times, the debate has taken on an "Islamic turn" in the 1980s. Particularly since the late 1990s, the narrative of "moral decline" has congealed and substantially constitutes public perceptions of Islamic morality and piety in general. These debates on morality energize and reshape the public sphere: particularly among the young generation, these debates have not only become Islamized, but also "sexualized". In the context of linking Islam and sexual morality, a market for Islamic books, films, and music has emerged in recent years that relates sexuality and Islam, such as books on topics like falling in love, finding marriage partners, or ostensibly teaching married couples how to make love in ways God has approved. Such books, films, or magazine articles respond to anxieties of both married and unmarried Muslims, but also seem - at least to a certain extent- to appeal to the desire of a "*halal* form of soft porn".

The call for the establishment of the caliphate constitutes perceptions of "proper" sexual morality. What Hizbut Tahrir activists have come to view as "proper" Islamic dress, is a one-piece dress and long headscarf. Further, they learn to slightly lower their gaze when talking to men. They are not allowed to ride a motorbike with a potential marriage partner and must avoid any form of flirtation. The main reference book on which Hizbut Tahrir activists base their understanding of "proper" sexual morality and "Islamic" interaction between men and women is an-Nabhani's book entitled *"The System of Social Interaction in Islam"* (2009). In this book, he relates the necessity to master one's desires and continuously work towards the establishment of the caliphate. Developing the ability to master and control one's own emotions and desires is framed as a precondition to being able to convince others of the necessity to do so as well, and to build an Islamic personality capable of leading others. This book is available in various bookshops in Yogyakarta and is intensively studied in study circles. Further, the topic of "proper" conduct in relation to the opposite sex, rules of dress, issues around finding a suitable marriage partner, and living as a married couple are frequently discussed in smaller discussions, as well as in informal talks.

Hizbut Tahrir activists' perceptions about proper moral conduct also influence the kind of novels they read, the films they watch and the music to which they listen. Particularly, media that may "stimulate immoral behaviour" are avoided and disdained. This includes most western films, novels and music. Hizbut Tahrir activists do not only constantly strive to

improve their morality *(akhlak),* but also consider it as their religious duty and as strategically important in order to admonish others to reform their own sexual morality. In particular, this endeavour to convince others of their understanding of Islamic morality leads to tensions among Islamic groups. At stake are issues of privacy, and hotly debated is the proper place of religion.

The ongoing debates about the necessity to make moral subjects bear similarities to discussions on ethics and sexuality taking place in other places of the world. One century ago, in Central Europe the language of sexual reform and ethics was discovered by German-speaking intellectuals and activists in order to revitalize the public sphere. Tracie Matysik (2008) outlines in her study about the early twentieth century ethics movement how the topic of forming moral subjects triggered debates about freedom, development and social responsibility. Taking place in a time influenced by the legacy of Darwin, and the advent of sexology and materialism, according to the author, it is not surprising that the role of sexuality came to hold an important place in defining ethics and morality.

In Indonesia, the political changes that have occurred since the late 1990s have opened up a public space that has made discussions on sexual morality possible. As a century ago in Europe, activists seem to have come to agree that sexual morality is central to the formation of the moral subject: Islamic activists in the early twenty-first century on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University were divided between viewing the moral subject as an individual who has come to tame and master its sexual drives, while others regard autonomy and self responsibility in this domain as a source of personal development. Yet, whereas some Central European reformers, particularly Bruno Meyer and Franz Staudinger, have argued to eliminate religion to reach the goal to reform the moral subject (Matysik, 2008: 114), eliminating religion is not a point of debate in Indonesia. Rather, Islam functions for different activists as a way to reform the self.

The debates around Islamic morality take place against the background of heightened transnational flows of capital, as well as moral discourses inspired by a capitalist rationality to which they are linked. In recent years, Islamic activists from various organizations have come to frame economic development and social welfare as an ethical, rather than a technical problem. It is not only student activists who link religious ethics and development.

As Daromir Rudnyckyj (2009) outlines with much analytical clarity, morality is paired with piety. He argues convincingly that morality is regarded a key site of national development needed in order to overcome Indonesia's economic crisis. Thus taming one's desires, including sexual desires *(hawa nafsu),* is framed as significant in order to overcome the challenges presented by globalization. Particularly among un-married students, "upholding" sexual morality is crucial because it is perceived as the cornerstone to building an Islamic personality. If one fails to learn to control sexual desires, so the argument goes, this would endanger the Islamic community as a whole. In the ongoing debates, sexual morality is equated with religious loyalty, the Islamic tradition and economic progress.

Hizbut Tahrir activists, and the women in particular, framed what they frequently referred to as the "decline" of sexual morality as the epitome of secularism and the outcome of cultural imperialism; as an evil outcome of the non-Islamic system that is, according to them, not based on divine norms. Making sexuality a matter of public relevance was thus deemed highly important and thought to be a consequence of understanding Islam as all-encompassing *(kaffah)*, as regulating and inspiring all actions of life. Central to discussions on sexual morality was their idea that the Sharia would function as the glue that would keep social order intact and thus avoid the perceived crumbling of family structures, and further, of social order. In these debates, the pious Islamic family *(keluarga sakinah)* was regarded not as subversive to social order, but as its guarantor, as supporting the Islamic state.

As argued in the previous chapters, Hizbut Tahrir activists – as well as many other activists from different strands of Islam – seek to live Islam in its totality; in such a way that Islam informs all of their practices and ethics. For Hizbut Tahrir women activists, this means to dress in a specific way perceived by the members of the organizations as "correct", but also to behave in a certain way. Particularly in regard to interacting with potential marriage partners *(bukan muhrim/mahram),* women students have to observe strict rules. A Hizbut Tahrir activist, identifiable as such by her attire, who interacts with male students in a "too intimate way", would lose her credibility.

The ideological call for the caliphate thus entails very specific forms of behaviour, and shapes moral development. Extant studies of the Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia have largely overlooked the role that female students play in calling for the caliphate. Further, the

question of how the endeavour to enhance sexual morality is linked to the organizations ultimate agenda to call for the caliphate remains unaddressed. As Hizbut Tahrir women student activists dedicate a lot of time and energy to the topic of reforming sexual morality, examining the entanglement of this topic with the larger aim to strive for the caliphate seems important.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss how the call for the caliphate, and for the implementation of a particular understanding of Islamic law, constitutes what is regarded as "proper" moral conduct, particularly in regard to what may be called sexual morality. Rather than trying to provide a single underlying cause of the public debate on Islamic morality and the *sexualisation* of this debate, I try to outline points of dispute and tensions. The call for an Islamic mode of governance inspired by a particular interpretation of the Sharia is constitutive of the endeavour of different groups of student activists to take sexuality out of the private domain and make it a matter of public relevance.

I begin this chapter by historicizing the call to "improve" sexual morality as formulated by Hizbut Tahrir, and many other women activists at the conference discussed in the vignette at the beginning of this chapter. Taking the discussions on veiling practices as an example, I seek to outline how perceptions of what is considered "proper" Islamic conduct have shifted over time. Further, I historicize the call to refrain from dating, and discuss how practices of courtship have changed. In particular, I analyze *ta'aruf*, a practice that is framed as an alternative Islamic matching method. I proceed to analyze the demands from, and claims of, the conference organizers, and reflect on why sexuality matters to contemporary student activists; particularly to women activists, and what implications the call for a particular form of sexual morality seems to have. Analyzing the conference's pledge, I examine the politics of their moral reform agenda, addressing the state, the media, the larger *ummat,* and also individual Muslims. This discussion shall provide an overview of the range of concerns, beyond the call to refrain from premarital sexual activity that discussions of ethics entail. Before concluding the chapter, I embed the call to "improve" sexual morality within the larger context of negotiating "proper" Islamic piety. As with other topics, what is understood by the term "Islamic morality" *(akhlak)* is subject to debate and. At times, these

debates challenge tolerance between different Islamic groups active on the campus and beyond.

Historicizing Discourses on Sexual Morality: Shifting Semantics of the Veil

The image of the veiled woman as the epitome of a woman with "good" moral character is a rather recent phenomenon in Indonesia. Whereas in the late 1970s only three percent of students of Gadjah Mada University were veiled (Smith-Hefner, 2007), the number increased to almost seventy percent by 2011. The number of women in the streets of Yogyakarta has also skyrocketed. In 2011 a wide range of veils were sold in numerous shops selling Muslim clothes, but also in the markets and shopping centres. Special shampoo for veiled women was largely advertised in the streets, as were accessories such as different kinds of brooches to decorate the veil. Yet, how a good Muslim should veil and dress is a matter of intense debate, particularly on the campus, where a large variety of veils coexist. In regard to the style of veil one chooses, no neutral terrain seems to exist: the choice one makes in regard to one's dress reflects a certain understanding of Islamic morality and piety.[75]

The narrative of the moral "degeneration" of society, and in particular of the youth, is not a recent phenomenon in Indonesia. Since colonial times parents, religious authorities, and colonial administrators expressed their concerns about the outward appearances of young girls and criticized their "inappropriate" interaction with male peers. Kees van Dijk (1997) outlines in his detailed study about outward dressing styles as means of distinction during the colonial period that girls dressing in western style clothes were already a matter of public concern at the beginning of the twentieth century, and were considered to have a

[75] In my article *"Youth and Pop Culture in Indonesian Islam"* (Nef, 2009a), as well as in my master's thesis on this subject (Nef, 2007), I elaborate on the perspective of different Islamic student organizations active on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University on "proper" ways of veiling and its moral implications. On the topic of veiling, debates on normative behavior seem to crystallize. As the veil is one of the most significant expressions of one's understanding of Islam, it is a highly contested terrain where no neutral ground exists.

"bad" morality. He discusses the example of three Minangkabau girls whose conduct was deemed "terrible". Not only did they wear western clothes and went cycling in the afternoon, but they also stayed out until seven in the evening and went to *"a very dangerous place"*, a park, where they met both other female and male students to seek "comfort" (van Dijk, 1997: 67). Van Dijk notes that a Dutch government official criticized their way of dressing, arguing that by dressing in this way, they could easily be spotted as "free women" (ibid.: 67). Already almost a century ago, western clothing became, as van Dijk reports, associated with an *"idle and wasteful life"* as opposed to leading a religious life and serving the community (ibid.: 67).

During colonial times, the veil was still uncommon, and most women, even the wives of leaders in Islamic organizations, went bareheaded. According to van Dijk, their husbands were proud if people admired their wife's bun *(konde).* Further, they regarded the veil as a sign of being a "fanatical" Muslim (ibid.: 65). Yet, as early as the 1930s, the veil became an issue of public controversy. Previously, the focus of public attention and the locus of discussion were not on female attire, but the outward appearance of men. In the Bandung area, stones were thrown at the homes of Muslim women who covered their hair. Apparently, people accused the governor (*bupati)* of Bandung of having provoked the incidents because he had made the following statement in public: *"Whether the head shawl, which costs only five cents, can become a passport to enter heaven?"* (ibid.: 65). He had made this argument to counter a sermon where it was argued that all women who go bareheaded would go to hell.

Another incident, which took place in the 1930s, shows that already the headscarf generated its own support and opposition. A seventeen-year-old school girl in Yogyakarta did not agree with the practice of veiling to "safeguard" a woman's virtue, reasoning that Java is not Arabia, and following Islam does not necessarily mean complying with Arab rules. Even though the editors of the magazine *Islam Bergerak* (Islam in Motion) agreed with her that Indonesia is not Arabia, she still had to continue to wear a veil. They argued that wearing a veil was not an imitation of Arab ways, as the veil in Indonesia is different to the ones used in Arabia (Ibid.: 65). This argument, that Indonesia is not Arabia, is still put

forward by student activists today who argue against veiling, or, against particular styles of veiling.

The Indonesian NGO activist M.M. Billah, analyzing the agenda of Jamaah Shalahuddin of the Gadjah Mada University during the 1980s, notes that at that time some, but not all, members were veiled. He writes that the veil was not regarded as mandatory by many students: *"[W]e do not compel to veil, it is enough to dress decently (kami tidak mengharuskan pakai jilbab, cukup pakain yang sopan saja)" (ibid.: 347).* Nevertheless, Jamaah Shalahuddin was, according to Billah regarded by many students as a *"fundamentalist group (kelompok fundamentalis)"*. Throughout his detailed study, Billah seeks to deconstruct this reproach and show why this label is not justified. His main argument is that they are not "fundamentalists" because they do not seek to cause systemic change (ibid.: 383). It was not only veiling that regarded as relatively unimportant to being a "good" Muslim, also the narrative of "restoring" sexual morality seems to have been marginal.

Billah does not mention that the way in which female and male students interacted during this time was perceived as problematic. Rather, he emphasizes that within the group the members maintained close *(akrab)* and intimate *(intim)* relations (Billah, 1989: 333). Arguing with the western sociological categories of Durkheim, although without making reference to him, Billah emphasizes that establishing these close and friendly relations was important, and a reaction against the effects of the alienation *(alienasi),* anomy *(anomi*) and atomization *(atomisasi*) the students experience for two reasons: first because he sees these effects as characteristic of city life, and second, because as most students are from rural areas, they come to miss these close structures (ibid.: 333). In 2009, Jamaah Shalahuddin activists had a different attitude towards the veil: They regarded veiling as mandatory *(wajib)* and all female members of the organization. The women did not only cover their hair, but wore loosely fitting clothes and long veils to ensure that also the shape of their body was concealed. Further, they wore socks to cover their feet. Donning socks is also a rather recent phenomenon.

When outlining his working agenda for the year 2009, the president of Jamaah Shalahuddin stated that the major weakness he believed the organization faced was that the relations

between men *(ikhwan)* and women *(akhwat)* were not preserved *(jaga)* well enough. In other words, that women and men were not separate enough, and interacted too frequently on a personal level (Nugroho, 2009: 118). To an external observer, it might be surprising that this point is mentioned at all. It reveals, however, how important sexual morality is within the organization. To both Islamic activists and non-activists alike, Jamaah Shalahuddin is well known for its strict gender division. Its members do not shake hands with the opposite sex, they lower their gaze when addressing a non related person of the opposite sex, women and men do not ride motorbikes together, and only seem to talk to each other about organizational matters.

In their office at the University Mosque, a special room exists for women. When events for both female and male activists are organized, a curtain *(hijab)* divides the room. Needless to say, dating is regarded as sinful *(haram).* The issue is not listed in the first position on the list of weaknesses in the sense that it is seen as an internal factor that is unfavourable to establish an Islamic state. Rather, as explained by Edi, if this point was not respected, it would immediately become a major weakness of the organization: *"You know, safeguarding relations between men and women is very important, as outlined in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. If we would not pay close attention to this point, we would lose our credibility on campus. How can we tell people to stop dating and dress properly if our members do not serve as good examples?"*

Safeguarding morality is framed as a fundamental condition to reach their aim of establishing an Islamic state. It is thus more a potential weakness than an actual weakness. During our meetings, Edi would make sure that other people were around to hear and watch us talk. He would not shake my hand, and kept a distance of at least one meter from me at all times. While we were talking, he meticulously avoided eye contact. Although distant in his attitude, he seemed to be interested in sharing his ideas, and did not try to avoid discussions.

Although Billah did in his study on Jamaah Shalahuddin conducted in the 1980s not stress the importance of veiling, this was the time when Islamic activists from the various national universities started donning the veil. According to Rosyad (1995), who examined the emergence of what was later called the *tarbiyah* movement at the Bandung Institute of

Technology, students in the early 1980s were inspired by the Iranian revolution, and opted to wear dark veils as the Iranian women activists they admired (ibid.: 22). In regard to the beard as an outward sign of an Islamic piety that particularly Hizbut Tahrir and *tarbiyah* activists promoted, Martin van Bruinessen observed that during the 1980s, the beard was not common and was not regarded as indicator of any particular strand of Islam. During the 1990s, facial hair was still a rare sight. Only after the end of the New Order did the beard become ideologically charged, and a symbol of a specific understanding of piety.

During the 1980s, among activists in Bandung, and also Yogyakarta, the perception of the semantics of the veil started to change. The poem "The Sea of Veils *(Lautan Jilbab)*" presented by the famous poet and performer Emah Ainun Najib at the event "Art Stage" *(Pentas Seni)* organized by Jamaah Shalahuddin during Ramadan 1986 mirrors this shift. In this poem, the veil is framed as sign of moral integrity, courage, and a symbol of hope for change:

The veil is braveness in the middle of days of great fear.
The veil is a sprinkling of light in the middle of the dark.
The veil is integrity in the middle of wiliness.
The veil is softness in the middle of rudeness and brutality.
The veil is wellbeing in the middle hypocrisy.
The veil is protection in the middle ambushes. [76]

Until the mid 1990s, veiling was associated with Islamic "fundamentalism" and perceived as threatening to public order and morality. Most Indonesian citizens, and also a large part of government did not look upon veiling as a sign of "moral integrity", but more as a challenge to social order and authority. When in 1985 a new legislation required all socio-political and religious organizations in Indonesia to acknowledge the official state ideology, the *Pancasila,* as their sole ideological basis *(azas tunggal),* violent protests emerged (Brenner, 1996: 693). At this time, the state also prohibited veiling in public schools; this ban was overturned, however, after much protest, referred to as *demo jilbab* (Mattewman 2000: 15). The veil was not yet fully accepted, however, and remained prohibited in some schools and

[76] For the Indonesian version of the poem see http://rachmadr.web.ugm.ac.id/in/?p=22, (30 November 2010).

universities. Yet, already during the 1980s, the State Institutes of Islamic Studies *(IAIN – Institut Agama Islam Negri),* as well as Muhammadiyah schools had a uniform that included a white veil. Only in 1991 was an official declaration made allowing female students, who wanted to wear a veil as part of a uniform for religious purposes, to wear it with the colour and design of the school uniform. This was only allowed with the parents' permission, however (Juliastuti, 2003: 5).

After this regulation passed, any female student in a public school was free to wear a veil. The subversive character that the veil carried during the 1980s had started to fade in the 1990s, although in the 1990s female students who veiled were still commonly seen as either very religious, old fashioned, or belonging to a "fanatic" group. The veil only started to gain in popularity towards the end of the New Order regime in 1998.

It is not a coincidence that at the time the veil started to become more popular, the then President of the republic, Suharto, also became "more" religious. As his support in the general populace weakened, he had to look for support among the Islamic groups. He allowed the Muslims in Indonesia to open Islamic banks and became more liberal towards the Islamic press and Islamic educational institutions (Fealy, 2008). As a now devoted Muslim, he also made his pilgrimage with his family to Mecca and his daughter – Tutut – started to veil in a colourful and trendy way. The veil was on its way to becoming largely accepted and these new models meant that the veil was no longer linked with forms of Islam that seemed threatening and subversive.

Changing Patterns of Courtship

The public image of the veil is not the only thing that has changed in recent years in Indonesia, so, too, have patterns of courtship and marriage undergone a significant transformation. Since the 1960s, the marital age of both women and men has risen significantly. In Yogyakarta, the average age at marriage is currently the second highest in the archipelago and increases with higher education (G. W. Jones & Gubhaju, 2008). Hefner-Smith notes that especially due to a significant rise in education in the 1970s, 80s and 90s,

the average marriage age had increased. Whereas in 1965 the average marriage age for women was 18.6, the figure had climbed to 24.1 in urban centres like Yogyakarta (2005: 450). At Gadjah Mada University, only a small percentage of students marry prior to, or during their studies for their bachelor degree. Most men and women tend to marry after completing their degree, women around the age of 25, and men around 28. Thus, often more than a decade lies between puberty and marriage, a decade where sexual interaction is strongly discouraged. This is the reason why sexual morality becomes such an important concern.

Hildred Geertz notes in her seminal study about Javanese family life conducted in the East Javanese town of Modjokuto in the mid fifties, that back then parents had arranged most marriages (H. Geertz, 1961: 55). She states that in the mid fifties families strictly supervised young girls to ensure their virginity and prevent them from bringing shame to the family. The physical mobility of most young women was thus severely restricted. Nancy Hefner-Smith also notes that in the 1960s and 1970s it was still common that young women were wed before the age of twenty, and many marriages were arranged (2005: 446). Often, these arrangements were not forced on the young couple. She notes, however, that whereas men had more opportunity to influence the parental decision, daughters' dissent was read as a sign of ingratitude and lack of respect. Most people married without previously dating, and many barely knowing one another, and without even having met before the marriage (ibid.: 447). Many of the parents' of the activists I worked with had married in the 1970s or early 80s. Some activists told me, proudly, that their parents did not have an arranged marriage. Often this was read as a sign of emancipation and personal autonomy.

In 2009, many students had a boyfriend/girlfriend *(pacar).* The used term *pacar* is distinct from the Indonesian term for friend *(teman),* also from fiancé(e) *(jodoh). (Ber)pacaran* is the verb that designates having a boyfriend/girlfriend. According to Slama (2002) *pacaran* is largely accepted in Indonesian middle class circles, as it is seen as a way for young people to autonomously find marriage partners, although the consent of the parents is still regarded as mandatory (ibid.: 4). Yet if the parents did not object to their children having a *pacar*, they strongly admonish them to refrain from any activity deemed "immoral", foremost from sex. The forms these relations took varies largely: whereas some students have sexual

relationships with changing partners, others say that kissing is permissible, and others again just spend time together, and go out for drinks and food.

The actual number of students that engage in premarital sexual relations is subject to much speculation. A number of surveys outlines that over 95 percent of all female university students in Yogyakarta lose their virginity during their time at university[77]. However, these non-academic surveys often conducted by unknown authors are not based on serious research and draw on dubious data. Until now, no academic representative research has been conducted on the issue of students' sexuality in Indonesia. Although I also do not have representative data, I base my assumption on various informal discussions with different female students that the number of 95 percent is much too high. The stakes for having sex prior to marriage are high: if a woman is known to have engaged in premarital sexual relations this might hurt her reputation and lower her chances of finding a "good" husband. Although it is still more accepted that men have sex out of wedlock, as this was the already the case in the 1950s (H. Geertz, 1961: 119), it is equally difficult to obtain data on how many male students engage in sexual relationships with either fellow students or prostitutes. I did not discuss topics focusing on sexuality with male activists beyond finding out their general point of view about whether it was permissible to have a girlfriend, in either informal discussions or interviews. The main reason for not addressing personal opinions or experiences on the topic of sexuality was that I felt uncomfortable doing so, and had the feeling that such a conversation would also make them uncomfortable.

Most often, female, but also male, students do not inform their parents about the fact that they had a *pacar*, especially if they do not live in the city. This issue is usually only discussed with close friends. Many couples do "backstreet dating" *(pacaran bekstrit)*, trying to hide their relationship from people who should not know; these might include relatives, some fellow students, or teachers. Saturday night is especially the time when couples go out together. Men would fetch the young women with their motorbikes, (almost every student has a motorbike in Yogyakarta), and take her out for dinner. The way these couples ride on

[77] For two examples of such studies see for example http://aw4nk.blogsome.com/2007/04/25/9705-mahasiswi-di-yogyakarta-hilang-kegadisannya/, (26 October 2010).

the motorbike often provokes gossip and comments. Whereas some young women seem to avoid touching the body of the driver, instead holding onto the handle at the back of the motorbike, others tightly embrace the wrist of their *pacar,* pressing their breast against his back. Most women need to be home around nine o'clock, as their boarding houses have curfews, or because their parents ask them to be home by then. In the boarding houses, people of the opposite sex are usually not allowed in private rooms, or only if the door remains open. Some women live in houses where they can return whenever they like and enjoy the freedom of staying out until late at night, hang out in cafes or in night clubs.

Besides the observable trend that students engage in longer and shorter love relationships, a growing opposite trend is also observable among some Muslim students: an increasing number Islamic activists are deciding not only to refrain from any sexual activity while *pacaran*, but also to forgo *pacaran* entirely (Smith-Hefner, 2005: 443). Any kind of dating, even going out for dinner or for a tea or soft drink, is considered *haram,* forbidden by Islamic law. They argue that they will only start *pacaran* after marriage *(pacaran setelah menikah).* What they propose instead to find a suitable partner for life, and for founding a blessed family *(keluarga sakinah),* is an Islamic matching method called *ta'aruf.*

Ta'aruf: An "Islamic" Method to Find a Partner for Marriage

Literally, *ta'aruf* may be translated "as getting to know each other". In Indonesia it is conceptualized as a matching method said to be in line with Islamic law. It is framed as "the" Islamic alternative to romantic love relations prior to marriage, but also as an alternative to traditional forms of arranged marriages where the agency of those to be wed was limited – although the spectrum of in how far both men and women were actively involved in the decision making process varied largely. The matching method of *ta'aruf* combines a specific notion of piety with a neoliberal logic of efficiently finding an optimal partner.

However, although framed as an alternative to traditionally arranged marriages, it employs the Javanese selection criteria family members would employ for finding suitable marriage partners. According to Hefner-Smith, Javanese parents would pay particular attention to the

potential partner's family background, education and professional situation, as well to the character, reputation and moral values as summarized in the Javanese phrase *bebet-bobot-bibit* (heredity, worldly wealth, and moral character) (Smith-Hefner, 2005: 445). Yet, opposed to the observations of Hildred Geertz, who stated that the religious orientation of a potential partner is only a secondary criterion subordinated to class and status (H. Geertz, 1961: 57), Smith-Hefner notes that most Javanese families in past decades considered belonging to the same religion and also sharing a similar understanding of piety an important selection criterion (2005: 445). Yet, in recent times, sharing religious values and norms seems to have gained in importance. It seems more important than the geographic area of origin, or, at least to some people, the wealth of the parents. Still considered very important is to have a similar level of education.

What *ta'aruf* is, why it is said to be a "proper" Islamic way of finding a marriage partner, and how it should be done in practice is explained in various books easily available in Yogyakarta. Further, it is discussed on various webpages and in different magazines targeting young Muslims who largely share the view that having a *pacar* is "un-Islamic", such as *"Girlie Zone*", *"Annida"*, or *"Elfata"*. Best selling books on the Yogyakarta Islamic book market in 2009 were entitled *"Dating? Iiiih… certainly not!! (Pacaran? Iiiih…Nggak Banget!!)"* (Al-Adawiyah & Syamsuddin, 2009), and *"When Men and Women fall in Love: Revealing the Secret Love among Activists (Ketika Ikhwan dan Akhwat Jatuh Cinta: Mengungkap Rahasia Cinta di Kalangan Aktivis)"* (Abdullah & Abdillah, 2008). Although published in 2005, but still popular among activists and republished several times, is the book *"Taaruf, Cool…! Dating, Sorry Men! (Taaruf, Keren…! Pacaran, Sorry Men!)*" (Imtichanah, 2006).

The target group is both unmarried Muslim men and women. All of these books were written in colloquial language, employing many youth slang expressions *(bahasa gaul).* Arabic words were also frequently used and frequently employed by those Muslim students who would read these kinds of books, such as *antum* (you), *ana* (I), *ane* (you), *ikhwan* (brother), *akhwat* (sister), *afwan* (excuse me), *tafadhol* (please), *syukron* (thank you). However, far more often than Arabic words, English words are used such as *having fun, pregnant, petting, wet kiss, virgin, free sex, I love you, sorry*. It is not that no Indonesian

words exist for most of the terms where the English word is used. This writing style, making use of English terms, makes the book appealing to the youth. Yet, a second reason for using English terms, especially for practices regarded as sinful, it to signal to the reader that these are not Indonesian, but are foreign imports from the west.

The strong message from all three books is that dating must be avoided. The arguments are manifold. On the one hand, the authors invoke the Qur'an and Sunnah to underline their claim that any form of dating is *haram.* They argue that one is not clean anymore, that by kissing one's lips will get soiled *(bibir yang ternodai),* that your hands will get contaminated *(tangan yang berkontaminasi).* Besides this, the "danger" of getting pregnant out of wedlock is discussed and outlined, how horrible and shameful this would be for all, for the young couple, for the families, but also for the "illegitimate" child. The topic of abortion is closely linked to unwanted pregnancies and is deemed a highly immoral and sinful act that must be avoided. Not surprisingly in regard to the moral disposition of the books, none of them contains a serious discussion of a means of contraception to avoid pregnancy. The books further contain (invented) testimonies of people who have been *pacaran* to exemplify the "terrible" things that can happen.

Prominently discussed is the topic of "losing self control". Love and romantic relations are described as particularly dangerous because they make you lose your mind and do things that are against your own will, namely have sex - although you did not intend to. Activists tell their stories of how they "went too far", and later regretted their deeds. These stories are meant to warn others of the dangers of *pacaran*. This possibility that people might become victims of their lust *(hawa nafsu)* is also why the authors strongly warn against any form of *pacaran*. Stressing that even non-sexual relationships are against Islam, they emphasize the danger of being overwhelmed. Further, feelings of desire are said to distract you from your faith, and your studies, your family and friends. Love causes *fithna,* a feeling of disorder und unrest.

To avoid the possible "evils" of dating and romantic love prior to marriage, *ta'aruf* is proposed as a safe, cheap, fast, efficient, and of course Islamic solution to finding an optimal partner for a happy marriage. In the book *"Taaruf, Cool…!"* in particular, the method is outlined in detail. If someone wishes to get married, the first step is to inform his/her

family, close friends and also one's religious teachers *(guru mengaji)* about ones readiness to get married. The next step is then to write one's *biodata,* a kind of curriculum vitae that contains information about the family background, the occupation of the parents, the number of siblings, and also state details about one's hobbies, character and appearance, one's religious education and extracurricular activities, especially in religious organizations. Further, this document should contain information about what kind of partner one is looking for, what kind of person he or she should be. This *biodata* should then be given to one's religious teacher, or to a senior activist responsible for matching. This already-married teacher then tries to find a suitable partner.

Matchmakers are thus not the parents or the members of the extended family, as was traditionally the case, but the religious teachers. Marriage is thus no longer a family affair, although the consent of the family is still considered highly important. To the religious teachers, selecting someone from the same movement, and thus someone who shares the same Islamic values, and is committed to the same "struggle" for a better future, is deemed to be priority. Ummi, the activist who had admonished her friend in the popcorn incident discussed in the previous chapter, explained to me the process of *ta'aruf*. She outlined that she absolutely wanted to marry a Hizbut Tahrir activist, but one that her parents would also approve of. Her future husband needed to have a good respectable family and a good education.

Ummi is already 24 years old and will finish her bachelor's in geography soon. She has discussed the topic of getting married with several senior female activists, who have also offered help in the process of finding a suitable husband. For these seniors, she told me, it is of utmost importance that she finds a Hizbut Tahrir activist to ensure that both continue to work towards the establishment of the caliphate together and pass this wish on to their children. Often, she explained, especially women who marry non-Hizbut Tahrir activists face problems fully submitting themselves to the organization's ideology, and often reduce their commitment to the organization's cause.

Once Ummi decides to actively look for a partner, she will thus prepare a dossier containing her data and expectations and give it to a trusted senior. *"It is a bit similar as when applying for a job,"* she told me. If her matchmaker thinks she has found someone suitable to marry,

she will pass Ummi's *biodata* to the young man, and give his biodata to Ummi. In this process, the religious teacher assisting in the matchmaking works together with his or her spouse. After reading the dossier, Ummi can agree to meet the young man her teacher considers suitable, or refuse. According to interviews with various female activists, it happens often that the young women and men already have someone particular in mind when they ask their teachers. Ummi also told me that she has her eyes open when meeting other activists. She is attentive.

When I asked her, what kind of husband she is looking for, Ummi smiled, and after a short pause, replied that he would need to fulfil several criteria. Fist, he needs to be a Hizbut Tahrir activist like her, having the same understanding of Islam was very important to her. Then, he would need a good education, a good job, and have a similar family background. The educational and family background were also very important, not only to guarantee a future free of financial worries, but also to ensure the consent of her own family she regards as crucial. Then he would need to be good looking - here she smiles - ideally tall and athletic. Further she would like to have a husband who wants two or three children. After hesitating, she adds that a further selection criterion for her would be that he does not want to marry more than one woman. In regard to polygamy she explained to me that she knows that it is allowed in Islam. *"It is just a personal thing, I would like to be the only wife of my future husband, this is important for me.*" She told me that many of her Hizbut Tahrir friends were ambiguous in regard to polygamy: although all agree that it is not against Islam, all of her friends said that they did not want to live in a polygamous marriage. When I asked her whether she knew of any senior activists who shared their husband she shook her head and said that she can only think of Pak Ismail, the spokesman of Hizbut Tahrir who has two wives. According to her, polygamy seemed rather uncommon.

Ummi explained to me the process of *ta'aruf* in detail, as it was explained to her and is outlined in books. She emphasized that there may always be nuances in how things proceed. According to her, Hizbut Tahrir and *tarbiyah* activists follow the same process to find marriage partners: no difference in the method exists. Yet, matchmakers would make sure that its activists marry within the movement to which they adhere.

The other way around, young women told me that they were approached by their teachers and asked whether they already felt ready *(siap)* to get married, because a young man showed interest and wished to give his *biodata* to them. If the woman agrees, they will meet in the company of their religious teachers. Mita, a KAMMI activist told me in an informal discussion that she was already given the *biodata* of seven young men, and that this flattered her, but she wanted to meet only one of them, because the others were not "good enough" and because she still had time. She did not tell her family or friends about any of the offers. She stressed the importance of being discrete and not telling others that a particular man had approached her. She argued that this was "un-Islamic" and would not only harm his reputation, but also her own, and would probably hinder others to do *ta'aruf* with her. In the books and texts, discretion is deemed important for religious reasons, but also to keep the personal chances of finding a good partner intact.

During this first meeting, the two potential partners are supposed to talk to each other to find out if they like each other. After this first meeting, both have the possibility to interrupt the process of *ta'aruf.* Mita had decided not to proceed after she had met the young man. It just did not feel good, she explained to me. She was not sure why and added that she did not exactly know how it should feel, but that she was just somehow not ready. Her plan was to finish her studies and then approach a teacher herself.

If both agree to proceed, Ummi explained to me, the next step is to have the two families get to know each other. Normally, the man's family would, upon formal invitation, visit the woman's family – as in the Javanese tradition, where this visit is called a "viewing" *(nontoni).* Leyla Imtichanah, the author of *"Taaruf, Cool…!"* stresses that getting married is not only the affair of the young couple, but is a family affair (2006: 53). Usually, the two families would already begin to discuss during this first meeting the details about when the marriage would take place. It is emphasized that the whole process of doing *ta'aruf* can be very quick. Imtichanah tells the story of a friend of hers for who it only took two weeks to get married (ibid.: 54). How long the process takes depends not only on the young couple, but also their families. She emphasized that one should not trust just anyone as matchmaker, but only people one knows well, who are trustworthy, and have a profound Islamic education, and hold a certain "expertise" in the field.

In the books one can read stories of couples, who met via *ta'aruf* and started a successful Islamic family. Aside from the stories, the different authors also give advise about how to present one's self, and about having realistic expectations about the characteristics of a potential marriage partner. Imtichanah (2006), for example, stresses that one really should want to get married, and that one should carefully prepare the questions one wishes to ask the others, such as on family background, on how many children he/she wants to have, about plans for the future, hobbies, and on what she/he considers as his duties as a husband/wife. No taboos should exist; issues such as polygamy may be discussed, as this is important for the happiness of the future couple. Besides this, tips are given on how to find solace when one is rejected or disappointed: one should remember the love of Allah, and talk to close friends.

The role of media technologies, the role of writing short messages and chatting via Facebook in particular, are discussed intensively. In the April-May 2009 edition of the magazine "Girlie Zone" a young woman called Ita asked Ustadz Munin, an alumnus of the Al-Imam Islamic University Riyadh about whether she is allowed to send short messages or chat with men online, as they would not be in the same room. Usadz Munin replies that only if she is seriously looking for a husband and has the strong intention to marry may she chat with men, but not about topics that might stimulate sexual fantasies. She should avoid chatting with men if it is merely for fun. He ends his recommendation by wishing that Allah will give her the strength to use new technologies to strengthen her faith and in line with His law (Bashri, 2009: 40).

Patterns of courtship have changed over the last years. Yet, contrary to the observations of Brenner (1996), who notes that the activists who choose to veil in a particular way seek to break with the Javanese past and oppose western lifestyles, I argue that neither veiling nor engaging in the process of *ta'aruf* is a rupture with Javanese tradition, nor is it entirely opposed to western concepts of romantic love. Elements of Javanese tradition are still present, for example the selection criteria are largely in line with traditional imaginations of how a suitable partner should be. Further, the importance of bringing together the two families and obtaining their blessing is still deemed crucial. Yet, bearing similarities with recruitment processes found in the job market, *ta'aruf* allows young Muslims to mediate

between self-chosen romantic love and their imaginary of what it means to live a pious life. This Islamic matching method is thus one possible Islamic answer to changed socio-political circumstances.[78]

As the young women with whom I discussed the topic of marriage stressed, they particularly liked the fact that the process of *ta'aruf* gave them more freedom and autonomy to choose. As the matchmakers are religious teachers rather then kin, they can, so they say, discuss on a more "neutral" or "objective" basis and formulate their wishes and expectations clearly. Also sensitive topics such as one's opinion towards polygamy can be addressed. They have more information about the man they will marry than they think their mothers had about their future husbands. Via their religious teacher, they can obtain information on almost every topic they regard as important. Further, they are free to reject proposed partners. The pool from which they can select seems to be much larger than the limited number of potential future husbands family members might propose. The agency of both women and men has increased. An economic logic of rationality and efficiency is transferred to the sphere of love and marriage. *Ta'aruf* is a highly pragmatic technique to efficiently make social relations that should hold until the end of life. Although Hizbut Tahrir activists strongly frame their utopia of establishing the caliphate against neoliberalism, they apply a market logic of supply and demand to one of the arguably most intimate spheres of life. "Correct" Islamic behaviour, piety, is reconceptualised along economic lines.

Uniting to "Win the Relay Race against Secularism"

In the following section, I aim to discuss why moral development, particularly "safeguarding" sexual "integrity" has become an important site of negotiating piety and thus a core concern for many activist. To examine the narrative of "moral decline", I turn to

[78] Muslims who have a different understanding of Islamic piety may chose other forms to tame sexual desire and find marriage partners. As fellow students told me, Salafi activists favor to marry at a young age, while still studying. Further, a large number of Muslims still meet their future marriage partners via friends or organizational networks, without foregoing the process of *ta'aruf.*

the conference discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Despite the differences within the attending organizations' structures, their member recruitment systems, the contexts in which they emerged and their political and societal agendas, their activists found a common ground upon which to collaborate in regard to Islamic morality. In regard to this specific agenda, if seemed to play a minor role whether some activists called for the establishment of the caliphate, while others have other imaginaries about an "Islamic" state: they all share the conviction that Islam shall inspire all aspects of life and have similar understandings about how Islam should constitute everyday behaviour. They all agree that the makeup of moral subjects is a pressing matter of public and political concern central to all considerations of social order – from law to politics to private intimacy. To the conference participants, morality and sexuality are urgent topics for public discussion and thus need to be taken out of the private domain, as they are of utmost relevance to the public.

The conference organizers' call to "improve" sexual morality and to live Islam in its totality constitutes their everyday life conduct in an all-encompassing way: it influences the way they interact with male students, the way they dress, the way they greet, the music they listen to, the books they read and even the way they walk and laugh. Yet, nuances exist between the organizations as to what is regarded as proper dress, or as "Islamic" conduct. Commonly, Hizbut Tahrir women members can be identified by their outward appearance: they wear a long one-piece dress, whereas the other activists commonly wear a long skirt and a loose blouse. Particularly in the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM of the Gadjah Mada University, we also find women that don a shorter veil model and combine it with pants. Whereas Hizbut Tahrir, KAMMI, Jamaah Shalahuddin, and the majority of HMI MPO activists refuse to shake hands with people of the opposite sex, in IMM some women are willing shake men's hands.

A refusal to shake hands reflects a particular understanding of Islam, namely that all forms of bodily contact between non *muhrim* need to be avoided. As outlined previously, ideas exist that one would soil one's body, and ruin one's moral integrity. The Hizbut Tahrir activist, Ummi, for example explained to me that she had learned not to shake hands while studying in Hizbut Tahrir. Yet, Ummi's argument against shaking hands is not only a theological one. For her, refusing to shake hands is also a right she has, a right to decide for

herself about who shall touch her. For her, no one other than her future husband and her close kin could touch her: *"I came to understand that any form of bodily contact with men that I could potentially marry is haram. This is the way it is outlined in the Qur'an. Some say that shaking the hand of the opposite sex may already raise sexual desire. To be honest, I'm not sure whether this is always true. Well maybe it is better to be on the safe side, just in case. But for me, Islam also gave me a reason to say no, it is my body. God has made it legitimate for me to protect myself. No unrelated man shall touch me, except my future husband."* This explanation focusing on personal autonomy and a right to self determination over one's own body seems to be inspired by the discourse on human rights. Yet Hizbut Tahrir activists strongly object Human Rights by arguing that they are opposed to Islam and an agenda promoted by the west to mould the country according to its own interests.

Tiara, an IMM activist who does shake hands with men has a different opinion about the meaning of a handshake. For her, this is primarily a gesture of politeness and in her understanding of Islam; politeness is one of the core virtues of Islam. In her view, refusing to shake hands is exaggerated *(berlebihan).* Especially if you actively refuse elders, for example, this puts them in an uncomfortable position: *"Just imagine I go home to my parents, to a village north of Yogya, and then refuse to shake the hand of a friend of my father's who comes to visit. Well, many do not offer to shake hands, and this is perfectly fine with me, but if someone offers his hand, I would not refuse. I guess I could, but this is not how I understand Islam."*

In these speeches held at the conference, sex before marriage, or "free sex" was framed as the culmination of moral "decline". The speeches carried titles such as *"Hedonistic Culture, Picturing the Young Generation in current Times"*, *"Sexual Education and the Ruin of the Young Generation"*, *"The Role of Muslim Women for Civilization"* or *"The Role of the Young Generation to Build the Islamic Civilization"*. The conference participants considered the "disrespect" of Islamic values of a large group of university students to be particularly harmful for the whole of society. Expressions of "disrespect" of Islamic values are not only having premarital sex, but also dressing in an "un-Islamic" way, thus in such a way that the hair and the body shape are not well concealed. Here nuances exist among the different organizations about what kind of behaviour is still regarded as "properly" Islamic. All five

organizations present at the conference have the rule that its members are not allowed to have boy- or girlfriends. If they break this rule, they are usually admonished, and in rare cases are excluded from the organization. Believing that pious Muslims should also avoid any form of bodily contact with potential marriage partners, Hizbut Tahrir, KAMMI and also Jamaah Shalahuddin members avoid shaking hands. Also many HMI MPO members and some IMM members do not shake hands. In the case of IMM, it seemed that in 2009 the women were more likely than the men to refuse shaking hands with the opposite sex. Also, members of Hizbut Tahrir, KAMMI and Jamaah Shalahuddin and most members of IMM and HMI MPO refuse to ride a motorbike with friends of the opposite sex.

The core argument is that sexual morality is the foundation for a happy and holy family *(keluarga sakinah).* The family is regarded as the building block of the *ummat*, the Muslim community. It fulfils the important role of raising the children to be pious Muslims, Muslims that strive for the same ideas as their parents, and share their moral values. The relationship between husband and wife is imagined as complementary, not as equal in the sense that both have the same rights, duties and responsibilities. The woman is thought to hold a particularly important role in the education of the children, but also in being active in public life and pursuing the aim of spreading the organization's ideas. Engaging in free sex is thus not regarded as disadvantageous to one's reputation, or to finding a suitable marriage partner, but as destroying the fundament of society.

Students of the best national universities such as Gadjah Mada, the conference organizers argued, will become Indonesia's future leaders. These Muslim students are, according to the conference organizers, not only ruining their own lives, but even more distressing, are jeopardizing the future of the nation. The success of Islam in what they refer to as the 'relay race' *(estafet)* against secularism lies in their hands. This metaphor seems to reflect the view that at least some of the students hold that two different systems, one secular-capitalistic, and one Islamic, are competing for power and influence. In this race, the students must collaborate to win, as in a rally where not only individual achievement is needed, but optimal collaboration. In the view of the conference organizers, the image of students as agents of change is again invoked: students must shoulder the burden to preserve Islamic civilization, a task for which both female and male students must prepare themselves from a

young age. Yet, as in the metaphor of the relay race, the importance of performance and efficiency is also evoked. To win the race, Islamic piety is reconfigured as hard work on the self to optimize one's own performance, to reach the western adversary, overtake it and win. In this race, controlling one's emotions and desires is deemed crucial.

The task consists of internalizing an all-encompassing Islamic lifestyle determined by the Sharia. At stake is – the organizers argue – the preservation of the Islamic civilization *(peradaban Islam).* The culmination of the conference was the declaration of a pledge encompassing nine points:

1. *We are fully aware that the young generation are the carriers of the civilization.*
2. *We are aware that the youth has to prepare itself from a young age to become future leaders.*
3. *We are very concerned about the condition of the young generation in Indonesia that is trapped in the permissive and hedonistic pop culture (budaya pop) that directs them to have free sex.*
4. *We are concerned about the Indonesian media, which spreads products that are not constructive for the moral education of the nation and stimulate permissive sexual behaviour.*
5. *We ask the entire young generation to leave behind the permissive and hedonistic pop culture and return to the noble Islamic culture.*
6. *Efforts to prepare oneself to become cultural leaders have to go hand in hand with avoiding free intercourse, which are permissive and hedonistic.*
7. *We deplore the government program (Adolescent Reproduction Health that is based on the agreement of the International Conference on Population and Development), as it increases free sexual intercourse among the young generation. Therefore, we ask that this program will be stopped.*
8. *Finally, we also ask the whole Islamic community to return to the Sharia and prepare the young generation to become future leaders and prohibit them from engaging in free sex.*
9. *Only by applying Islam* kaffah */ in its whole entity to all problems in this country can all problems be solved, including the problem of the permissive sexual behaviour of*

> *the young generation, because a degenerated young generation is not only caused by a broken social system, but also because of a damaged education system, damaged education system, family system and so on.*[79]

At least in the pledge officially declared, the demand of the formal implementation of Islamic law was not explicitly formulated. For most students present at the conference, the last point that demands one "apply Islam in an all encompassing way" implies the implementation of the Sharia. Not explicitly making this demand has the advantage of addressing a larger audience, such as the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM that is structurally linked to Muhammadiyah, counting around thirty million members**.** This Muslim mass organization does not have the formal establishment of the Sharia on its agenda (Machasin, 2007)**.** Also KAMMI that is often regarded as the student vehicle of the Prosperous Justice Party PKS is hesitant about openly demanding the formal establishment of the Sharia in the Indonesian constitution, as such an attitude would diminish their success in party politics (Diederich, 2002; Machmudi, 2008)**.**

Linking Narratives of Western Imperialism and Moral Decline

In the pledge, and in speeches, different actors were deemed responsible for the current moral decline. A core critique was addressed to the Indonesian state. On the political level, the activists asked that the government programs for adolescent reproduction health be stopped. These programs are based on a consensus different countries, including Indonesia, achieved at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in regard to increased access to reproductive and sexual health services and education and family planning. The conference took place in Cairo in 1994. The aim of these governmental programs is to "shape healthy behaviours" in regard to adolescent reproductive health (Hughes & McCauley, 1998: 233), as well as to "educate" adolescents about the hazards related to sexual intercourse. The agenda is to reduce unwanted pregnancies, and abate the

[79] For the Indonesian version of the pledge, see http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2009/09/28/orasi-peradaban-islam-di-ugm/, (11 January 2012).

rate of infections of sexually transmitted diseases, foremost reducing the high rate of HIV infections (Hull, Hasmi, & Widyantoro, 2004).

In the view of the women activists present at the conference, the program, as well as other governmental measures to reduce sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies, such the promotion of condom use, encourage adolescents to engage in premarital sexual relations they consider *haram* (forbidden by Islamic law). The main point of argument the activists pushed was not that employing means of contraception is per se *haram*. All of the groups present at the conference see high value in family planning measures for married couples. Foremost they argue that one should not have as many children as possible, but rather make sure that one is able to care for them properly, and is able to finance their future education. The point of the argument was thus that contraceptives should not be easily available to unmarried people, and also that sexual education should only take place shortly before marriage, as knowledge in this matter might raise young peoples' desire to do what they have learned, that knowledge about contraception would raise the number of people engaging in premarital sex.

The Forum for Study and Dakwah FOSDA active at the Mardliyah mosque offers pre wedding courses on a regular basis, for both male and female students who wish to get married soon. In these popular courses, students learn about the duties, responsibilities and rights that both men and women have as husbands and wives. Further, the topic of family planning is emphasised. During these courses, the participants are again admonished to refrain from dating and any bodily contact prior to marriage, as this would reduce their later happiness in marriage.

The conference organizers did not make the argument that the Cairo agreement was a western agenda to control, and ultimately reduce, the birth rate of Muslims. It was not the idea of population control per se that was criticised, or framed as a western agenda or form of neo-colonialism. The organizers' point was neither that local women needed to be protected – as Gayatri Spivak summarized the relationship between colonizers and the colonized as: *"White men are saving brown women from brown men"* (Spivak, 1988: 297). Rather, what was criticized was the Indonesian state's agreement to this program. The activists argued that the government agreed not because it believes that this form of sexual

education is good, but rather because this brings funds to the country in the form of international donations. In an interview about this topic, Ummi, the Hizbut Tahrir activist who explained to me the process of *ta'aruf: "We don't need this money; these NGO workers talk about AIDS. If Islam were applied correctly, there would be no AIDS. Islam is the better solution than condoms. Our government is stupid to think that money that flows into the country will be good for all Indonesians. The effect of what they call "education" is harmful, the foreign funds destroy our values."*

What is thus criticised is the government's seemingly "neoliberal" policy to allow international institutions to spread their vision of a better world in return for money. Ummi, as well as the conference organizers, considered this a form of cultural imperialism. Calling for "better" morality and opposing "imperialism" is a profoundly political project that cannot be analyzed apart from the larger socio-political context. The call for systemic change is entangled with the call for moral reform.

Blaming the State's Lax Attitude towards the Press

It was not only the government's attitude towards adolescent reproductive health programs that was criticised as un-Islamic and destructive of social order, but also its lax attitude, according to activists, towards commercial actors, and particularly towards the mass media. The media were accused of spreading content that the conference organizers considered destructive of the nation's morality, and encouraging sexual activity. Aside from stressing the editors' responsibility in maintaining social order, the government was addressed: the state should intervene and prohibit every kind of media content that is considered pornographic and implement the anti-pornography bill that was passed in October 2008. This bill outlaws pornographic acts and images and calls for harsh penalties for those violating the law. Pornography is defined as *"man-made sexual materials in the form of drawings, sketches, illustrations, photographs, text, voice, sound, moving pictures,*

animation, cartoons, poetry, conversations and gestures" [80]. Furthermore, outlawed are public performances that could "incite sexual desire". For a detailed discussion on the debates around the pornography bill, as well as on its implications, see Rinaldo (2008a) and Ichwan (2012).

This agenda to call for moral "integrity" places Hizbut Tahrir activists in the dilemma of having to address the secular state as its ally, calling to implement laws to "protect moral order", as outlined in the pledge. Simultaneously, however, they criticize the current system for the "moral decline". At least for the Hizbut Tahrir activists present at the conference, addressing the Indonesian state and asking for the implementation of laws to "protect morality" is at odds with the organization's rejection to engage with the "disbelieving" *(kafir)* system. In his comparative study of the Prosperous Justice Party PKS inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Indonesian scholar Arief Ihsan Rathomy (2007) outlines in detail Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's call to reject gradualism. He stresses that the organization's rejection to compromise *(berkompromi)* with the existing rulers. On the official webpage of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia it is also outlined that *"the end does not justify the means"*; that although the intentions my be good, it is *haram* to interact with representatives of the secular system (Al-Jawi, 2009).

Collaborating with activists on the grassroots level holding different agendas is encouraged, as long as Hizbut Tahrir activists take the lead and do not compromise their ideology (Ahmad, 2010). In everyday practice, what compromising means, and what is regarded as seeking support for the cause of establishing the caliphate, seems to have become more flexible than in the past, as more ways of engaging with the system exist. To some, not compromising with the government seems to be limited to not actively participating in a political party; to others, the rejection of a gradual approach to implementing Islamic law and ultimately the caliphate includes not trying to "Islamize" the existing laws.

What seems to be at stake for the activists is the "western" call for a free press. In regard to this topic, Ummi, the previously cited Hizbut Tahrir activist told me in an interview: *"The problem is that the government seems to be uncertain what to prioritize, freedom of the*

[80] See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/world/asia/30iht-indo.1.17378031.html, (25 October 2010).

press, or protecting its citizens from media content that is dangerous for stability and social order. Well, I know that we [Hizbut Tahrir] also benefit from a certain freedom of the press. During the Suharto time we could not have communicated our ideas. And well, I guess our call for revolution, to establish the caliphate, is seen by some as destabilizing, probably even as dangerous to social order. So to a certain extent I see value in a free press. But not in all aspect; for example, I'm strongly against publishing pornographic magazines such as Playboy. Would you like it if your husband would read that? I think that this way of selling women's bodies is disrespectful. The government should control media content to a certain extent. Not all that sells is good. The market should be regulated – and this should happen according to the Sharia."

The first issue of Playboy was published in Indonesia in 2006, despite large protests that preceded the first edition. Despite the anti-pornography bill, this magazine continued to be published until 2009, when its editor Erwin Arnada was brought to court and sentenced to prison for two years. Within this time, Playboy became in Indonesia what Moch Nur Ichwan calls an *"icon of pornography"* (2012: 23). According to this activist, not only are obviously pornographic magazines like Playboy seen as problematic. What she regards as just as dangerous, or probably even more harmful to public morality, is the plethora of expressions of popular culture such as western popular music, teenage soap operas or reports about the lives of celebrities that seem to suggest that having premarital sex, dating and breaking up are to be considered "normal" for adolescents. At least in regard to Indonesian productions, for example films and music, the state should thus make certain that premarital sexual relations are not depicted as normal. When I asked her for an example, she mentioned the successful Indonesian movie *"What's up with love? (Ada apa dengan Cinta?)*".

In this film about teenage life, the popular and pretty high school girl called Cinta falls in love with the shy and introverted winner of the school poetry contest named Rangga. Ummi criticized this film for its overall story, and in particular for its kissing scene at the end of the film. She argued that such films have a particularly bad influence: *"I watched the movie, already some years ago, but the problem with it is that it is somehow a good movie, but it should have gone in another direction, into an Islamic direction. For example, in the style of "Verses of Love (Ayat Ayat Cinta)". In "What's up with Love", Cinta [the Indonesian word for*

love and the name of the main character in that film] should resist the temptation to get close to Rangga. The film shows what happens, we (kita)[81] *start to neglect things that are important in life, in the case of Cinta, her friends; thinking of Rangga takes so much space and emotions. We (kami) should direct this energy into loving Allah, into our studies, in doing dakwah. And of course kissing is a sin, we (kita) should only do that once we are married. Showing this in a film that millions of people, especially young people watch is dangerous. They will think that it is ok to kiss and consider it normal."*

Aside from blaming the state for not censoring such scenes and neglecting its duty to protect its citizens from pornographic media content, she also appeals to the activists themselves to offer Islamic alternatives that are interesting to consume, but in line with the Sharia. Especially in the age of the Internet where access is increasingly difficult to control: *"We need to become active to push this industry, make good Islamic movies, write books, make music. We have to become creative in meeting the demands of the youth, take up the topics that interest them, but do so in an Islamic way. And of course, promote these. This is probably more efficient than relying on government control – at least in current times in Indonesia. Even if they would try, I think they [the government officials] would not be entirely successful. We have to become active ourselves."*

Hizbut Tahrir, as well as activists of other organizations involved in organizing the conference criticized the government's attitude they call "neoliberal" to entrust ever more to the market and increasingly devolving responsibility to the citizens in regard to what they wish to consume. A consequence of this attitude of empowering individuals to choose from a wide range of goods is that the state loses its ability to safeguard public morality. Yet,

[81] In Indonesian, two words for "we" exist. *Kita* includes the person addressed and *kami* excludes the person addressed. As in the case of Ummi, activists often used the we-form *kita* that included me when talking about how one should morally behave. Often, such discussions left me with a feeling of discomfort. They seemed to imply that I - being a Westerner - was an immoral person. The fact that I was married helped to at least partly restore my integrity, but they - correctly - seemed to assume that I did not share all of their moral concerns. Regarding their own understanding of ethics as correct and superior left me with a feeling of moral inferiority – an implicit claim that I often did not address. When activists realized that they might have offended me, or addressed me as morally inferior, they usually tried to ensure that they were referring to westerners in general, not to me.

according to Hizbut Tahrir activists, the state's belief in self-regulation and self-responsibility is a utopia that fails to effectively guarantee social order. Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) discuss that resorting to law and faith in order to make different kinds of claims is observable in different countries in the 21st century. The authors argue that particularly religious groups resort to law in order to extend their imperium with the aim of displacing liberal reason, yet by liberal means (2009: 47). However, as I have been arguing in this, and previous, chapters, Hizbut Tahrir activists do not only use liberal means to strive to enlarge their influence and power, but also pair their religious arguments with an economic rationality.

Negotiating Islamic Morality on Campus

Different understandings of Islam often lead to competing understandings of what it means to live as a "good Muslim", and thus to different perceptions of Islamic morality *(akhlak).* What may be considered "proper" Islamic conduct, "good" manners, "correct" behaviour is an issue of dissent and tension. In the everyday life of students, emerging differences often challenge the limits of tolerance between different Islamic groups. Along with debates about what proper Islamic conduct and morality is, a major issue of debate is whether one should try to impose one's own understanding onto others, or whether one should rather tolerate diversity and renounce to make truth claims. In this matter, both sides base their argumentation on Islam.

For some activists, convincing others of what they hold to be "correct" Islamic morality is seen as their duty as Muslims, and as an important part of worship. Calling others to veil in a specific way or reminding fellow students to refrain from dating and premarital sex, for example, is considered an intrinsic part of being a good Muslim and pursuing the path to piety; they consider their *dakwah* activities as fulfilling the divine command to "promote good and forbid evil" *(amar ma'aruf nahi mungkar)*. Leaving others in the state of *jahilia* would be against their understanding of *akhlak* and is, thus, considered sinful.

Those activists who engage in romantic love relationships and choose to combine the veil with jeans, or not to veil at all, also justify their comportment by invoking theological arguments: Most argue that only premarital sexual intercourse is forbidden by Islamic law, but not dating per se, if one respects this limit. The arguments put forward against veiling are foremost inspired by scholars such as Fatima Mernissi (1987, 1991), and by the book of Fadwa el Guindi (1999), both of which were translated into Indonesian. The main argument is thus that the practice of veiling needs to be seen within the specific context the Prophet Muhammad lived, and further that the hegemonic role that male scholars have played in reading and interpreting the Qur'an and Sunnah needs to be taken into account.

For members of PMII and HMI Dipo, dating is quite common and is not seen as immoral behaviour. Shaking hands, going out, having dinner, riding motorbikes bikes and joking are regarded as part of being young. However, premarital sex is also discouraged. An argument that is often uttered by Islamic activists engaging in love relationships is that their behaviour harms nobody. They thus oppose the claim made by the conference organizers that dating ultimately jeopardizes the wellbeing of the nation and weakens the Islamic community. Further, they oppose their conceptualization of love as a form of madness that makes you lose control and renders you unable to judge how far to go. These two organizations tend to regard choices of whether to date or not as belonging to the private realm, and not as pivotal for the wellbeing for the Islamic community. Indonesia faces many important problems such as unemployment, poverty and corruption. Students who date one another are not regarded as core problem.

Nisa, the PMII activist cited previously argues that she does not regard it as her problem if others engage in sexual activities because, first, it is not up to her to judge others on how to live their lives, and second, she thinks that Indonesia faces bigger problems: *"Contrarily to those girls wearing long veils, I do not believe that admonishing students to veil or to stop dating or engage in sexual activities is a pressing matter. Look at the poverty we have in this country, or the number of women who do not have access to education or health care. […] I would just be ashamed to tell others what to do. I regard sexuality as a private matter, like veiling, it is ultimately a private choice. I think intervening into this sphere is disrespectful. And one of the most important things the Qur'an teaches me is to respect others."*

In these two organizations, PMII and HMI Dipo, we also find, albeit rarely, women who have made the choice not to veil based on their understanding of Islam. Goras for example, the head of HMI Dipo of the commissariat of the Faculty of Cultural Sciences for the year 2008-9 is a particularly active young woman who, despite being pressured, decided not to veil. She describes herself as someone who cannot stay calm *(tidak bias tinggal diam).* She told me that since she was small her parents, both active in social work *(bidang social kemasyarakatan),* taught her to be sensitive towards the world she lives in, reflect critically on problems and strive to change at least small things. She was one of the few women who officiates as head of a commissariat – and the fact that she is not veiled did not help her to obtain this position. Goras emphasised in our discussion that she had to explain herself quite often: *"Most women activists of HMI are veiled. I'm really an exception and this is not always easy. Actually, I'm quite tired of this topic. Well, I think that it is fine to veil, I do not tell my friends not to. But I have my reasons for not veiling. I just think that this is not really important, the donning of a veil does not make you a better Muslim. I think that it is far more important to try to address real problems that Indonesia is facing, poverty, or poor health and education access – especially for women. I think it is important to carry on the spirit of Islam, to reform society, to make a better world. In this struggle, I regard it as secondary, whether people are veiled. When Muhammad lived, veiling was already part of the local culture. If he had lived here in Indonesia or just somewhere else, the women would not have veiled. […] Currently, the problem is that in public, veiled women are regarded as better Muslims, and the unveiled ones are widely believed to be easy going. Just ask the boys, but also the girls here what they think about unveiled woman".*

What these activists primarily oppose is not that there are people on campus that regard other forms of behaviour to be "properly" Islamic. What they criticize is the imposition of truth claims, disrespecting other opinions and determining them wrong. The etiquette of *dakwah (adab dakwah)* is contested. Their argument is thus also a theological one: they argue that the other activists' etiquette of judging people and claiming moral superiority over other Muslims is "un-Islamic". As Nisa put it: *"Islam teaches us that only God should judge others. He has taught us to tolerate people holding different opinions, respect them. In my opinion, telling others that their reading of Islam is wrong, or insufficient, that they have*

not yet properly understood God's word is not in line with the spirit of Islam. Love is a personal private affair."

Nisa argues that dating and love affairs belong to the private realm, and she does not challenge the conference organizers' idea that Islam should be lived in an all-encompassing way. She and her friends do not oppose this idea; they also believe that Islam should inspire and guide all action and thought. Rather, she is strongly against control and sanctions in this realm of everyday life. She and her friends oppose the idea that either the state or self-proclaimed "guardians" of morality can impose their particular truth claims on others, and sanction deviance from this norm. In Nisa and her friends' view, the state should protect this sphere from the influence of particular Islamic organizations. Not because it is regarded as outside the realm of religion, but rather because Islamic orthodoxy is a field of constant negotiations.

"Child" Marriage: Arguing for the Superiority a Particular Understanding of Islamic Law

Islamic orthodoxy is also negotiated with respect to the marital age. Ongoing discussions reveal the competition between existing understandings about the "proper" place of Islam in society, and on the interpretation of Islamic law. In the following, I discuss one moment where Hizbut Tahrir women activists challenged a particular understanding of Islam by attending a conference held on the campus of the Gadjah Mada University on May 6, 2009, entitled *"Protecting Children from Underage Marriage"*. The Yogyakarta Women Network *(Jaringan Perempuan Yogyakarta)* had organized this conference. This network is composed of different organizations and communities that all focus on women's issues, some, but not all of the joining members hold an Islamic perspective. The core aim of the organizers was to raise awareness in the media and public, as well as in the minds of invited government representatives that child marriage is against Indonesian law. The aim of Hizbut Tahrir women activists present at the meeting was to try to challenge the organizers' understanding of Islam and to pass on their own concepts of a prosperous society.

The impetus for holding this conference was the controversy that emerged in Indonesia after Syekh Puji (Pujiyono Cahayo Widiyanto), the head of an Islamic boarding school in Central Java, had married the twelve-year-old girl, Lutfiana Ulfa, in August 2008. In Indonesia, the legal marriage age for women is 16 years. At stake in the subsequent debates was the meaning of Islamic law and its relationship to Indonesian law, as outlined in the country's constitution. The debate that emerged around the topic of marriage is in many ways symptomatic of the core issues that are debated among different strands of Islamic student activists and reflects how different readings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah compete. Syekh Puji and his supporters argued that this marriage was legal *(sah)* by Islamic law. As proof, they referred to the Qur'an and to the Sunnah, and invoked verse 65: 4 that is, according to them, divine proof that a woman may be married as soon as she starts menstruating: *"Now as for such of your women as are beyond the age of monthly courses, as well as for such as don not have any courses, their waiting-period – if you have any doubt (about it) – shall be three (lunar) months; and as for those who are with child, the end of their waiting-term shall come when they deliver their burden. And for everyone who is conscious of God, He makes it easy to obey His commandment"* (Translated meaning of the Qur'an by M. Asad, 2003: 995). Further, they argue that the Prophet himself married Aisyah at the age of six or seven years, when she was still a child. In their eyes, Islamic law is superior to "man-made" Indonesian law.

The organizers of the conference countered the argument that marriage with a twelve-year-old is legal by stating that while it is not forbidden by Islamic law to marry a child, it is not in line with the progressive spirit of Islam and the life long endeavours of Muhammad to improve the rights of children and women, as well as of all who were oppressed. The organizers stressed that this specific Qur'anic verse needs to be seen within the context of the time and the specific circumstances of the society in which Muhammad lived. Also the fact that he married Aisyah should not be understood as an example to be imitated. Rather, this should be contextualized and read as an act to protect and save her. As times have changed, they argued, it would be wrong to stick to this practice, rather, his progressive mission of improving the living conditions of the community should be carried on. They

argued fiercely that fixing a minimum age limit for marriage is not against Islamic law, but rather a continuation of the struggle for social justice.

As this is commonly the case when such public conferences are organized, the attending Hizbut Tahrir members were invited to join the discussion. They opposed Indonesian national law, which they believe sanctions those disrespecting national law, such as Syekh Puji. Their understanding of Islamic law should be considered superior to what they called "man-made" law. Their main argument was not that others should imitate Syekh Puji's behaviour, rather, they objected to the implementation of laws they considered out of alignment with Islamic law. One Hizbut Tahrir woman activist in particular argued calmly but vigorously against the implementation of this existing law and started to distribute an article that she had photocopied for the audience in advance. It was written by Ir. Lathifah Musa, a member of the Central Board (DPP) of Muslimah Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (MHTI) (Musa, 2009). Citing the article she circulated, the woman argued that according to Islamic law, a girl is regarded as an adult *(dewasa)* as soon as she gets her first menstruation. Indonesian law should thus define when a girl becomes a woman not by the randomly chosen age of 16, but rather based on biological parameters such as outlined in the Qur'an. The major argument was not that children should be married, but rather that what counts as adult should be redefined. Further, she argued against contextualizing the verses of the Qur'an. What is written in the Qur'an, she argued, should be read as Allah's words that hold eternal value and should not be reinterpreted and adjusted to modernity.

The conference participants objected to her arguments and pointed to the severe consequences it would have for the wellbeing of the Islamic community if children are married who have children themselves before finishing their own education. Some Hizbut Tahrir members, who themselves chose to finish their studies before getting married, supported this argument. Several female student activists also told me in informal conversations that they would want their daughters to finish their studies before getting married. Marrying at a very young age is not what they consider ideal, neither for the girl, nor for the wellbeing of the community. However, they do not see the necessity of protecting children by imposing secular law. The organizers closed the conference by jointly appealing to parents not to marry their young daughters off too early, to the government to

implement the existing law that prohibits child marriage, and to the police and the courts to sanction legal transgressions and to monitor that such cases do not occur. In the end, the Hizbut Tahrir activists failed to impose their views on the organizers, though, I suppose that this was not their hope. Rather, their target seemed to have been to convince at least some members sitting in the audience of the superiority of Islamic law. However, similar discussions about how to read and practically implement Qur'anic verses and the Sunnah of the Prophet are often hotly debated.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the question has been discussed in how far the call for the establishment of the caliphate under the implementation of Islamic law constitutes perceptions of "proper" Islamic conduct and piety. The call not only significantly influences critiques of the state and the larger socio-political context, but it also encourages particular forms of moral development and thus significantly influences everyday conduct. Particularly the topic of sexual morality is central to the everyday life of student activists, and influences not only imaginaries about how to interact with the opposite sex, but also outward appearances and the selection of marriage partners. What could be defined as proper Islamic conduct is an issue of both negotiation and contestation. Competing understandings of Islamic morality at times challenge tolerance between different Islamic groups: foremost in the realm of everyday conduct, perceptions of "proper" Islamic conduct clash. Particularly since the late 1990s, sexuality has become the ground on which debates about Islam and morality take place. The increasing popularity of Islamic popular culture such as books, films, and music that focus on love, romance and marriage – but in a particular Islamic way – need to be seen within this context. An emerging market exists that successfully combines piety and sexuality.

In regard to finding a suitable partner for marriage, Hizbut Tahrir activists promote what they call an "Islamic matching method" named *ta'aruf.* This is a highly pragmatic technique to efficiently finding the optimal partner for life and the establishment of an Islamic family.

In their ideology, the intact holy family is regarded as the cornerstone and impetus behind their ultimate goal. *Ta'aruf* grants both the woman and the man a high level of autonomy in making her or his choice according to different selection criteria and personal preferences. An economic logic of rationality and efficiency is transferred to the sphere of marriage.

In regard to safeguarding sexual morality, the state is ascribed an important role in protecting its citizens by passing laws. Thus, different groups demand the state to protect, and at times, legally enforce their point of view for the sake of protecting all citizens: whereas some demand restrictive regulations regarding sexual education, for example, and the availability of condoms, others pressure the government to halt sexual education and restrict access to means of family planning for non married people. As in other countries, also in Indonesia, individuals seem to regard it as increasingly necessarily to not only invoke religious belief in order to establish, preserve or alter morality and social order, but also call for the regulation of certain behaviours. Economic calculations of efficiency and success constitute their techniques of criticizing the Indonesian government, private entrepreneurs and individuals. In regard to individuals, they appeal to their self-responsibility, self-interest and self-regulation to compensate for the missteps of the state. At stake are different imaginaries of an Islamic modernity, and about what kind of social order should be established.

Chapter VII:

Mediating the Call for the Caliphate

1. *With all our soul, we believe that secular systems, either capitalist democratic, or socialist communist, are sources of people's deprivation and endanger Indonesia's existence and that of other Muslims countries.*
2. *With all our soul, we believe that absolute sovereignty is reserved solely to Allah – the creator of the universe, humanity and life – to determine the future of Indonesia and other Muslim countries.*
3. *With all our soul, we will continue to relentlessly fight for the enactment of the Sharia under the caliphate as the ultimate solution to Indonesia's problems and those of other Muslims societies.*
4. *With all our soul, we declare to all that our struggle is verbal and intellectual, and not violent.*
5. *With all our soul, we declare that our struggle is not a consequence of historical demands, but is instead a consequence of deep faith in Allah.*

(Sequences of the official video of the Indonesian Islamic Student Congress held in Jakarta on 18 October 2009, including the declaration of the Student's Pledge, organized by a front organization of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)[82]

New media technologies are omnipresent in the everyday life of Islamic student activists in Indonesia. They provide unforeseen opportunities to frame and disseminate religious ideas, allowing for creative ways of translating awareness into action. This permits an increasingly broad spectrum of people to engage in shaping normative expressions of Islam by bypassing

[82] This is my own translation. For the Indonesian version and further description of the pledge, see http://dakwahkampus.com/artikel/pemikiran/136.html, (17 February 2012). The video can be downloaded from http://dakwahkampus.com/berita/isu-utama/189.html, or also from the video sharing page Youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o74RYXMpQK4, (17 February 2012).

traditional gatekeepers. As I argue in this chapter, the polarity between deliberative and normative approaches to the impact of media technologies on religious practice needs to be rethought. The public space constituted by media practices of Islamic activistism, of any strand of Islam, cannot be identified as *either* a place for argumentation and discussion *or* indoctrination.

Given that both students and well-educated professionals support Hizbut Tahrir, the use of media is crucial for both internal and external communication. Most extant studies about Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia stress that the organization is adept at using both traditional and new media technology (Fealy, 2007; Muhtadi, 2009; Osman, 2010; Ward, 2009). The organization has long committed to producing a wide array of printed media. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has its own publishing houses, *Pustaka Thariqul Izzah* and *Al-Izzah* Press. In 2006, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia opened HTI Press, which focuses on translating Hizbut Tahrir books into Indonesian (Osman, 2010: 607). Other publishing houses affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia are *Al-Kautsar* Press, *Khilafah* Press, PTI and WADI Press. These houses mainly publish books written by Indonesian Hizbut Tahrir activists, who relate the organization's ideology to contemporary issues.[83] The published books are meant for mass circulation and can be purchased online, or in small, specialized bookstores, often run by Hizbut Tahrir activists. Since 1993, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has also published the weekly bulletin *Al-Islam*, which is freely distributed each week at Friday prayers. *Al-Wai'e*, a monthly journal published since 2000 (Osman, 2010: 607), relates the ideology of the organization to contemporary problems in a more sophisticated manner than this is done in the bulletin *Al-Islam,* which is addressed to a larger public.[84]

Hizbut Tahrir also uses online resources to disseminate its ideas, most prominently through its official website, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id. This site features a wealth of information presented in formats that range from articles on various topics and photos to videos. A

[83] See http://pasarkhilafah.com/ for an extensive overview of currently available books in Indonesia (12 November 2011).

[84] See Schulze (2008) for a content analysis of *Al-Wai'e* regarding Hizbut Tahrir's views on pluralism and democracy. Past editions of *Al-Wai'e* can be accessed on the official website of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id.

professional team produces the majority of the videos. They are responsible for documenting different events such as conferences, workshops and demonstrations (Osman, 2010: 608). Videos of Hizbut Tahrir, more and less professionally produced, can also be accessed on video-sharing websites such as YouTube.[85]

Even though Osman briefly points to the fact that many Hizbut Tahrir members also use informal Internet platforms that are not officially linked to the organization (Osman, 2010: 608), he does not elaborate on how such activities might look or what opportunities and challenges the Internet might provide for students. Similarly, Fealy, Muhtadi, and Ward do not ask how new technologies such as the Internet, and cheap printing technology, not only influence the dissemination of ideas, but also open up new ways for a larger group of young Hizbut Tahrir members to address a wider public. To address this research gap, this chapter examines the web portal *Dakwahkampus.com,* or *DK.com* in short, which is not officially linked to Hizbut Tahrir, but nevertheless mirrors its ideology. Further, the best selling novel *"Ayat Ayat Cinta (Verses of Love)"* (El Shirazy, 2008) is discussed to further reflect on the entanglement between indoctrination and argumentation. In both discussed examples, Islam is reconfigured according to a neoliberal kind of rationality. Values such as self-discipline, academic excellence, efficiency and honesty are reconfigured as core Islamic values that shall lead to success not only in regard to changing society, but also in mastering one's own life.

Charles Hirschkind's (2001, 2006) influential reflections on how popular Islamic media – in his study recorded sermons on cassette – have influenced and shaped the Islamic revival in Egypt, invite me to reflect on how modern media technologies constitute Hizbut Tahrir activists' struggle for the caliphate. I follow his argument that disciplinary and deliberative media effects are inextricably interwoven into the everyday lives of Islamic student activists. Media effects must not be understood in terms of a polarity between what are often assumed to be two contradictory processes: on the one hand is the disciplinary effect of media, in which media become a vehicle for disseminating ideas to a passive citizenry, and

[85] For examples see http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=hizbut+tahrir+indonesia&aq=f, (12 November 2011).

on the other hand is the deliberative character of media, in which media offers a democratic opportunity to foster argumentation and dialogue.

Studies that focus on the deliberative aspect of new media technologies tend to emphasise the possibilities for argument and dialogue. Broader access to information is stressed. This is seen as resulting in a democratization of religious authority. In a nutshell, it is assumed that access to different sources of knowledge would encourage people, and "radicals" in particular to revise their "false assumptions" and question their religious practices. Individuals with "liberal" thoughts often argue that members adhering to movements promoting strict forms of collective discipline - such as members of Hizbut Tahrir - would revise their practices and belief, if they had a better religious education. Prominent scholars emphasizing the deliberative aspect of modern media technology in the Middle East are Eickelman (1992), Eickelman and Anderson (1997), and several contributors to the volume edited by Norton (1995). In regard to the democratization of religious authority and autonomous reasoning they argue that easier access to a broad range of sources representing different strands of Islam would push Muslims to continuously question, and in some cases revise, their belief. In Indonesia, Hosen (2008) illustrates the democratization of religious authority in the process of searching different Islamic websites for personally suitable fatwas, Islamic legal opinions.

Scholars emphasizing the disciplinary functions of religious media, on the other hand, stress the ideological aspect over the dialogic one. In this view, media technologies enable the extension of an authoritative religious discourse. In this case, the public is less a sphere of discussion than it is a site of subjection to authority. This is seen as part of an endeavour aimed at promoting and securing a uniform model of moral behaviour. Examples of studies that mainly put the ideological or disciplinary aspect of modern media technology forward in the context of Islamism are Roy (1996), Sivan (1990), or, in the Indonesian context, Lim (2005) or Bräuchler (2003). In regard to Hizbut Tahrir, Zeno Baran states that *"it [Hizbut Tahrir] indoctrinates individuals with radical ideology*" (Baran, 2005: 68). Ameer Ali, comparing the mobilization strategies of Tabligh Jama'at and Hizut Tahrir also stresses that media technologies will enable the extension of authoritative discourses, and notes that

innocent youth are driven into the hands of *"fundamentalists"* such as Hizbut Tahrir as a result of being indoctrinated through media (Ali, 2006: 61).

Given the social reality of student activists on campuses where different Islamic groups seek to promote their own understandings of Islam, it is indispensable to assume a contested public sphere where activists are not simply *"indoctrinated"* but rather engage in regular discussion with peers. I therefore argue that both disciplinary and deliberative media effects are inextricably interwoven into the everyday lives of Islamic student activists. In the case of the Hizbut Tahrir activists I have worked with, at least, the increasingly easy access to both Islamic and non-Islamic texts of various provenances did not seem to cause a revision of their beliefs. Rather, they actively used media to educate themselves to more effectively link their ideology to what is happening in the world and promote solutions. Further, they benefited from modern media technology, particularly from the Internet, to spread their ideas. They were aware that if they wanted to convince others in the deliberative climate of the Gadjah Mada University, they needed to master the new technologies.

I begin this chapter by introducing the reader to the web portal, *DK.com,* and address different aspects of how the Internet may constitute religious activism. I then discuss an article written by a prominent member of Hizbut Tahrir, and posted on the portal. I also examine the novel *"Verses of Love",* in order to underline my argument that disciplinary and deliberative media effects are entangled. Before concluding, I reflect on how people alter their ways of knowledge dissemination and mobilization strategies when using the Internet. The analysis of *DK.com* is embedded in with insights gained during discussions I had with predominantly women activists about how new media enable their active participation in public discussions, and also on what challenges new media technologies present, particularly social network sites such as Facebook.

The Web Portal *Dakwahkampus.com*

The web portal *Dakwahkampus.com* was founded in 2009 by student activists from different University Dakwah Organizations (LDK) with the aim of coordinating information,

intellectual discussions and movement strategies among the different student *dakwah* activists. In May 2012, the page registered around 1'000 daily visits, at the beginning of July the number had risen to over 2'000 hits daily.[86] *DK.com* defines itself as the online communication organ of the Coordinating Body of University Dakwah Organizations (BKLDK), which was founded in Bogor in 2006 by Hizbut Tahrir activists from different Indonesian Universities.[87] This self-proclaimed coordinating body is only one of many organizations aimed at coordinating the activities of different University Dakwah Organizations. It is not a structurally superior organization that can exercise authority over LDKs. Bigger and better known is the Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations (FSLDK), founded in 1986 in Yogyakarta, which to a large extent reflects the ideology of the *tarbiyah* movement (Sidiq, 2003: 75).[88] Given the important role assigned to University Dakwah Organizations it does not seem surprising that different movements strive to gain control over these organizations.

The portal *DK.com* is mainly designed to address students. In its profile, the narrative of students as agents of change is dominant. It is assumed that they will become future leaders of the country, and of the Muslim community, because, according to the argument, their intellectual capacity is above average. They will thus be in positions of authority in the struggle to encourage fellow students to become "better Muslims". At the same time, it is emphasised that students have a social responsibility to surpass their own knowledge and do *dakwah. Dakwah* is thus framed both as a religious and social responsibility.[89]

DK.com is not explicitly linked to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia; indeed the organization is rarely mentioned on the portal. Rather than addressing Hizbut Tahrir members or even

[86] For the current number of daily, weekly and monthly visits, see http://dakwahkampus.com/, (10 July 2012).

[87] For a detailed profile of the BKLDK (*Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*) see http://dakwahkampus.com/profil/bkldk.html, (10 July 2012).

[88] To my knowledge, no comprehensive study exists that examines the influence of Hizbut Tahrir's ideas within the Friendship Forum of University Dakwah Organizations FSLDK. Yet, as discussed in the second chapter, I assume that Hizbut Tahrir members hold important positions within this organization.

[89] For a detailed profile of DK.com see http://dakwahkampus.com/profil/dakwahkampuscom.html, (10 July 2012).

sympathizers, the authors seek to speak to *dakwah* activists in general. However, the portal's ideological affiliation manifests itself in a variety of ways. In addition to more and less well-known campus activists, many high-ranking Hizbut Tahrir members also contribute articles, even as they do so without exerting authority by mentioning their positions within the organization, as is otherwise typically done in official Hizbut Tahrir media releases. Besides the obvious ideological affiliation, the logo of Hizbut Tahrir[90] is highly visible on numerous photos and on videos that can be downloaded from the portal. Numerous cross references to events promoted on the portal can also be found on the official webpage of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. While the reasons for not explicitly linking the organization to the portal might be many and varied, one significant effect is that it allows the portal to address a broader public of different *dakwah* activists.

On the web portal interested readers can access texts arranged in different rubrics:

i) news: divided in "news of the Islamic world", "prime focus", primarily focusing on national news, and "news from the campus";
ii) consultation: including the categories "question and answer for women students", "consultation concerning *dakwah* activities on the campus" and "*Ustadz* (Islamic teacher) responds";
iii) articles: embracing the categories "student's opinions", "ideology", "women students" and "personality";
iv) organizational profiles: including the one of *DK.com* and the coordinating body BKLDK.

In addition to the text files, videos and photos from different demonstrations and workshops can also be accessed. One of the more frequently opened files on the portal is a technically well-made video of the first Indonesian Islamic Student Congress *(Kongres Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia)*, which was held in Jakarta on October 18, 2009. The congress

[90] The logo of Hizbut Tahrir, the white and black flag *(liwa* and *rayah)* could theoretically also be used by other Islamic groups, as Hizbut Tahrir activists claim that they were used by the Prophet. In Indonesia, these two flags with the inscription, "There is no God except Allah and Muhammad is his messenger," are commonly identified as logo of Hizbut Tahrir, however (see Budiarti, 2009). The flags are also omnipresent on the webpage of Hizbut Tahrir as well as on various publications.

was organized by the BKLDK and promoted on *DK.com*. In the introduction, an anonymous male speaker describes the congress as: *"…a moment in history, that was attended by thousands of students from all Indonesia, the greatest moment in the history of Islamic student movement that unites and creates an intellectual student vision to make Indonesia a better place, a new direction in the student movement, a pledge will be born.*[91]*"*

The whole introduction is accompanied by sound, creating a mood of anticipation. One can then listen to extracts of the speeches delivered by three prominent Hizbut Tahrir members, namely Fahmi Amhar, Dwi Condro Triono and Fahmi Lukman, who seek to raise awareness of the problems Indonesia faces in the areas of natural resource management, economy, and education. They address the more than 5'000 students who convened in the yard outside Senayan Basket Hall, as the police had not allowed students to hold the event inside the hall as was originally planned. The students Felix Siauw, Pariadi Hartono and Adi Wijaya also delivered speeches emphasising that "Islam is the only solution" and motivating the crowd to struggle for the achievement of this ultimate goal through *dakwah*. The enthusiastic audience often chanted "caliphate!" Repeatedly the speakers shouted "*takbir*," and the crowd responded with a chorus of "*Allahu Akbar*" (God is greater), raising their right fists.

The dramaturgical culmination of the video, and the most important part of the congress, was the reading out loud of the Student's Pledge *(Sumpah Mahasiswa),* as outlined in the beginning of this chapter. This pledge mirrors the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir in a nutshell. It can be downloaded in different forms from *Dakwahkampus.com*, in text, photos or audio. At the congress, the national coordinator of the BKLDK, Erwin El-Jundi[92], reads the pledge, stopping every few words to permit the audience to repeat.

In the aftermath of the Jakarta congress, student activists read out the same pledge in different Indonesian cities, organizing similar congresses, workshops or public events.

[91] The video can be downloaded from http://dakwahkampus.com/berita/isu-utama/189.html, (12 October 2011).

[92] Most likely this is not the speaker's given name, but a chosen name. Erwin El-Jundi may be translated as Erwin the Soldier. At times, Hizbut Tahrir members also change their names to "Father of (name of their first born son)"; for example, Dwi Condro Triono is often called Ustadz Abu Haris, thus Father of Haris.

Within ten days in almost thirty Indonesian cities it had triggered similar events where students gathered to read out the same pledge together.[93] The congress continued inspiring events over the next few months; for example, on 24th of April 2010, over 2,000 students gathered at a conference in central Sulawesi to jointly read out the Student's Pledge and commit themselves to the struggle to replace democracy with the caliphate.[94] After the event, photos and reports were uploaded to *DK.com* with the aim of instigating further public action. As *DK.com* is on Facebook, the events were also announced and discussed on this social networking website. Further, a large number of amateur videos of the congress in Jakarta, as well as of the events that took place in other cities were uploaded on YouTube.

On October 28th, a few hundred students read out the Student's Pledge in front of the main entrance of the Gadjah Mada University. Like the activists in Jakarta, they demanded the establishment of the caliphate and the implementation of the Sharia as the ultimate solution to all problems that Indonesia is currently facing. For this goal to change the system – so the crowd screamed - they would struggle peacefully.[95] In Yogyakarta and other cities, this event took place on the 28th of October. As outlined in chapter three, the 28th of October is not a random day in Indonesia, but the Day of the Youth Pledge (*Hari Sumpah Pemuda*), the day when young people pledge themselves to the Indonesian nation, homeland, and language (Foulcher, 2000). Yet, the students' pledge to strive for the establishment of the caliphate is at odds with the official Youth Pledge.

[93] See for example on http://kumpay.dagdigdug.com/sumpah-pemuda-berganti-menjadi-sumpah-mahasiswa/, (8 September 2011), for a detailed list of the involved cities. On the web portal www.dakwahkampus.com an extensive collection of photos of events organized in different cities can be found, as well as a professionally produced video of the first Indonesian Islamic Students' Congress.

[94] For a detailed account of the congress see http://dakwahkampus.com/berita/isu-utama/842-kongres-mahasiswa-islam-sulawesi-tenggara-2000-mahasiswa-lebih-mendukung-syariah-a-khilafah.html, (8 September 2010).

[95] For a detailed description of the event in Yogyakarta see for example http://syabab.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=640:sumpah-pemuda-mahasiswa-muslim-di-berbagai-daerah-serentak-tolak-neoliberalisme-serukan-khilafah&Itemid=198, (8 September 2010).

The Internet with its visual and auditory characteristics allows for the creation of dynamic, multi-sensory virtual environments, permitting users to immerse into another world. Electronically mediated participation has thus facilitated the emergence of new kinds of highly dynamic mobilization structures. As horizontal ties bind participants together, the peer-to-peer communication allows for the creation of schemata to be used in diagnosing problems that resonate with certain target groups.

DK.com is hierarchically structured, with a head of redaction, a head of administration, and staff responsible for handling contributions from local partners. The web portal is thus not an open space where anyone can upload documents, photos or videos. No articles can be found that are out of line with the ideology of the administrators as stated in the pledge. Contributions have to pass through the editorial team before being put online. All authors are asked to provide their full identities, and no opportunities for anonymous "comments" exist. It is, however, possible for anyone to comment on articles on Facebook. Critical comments - for example, those that question whether the caliphate is an ultimate solution - are rare, as people who join this group tend to sympathise with its general ideology.

Entangled Disciplinary and Deliberative Media Effects

By taking one article posted on *DK.com* as an example, I wish to emphasise that the effects of *DK.com* cannot be fully understood in terms of the indoctrination of passive individuals. As different articles on the portal show, the activists face a variety of problems when it comes to convincing fellow students to change their attitudes and beliefs. By examining an article posted on *DK.com* in March 2010 by Zamroni Ahmad, a member of the Central Executive Board of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia *(Dewan Pimpinan Pusat),* I show how the public arena is used as a deliberative space for argumentation among different individuals and, *at the same time,* as a normative space for the promotion of individuals' own visions of Islamic virtue.

Zamroni Ahmad's article titled *"Attitudes towards Differences and Frictions between Student Dakwah Movements"*[96] is a response to a question a student activist asked him in the consolation rubric. This student was talking about her difficulties in struggling for the caliphate, due to the fact that various Islamic activists promote different understandings of Islam, and of what it means to live a pious life. Zamroni Ahmad focuses thus on how to handle differences among various Islamic student movements on campus and then discusses strategies to convince other activists that they are interpreting the Qur'an and the Hadith in an "incorrect" way.

He does not explicitly address Hizbut Tahrir activists in his article, but rather talks about "ideological activists" *(aktivis ideologis)* and *"dakwah* activists"*.* This allows him to address a potentially larger group than Hizbut Tahrir activists and sympathisers. He defines "ideological activists" in a narrow way as those activists who present clear-cut solutions to problems facing the Islamic community and who are systematic in their line of argumentation. Hizbut Tahrir activists often praise themselves as being most logical and stringent in their way of argumentation and most coherent in the ultimate solution they propose – the re-establishment of the caliphate. An-Nabhani himself also framed Hizbut Tahrir as the most rational, comprehensive movement (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 45-7).

Ahmad starts his article by cautioning "*dakwah* activists" against assuming that the process of convincing others will be smooth and problem-free. The text is then divided into two parts, in which Ahmad first discusses "internal", and then "external", factors that may cause friction among different Islamic activists. In the first part of the article, he addresses the mentality that a "*dakwah* activist" needs to have as a precondition to convincing others. She or he must be sure that the others must be "brought back to the straight path" and that they are objects of *dakwah (obyek dakwah)* rather than equal competitors. The types of outreach other Islamic groups are doing, he states, does not need to be seen as "real" *dakwah,* as these students are exploited by political parties who send out their socialist and liberal henchmen in Islamic dress at election time. He is not specific about which Islamic organizations he considers to be doing "fake" *dakwah.* With his statement about students

[96] See http://dakwahkampus.com/konsultasi/konsultasi-dakwah-kampus/743-menyikapi-perbedaan-dan-pergesekan-antar-gerakan-dakwah-kampus.html/, (8 March 2010).

exploited by political parties, he seems however to be implicitly referring to the adherents of the *tarbiyah* movement, which supports the Prosperous Justice Party PKS and draws its ideological inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood[97]. Thus, in his opinion, it is not tolerable to adopt a pluralistic view and let others practice Islam in the ways they think are correct. *Dakwah* activists, he claims, must fully understand that only they have truly understood the message of Allah.

In the second part of the article, Ahmad discusses "external" factors that might lead to friction among different Islamic activists, and make convincing others of what he sees as the "truth", difficult. He focuses in particular on the resistance of other Islamic activists to embracing the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir. To mitigate this friction and convince others, the "ideological activists" should follow a certain path: after they are certain that they are the authentic activists, they should visit the other active Islamic groups on campus one by one to explain their existence and mission clearly and understandably. All organizations should be invited to join the organized events. The "ideological activists" should furthermore try to work together with the different organizations whenever possible, but make sure that they are the leaders and main actors. They should always remind others that global capitalism is the common enemy and avoid making it seem as if they were the common enemy of other Islamic groups.

In addition to actively diagnosing problems and providing Islamic solutions, "ideological activists" should also always remember to behave in a morally Islamic manner and follow the ethical model of the Prophet. Ahmed suggests, for example, treating intellectuals of other Islamic movements with respect, taking care not to insult or humiliate them. He further suggests that "ideological activists" make the first steps in approaching other activists to congratulate them on major Islamic holy days, such as *Idul Fitri* (marking the end of Ramadan)*, Idul Adaha* (feast of sacrifice) and the Islamic New Year. Furthermore, if "ideological activists" hear others complain about their behaviour, they should visit them and try to solve the problem through dialogue. Those who issue complaints should be

[97] See Taji-Farouki for a detailed account of the ideological differences between Hizbut Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the most significant differences is Hizbut Tahrir's rejection of gradualism as a way to reach the ultimate goal of establishing the caliphate (1996: 111-112).

reminded that the enemies of Islam hope for internal quarrels among Islamic groups, as this will weaken the *ummat,* the worldwide Islamic community. In addition to these rationally based arguments[98], Ahmad also stresses the need to be emotionally sensitive. For example, he states that it is important to bring gifts, as Islam sees this as a favourable behaviour. "Ideological activists" should behave more maturely and not respond harshly or impolitely. They have to stay calm and maintain equanimity, behaving like a big sister or brother should behave towards his or her young sibling.

Ahmad's article ascribes a salient role to debate and argumentation in the everyday activities of *dakwah* activists. Because *dakwah* is undertaken in public places with the aim of enforcing public virtue, some *dakwah* activities might be seen as an unwarranted intrusion into the personal privacy of those Muslims who tend to see virtue as a matter of private choice. Moral issues in particular, such as the modesty of one's dress, proximity of unrelated men and women, and consumption patterns, often become sites of confrontation and pose challenges to maintaining tolerance between different groups. Whereas Hizbut Tahrir activists perceive these issues as crucial to establishing the caliphate and therefore not as matters of individual choice, others argue that they are secondary to "making Islam become a blessing to all" *(rahmatan lil alamin)*. At stake in these debates are different imaginations of personal and collective freedom. Hizbut Tahrir activists thus constantly traverse the distinction between public and private. At least in some respect, their behaviour may be seen as deviant from secular-liberal expectations of critical reasoning. The distinction between private and public is not fixed, but an issue of constant negotiation.

Engagement in Web Communities versus Formal Membership

Birgit Meyer (2009) in the introduction to her edited volume *"Aesthetic Formations"* develops the approach that media technologies need to be regarded as intrinsic to religion. She argues against a binary opposition between religion, on one hand, and technology on the other, but instead argues that mediation has always been a part of religion. The primary

[98] For a detailed account of the rationality of the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir, see (Taji-Farouki, 1996: 45-7).

question that interests her is how religion is articulated in newly accessible technologies and how these articulations inform everyday religious practices. In this way, media technologies are not a substitute for religion, but rather transform it. Meyer argues that due to the fact that religion is constantly and creatively articulated in public space, the boundaries between religion and entertainment, between religious and secular, as well as between religion and politics is increasingly fuzzy. In my analysis, I underline her argument that it is difficult to draw the line between religions claims, political agendas and entertainment, as also discussed in the previous chapter within the context of popular Islamic literature. Up und downloading photos and self-made video clips of rallies to call for the caliphate bears elements of worship, political demands, and also entertainment.

Before Meyer, Hent de Vries (2001) argued in his introductory chapter to the edited volume *"Religion and Media"* (De Vries & Weber, 2001) that media are not exterior to religion. He warns that reflections on religion and faith should not be made in opposition to technology; rather, one should focus on the manifold processes of mediation. Without mediation and mediatisation, no religion would have been able to reveal itself in the first place. Hirschkind and Larkin (2008b) argue, inspired by the argument of De Vries, that the focus of scholarly attention should be on examining, and seeking to understand how processes of mediation take place. The authors were invited to contribute to this special issue on media, politics and religious practice to explore the constitutive role played by media technologies in shaping religious practices. They argue that the question of how new media technologies shape religious belief has received little attention.

Altough *DK.com* is the formal communication organ of the Coordinating Body BKLDK; it also has several characteristics of a distinct independent community. When, for example, events are organized, the logo of the *DK.com* community appears alongside the logo of the BKLDK. *DK.com*'s Facebook profile has almost 16'000 users who have claimed that they "like" the page. In addition to individuals, organizations and communities have also declared that they "like" *DK.com*, among them different local branches of the Muhammadiyah Student Organization IMM*,* and local branches of the Prosperous Justice Party*.* The BKLDK, on the

other hand, has a Facebook community only about a tenth of the size of *DK.com's*.[99] The strategic choice to appear as a relatively detached community has the advantage of potentially reaching all campus *dakwah* activists, rather than only the members of particular University Dakwah Organizations. *DK.com* is thus more inclusive in character than the BKLDK.

In his study of Hizbut Tahrir's discourses on pluralism and democracy in Indonesia, Schulze shows that the organization's ideology seems to find acceptance and even support among *mainstream* Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah (2008: 40). He also notes that the relations between the Prosperous Justice Party PKS and Hizbut Tahrir are cordial (ibid: 39). He bases his study, however, on the words and actions of high-ranking members, such as Din Syamsuddin, who has been chairman of Muhammadiyah since 2005. From conducting interviews with different student activists of the Gadjah Mada University, I have observed that also on the grassroots level, the ideology of Hizbut Tahrir finds much broader support among a range of different student organizations, including HMI MPO, IMM as well as KAMMI. Whereas in HMI MPO some activists are official Hizbut Tahrir members, KAMMI, which is part of the *tarbiyah* movement, draws its ideological inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood, which partially opposes Hizbut Tahrir's ideology. It is nevertheless interesting to note that both organizations "like" *DK.com,* and attend at least some discussions and promoted activities. On *DK.com*, a variety of topics are discussed that are also on the agendas of other organizations.

Due to the anonymity an individual enjoys while surfing the web portal, becoming familiar with the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir does not demand personal commitment; at this casual stage, it is not yet necessary to change one's behaviour. Expressing support for *DK.com*, for example by "liking" it on Facebook, technically only demands clicking a single button, whereas becoming a member of Hizbut Tahrir is a long process that demands intensive learning and behavioural change. The fluid and dynamic network of followers that emerges supersedes the moral and geographical boundaries of the Indonesian state and is thus more open and inclusive than the organization whose ideology it reflects. A contributor or active

[99] See http://www.facebook.com/felix.siauw#!/pages/Dakwah-kampus/209564192379 and http://id-id.facebook.com/group.php?gid=176100947877, (17 August 2010).

participant need not have a vertical affiliation to any organization as long as one's contributions conforms to the group's ideology. Electronically mediated participation may thus be seen to be facilitating the emergence of new mobilization structures.

Since 2000, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia has been organizing different public events, ranging from large-scale events such as the 2007 International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta, to much smaller-scale events held on different campuses. Usually, journalists and television reporters are invited to document and comment on these events and hereby helping the organization to publicity. Also, activists themselves eagerly document these events in various forms, ranging from writing articles, blog entries, to uploading photos and videos to the Internet. Because of this broad range, interested people have the chance to "experience" Hizbut Tahrir events, whether they are obviously declared to be Hizbut Tahrir events or not. Elucidated in personal discussions with activists from other groups, they often admired Hizbut Tahrir's strong public presence and elaborated external communication and thought about imitating it, at least in part. Yet, one frequently heard justification for why their own organization was less publically active, which was that the aim was not to reach masses, but to hold small, high-quality discussions.

I argue that the Internet, for example in the form of *DK.com*, has not only allowed sympathisers and other interested people to familiarise themselves with the organization's ideas, it has further allowed novices and low-ranking members to actively participate in the broader application of the Hizbut Tahrir ideology, and address a larger audience. Innovative applications of the ideology via the Internet target the needs of at least some fellow students by using an appealing and understandable language and making the ideology attractive to young Indonesian Muslims. On the other hand, it also makes it easier for non-sympathisers to critically respond to the various writings of Hizbut Tahrir members in everyday discussions held on campus, as well as in public seminars organized by different Islamic organizations. These processes seem to have the effect of fostering public debate on a number of campuses, and often lead to ongoing discussions of what it means to "be a good Muslim".

The Internet is just one among other media that popularizes various strands of Islam. Foremost in recent years, the market for Islamic books, films and music that conveys a

specific understanding of how a "good Muslim" should live has proliferated. In many books and films a specific understanding of Islamic orthodoxy and *"apt performance"* (Asad, 1986) are propagated, often in subtle ways as to address a broad readership. In the best selling novel, *"Verses of Love"* (El Shirazy, 2008) for example, a particular understanding of "proper" Islamic conduct is promoted in a way that appeals to many Hizbut Tahrir activists, and also to *tarbiyah* activists, and Indonesian Muslims in general, young and old, men and women. The aim of many of these media releases is to combine entertainment and Islamic knowledge. Often, these products are framed as alternative to "western" popular culture, "contaminated" with secular or even pornographic ideology.

Offering Alternatives: Islamic Popular Culture

The number of media releases that try to merge Islam and modern youth is increasing rapidly in Indonesia and beyond. Yet, the endeavour to spread Islamic teachings in a popular way and language is not new. In the 1970s, not only Islamic student organizations called for a return to the Qur'an, but the first Indonesian music superstar, Rhoma Irama, also emerged. He emphasized the validity of Muslim values in everyday life through his music and his films, and was able to reach a very broad audience. His films were seen by as many as fifteen million Indonesians in the years 1978-9 alone (Frederick 1982: 123).

Since the late 1970s, the size and economic importance of this market segment has increased. Arguably, a quantum leap within the field of what might be called Islamic popular culture has happened with the publication of Habiburrahman El Shirazy's best selling novel *"Ayat Ayat Cinta (Verses of Love)"* that was first published in 2004. Four years later, over 400'000 legitimate copies were sold (Widodo, 2008). Islamic popular culture is vast, and as opinions about what is regarded as "Islamic" vary, so too does what is regarded as Islamic "popular culture". In the following, I refer to an attempt within Islamic popular culture that seeks to apply a specific understanding of Islam to the lives of young educated people, as exemplified in the novel *"Verses of Love"*. The main message of this book is how to live a pious life, and how to master the challenges of modernity in an "Islamic way". Topics that

seem to preoccupy many young Muslims are addressed, such as: how to find a suitable marriage partner? How to be a good son or daughter and meet the manifold demands of parents? How to be a good friend and handle peer group conflicts or tensions? Also often discussed is the topic of doing *dakwah*, and how to teach others to become "good Muslims".

Novels of this genre are full of practical examples of how to behave in various situations, and convey a specific understanding of piety, and of what is to be considered proper Islamic behavior. Habiburrahman El Shirazy is one particularly successful author, but he is by far not the only representative of this genre. He is one of the most prominent members of a group of authors called Pen Circle Forum *(Forum Lingkar Pena),* which was founded by a group of writers in February 1997 (Arnez, 2009: 48). The Indonesian scholar Najib Kailani discusses at length the activities of the grassroots activists of the Pen Circle Forum. His thesis sheds valuable insights into how young people try to relate their understanding of piety to everyday topics (Kailani, 2009). In 2012, the Pen Circle Forum counted about five thousand members, most of them women, and had so far published more than two hundred books. Its most successful novel is still *"Verses of Love"*.[100] In the following I will discuss what kind of morality, particularly sexual morality, Habiburrahman considers "proper Islamic conduct.

Fahri, the main male character of the book, is a young unmarried Indonesian who lives in Cairo to pursue his master's studies at Al-Azhar University, and deepen his knowledge of Islam. He is a *hafiz,* someone who memorizes the Qur'an. Fahri is very committed to the four male friends he lives with, but also to his family back home in Indonesia. He is highly ambitious and constantly struggling to let Islam guide his life. Despite the fact that four young women fall in love with him, he strictly avoids being alone in a room with a woman, and all bodily contact with women. Although he interacts in various ways with these women, he dates none of them. With his neighbour, Maria, he communicates regularly in the form of short messages. On more than one occasion, he makes small shopping

[100] For a detailed profile of the Pen Circle Forum see its webpage http://forumlingkarpena.net/profil/ (21 March 2012).

excursions for her, or helps her with homework. He views chastity, but also punctuality, politeness, hard work and discipline as core Islamic values.

He often justifies his behaviour by referring to and citing verses of the Qur'an, invokes Hadith and explains these sources of Islamic jurisprudence in everyday language, relating them to concrete examples. For example, he explains to Alicia, the American reporter, (as well as to the reader), why he did not shake her hand so that she would not misinterpret this gesture as expression of disrespect or impoliteness. Habiburrahman, through his main character, stresses the necessity of respect and humanity throughout the novel. For example, in a key scene in the book which takes place in the metro, Fahri teaches fellow Muslims the necessity of respecting and loving everyone, even Americans whose government is deemed responsible for causing pain to Muslims - in particular those in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. Citing Qur'anic verses he outlines that it is only up to Allah to judge the deeds of others and that Allah teaches Muslims love and respect towards all humans, as He created them all (El Shirazy, 2008: 40).

However, he sharply criticizes the American tourists' outfit. In particular he criticizes the dress of the American reporter, Alicia. Fahri compares her tight and transparent style of dress to the dress of the Muslim woman standing next to her in the metro. This woman is called Aisha and will towards the end of the book become Fahri's wife. She wears a white *cadar* that conceals her face, except the eyes, and all of her body in a proper and polite way. Whereas Alicia is said to look cheap, almost naked, Aishia's style is described as polite and appropriate (ibid.: 44). Aisha's kindness for relinquishing her seat so that an elderly American woman could sit down is also praised. Fahri also admires her fluency in English and German. Throughout the book, Aisha is held as the template of a pious, but cosmopolitan modern woman.

Aisha is not only pious and self-confident, but also very rich, enjoying a luxurious and extravagant lifestyle. In the novel, earning money is framed as a core Islamic virtue, and an outward sign of hard work and success. Yet, the question is raised as to how to spend money in an Islamic way. In Fahri's opinion, one may be rich and display wealth, but only to a certain extent. One should never forget the poor and be generous towards them. Caring

for the poor, helping them and being kind to those who have less is considered an important aspect of piety.

In the book, the topic of prejudice towards Muslims by westerners is addressed. For example, the American woman, Alicia, who turns out to be a reporter, asks Fahri about how Islam treats women, about how Muslims should treat non-Muslims, and why in Islam polygamy is allowed. Again, Fahri invokes the Qur'an and Sunnah to draw a friendly and peaceful picture of Islam. He tries to think of examples from ancient Greece *(zaman Yunani kuno)* to post-modernity *(zaman postmo)* (ibid.: 152). Not once in the book does he justify violence towards minorities or people who think differently;, rather, he constantly emphasizes the humanistic values of Islam *(nilai humanism Islam).*

Although the book makes no explicit political demands, the message that an Islamic state under Islamic law should be established is omnipresent. Emphasizing the universal values of justice, altruism, safety and peace, the claim is that everyone - including non-Muslims - would benefit form this mode of governance. Islam is described as providing solutions to all problems the world is facing. It is framed as a rational and just religion, compatible with modernity. Although the fact that towards the end of the book Alicia converts to Islam and starts veiling may seem excessive, it is within the logic of the book. In the film directed by Hanung Bramantyo in 2008, Alicia does not convert to Islam. The fact that Alicia is not seen to convert to Islam in the film did not trigger a debate in Indonesia. Yet, eagerly discussed was the conversion of the Coptic woman, Maria, to Islam. Non-Muslim groups in particular found this part of the story problematic because it seems to imply that Islam is the only "true" religion and that Maria finally came to realize this.[101]

The film - titled after the book - became a box office hit and within weeks after its release reached an audience of over four million. However, its director was criticized by Islamic activists as well as by the book's author, Habiburrahman, for not having cast real-life pious Muslims in the roles. The chosen actors did not embody Islamic values in their real lives. As a consequence of this critique, the next of Habiburrahman's works to be turned into a film,

[101] For one example of a comment on the debate about conversion *(pindah agama)* see for example http://www.mail-archive.com/gorontalomaju2020@yahoogroups.com/msg05174.html (11 May 2012).

"Ketika Cinta Bertasbih (When Love is blessed by God)", was to be cast in an *"American Idol"* style format. Aside from having acting skills, a major selection criterion was their Islamic morality *(akhlak),* and their faith *(akidah)*, which was tested with questions from the selection committee. Besides proving their knowledge in Islamic jurisprudence, history and ability to recite the Qur'an, they had to have moral "integrity" as manifested in their dress, and also in their attitude towards the opposite sex. The selected actors were believed to be able to serve as good examples to other young Indonesians. This talent scouting show became a huge TV success itself, as did the film released in two sequels.

Many students liked *"Verses of Love"* that caused – as Widodo writes – a "fever" in Indonesia (Widodo, 2008: 1). Various Hizbut Tahrir women activists told me that this book was one of their favourites and that more books such as this one should be published. They argued that expressions of popular culture, novels, films, and also music are highly effective in showing young people that there are Islamic alternatives to western forms of dating, having friends (even with the opposite sex), and finding suitable marriage partners. As the previously cited Hizbut Tahrir activist Ummi put it: *"If one manages to pack Islamic teaching in a good story, this is so effective, probably more effective than anything else, this really touches the heart of people and makes them want to act in a similar way. We should try to spread our message in such a gentle (halus) way. Make the people miss the caliphate. I have tried to write short stories, but they are not good yet, I have to keep trying."*

"Verse of Love" was critically acclaimed from Muslims representing different strands of Islam, and was reported to have moved thousands to tears. Even Indonesia's President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, watched the movie and praised it as one of the best demonstrations of Islam's positive values, in a popular way. He is also said to have shed tears (van Heeren, 2008: 20). However, different Islamic student activists enrolled at Gadjah Mada University also criticized the film because of what they saw as a narrow-minded understanding of what it means to live as a pious Muslim. Nisa was particularly annoyed by the way the women were dressed, and in how they behaved towards men: *"I think this film is highly problematic in some aspects, foremost the way women and also men are shown as perfect Muslims. Just look at how they are dressed! Aisha is wearing a cadar. Although also in the book the cadar is described as not compulsory to wear, it becomes very clear*

throughout the book that donning a long veil and hiding the shape of the body is regarded as the proper way of dressing for Muslim women." Her criticism is not only in regard to how the main characters are dressed, but she and her friends also criticized the way men and women in the film interacted. More generally they objected to the particular sexual morality that is transmitted on almost every page of the book.

The strong truth claims the book makes about what proper conduct for unmarried students should be, and authorizing these claims by invoking the Qur'an and Sunnah, were criticized by Tina, a woman activist of PMII: *"I'm definitely not calling young people to engage in premarital sex. But I think that movies like "Verses of Love" spread distorted forms of morality. Look at the typical Javanese dress the kebaya and compare it to the way Aisha dresses. They talk about western imperialism. Well this is also a form of foreign imperialism, Arabian imperialism - not only the dressing style, but also this extreme gender segregation. I just think that it is too much. In Java, we also know traditional types of gender segregation, but this is different. It's too much (berlebihan)."*

Chances and Challenges of New Media Technologies for Women Activists

New media technologies have opened up new opportunities for student activists to spread their thoughts and opinions about worldly matters to others. Yet, new media, particularly social networking sites, and cheap telecommunication, also pose new challenges and raise questions about "proper" Muslim behaviour. Women activists in particular, who believe that they are not allowed to speak to a male public, see a large potential for doing *dakwah,* when using new technologies "correctly".

Despite the fact that women activists are overrepresented in most of the student organizations I worked with, also in Hizbut Tahrir, the women's voices are generally underrepresented in research conducted thus far, and also in public discussions. In the case of Hizbut Tahrir, women members are not allowed to represent and speak in the name of the organization in front of a male or mixed public. When the public discussion of the book *"Dynamics of Islamic Student Movements"* (Nef, 2009b) in May 2009 came up, where the

authors of the different chapters could present their organization and discuss their contribution, Riskah who had written about Hizbut Tahrir, approached me to inform me that she was not allowed to participate in this discussion. For her, this was not discriminatory, but rather a logical consequence of her understanding of Islamic orthodoxy, of how Islam should be lived and practiced in public. When I asked her what she suggested, she said that there were different solutions: the first and easiest one would be to replace her with a man activist and let him discuss her contribution. Another option would be that someone could read a statement that she would write in advance, where she could address specific questions; and interestingly, a third option would be to film her statement and play that short film, given that Hizbut Tahrir women are allowed to speak on television.

Because the publisher and I hoped for an interactive discussion, we opted to invite a man member of Hizbut Tahrir – this was also Riskha's favoured option. She was in the audience. Notably, there exists no restriction for Hizbut Tahrir women activists to ask questions. The reason why she should not represent Hizbut Tahrir on stage was thus not because her voice is considered *aurat,* that cannot be heard by men. Rather, she argued that it was *"just better (lebih baik)*" and *"safer (lebih aman)"* when a man talked. I told her that for me it was not fully comprehensible why someone could talk on television and radio, but not live. She told me that she understood my confusion, but that it is just not the same. She could not explain to me the difference, but stated that she fully respected the organization's directive and that she had other possibilities to do *dakwah*.[102]

This example lead me to argue that new media technologies provide new possibilities, especially to women to address a large public and strive to shape the public face of Islam. The case of Riskha, who was not allowed to speak in front of the male public, is an unusual example. Women activists in the eight other organizations on campus would have been allowed to talk to a mixed public; regardless, no other women, besides me, were present on stage. A senior man colleague also represented the other woman activist who had written a chapter. She just did not feel comfortable and felt that her male friend would do a better

[102] She told me that she was not referring to a written document, but rather to an internal decision. I never encountered a written statement that advises women not to speak in front of a male audience. The young man that replaced Riskah seemed well prepared to speak in a forum where different opinions coexisted.

job. Having carefully chosen my place between the moderator and an activist, who I believed would not feel uncomfortable sitting beside a women, I could understand her choice.

When Riskah approached me to tell me that she would not be able to present her contribution, she also presented the idea that we could organize a separate, smaller discussion exclusively for women students. She emphasised that in Hizbut Tahrir, as well as in the other organizations, women were important and that their participation in *dakwah* was highly encouraged. She regretted that despite the fact that many doors are open to women to pursue *dakwah*, and the fact that in many organizations women outnumber the men activists, their voices are publically underrepresented. Her idea was therefore to organize a discussion of the book, combined with a discussion on how to increase the influence and presence of women's voices in public.

The discussion took place in the Rumah Muslim on the 4th of June 2009. It was entitled *"The Role of Muslim Women Activists in Influencing the Intellectual Climate on the Campus"*. Invitations were distributed to different women Muslim activists. The core questions to be discussed as outlined in the invitation letter written by Riskha were how the potential of women student activists could be increased. She outlined that in public, the role of women activists was hardly acknowledged and was often reduced to topics such as child education and marriage. She emphasised that the intellectual capacity of women is equivalent to that of men. According to her then, it is a waste of resources when the talent and skills of women activists are not optimised and turned to the task of investigating social problems and finding solutions. Already in the invitation, she pointed to some of the reasons why women's voices are less heard in public: for example that women students are not as eager as men to speak up in public, that they are sometimes less mobile and restricted in staying out late, or that they sometimes lack the self confidence to publically defend their opinion.

Approximately thirty women belonging to various Islamic groups attended. One activist was wearing a black chador showing only her eyes, while others were unveiled, wearing jeans and T-shirts. All of these women agreed that they had the same intellectual capacity as men, but that their voices were underrepresented. A number of issues they faced were identified, such as the lack of self-esteem, the lack of physical mobility and restrictions on staying out

until late. Some activists pointed out that new media technologies, such as cheaper book and magazine production, as well as online media, blogs and Facebook, were opening up new possibilities for participation that should be increasingly used. Training in writing skills was thus deemed particularly important.

The core advantage of Internet mediated technology, the women agreed, was that it was fast, quick and safe for women. One KAMMI activist raised the concern that one could become too isolated, and thus stressed the need of personal interaction. She also warned against flirting via Facebook and SMS. She went on to say that the rules must be respected: *"If you chat until late at night with a man, this is against Islam. You have to stay aware of the dirty fantasies (pikiran kotor) of others. So there are problems with Facebook, this already starts with the profile picture; one has to select it carefully. I just think one has to be careful, but if one has Islamic morality (beraklak Islam), it can indeed be a very good way to communicate with friends, but also to address many people."*

Towards the end of the discussion, the idea to write a book containing the chapter contributions of different women activists came up. Yet the project never came to fruition as divergent views as to how to go about changing society caused a breakdown in cooperation, and a refusal to collaborate with women holding opposing views. Organizing the event, however, provided Rishka and others with an opportunity to promote some of their ideas, thus to do *dakwah.*

Conclusion: New Ways for Honing Islamic Virtues

In this chapter, I argued that new media technologies, such as the web portal *DK.com*, have facilitated the emergence of new and dynamic structures of mobilization, which are less hierarchic in nature. The fluid networks that emerge are more open and inclusive than the organizations whose ideology they reflect. Joining a virtual community demands a minimum level of initial commitment, and everyday activities may not be permeated by the ideological aims of the organization at this early stage of involvement. As the web portal *DK.com* was designed mostly by students for students, it is tailored to their needs. It offers

schemata that address problems Indonesia is thought to be facing, and responds to their concerns and frustrations. The advantage of having a wide range of authors address a broad readership is the vast array of topics they discuss ranging from everyday questions about motivation, to much broader questions about the reorganization of resource distribution, education or healthcare.

To analyse phenomena such as the web portal *DK.com*, the mobilization processes of organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir need to be imagined more dynamically. In particular, the group of people sympathising with at least some of the organization's ideas, the sympathisers, deserves closer attention. The image of a set of concentric circles that grow in circumference as the level of involvement decreases might help to imagine this group in a more dynamic way than simply speaking of sympathisers and non-sympathisers as done in previous studies conducted on the organization. Although "liking" *DK.com* on Facebook is not the same as actively participating in study circles, any group that encompasses both weak and strong sympathisers is not only important for Hizbut Tahrir as a target group, but is also deserving of scholarly attention so as to understand trends in contemporary Islam. A more dynamic approach in regard to mobilization strategies and media usage could help us grasp the group's influence beyond the limits of its official organizational membership. It could also help account for phenomena such as electronically mediated forms of participation, which have gained considerable support among mainstream organizations.

In the case of *DK.com,* as in the novel, *"Verses of Love"* indoctrination and argumentation are entangled, and economic rationality and Islam are paired in a complex way. In El Shirazy's bestselling books, the protagonists are often depicted as devout Muslims, in contrast to "westerners". Islam is deemed to constitute a whole way of life. Values such as hard work, efficiency, deliberation and argumentation are defined as core Islamic values. Islam is depicted as a highly rational religion, and in many instances as superior to western secularism, which is thought to lack morality. Sexual morality and a strong work ethic are depicted as cornerstones for success in private life, but also as elements that would stabilize society and ultimately lead to economic prosperity. A specific understanding of Islamic morality *(aklahk)* is thus reconfigured as a technique necessary to organize human conduct. Ultimately, Islam is deemed the solution to all problems. This narrative is also strongly

promoted by Hizbut Tahrir activists, and it allows them to formulate their own political demands.

In their everyday reality as "*dakwah* activists", Hizbut Tahrir students often face severe opposition to their ideology, and must engage in critical discussions. The public sphere is as much a space for the normative education of others that "*dakwah* activists" pursue, as it is place for public deliberation and argumentation. As I have shown, *dakwah* is performed precisely where differences emerge about what it means to be "a good Muslim", and when these discrepancies make debate necessary. The type of public sphere I have been discussing cuts across the distinction between public and private, as well as between state and society. Deliberative and disciplinary moments are inextricably interwoven and interdependent within this space. It thus becomes necessary to analyse disciplinary and deliberative media effects as inextricably interwoven into the everyday religious practice of Islamic student activists.

Epilogue

In this study, I analyzed the dynamic interplay of the Islamic revival, globalization and decreasing faith in state-led development in Indonesia. Focusing on Hizbut Tahrir activists studying at one of the country's top universities, the renowned Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, this research sought to shed light on an international Islamic movement that succeeds in attracting well-educated people by pairing capitalist values with a rigid textual interpretation of Islam. Although this organization discursively frames Islam as an alternative to neoliberalism and capitalism, its young Muslim members conceptualize religion along economic lines insofar as Islamic values are mobilized for the attainment of financial success, academic excellence and efficiency in popularizing its visions for a better world.

In postcolonial Indonesia, it was the liberalization of the economy under the influence of global capitalism that inspired organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir to reach out to and mobilize an increasing number of the country's well-educated men and women. Thus, in this study, religion is not analysed as a way of resistance to global economic developments or a means of escape into an ascetic or mystical world. Rather, going beyond causality in order to analyze processes of social change, religion is conceptualized as an integral part of neoliberalism, inspired by its rationality and way of organizing human conduct. Influenced by Foucault's (2008: 131) understanding of neoliberalism, the term has been used in this study as an analytical category to make reference to a technique of introducing a certain economic rationality of productivity, efficiency, and self-discipline into spheres that were previously organized according to different logics. The theme of this study is thus opposed to Max Weber's (1934) main thesis in his seminal work *"The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism".* Whereas Weber was mainly interested in how religion influenced the development of capitalism, the focus of this study has been to examine how everyday religious practices are modelled on the principles of market logic.

Not analysing religion and globalization as separate analytical domains, as suggested by scholars such as Csordas (2009) or Rudnyckyj (2010), has allowed me to focus on the

interplay of Islam and economic globalization. Whereas extant studies with this focus mainly address the question of how particular religious messages travel across geographic spaces, this study discussed a dimension of globalization that has so far received little attention: the emphasis of placing responsibility for economic development in the hands of individuals rather than hoping for the state to bring about change. In this study, I have focused on how Hizbut Tahrir activists stress the duty of each Muslim to shape the own future, as well as the future of the larger Muslim community. Responsibility and accountability for bringing about change are located at the level of the individual. Having lost faith in the nation state's development projects, the duty of striving for economic improvement is placed on the *ummat.* Hizbut Tahrir activists thus seek to instil the ethical maxim that *dakwah* is piety. Thus, they not only urge others to "greater" piety, but also to join what they frame as the struggle for a better world. Mobilizing others and popularizing their vision of Islam is thus framed as an integral part of worship.

In today's world, a rapid proliferation of various forms of religiosity is observable, ranging from evangelical and charismatic forms of Christianity, to Indian and Chinese forms of spirituality such as Yoga or Qigong, to various expressions of Islam. Most of these forms of spirituality do not entail a withdrawal from social and political life, although some movements derive at least part of their authority precisely from this withdrawal. The piety they promote, however, has political implications. The ideology of Hizbut Tahrir, however transcendental and transnational it claims to be, is firmly embedded within Indonesia's particular political and economic history. Although Hizbut Tahrir's political impact does not lie in its participation in the democratic system, which its activists consider to be opposed to Islamic law, the organization has been successful in influencing the social and moral landscape of Indonesian society. Embodying the ideas of Hizbut Tahrir, and living for the caliphate, is embedded in global discourses on health and good, dignified living, as well as on modern management practices meant to optimize performance and efficiency in a world dominated by capitalist values. In this study, the everyday practices of Hizbut Tahrir activists have thus been analyzed as a historical and political phenomenon that is intimately linked to the construction of modernity.

As with any religious movement, Hizbut Tahrir deals with spiritual matters. Spirituality is attained through intense learning and working on the body. Hizbut Tahrir activists dedicate a lot of their time to studying the ideology of the organization by attending weekly-held study circles, attending mosque lessons, public discussions on religious topics, and importantly, by honing their skills in their respective academic disciplines, acquiring organizational and rhetorical skills and following day to day events in various media. Yet, skilfully arguing for the establishment and formalization of the caliphate is not deemed enough: members must also correctly embody the organization's values. They need to tame their sexual desires, scrutinize their consumption patterns and consciously use new media technologies. The overarching theme of the activists – to live Islam in its totality *(Islam kaffah)* – should thus inspire all their practices.

In contrast to existing studies that mainly focus on interviews conducted with high-ranking male members of the organization, this dissertation has sought to break new ground by focusing on the agency of women and men student activists. The organization's normative doctrine and the members' everyday practices are thus not placed on different analytical levels. Rather, the articulation of Hizbut Tahrir's ideology has been considered an everyday practice that has sought to be understood as such. A main focus of this research has thus been to grasp the relationship between normative doctrines and specific every day struggles the activists face. Samuli Schielke and Liza Debevec argued in the introduction to their edited volume entitled *"Ordinary lives and Grand Schemes"* (2012) that understanding the ambiguous relationship between doctrines and ordinary lives remains one of the key problems in the anthropological study of religion. Speaking to this problem, this study thus particularly addresses the question of how believers navigate through and make sense of the world in which they live. As outlined in the different chapters, the everyday practices of Hizbut Tahrir activists are often marked by ambivalence. Particularly in public speeches and interviews, the students were eager to promote a coherent and comprehensive picture of their organization, and of Islam as capable of providing answers to all of life's questions. However, this image of coherence and consistency became shaky when I questioned the student members about their personal concerns and struggles. The question of how to "properly" enact the normative doctrine of the movement often triggered discussion. The

major challenge was thus how to navigate a way of becoming a "good Muslim". This endeavour is reflected in the chosen title for this dissertation *"Living for the Caliphate".*

In this study, I have avoided analyzing the everyday practices of Hizbut Tahrir activists as an expression of indoctrination or false consciousness. The methodological approach I chose for examining the entanglement between religious practice and economic globalization precluded this explanation. Not only would such an approach have failed to understand such a complex phenomenon as the emergence of Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia, but would have implied that I had gained greater insight than the students with whom I worked for almost two years.

In this study, I did not explicitly address the topic of whether Hizbut Tahrir is dangerous, or may become dangerous in the future. In this concluding chapter, I wish to briefly address the question that my research often elicits from both academic and non-academic audiences. Yet, I will not provide an ultimate answer. Rather, my aim is to reflect on some of the assumptions that animate questions focusing on security issues when it comes to analyzing movements that challenge secular-liberal thoughts on freedom and tolerance. Organizations that promote - as Hizbut Tahrir does - the view that the Sharia is a fixed set of prescriptions that should be legally enforced by an authoritarian ruler often triggers scepticism and resistance from both Muslims and non-Muslims around the world. Statements as expressed by the Hizbut Tahrir activist cited in the introduction of this study - to destroy secularism, pluralism and liberalism - evoke strong reactions and often suspicion. Particularly since September 11, 2001, such statements are often associated with terrorism.

In the extant literature on Hizbut Tahrir, security issues are centrally discussed. In this regard it is revealing that arguably the most comprehensive study published on Hizbut Tahrir so far - conducted by Osman (2010) - was printed in a journal entitled *"Terrorism and Political Violence".* Although the author provides rich data on the movement and stresses the organization's official rejection of violence, placing the article in such a frame seems to suggest that a link exists between Hizbut Tahrir, violence and terrorism. As discussed in this study, other authors, who have conducted more or less intensive research on the movement, have chosen a security lens with which to examine the movement. In the vast majority of these studies, Hizbut Tahrir's rejection of the use of violence in order to reach its

goal is emphasized. In none of the studies, were Hizbut Tahrir members accused of engaging in physical violence. With my empirical data, I cannot exclude the possibility that either individual members of the organization might turn to violence in defence of their beliefs, or that that the organization will, in the near or distant future, adopt a violent strategy. Yet, based on my research, this strong focus on security issues seems disproportional. Rather than assuming prematurely that interreligious disaccord and security threats were the likely outcomes of Hizbut Tahrir's way of mobilizing a religio-political rhetoric, I was interested in their logic of arguing, and how their vision for a better society constitutes their subjectivities, and thus everyday conduct.

On the campus of the Gajdah Mada University, Hizbut Tahrir was not though about from a security perspective. Although its members' opinions and practices were often severely criticized, the question of whether or not they were dangerous was not discussed. Rather, they were given other labels ranging from "indoctrinated", "blinded", "uneducated", "stupid" to "unrealistic" or "romantic". I never encountered a student or professor who stated in our discussions that she or he was physically afraid of Hizbut Tahrir activists. When adopting a micro perspective, the focus on security seems unjustified.

Let me stress that that I am not arguing that Hizbut Tahrir presents no threat to religious harmony in the country, or that their demands have no impact. Their position, for example, that homosexuality is an evil that destroys society and their call for the severe punishment of gays and lesbians is just one among many examples of how Hizbut Tahrir activists provoke strong reactions from different groups; last, but not least, from other Islamic groups. An example of how Hizbut Tahrir did not foster harmonious religious cohabitation was its massive rallies to demand the Indonesian government to ban Ahmadiyyah.[103] Yet,

[103] In Indonesia, in April 2008, a governmental panel recommended that the Ahmadiyyah group be banned. This was shortly after the Indonesian Ulema Council MUI had issued a fatwa with the demand to ban this group. The members of Ahmadiyyah believe that Muhammad was not the last prophet, but rather, they believe that their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who founded the group in 1889, was the last prophet. Hizbut Tahrir as well as different other Muslim organizations thus consider the Ahmadiyyah as a deviant sect. The government banned the group from spreading its message, yet it did not actively disband the group, as demanded among others by Hizbut Tahrir.

opposed to other Islamic organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front *(FPI Front Pembela Islam)*[104], Hizbut Tahrir's activists did not engage in physical violence against Ahmadis. Nevertheless, Hizbut Tahrir's numerous press releases not only influence government decisions, but also trigger harsh criticism from different groups active in Indonesia; again, also from religious groups.

Many Indonesians and foreign analysts observe with suspicion the fact that Hizbut Tahrir activists have made different minority groups the target of verbal attacks. Yet, linking such attitudes of intolerance to terrorism seems to prohibit a careful examination of their logic of reasoning. It seems to disable our ability to understand the different patterns of arguing and linking the activists' criticism to the larger socio-political context. Interesting questions to examine would include: What different forms of religious and secular argumentation can provide the basis for dealing with individuals from different groups in everyday interaction? How do the activists uphold the values of respect, friendliness and being helpful to others when interacting with people they deem as opposed to Islam? Hizbut Tahrir activists challenge accustomed ways of thinking. Yet, rather than dismissing their visions to change the world as false consciousness, or as a threat, it seems worthwhile to take their concerns seriously – in the least in order to rethink our own norms and assumptions.

In this dissertation, many themes have been left out and many questions remain open. One topic that remains poorly understood in extant research about Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, including in this study, is its historical development in the country, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s. Understanding both the women and men's way of framing the movement's core ideas during the Asian financial crisis, which hit Indonesia in 1997, would shed light on whether the activists' logic of popularizing an-Nabhani's ideas has changed. As I have outlined, secular arguments against capitalism and democracy dominated the students' lines of argument. Although both "ideologies" *(ideologi)*, as the activists often called them, were, according to them, opposed to Islam, they mainly argue along economic lines and

[104] For a detailed study on the claims and often violent methods of this movement see the study of Jajang Jahroni (2008).

stress that both "systems" *(sistem kapitalis* and *sistem demokrasi)* have failed to bring prosperity *(kesejahteraan)* to the country.

Examining what occurred during the 1990s might also contribute to a better understanding of the history of the discourse on reforming sexual morality. This discourse has been largely neglected in regard to understanding Hizbut Tahrir activists' strategy of popularizing the organization's ideas, and it remains unclear when the call for the caliphate became entangled with debates about sexual ethics. As it has been argued in this study, Hizbut Tahrir activists' conviction that Islam should be lived in an all-encompassing way significantly constitutes their perceptions of "proper" sexual morality. Their agenda to "improve" the sexual morality of particularly fellow students enables Hizbut Tahrir activists to collaborate with organizations that do not promote the establishment of the caliphate. Yet, in the case of Hizbut Tahrir, this strong focus on self-discipline and "restoring" public morality is not an end in itself, but rather a way to energize debates and mobilize masses to reach their ultimate of goal. Researching questions such as when and how sexual ethics became a core topic in the argument for the establishment of the caliphate would contribute to a better understanding and historical contextualization of the movement. Further, focusing on the entanglement between politics and sexual morality seems crucial to better understand the revival of religious movements beyond Indonesia.

Linked to this question of sexual morality is the gender theme, which has not been systematically addressed in this or previous research conducted on Hizbut Tahrir. Whereas this study mainly focuses on how women student activists reconfigure the organization's core ideas to call for the caliphate, the question of how men student activists frame the call for the caliphate remains under researched. Although previously conducted studies focused almost exclusively on male members of the organization, the strategies of student activists in popularizing an-Nabhani's vision for a better society have been largely neglected. The main focus the studies conducted thus far has been less on examining everyday practices, and more on the organization's normative doctrine as promoted by male authorities. Systematically outlining gender differences in doing *dakwah* among well-educated grassroots activists remains beyond the scoop of this study. Yet, based on my observations, gender differences do exist. In particular, the topic of "restoring" sexual morality seems to

be a more pressing matter to women activists, and more useful in mobilizing other women for the organization's cause. Generally, women student activists seem to collaborate more often with other organizations, and engage frequently in cordial friendships with activists from other organizations. Yet, the question of whether differences between women and men activists in reconfiguring Islam using an economic rationality would need further research.

This study has focused on youth activists of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, and mostly on young women who had joined the organization only a few years or even a few months prior. The large majority of these activists were not yet married, and many lived away from their families for the first time. For a future study, focusing on married young professional members of the organization would be revealing in addressing the question of how the movement's ideology is reconfigured and made compatible with life situations such as parenting, being a "good" husband or wife, and succeeding in one's career. Such a study could help us better understand the relationship between religious doctrine and everyday practices of piety. Further, it could make a valuable contribution to the extant anthropological literature that analyses religion and economic globalization within the same analytical framework.

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12/2011 – 11/2012	Förderung durch den Forschungskredit der Universität Zürich für Nachwuchswissenschaftler Stufe Candoc.
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08/2008 – 07/2009	Mobilitätsstipendium für angehende Forschende des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds zwecks Studium und Forschung in Indonesien.
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Schwimmen (10 Jahre im Schwimmclub Wittenbach SG), wandern, lesen, kochen.